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INTRODUCTION 
 
What’s the Story? Interrogating the Constitutional and Legislative 
Position on Same-Sex Marriage in Ireland 
 
Let me be clear about one thing. There is nothing visionary in the 
[civil partnership] legislation, nor is there anything revolutionary 
about it. … This [Irish] legislation does not grant equality; it 
merely improves the second-class status of gay people in some 
practical ways. … Opponents of social advance have never 
allowed logic or reason to cloud the clarity of their prejudice. 
These are the very same groups which but a few decades ago 
accused the gay community of being incapable of sustaining 
relationships and addicted to compulsive promiscuity instead. 
Now it appears that the plain desire of many within the gay 
community to settle down and make a commitment in a 
relationship disturbs them just as much as did their former 
grievance. … Gay people cannot marry, … I, a Member of this 
House in good standing, have no such right. I find myself in the 
position that is complained of universally within the gay 
community of being deprived of full equality. … There is a 
nasty, mean-spirited separation between gay people and the rest 
of the population which militates against their full equality … 
Under this law that the Minister thinks generous, we are not to 
have legal rights to children, even our own children, we are not 
even to have marriage, and we are not even to have a family 
home. Everything is to be … partial and second rate.  
 
                 Senator Norris, Seanad Éireann, 2010a, paras. 151-153 
 
 11 
Once people engaging in homosexual activity are no longer seen 
as criminals, but instead as citizens, they can hardly be denied 
their civil rights, including their right not to be treated differently 
because of their (criminally irrelevant) sexual orientation. In this 
way the step of anti-discrimination not only follows, but builds 
on the step of decriminalisation. Similarly, the very idea of non-
discrimination with regard to sexual orientation, simply demands 
that no one shall be disadvantaged by law because of the gender 
of the person he or she happens to love. In this way the links 
between the steps of decriminalisation, anti-discrimination, and 
partnership legislation are not only sequential (in the European 
countries that have gone that far), but also morally and politically 
compelling.  
 
                                                                       Waaldijk, 2000, p.86 
 
Both of these quotations capture the issues that are at the heart of this 
thesis, specifically, the principle of equality and its precise meaning, and 
the Irish State’s response to this imperative in the context of same-sex 
marriage. My thesis centres on one aspect to lesbian and gay inequality in 
Ireland, i.e. the State’s denial of marriage rights to this minority cohort of 
the population. In that regard, I provide a critical discourse analysis of the 
2006 Irish High Court ruling in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan v. 
Revenue Commissioners and Attorney General (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513).
1
 
 
In this introduction, I pose my research questions. I put forward my 
rationale for conducting this research. I also highlight the circumstances 
that gave rise to the taking of a High Court action against the Irish State by 
two women who sought to have their Canadian marriage recognised in this 
jurisdiction. The Zappone and Gilligan case largely centred on different 
understandings of Articles 40 and 41 of the Irish Constitution (1937), 
which pertain to the principle of equality, and the institutions of marriage 
                                           
1
 Hereafter, I refer to this case as Zappone and Gilligan. 
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and family respectively.
2
 So as to contextualise the 2006 High Court ruling, 
I provide the reader with some sense of the ways in which gay and lesbian 
activists and advocacy organisations in Ireland, over a period of four 
decades, conceived of the principle of equality in the context of the wider 
premise of adult relationship and family recognition. In this regard, I also 
refer to initiatives that were proposed by committees, conventions or 
review groups that were established by the State. With regard to lesbianism 
and homosexuality, this Irish trajectory demonstrates how the imperative of 
‘doing’ equality, which is underpinned by Article 40, is so difficult against 
the backdrop of the dominant understanding of Article 41. I contextualise 
this Irish trajectory by alluding to some of the ways in which other 
jurisdictions either moved towards an anti-discrimination and rights-based 
equality agenda, in the context of adult relationship recognition, or simply 
reinforced heterosexist norms. In this introduction, I also provide a sense of 
the structure of this thesis by outlining the subject matter of each of its six 
chapters and conclusion. 
 
Background to the High Court Ruling 
 
The plaintiffs in this case are Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan, 
who have lived as a couple in Ireland since 1983. Together since 1981, they 
married each other in British Columbia, Canada, in September 2003. This 
was possible for two reasons: this Canadian province did not require 
citizenship or residency as preconditions for issuing a marriage license; 
marriages between persons of the same sex have been legal there since the 
ruling in Barbeau v. British Columbia (Attorney General), which the Court 
of Appeal handed down in May 2003 (see [2003] BCCA 251). In April 
2004, the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan sought confirmation from the 
                                           
2
 See Appendix I for details of the articles in the Irish Constitution (1937) that I rely upon throughout this 
thesis. 
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Irish Registrar General that their marriage was legally binding in Ireland. In 
May 2004, that office stated that it was not within its remit to make a 
declaration on the validity of a marriage that occurred outside this 
jurisdiction.
3
 Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan also contacted 
the Revenue Commissioners in Ireland in April 2004 because they wished 
to be treated as a married couple for taxation purposes. This was refused in 
July 2004. The plaintiffs then sought leave to apply for a judicial review in 
respect of that decision. The High Court granted this in November 2004. 
Their case subsequently came before that court in October 2006. In their 
pleadings, Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan asserted that the 
refusal to treat them as a married couple breached their constitutional rights 
under Articles 40 and 41 of the Irish Constitution (1937), and Articles 8, 12 
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
4
 Justice 
Dunne gave her ruling in December 2006.
5
 The plaintiffs lost their High 
Court action (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 257). They 
subsequently appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. In 2011, they 
tried to incorporate additional evidence into their appeal. Specifically, they 
sought to test the constitutionality of the Civil Registration Act, 2004, 
which bars same-sex couples from marrying in Ireland. However, this was 
ultimately denied. They subsequently withdrew their Supreme Court 
appeal. Katherine Zappone and Ann Louise Gilligan have now initiated a 
new High Court action in which they will challenge the constitutionality of 
this 2004 legislation.
6
 
                                           
3
 The General Register Office has no function in terms of advising on, or in the registration of, marriages 
that take place outside the jurisdiction. There is no facility for registering such marriages in Ireland. The 
civil marriage certificate is normally accepted as legal proof of a marriage. In cases where a serious doubt 
exists as to whether the marriage is recognised in Irish law, legal advice can be sought, and an application 
can be made to the Circuit Family Court for a ruling under Section 29 of the Family Law Act, 1995 as to 
whether the marriage is recognised under Irish law. I garnered this information from the following link: 
http://www.groireland.ie/getting_married.htm#section3 
4
 See Appendix IX for relevant details of the ECHR. 
5
 I garnered all of this information from the reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at paras. 1-6). 
6
 I garnered information regarding the background to the new High Court challenge through personal 
communication with the following: the organisation that is known as Marriage Equality, which 
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Research Questions and Rationale 
 
Given that the principle of equality has both a constitutional and legislative 
underpinning in Ireland,
7
 how can the intransigence of inequality vis-à-vis 
gender and sexual orientation be explained? Specifically, what accounts for 
the persistence of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland with regard to the 
social institution of marriage, which also has a constitutional and legislative 
underpinning in this jurisdiction?
8
 My thesis attempts to answer these 
questions. 
 
I argue that the recognition, protection and vindication of constitutional 
rights is a fundamental precept, not least because their denial diminishes us 
all as a society. Personal rights, such as the right to marry, are provided for 
in the equality provisions of Article 40 of our Constitution, which the 
majority of the voting electorate ratified in 1937.
9
 Societies, including 
Ireland, tend to be organised according to social norms that are grounded in 
assumptions surrounding criteria, such as gender and sexual orientation. 
Therefore, the imperative to vindicate personal rights in a democracy is 
particularly acute in the context of minority cohorts of our population, 
including lesbians and gay men. My belief is that the right to marry denotes 
                                                                                                                           
campaigns for the introduction of same-sex marriage in Ireland; Dr. O’Mahony from the Faculty of Law 
in University College Cork; Dr. Zappone. See also Anon. (2011). 
7
 Article 40 of our Constitution pertains to the principle of equality. Moreover, a substantial body of anti-
discrimination and equality legislation has been enacted in this jurisdiction. These include the following: 
the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989; the Employment Equality Act, 1998; and the Equal 
Status Act, 2000. 
8
 Article 41 of our Constitution pertains to marriage and family. See Appendix VI for examples of 
legislation on marriage that either took effect in Ireland because of our relationship with England over the 
centuries, or was enacted by legislators in Ireland post Independence in the early 20
th
 century. Some 
legislation that was enacted in the 19
th
 century in England still prevails in this jurisdiction. Section 57 of 
the Offences against the Person Act, 1861, which makes bigamy a criminal offence in Ireland, is one such 
example. See Appendix II for details in this regard. See also Barrington (2009, p.57). Another important 
point here is that 19
th
 century legislation on marriage would have formed part of the official 
understanding of marriage as a legal institution in Ireland, prior to both achieving Independence and 
ratifying our Constitution in the early 20
th
 century. I have not made a determination on whether or not the 
socio-cultural meaning of marriage in Ireland in the 19
th
 century differed from that which obtained in 
England. 
9
 The right to marry is not expressly provided for in the text of Article 40. Rather, it has been enunciated 
through case law in our constitutional courts. I will revisit this issue in Chapter Four. 
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one such right. Therefore, I am opposed to the Irish State’s position in the 
matter of Zappone and Gilligan. To some extent, the State’s position 
hinged on a thesis that is implicitly grounded in the concept of difference, 
which, I argue, is at the core of the routine reproduction of gay and lesbian 
inequality in Ireland.
10
 Firstly, the State implicitly invoked difference in an 
attempt to posit the notion that the plaintiffs in this 2006 constitutional case 
relied upon a right to same-sex marriage, rather than a right to marry per 
se. The former was then deemed to be non-existent.
11
 Secondly, because 
marriage and family remain inextricably linked in Ireland, difference was 
implicitly invoked so as to normalise the heterosexist assumption that the 
issue of child welfare necessarily warranted consideration vis-à-vis the 
introduction of same-sex marriage in Ireland.
12
 This ‘logic’13 in its entirety 
was also predicated on the dominant understanding of Article 41 of our 
Constitution, which takes as given a seemingly self-evident rationale for 
privileging the traditional family in Ireland. My rationale for embarking on 
this research centres on the unacceptability of these diktats.
14
 It is guided 
by the necessity to unpack these seemingly commonsensical ‘truths’, so 
that the denial of the right of lesbians and gay men to marry will no longer 
be acceptable in Ireland. 
 
                                           
10
 I theorise the concept of difference in Chapter Two. 
11
 These dynamics to the Irish State’s position will become apparent as my analysis evolves in Section 
One of Chapter Five. 
12
 This dynamic will become apparent as my analysis evolves in Section Two of Chapter Five. 
13
 I use ‘scare quotes’ throughout my research to denote a contentious representation of such terms as 
‘logic’ and ‘commonsensical’ (see Fairclough, 2000a, p.173). 
14
 I discuss my politics as part of my methodological orientation in Chapter One. 
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Relationship and Family Recognition: Irish and International 
Developments 
 
Introduction to Trajectory 
 
The Irish trajectory helps to explain how the imperatives of relationship 
and family recognition, in the context of lesbianism and homosexuality, 
entered public discourse, to the extent that same-sex marriage became an 
issue for a constitutional court in Ireland in 2006. In this regard, the Irish 
trajectory denotes an important aspect to what is referred to as a ‘discourse-
historical approach’ (DHA), which requires the integration of the historical 
dimension to the issue that is under investigation, into the analysis of 
discourse (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011).
15
 In this jurisdiction, the 
premise of relationship recognition refers to the underpinning of 
cohabitation, marriage and partnership regimes through constitutional and / 
or legislative provisions.
16
 These regimes presuppose a level of engagement 
with the State, in terms of both the rights and responsibilities that they 
trigger. However, the dominance of the nuclear family paradigm in Ireland, 
which is informed by the dominant understanding of Article 41 of our 
Constitution, is such that it officially precludes space for other 
manifestations of family in this jurisdiction. Therefore, references to the 
Irish trajectory also incorporate the imperative of family recognition. 
Referring to activism, advocacy and government initiative, I elaborate on 
developments that took place in Ireland from the 1980s to the present. This 
timeline is important in terms of gauging the pace of incremental change in 
Ireland, both in terms of understandings of lesbian and gay equality in the 
                                           
15
 I elaborate on this dynamic in Chapter One. 
16
 In Ireland, marriage is the only regime that is afforded constitutional recognition and protection under 
Article 41. Moreover, it is only open to opposite-sex couples. See Appendix VI for examples of 
legislation vis-à-vis marriage that has been enacted in this jurisdiction. Civil partnership, which was 
legislated for in 2010, is only open to same-sex couples. A presumptive scheme vis-à-vis cohabitation, 
which applies to opposite-sex and same-sex couples under certain conditions, was also legislated for in 
2010. See Appendix VII for relevant details of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act, 2010. 
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context of relationship and family recognition, and when such 
conceptualisations entered public discourse. In this regard, the Irish 
trajectory denotes an aspect to the ‘what, when, where, who, why, how, to 
whom, and with what effect’ questions (see Wodak, 1997b) that can inform 
critical discourse analysis.
17
 Important themes that emerge from this 
elaboration include the following: the centrality of parity and equal status, 
which are rooted in the principle of equality;
18
 the need to challenge 
heteronormativity, as evidenced by the demand to repeal the 2004 
legislative ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland, for example;
19
 and the 
degree to which Article 41 of our Constitution has been deliberated upon in 
terms of the debate surrounding relationship and family recognition in 
Ireland. This latter dynamic denotes a crucial dimension to this trajectory. 
The dominant understanding of Article 41 conceives of marriage and 
family as one social institution with a constitutional and legislative 
underpinning. This informed both the outcome of the 2006 High Court case 
that is at the centre of my critical discourse analysis, and many of the 
specificities to the civil partnership and cohabitation legislation that was 
enacted in Ireland in 2010.
20
 
 
I situate the Irish trajectory within the wider international demand for 
relationship recognition in the context of lesbianism and homosexuality. I 
highlight ways in which some European countries, including Belgium and 
Denmark, embraced this premise through legislative change. I also make 
reference to the manner in which case law precluded the introduction of 
same-sex marriage in Britain. The earliest impetus for change that I am 
aware of in relation to articulating the right of lesbians and gay men to 
                                           
17
 I discuss this dynamic in the context of my methodological considerations in Chapter One. 
18
 I theorise this fundamental principle in Chapter Two. 
19
 I discuss aspects to the enactment of this legislation in Chapter Six. 
20
 In Chapter Six, I refer to the 2010 enactment of civil partnership legislation in Ireland, with a view to 
fostering a greater understanding of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, particularly in terms 
of the dominant conceptualisation of Article 41. 
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marry harks back to 1971 in the United States. This grounds my rationale 
for discussing aspects to the American pathway vis-à-vis relationship 
recognition. Similar to the wider European trajectory, it is informed by both 
case law and legislation. 
 
Here, I wish to make the point that this discussion does not denote an 
exhaustive listing of all aspects to the Irish, wider European, and American 
trajectories. Rather, the overriding rationale here is to provide some level of 
detail that situates the relatively recent framing of marriage rights in Ireland 
in the language of lesbian and gay equality. Another important aspect to the 
Irish trajectory is that it provides some sense of the ‘kicking and 
screaming’ that was required over a number of decades so as to further the 
wider project of relationship and family recognition in Ireland. Part of that 
complexity is attributable to the dominant understanding of Article 41, and 
its attendant impact on the ‘doing’ of equality, which is underpinned by 
Article 40.
21
 
 
Aspects to the American Trajectory 
 
The earliest impetus for change in relation to same-sex marriage that I 
unearthed in the literature harks back to 1971 in the United States, where 
two gay men petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court to recognise their 
right to marry (see Anon., 1973, p.573; Eskridge, 1999, pp.134-135; 
Rivera, 1979, pp.874-876). The following denotes an excerpt from Justice 
Peterson’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson: “The institution of marriage as a 
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing 
                                           
21
 The imperative to balance the principles that are underpinned by Articles 40 and 41 was a dynamic that 
arose over the course of parliamentary debates surrounding the instituting of the legislative regime of civil 
partnership in Ireland in 2010. This will become apparent as my analysis evolves in Chapter Six. Here, I 
reiterate that the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan relied upon Articles 40 and 41 of the Irish 
Constitution (1937) in furtherance of their right to have their Canadian marriage recognised in this 
jurisdiction. 
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of children within a family, is as old as the [B]ook of Genesis.” (see [1971] 
191 N.W. 2d., pp.185-187, at p.186) In terms of heterosexist opposition to 
same-sex marriage today, this conceptualisation is important. It suggests 
that marriage and family have been conceived of as one social institution 
from the beginning of time. Moreover, it seamlessly intertwines 
procreation, which relies on biological complementarity, with the social 
construct of gender, and the seemingly self-evident imperative of gender 
complementarity with regard to the rearing of children. The plaintiffs in 
Baker v. Nelson lost their case because the relevant legislation regarding 
marriage was not found to offend the U.S. Constitution (see [1971] 191 
N.W. 2d., pp.185-187, at p.187). They appealed this decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which also dismissed their case (Anon., 1973, p.573). 
Given that what was known as the ‘crime against nature’ was still on 
Minnesota’s Statute Books at the time that these plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit (see Eskridge, 1999, p.332), their courage is quite profound. Of 
additional interest here is that counsel for the Irish State in Zappone and 
Gilligan alluded to Baker v. Nelson with a view to furthering the claim that 
other jurisdictions have long rejected same-sex marriage (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at para. 186). 
 
In the early to mid 1970s in the United States, both a lesbian and a gay 
couple initiated unsuccessful constitutional challenges in Kentucky and 
Washington respectively (see Eskridge, 1999, p.135; Lambda Law Students 
Association, 2011; Stoddard, 1997, p.755). Stoddard (1997, p.755) states 
that each of the courts justified limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
by drawing upon both its historical definition and the imperative of 
procreation. Here, it is important to make the point that this gendered 
construction of marriage, which is consistent with Justice Peterson’s ruling 
in Baker v. Nelson (see [1971] 191 N.W. 2d., pp.185-187), denotes a core 
aspect to contemporary heterosexist opposition to same-sex marriage, not 
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just in the United States (see Gallagher, 2004), but also in Ireland (see 
O’Brien, 2006).22 In particular, I draw attention to the manner in which the 
imperative of procreation, which requires biological complementarity, 
seamlessly morphs into the imperative of gender complementarity, in the 
context of marriage and family in Ireland (see O’Brien, 2008a,b,c). All of 
these issues help to underscore the rootedness of the nuclear family 
paradigm across time and place. The above attempts in the United States to 
drive constitutional change with regard to lesbian and gay rights is 
consistent with Eskridge’s (1993, p.1423) thesis that the demand for legal 
recognition of intimate adult relationships began in the early 1970s. 
However, Stoddard (1997, p.755) asserts that it was not until the late 1980s 
that the issue began to emerge as a topic for discussion amongst gay rights 
organisations in the United States. 
 
Aspects to the Wider European Trajectory 
 
In the 1980s, Europe had a ‘first’ in terms of relationship recognition for 
gay men and lesbians when Denmark became the first country to introduce 
a legislative regime for registered same-sex partnerships in 1989 (see 
Equality Authority, 2002, p.22). The Netherlands subsequently instituted a 
partnership regime for same-sex couples in 1998, followed by France in 
1999, with both regimes underpinned by legislation (see Equality 
Authority, 2002, p.21). In terms of the European trajectory, it is worth 
noting that the Danish initiative occurred at a time when homosexuality 
was criminalised in Ireland.
23
 Moreover, nine years passed before another 
European country instituted a legislative regime for same-sex couples. 
                                           
22
 These dynamics to heterosexist opposition to same-sex marriage in Ireland will become apparent as my 
analysis evolves, particularly in Chapter Six. 
23
 See Appendix II for details of Sections 61 and 62 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 and 
Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, which criminalised homosexuality in Ireland. This 
19
th
 century legislation was repealed in 1993. In this latter regard, see Section 2 of the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences) Act, 1993. Please note that lesbianism was never criminalised in Ireland. 
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Nonetheless, once the Dutch took up the mantle, the pace of incremental 
change in Europe accelerated, with France following one year later, while 
registered partnerships for same-sex couples became legal in Germany in 
2001 (see Equality Authority, 2002, p.22). 
 
Aspects to the Irish Trajectory 
 
The earliest reference that I unearthed in relation to Ireland pertains to a 
forum that the Council for the Status of Women organised in 1980 (see 
Smyth, 1983, p.13). A workshop on Lesbian Feminism formulated 
demands that were considered necessary to counter the legal difficulties 
that lesbians faced at that time (Smyth, 1983, p.151). Attendees asserted 
that legislation should assure lesbian parents of their custody rights, and 
that eligibility for adoption should include lesbians (Smyth, 1983, p.151). 
While not couched in the language of family recognition, such demands are 
consistent with the imperatives of recognition and protection, and the 
State’s role in that regard. There is an added significance here in terms of 
the equality theory that underpins my research. Smyth (1983, pp.11-13) 
acknowledged the incremental change that had taken place in Ireland vis-à-
vis legal rights in the context of gender. “We have gained a degree of legal 
equality, but socially, economically and politically, Irish women are not 
equal with men.” (Smyth, 1983, p.12) This is an important point in terms of 
understandings of the principle of equality. It implicitly concedes the 
complexity of equality, which, I argue derives from its co-existence with 
inequality. It also underscores the premise that there are different 
dimensions to equality, which is central to the thesis that Baker et al (2004) 
put forward.
24
 
                                           
24
 Smyth’s (1983) thesis also evokes that sense of the denial of ‘full’ equality, which Senator Norris 
alluded to in the context of articulating his perspective on proposals vis-à-vis civil partnership legislation 
in Ireland (see Seanad Éireann, 2010a, paras. 151-153). I elaborate on all of these dynamics in my 
theorisation of the principle of equality in Chapter Two. Please note that the terms ‘Seanad Éireann’ or 
‘Seanad’ refer to the upper house of our national parliament in Dublin, members of which are senators. 
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The principle of equality was deployed in the Irish Council’s for Civil 
Liberties (ICCL, 1990, p.26) call for a common age of consent for 
heterosexuals and homosexuals. This can be conceived of as politicising 
the continued criminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland at the time.
25
 
Against the backdrop of the above initiative in Denmark in 1989,
26
 ICCL 
(1990, p.33) called for the enactment of legislation that would recognise the 
right of lesbians and gay men to form domestic partnerships. The council 
indicated that this partnership regime could provide for a civil status that 
would be equivalent to that attaching to married spouses, and that it could 
give same-sex partners equal access to the various benefits that are 
conferred on married heterosexuals (ICCL, 1990, pp.32-33). In relation to 
family, ICCL (1990, p.27) was quick to put paid to the idea that lesbians or 
gay men are necessarily unfit to parent. The council highlighted age-old 
misconceptions that such parents can be faced with in terms of their 
children’s gender identity, and also their psychological, sexual and social 
development (see ICCL, 1990, p.27).
27
 At that time, the criminalisation of 
homosexuality in Ireland would have denoted a significant barrier in terms 
of the access, adoption, custody, fostering, and guardianship of children 
(see ICCL, 1990, pp.33-34). Therefore, the courage and vision that was 
                                           
25
 ICCL (1990, p.26) alluded to the common age of consent that prevailed at the time in a number of 
European countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands and France. Earlier, I highlighted legislative 
initiatives that these countries instituted in the context of relationship recognition. 
26
 ICCL (1990, p.33) asserted that the Danish legislation of 1989 enabled lesbian and gay couples to get 
married [my italics], although the council then discussed aspects to that legislation in terms of 
partnership. Writing in the Sunday Tribune, Burke, J. (2006) consistently relied on the term ‘married’ 
[my italics] in his article on the performing of civil partnership ceremonies in the British embassy in 
Dublin (prior to the enactment of civil partnership legislation in Ireland). I argue that this general use of 
language is problematic because it engenders utter confusion amongst some members of the public who 
are positively disposed to the introduction of same-sex marriage in Ireland. While protesting against the 
2004 ban on same-sex marriage outside parliament buildings in Dublin in 2012 and 2013, I met people 
who genuinely believed that the issue of marriage rights for lesbians and gay men had been settled in 
Ireland. This derives from the incorrect use of the terms ‘marriage’ and ‘married’ in the context of civil 
partnership, which was legislated for in 2010. This use of language engenders confusion about the 2004 
legislative ban because it makes no sense to those who believe that same-sex marriage is now legal in 
Ireland. This is problematic because it obscures not just the ban, but also the 2006 High Court ruling in 
Zappone and Gilligan, and, indeed, the plaintiffs’ new High Court action. I argue that this inhibits public 
discourse that is so vital in terms of challenging the State’s denial of marriage rights to lesbians and gay 
men in Ireland. 
27
 Their embeddedness is such that these issues arose over the course of proceedings and deliberations in 
Zappone and Gilligan. I will revisit this issue of child development in the context of the parenting that is 
done by lesbians and gay men in Section Two of Chapter Five. 
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required to situate the principle of equality firmly within the realm of 
relationship and family recognition in Ireland should not be 
underestimated.  
 
After the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland in 1993, Rose 
(1994, p.61) identified the recognition of lesbian and gay domestic 
partnerships, and matters relating to the parenting of children, as areas that 
could feature in the pursuit of gay and lesbian equality. While he believed 
that discrimination vis-à-vis such issues as taxation, for example, was 
rooted in the absence of legal recognition for intimate adult relationships, 
he acknowledged that much debate took place within the gay and lesbian 
community in Ireland as to whether or not the pursuit of formal partnership 
recognition denoted an important goal for activists (Rose, 1994, pp.61-62). 
 
International Perspectives on Relationship Recognition 
 
This is an important point that is also applicable to the international debate 
surrounding relationship recognition, such as that obtaining in the United 
States and Britain, for example. For activists and theorists, such as 
Bevacqua (2004), Stoddard (1997), Sullivan (1996), and Vaid (1995), all of 
whom write with regard to the United States, access to civil marriage is 
conceived of as being central to the realisation of equality for lesbians and 
gay men. Furthermore, Vaid (1995, p.376) deems the recognition of other 
forms of gay and lesbian relationships to be essential to ‘full’ equality. 
However, Stoddard (1997, p.756) asserts that other forms of relationship 
recognition, such as domestic partnerships, for example, cannot assure this. 
Writing in the British context, Peel and Harding (2004) reject marriage 
because of its heterosexist and sexist underpinnings. They both conceive of 
civil partnership as the most appropriate mechanism for the legal 
recognition of their relationship (see Peel and Harding, 2004). However, 
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Donovan (2004) and Wise and Stanley (2004), who also write in the British 
context, reject both marriage and partnership because they conceive of 
these regimes as reinforcing the inequalities that attach to other forms of 
living and loving. Some of the above perspectives evoke the sentiments 
expressed by Senator Norris in relation to civil partnership in Ireland, 
which I highlighted at the beginning of this thesis (see Seanad Éireann, 
2010a). They all implicitly hone in on the tensions that prevail vis-à-vis the 
way forward in terms of affording protection to parties to adult intimate 
relationships, and reconciling that with the fundamental principle of 
equality. 
 
Further Aspects to the Irish Trajectory 
 
In 1995 in Ireland, the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) and the 
Nexus Research Cooperative (NRC) recommended the inclusion of 
provisions within proposed equal status legislation that would facilitate the 
registration of non-marital same-sex relationships (GLEN and NRC, 1995, 
pp.40-41). Therefore, relationship recognition was conceptualised here in 
terms of equal status on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. It 
suggests that the legal and moral imperative of decriminalising 
manifestations of same-sex intimacy in 1993 was so profound that it 
created a space wherein the unwavering and unequivocal demand for equal 
status as a citizen, who was no longer a ‘criminal’, could not be ignored. 
This underscores the salience of Waaldijk’s (2000) thesis, which I 
highlighted at the beginning of the introduction to this research. 
 
In Ireland in the 1990s, advocates of equality for gay and lesbian persons 
availed of a consultative process in an effort to further their aims through 
engagement with the State. The Commission on the Family (CF) was set up 
in 1995 with a view to examining the needs and priorities of families 
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against the backdrop of social change (CF, 1996, p.8). It received 
submissions from three gay / lesbian organisations, including the Gay and 
Lesbian Equality Network (see CF, 1996, pp.109-111). While the report 
did not provide details of the submissions, it did state the following: 
“Submissions from homosexual representative groups sought parity with 
heterosexual individuals and partnerships.” (CF, 1996, p.64) Here, reliance 
on the term ‘parity’, so as to encapsulate the general tenor of these 
submissions, is significant. It demonstrates that invoking and relying upon 
the principle of equality or the premise of equal status were fundamental to 
the pursuit and realisation of relationship recognition. Having said that, the 
commission also received submissions that strongly rejected the idea of 
relationship parity and / or adoption by gay persons (see CF, 1996, pp.64-
108). This suggests that the issues of relationship and family recognition 
were ‘out there’ (see Parker, 1999, p.3) in public discourse, to the extent 
that they impelled some opponents of such ideas into voicing their 
objections to the commission.  
 
Again in 1995, the Irish Government established the Constitution Review 
Group (CRG), which comprised senior officials and public servants from 
the realms of law and academia (CRG, 1996, p. ix). This group was 
charged with reviewing our Constitution with a view to determining areas 
where change might be warranted (CRG, 1996, p. x). It received 
submissions from advocacy groups, including the Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Network (see CRG, 1996, pp.651-654). The CRG (1996) stated 
that the constitutional recognition and protection of families other than 
those based on marriage presented significant difficulties, because of the 
accretion of Irish case law on Article 41 (see CRG, 1996, p.321).
28
 
Nonetheless, it was open to the idea that families headed by same-sex 
                                           
28
 I provide details of this important case law in Chapter Five. The dominant understanding of Article 41 
did inform aspects to the Irish regime of civil partnership, which was legislated for in 2010. This dynamic 
will become apparent in Chapter Six. 
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couples denoted one of many family types that could warrant consideration 
vis-à-vis change to the definition of family in the Constitution (see CRG, 
1996, pp.321-322).
29
 The CRG (1996) recommended that Articles 41.1.1, 
41.1.2, 41.2.1, 41.2.2, and 41.3.1 should be deleted, and that a revised 
Article 41 should expressly provide for the following: the right to marry 
and found a family; a guarantee to respect family life, irrespective of 
whether or not it is based on marriage; confirmation that the State’s 
obligations vis-à-vis marriage does not preclude legislating for the benefit 
of families that are not based on marriage (see CRG, 1996, p.336).
30
 These 
recommendations, which derived from the group’s mandate, would have 
signalled to the Irish Government that relationship and family recognition 
denoted imperatives that needed to be addressed. However, the above 
recommendations with regard to constitutional change were never 
implemented.
31
 
 
Further Aspects to the American Trajectory 
 
In the United States, 1996 also proved to be a pivotal year in terms of 
solidifying heterosexist opposition to the introduction of same-sex 
marriage. Federal legislation, which defined marriage as a legal union 
between one man and one woman, was enacted that year (see Alliance 
Defense Fund, 2008).
32
 Both Eskridge (1999, p.219) and Hull (2001, p.207) 
state that it was a decision in the Hawaii Supreme Court on same-sex 
marriage in 1993 that informed the rationale behind the enactment of the 
                                           
29
 Part of the complexity of Article 41 derives from case law; two Irish Supreme Court justices stated in 
the 1970s that the term ‘family’ is not defined in our Constitution. I will revisit this dynamic in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
30
 Article 41.3.2 was changed by the will of the majority of the electorate in the 1995 constitutional 
referendum on divorce, which I discuss in Chapter Four. CRG (1996, p.337) recommended that the 
remaining clause, i.e. Article 41.3.3, should remain intact. 
31
 Our civil partnership regime, for example, was provided for without constitutional change to Article 41. 
32
 See Appendix V for relevant details. 
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Defense of Marriage Act, 1996.
33
 While marriage laws come within the 
purview of each state in the U.S., this federal law permits individual states 
to refuse to recognise same-sex marriages that are legal in some states 
(Bonauto, 2010, p.2). Moreover, it prevents married same-sex couples from 
accessing federal benefits or programmes in which marital status is a 
criterion for eligibility (Bonauto, 2010, p.2). Therefore, it denotes a 
reminder of the myriad ways in which heteronormativity is routinely 
operationalised. An important parallel obtains between the title of this 
American legislation, which centres on the need to defend marriage, and 
the text of Article 41.3.1 of the Irish Constitution (1937), which stipulates 
that the State must guard and protect marriage.
34
 This imperative to defend 
marriage, as if it were under attack, suggests unease as to its potential 
vulnerability, which seems at odds with the rootedness of the nuclear 
family paradigm over time and place. 
 
Further Aspects to the Irish Trajectory 
 
In 2000, the triggering of rights and responsibilities on the basis of marital 
status came under scrutiny in Ireland in the context of attempting to chart a 
way forward vis-à-vis civil partnership. The report compiled by Mee and 
Ronayne (2000) on behalf of the Equality Authority denoted an audit of the 
myriad ways in which married heterosexual couples were treated 
differently to same-sex couples in Irish law (see Mee and Ronayne, 2000, 
pp.1-5). This snap shot in time detailed the rights and responsibilities that 
are triggered by the status of marriage in such areas as social security, 
taxation, and family, the latter of which incorporated issues such as 
adoption, fostering and guardianship (see Mee and Ronayne, 2000, pp.1-5). 
                                           
33
 See Hull (2001, pp.212-217) for an elaboration on this case, which initially found for the plaintiffs. 
However, the outcome of a 1998 constitutional referendum on same-sex marriage in Hawaii was such that 
the court held in 1999 that the plaintiffs’ case was without constitutional merit. 
34
 This dynamic proved to be crucial in terms of the distribution of marriage rights in Ireland. This will 
become apparent in Chapter Five. 
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While the report did not make recommendations (see Niall Crowley’s 
foreword in Mee and Ronayne, 2000),
35
 it created a space wherein a civil 
partnership regime, which could formalise rights and responsibilities for 
same-sex couples, could be envisioned. 
 
Two years later, the Equality Authority (2002, p.28) asserted that the 
principle of equality needed to be at the heart of any process of legal 
reform in Ireland that might be envisaged in the area of civil partnership. 
This underpinned its belief that the rights and responsibilities that attached 
to marriage at the time should be available to lesbian and gay couples 
(Equality Authority, 2002, p.28). While it did not expressly call for a right 
to marry, it recommended that Irish law needed to recognise the diversity 
of family forms by providing for a myriad of rights pertaining to such 
issues as fostering, guardianship, inheritance, and next-of-kinship (see 
Equality Authority, 2002, pp.29-30). Again, there is a sense that the logic 
of the decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1993 helped to foster the idea 
that enacting equality legislation, firmly based on a now self-evident parity, 
should incorporate the imperatives of relationship and family recognition in 
Ireland. Again, this underscores Waaldijk’s (2000) thesis, which I 
highlighted at the beginning of this research. 
 
In Ireland, the continued push for recognition was also evidenced in 2004 
in a report that the Dept. of Social and Family Affairs published, following 
a nation-wide public consultation process regarding family life, and the role 
of the State in that regard (see Daly, 2004, p.13). While none of its 
workshop themes were premised on what is perhaps the most important 
dynamic in terms of policy development, i.e. the definition of family, this 
issue did concern attendees (see Daly, 2004, p.21). They pointed to the 
                                           
35
 Former Chief Executive of the Equality Authority, Niall Crowley, conceived of equality as a 
fundamental principle. His ethic of public service was such that, on foot of government action, he felt 
compelled to resign his position. See Coulter (2008) and Sheridan (2009) in this regard. 
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need to include families that are headed by lesbian or gay parents within a 
more inclusive definition of family (see Daly, 2004, pp.24-25). Here 
however, it is important to make the point that the publication of this report 
coincided with the enactment of the 2004 legislation that bars same-sex 
couples from marrying in Ireland.
36
 This denotes a significant twist in the 
Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition. The relevant 
minister’s (Dept. of Social and Family Affairs) vote in the Oireachtas,37 
and those of her parliamentary party and government colleagues, helped to 
codify the seemingly self-evident premise that same-sex marriage is 
antithetical to family.
38
 This jars with the hope that is engendered by many 
of the above understandings of parity and equal status in the context of 
relationship and family recognition and protection in Ireland. 
 
Availing of the consultative process, in order to further the demand for 
same-sex relationship recognition in Ireland, was also apparent following 
the establishment of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution (APOCC). Comprising a total of fourteen serving politicians, 
this committee was charged with identifying aspects to the Constitution vis-
à-vis the family that might warrant change (APOCC, 2006, pp.3-5). In 
undertaking its review, the committee resolved to pay heed to the 
Constitution Review Group’s (1996, p.336) recommendations regarding 
Article 41 (see APOCC, 2006, p.3). It received submissions from many 
advocacy organisations, including the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network 
and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (see APOCC, 2006, pp. A13-A14). 
These advocates supported both the instituting of a legislative regime for 
                                           
36
 See Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs, 2004b, amendment 9; see line 9, page 10, of the 
proposed legislation at the time: http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2003/3503/b35a03d.pdf 
; see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, amendment 5, para. 1009. I will revisit this by elaborating on aspects to the 
2004 enactment of this legislation in Section Two of Chapter Six. Please note that the terms ‘Dáil 
Éireann’ or ‘Dáil’ refer to the lower house of our national parliament in Dublin. Comprising deputies, 
ministers and primeminister, it houses the Government of Ireland. 
37
 The term ‘Oireachtas’ refers to our national parliament, which comprises the upper and lower houses, 
i.e. Seanad Éireann and Dáil Éireann respectively. 
38
 This will become apparent as my analysis evolves in Chapter Five. 
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civil partnership, and opening up the institution of marriage to lesbians and 
gay men (see APOCC, 2006, pp. A95-A96 and pp. A122-A132 
respectively).
39
 However, this committee also received submissions from 
organisations, such as Muintir na hÉireann and Right Nation, which were 
opposed to constitutional change regarding marriage and family in the 
context of lesbianism and homosexuality (see APOCC, 2006, pp. A192-
A195 and pp. A238-A245 respectively).
40
 Informed by the general tenor of 
submissions, which were largely divided into those that were underpinned 
by the principle of equality, and those that were concerned about a threat to 
the traditional family, the committee held that a constitutional amendment 
to broaden the definition of family as understood in Article 41 “… would 
cause deep and long-lasting division in our society and would not 
necessarily be passed by a majority.” (APOCC, 2006, pp.121-122) Here, 
there is no sense that those serving on the committee could provide 
political leadership with regard to the complexities of Article 41, such that 
a referendum could be decided, firstly by the Irish Government in terms of 
the decision to hold one or not, and then by the will of the people in terms 
of its outcome, rather than pre-empted by the will of fourteen. This point 
warrants reflection in terms of expectations vis-à-vis our constitutional and 
parliamentary democracy. It is also important to state that this committee 
did recommend providing for both partnership and cohabitation regimes for 
same-sex couples through legislation (APOCC, 2006, p.123). These latter 
recommendations came to fruition with the enactment of the Civil 
Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 
2010.
41
  
                                           
39
 See Joint Committee on the Constitution (2005b) for details of the Irish Council’s for Civil Liberties 
oral submission to the public hearings that were held in relation to the family, and its dominant 
understanding in our Constitution. I was unable to obtain details of the Gay and Lesbian Equality 
Network’s oral submission to these public hearings, which took place on 26th May 2005 (see APOCC, 
2006, p.16). 
40
 For details of the oral submissions to these public hearings that were made by Muintir na hÉireann and 
Right Nation, see Joint Committee on the Constitution (2005c,d) respectively. 
41
 In Section Three of Chapter Six, I provide a critical discourse analysis of parliamentary debates that 
took place in 2009 and 2010 as this legislation progressed through both Houses of the Oireachtas. My 
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The Irish Council’s for Civil Liberties (ICCL) above submission regarding 
the opening up of the institution of marriage to lesbians and gay men (see 
APOCC, 2006, pp. A122-A132) is consistent with its call for the repeal of 
the 2004 legislation that bars same-sex couples from marrying in this 
jurisdiction (ICCL, 2006, p.59). This demand denotes an important step in 
the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition. The Irish 
Council for Civil Liberties remains one of the few advocates that 
incorporate the marriage ban’s repeal within its demands for legislative 
change.
42
 Furthermore, ten years after the Constitution Review Group’s 
(1996, p.336) recommendation that the right to marry should be expressly 
enunciated in our Constitution, ICCL (2006, p.6) reiterated this position. 
Moreover, it conceived of that right as one that inheres in persons, 
irrespective of their gender and sexual orientation (see ICCL, 2006, p.6). 
This suggests that the 2004 ban had the effect of placing same-sex marriage 
on the agenda for change vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition in 
Ireland. 
 
Again in Ireland in 2006, the Dept. of Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
published a report that was compiled by the Working Group on Domestic 
Partnership (WGDP). This group was charged with identifying a range of 
possible options vis-à-vis relationship recognition, which could form a 
template that the department could then work with in terms of developing 
legislation (see WGDP, 2006, p.2). This step on the Irish trajectory 
suggests that the State was cognisant of activists’ and organisations’ 
demands regarding the imperatives of recognition and protection. However, 
the difficulty from the outset was that the group’s work was circumscribed 
by the proviso that proposals could not interfere with constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
focus will be on the dynamic of civil partnership. Here, I reiterate that our legislative regime vis-à-vis 
cohabitation applies to same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 
42
 Judy Walsh consistently calls for the removal of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage. For 
example, see her foreword in Fagan (2011, p.5) and Pillinger (2008, pp.3-4). She is one of the authors of 
Baker et al (2004), which is a publication that I rely upon in my theorisation of equality in Chapter Two. 
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provisions that prevailed at the time (see WGDP, 2006, p.2),
43
 and that still 
prevail. This suggests an imperative on the part of the Irish Government to 
keep Article 41 intact.
44
 This precluded any possible recommendation for 
constitutional change vis-à-vis marriage and family in Ireland, wherein 
such change tends to be seen as a necessary precursor to the introduction of 
same-sex marriage. This denotes another significant twist in the 
relationship and family trajectory. It meant that the creation of a separate 
and unequal system of recognition, without constitutional status or 
protection (see WGDP, 2006, p.51), i.e. civil partnership, became a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Senator Norris’ earlier remarks, about aspects to the 
Irish manifestation of civil partnership (see Seanad Éireann, 2010a), 
capture the disappointment that arises out of the Government’s inability to 
fully vindicate the parity of lesbians and gay men in Ireland, because of an 
overriding imperative to keep Article 41 intact, as if such persons, and their 
relationships and families, were ‘commonsensically’ outside its 
protections.
45
 
 
In 2009, the National Lesbian and Gay Federation (NLGF) conducted a 
survey to garner some sense of the issues that concerned lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons in Ireland (see Denyer et al, 
2009, pp.8-11). An analysis of responses to the survey’s open-ended 
questions indicated that ‘full’ or ‘complete’ equality, marriage equality,46 
and parenting rights emerged as the most important priorities for the 
majority of respondents (see Denyer et al, 2009, pp.24-25). The research 
also demonstrated that a small number of respondents identified civil 
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 In terms of relationship and family recognition, Article 41 remains intact, notwithstanding the 
Constitution Review Group’s recommendations in 1996, and the All-Party Oireachtas Committee’s on the 
Constitution resolve to heed those recommendations ten years later in 2006. This is perhaps indicative of 
the complexity of Article 41 of our Constitution, in terms of charting a way forward with regard to the 
premise of relationship and family recognition. This also raises questions about the general utility of both 
the consultative process and the establishment of groups or committees, with regard to constitutional 
change vis-à-vis Article 41. 
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 This will become apparent in Chapter Six. 
46
 I define the term ‘marriage equality’ in Chapter One. 
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partnership as a mechanism that could meet their needs (see Denyer et al, 
2009, p.28). While the research cohort was not statistically representative 
of the entire LGBT population in Ireland (see Denyer et al, 2009, pp.8-11), 
these findings suggest that same-sex marriage formed an important part of 
respondents’ conceptualisations of relationship and family recognition in 
the context of the principle of equality. 
 
After the enactment of civil partnership legislation in Ireland in 2010, the 
organisation that is known as Marriage Equality commissioned a report 
with a view to challenging the thesis that this legislative regime provides 
most of the protections that accrue to marriage, as is currently constituted 
in a raft of legislation (see Fagan, 2011, p.6).
47
 This report denotes an audit 
of the differences in treatment between opposite-sex married couples and 
same-sex civil partners in terms of the rights and responsibilities that are 
trigged by the relevant legislation (Fagan, 2011, p.6). Honing in on issues, 
such as adoption, guardianship and immigration, the audit demonstrates 
that there are a myriad of differences between these two legislative regimes 
(see Fagan, 2011, pp.6-11). These largely derive from the following: not 
amending some existing legislation that has regard for spouses so as to 
include civil partners; not always instituting equivalent provisions for civil 
partners; instituting parallel provision for partners without provision for 
children; not amending much of the legislation that prevails in relation to 
dependent children; some lack of clarity because of an absence of express 
provision; and reliance on policy or ministerial order rather than statutory 
entitlement (see Fagan, 2011, pp.35-46). Here, it is very important to 
acknowledge that the enactment of civil partnership legislation in 2010 
denotes a significant step on the Irish trajectory, in terms of the recognition 
of same-sex adult intimate relationships in this country. However, the 
differences between the two regimes are such that this legislation also 
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codifies the second-class status of gay men, lesbians, and their families. 
This dynamic is at the core of Senator Norris’ perspective on the legislation 
(see Seanad Éireann, 2010a). While it does recognise and protect, it also 
denies. It implicitly relies on a seemingly self-evident logic of a two-tier 
system of recognition and protection, which is underpinned by dimensions 
to the concept of difference. These include the following: ‘difference as 
disadvantage’ (see Spicker, 2000); ‘difference as social relation’ (see Brah, 
1991; 1996); and what I refer to as ‘difference to’ and ‘difference as 
deployment’, the latter of which derives from Brah (1991). In Chapter 
Two, I argue that these and other crucial dynamics to the concept of 
difference are at the core of the routine reproduction of lesbian and gay 
inequality in Ireland. 
 
Further Aspects to the Wider European Trajectory 
 
With regard to the wider European trajectory, the Netherlands became the 
first country to open up the institution of civil marriage to same-sex 
couples in 2001 (Waaldijk, 2004, p.572). There, the legislature amended 
the definition of marriage to a contract that could be entered into by two 
persons, irrespective of their gender and sexual orientation (Waaldijk, 
2004, p.572).
48
 Waaldijk (2004, pp.577-578) makes the point that such 
legislative change in that jurisdiction was predicated on both the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality, which occurred in 1811, and the 
introduction of comprehensive legislation prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, which was a process that began in 1992. 
Belgium had a similar trajectory to the Netherlands in that homosexuality 
was decriminalised in the late 18
th
 century, measures prohibiting sexual 
orientation discrimination were first introduced in 1999, and the legislature 
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 In 1996 and 1997, Dr. Waaldijk was a member of a Dutch commission of legal experts that was set up 
to advise government on the opening up of civil marriage to same-sex couples (see Leiden University, 
2011). Therefore, this issue was on the Dutch legislature’s agenda in the late 1990s. 
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amended the legal definition of marriage in 2003 (Waaldijk, 2004, pp.581-
584). While decriminalisation presupposes that criminalisation ‘made 
sense’ in Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, it cannot go unnoticed 
that their legislatures decriminalised homosexuality decades before it was 
actually criminalised in Ireland in the mid to late 19
th
 century. What is also 
fascinating about the Belgian trajectory is that once the impetus for change 
in terms of the logic of enacting anti-discrimination and equality legislation 
was rationalised, albeit two centuries after decriminalisation, the journey 
time of four years from ‘there’ to the realisation of marriage equality is 
quite profound. It suggests that the principles of parity and equal status 
were so compelling to the Belgian legislature that providing for same-sex 
marriage denoted a logical initiative and imperative. This premise is at the 
core of Waaldijk’s (2000) thesis, which I highlighted at the beginning of 
this research. It offers hope to persons living in countries that have taken 
steps to redress the ‘logic’ of criminalisation, in that other manifestations of 
heteronormativity, including the absence of legal protections for families 
that are headed by gay men or lesbians, will simply be no longer acceptable 
in those jurisdictions. 
 
The courts are also a mechanism through which rights can be either 
affirmed or denied, such as in determining the right of lesbians and gay 
men to marry. As with Zappone and Gilligan, Wilkinson and Kitzinger v. 
Attorney General was a case that was taken by two women who married 
each other in British Columbia, Canada, in 2003 (see [2006] EWHC 2022, 
paras. 1-131). Upon their return home to Britain, they initiated legal 
proceedings in advance of the impending implementation of a legislative 
regime for civil partnership in 2004 / 2005. Their rationale in this regard 
was twofold: they sought recognition of their Canadian marriage in Britain; 
they did not want their marriage to be ‘downgraded’ to a civil partnership, 
which the legislation proposed in relation to same-sex marriages that took 
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place in foreign jurisdictions (see [2006] EWHC 2022, at paras. 2-5 and 
para. 18). The plaintiffs also relied on Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see [2006] EWHC 2022, 
at paras. 26-29). The following denotes an excerpt from Justice Potter’s 
ruling in this case: 
 
Parliament has not called partnerships between persons of the 
same-sex marriage, not because they are considered inferior to 
the institution of marriage but because, as a matter of objective 
fact and common understanding, as well as under the present 
definition of marriage in English law, and by recognition in 
European jurisprudence, they are indeed different. 
 
                            Justice Potter, [2006] EWHC 2022, at para. 121 
 
This is an interesting extract from the judgment, particularly in terms of the 
reliance on language to underpin the seemingly commonsensical logic of 
difference. This concept is at the heart of my theorisation of equality and 
inequality in Chapter Two. I also allude to it in Chapter One in the context 
of the methodological considerations that underpin my research. The 
plaintiffs’ case was dismissed in 2006, in part because British law was not 
found to be incompatible with the ECHR (see [2006] EWHC 2022, at 
paras. 129-131). This is an important point in terms of both the recourse to 
the protections that are afforded by the ECHR, and the manner in which it 
is incorporated into domestic law. This dynamic arose in Zappone and 
Gilligan, wherein those plaintiffs also relied on Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the 
ECHR.
49
 
 
Further Aspects to the American Trajectory 
 
Efforts to further the recognition of same-sex marriage through the courts 
have also been made in America. Massachusetts became the first state to 
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 I will revisit this in Chapter Five. 
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legalise same-sex marriage in the United States on foot of the Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health ruling in 2003 (see [2003] Mass. 440, paras. 
309-395). Counsel for both the plaintiffs and the Irish State in the matter of 
Zappone and Gilligan relied upon different aspects to this ruling in 
furtherance of their respective positions. Of particular interest to this 
research is an excerpt from Justice Sosman’s dissenting judgment in 
Goodridge (see [2003] Mass. 440, at paras. 358-359).
50
 I discuss it in 
Chapter Five in relation to the conducting and interpretation of social 
scientific research regarding the dynamic of child development in the 
context of lesbian and gay parenting. This excerpt from Justice Sosman’s 
ruling hints at the sheer scale of institutionalised heterosexuality in the 
United States, in that it has the capacity to prey upon those who seem to be 
positively disposed to the general realisation of lesbian and gay rights, in a 
state that is considered to be one of the most liberal in the Union. 
 
Current Aspects to the Irish Trajectory 
 
In July 2012, the Houses of the Oireachtas approved the establishment of 
the Convention on the Constitution, which is often referred to as the 
Constitutional Convention. It comprises one hundred people, including 
parliamentarians from both Houses of the Oireachtas, and Irish citizens 
who were selected from the electoral register. Its terms of reference are 
such that it is charged with considering eight specific issues, including 
same-sex marriage, with a view to making recommendations to the 
Oireachtas regarding same in terms of possible future amendments to our 
Constitution. The Constitutional Convention, which intends to complete its 
work within one year, has invited public submissions on all eight issues. 
There was an unprecedented public response to the issue of same-sex 
marriage. Indeed, the Constitutional Convention received over one 
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thousand submissions in this regard. In April 2013, it convened with a view 
to making recommendations to the Oireachtas vis-à-vis a constitutional 
provision for same-sex marriage. The convention overwhelmingly voted in 
favour of recommending that our Constitution should be changed to allow 
for civil marriage for same-sex couples. Similarly, the overwhelming 
majority of delegates recommended that the State should enact attendant 
legislation vis-à-vis the issues of parenthood and the guardianship of 
children. A report comprising these recommendations will now go to 
Government, which currently comprises a coalition of Fine Gael and 
Labour. Upon receipt, the Government is committed to respond within four 
months by way of a debate in the Oireachtas. If it agrees with the 
recommendation to amend the Constitution, the Government will also 
determine a timeframe for that constitutional referendum.
51
 
 
In March 2013, the Labour Party published legislation that seeks to remove 
the legislative prohibition on marriage between persons who are of the 
same sex (see Labour Party, 2013). Its Civil Registration (Marriage 
Equality) Bill, 2013, which was introduced in Seanad Éireann by Senator 
Bacik, seeks to repeal Section 2.2(e) of the Civil Registration Act, 2004. 
This initiative is indicative of Labour’s commitment, in government, to the 
realisation of marriage equality in Ireland. It denotes an important aspect to 
this Irish trajectory in that it implicitly concedes that providing for marriage 
equality necessitates legislative change. It draws much needed attention to 
the legislative position, rather than simply focusing on the constitutional 
dynamic. Having said that, it is important to bear in mind that the 
enactment of the Civil Registration (Marriage Equality) Bill, 2013 requires 
successful negotiation of a number of stages through both Houses of the 
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Oireachtas.
52
 As of May 2013, Senator Bacik is working with the 
Government with a view to formalising a date for the legislation’s ‘Second 
Stage’.53 
 
Conclusion to Trajectory 
 
Most of the above examples that form part of the Irish, wider European, 
and American trajectories are informed by the imperative of equality, and 
its realisation through legislation. Many of them situate the relatively recent 
framing of marriage rights in Ireland in the language of lesbian and gay 
equality. However, the imperative to define marriage at a federal level in 
the United States can be conceived of as furthering inequality vis-à-vis 
marriage through a reliance on legislation. Moreover, the Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger decision relied on both legislation and case law to further 
inequality vis-à-vis marriage in Britain. What emerges from the above 
discussion in its entirety is a sense that while some countries, such as 
Belgium, embraced the principle of relationship recognition through 
legislative change, Ireland’s trajectory is characterised by a lot of ‘kicking 
and screaming’. While Ireland grappled, and still grapples, with the 
principles of recognition and protection for adult and family relationships, 
other European countries got on with the business of legislating for 
marriage and partnership. Important themes emerge from the above 
elaboration on the Irish trajectory. They include the advocating of the 
concepts of genuine parity and equal status, which are rooted in the 
principle of equality. This is important because the plaintiffs in Zappone 
and Gilligan relied on the equality provisions in Article 40 of the Irish 
Constitution (1937) to assert their right to have their marriage recognised 
and protected in this jurisdiction. Another crucial aspect to the Irish 
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trajectory is the significance of Article 41 of our Constitution to the wider 
issue of relationship and family recognition and protection. The dominant 
conceptualisation of Article 41 still informs that debate, as evidenced by 
the establishment of the Constitutional Convention in 2012, for example, as 
well as the taking of the High Court action that is at the centre of my 
research. The significance of the Irish trajectory is that it helps to 
contextualise the plaintiffs’ reliance on both Articles 40 and 41 in the 
matter of Zappone and Gilligan. In that regard, this trajectory denotes an 
important aspect to my discourse-historical approach to research (see 
Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011), which I discuss in Chapter One. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Introduction: What’s the Story? Interrogating the Constitutional and 
Legislative Position on Same-Sex Marriage in Ireland 
 
Chapter One: Text Messages and Baggage Claim: Method and 
Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the methodological orientation of my research. I 
am fascinated by the wherewithal of language in terms of its capacity to 
actively construct, rather than merely reflect, social relations (see Riggins, 
1997). What has emerged from research over time is the premise that 
language use actually denotes social action (see Chilton and Schäffner, 
1997; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Wodak, 1999). This breakthrough 
subsequently gave rise to a mode of study that is known as Discourse 
Analysis. Within this field, the impetus to challenge the routine 
reproduction of inequality in society, which is consistent with a critical 
perspective (see Sarantakos, 1994), led to the emergence of what became 
known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This denotes both a method 
and a methodology (see Phillips and Hardy, 2002) that best suits my 
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research, in terms of unpacking the discursive processes through which 
lesbian and gay inequality is routinely reproduced in Ireland. In this regard, 
I discuss elements in my CDA tool kit that facilitate this research, including 
the discursive wherewithal of legitimation (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 
1997). This strategy was to the fore throughout the Irish State’s defence of 
its position vis-à-vis same-sex marriage in the matter of Zappone and 
Gilligan. I also discuss the utility of the discourse-historical approach to 
research (DHA), which I alluded to earlier. This requires the integration of 
material from as many different genres of discourse as possible (see 
Wodak, 1997b), as well as the historical dimension to the issues that are 
under investigation, into the analysis of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b; 
1999; 2001; 2011). In Chapter One, I also provide definitions of important 
terms that I consistently refer to throughout this work, specifically, 
marriage and family as institution, marriage equality, heteronormativity, 
and heterosexism. In doing so, I reflect on my understanding of relevant 
aspects to our Constitution, as well as my evolving perspective on the 
wider issue of relationship and family recognition and protection. This 
acknowledges both the importance and utility of researcher reflexivity, 
which I also discuss in Chapter One as part of my critical orientation. 
 
Chapter Two: In Theory: Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations 
 
My theorisation of the fundamental principle of equality first elaborates on 
its co-existence with inequality. I argue that the crucial dynamic that helps 
to explain the reproduction of inequality in all its manifestations is the 
concept of difference and its social significance. In this regard, I discuss the 
following theses: Spicker’s (2000) conceptualisation of difference as 
disadvantage; Brah’s (1991; 1996) theorisation of difference in the context 
of social relations; Baumrind’s (1995) perspective vis-à-vis differences as 
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deficits,
54
 in conjunction with Cameron’s and Cameron’s (1996) thesis 
regarding pathology and deviance in the context of homosexuality; and 
what I refer to as ‘difference to’ and ‘difference as deployment’, the latter 
of which derives from Brah (1991). These dynamics tie in with aspects to 
the routine operationalisation of socio-cultural norms, which are also 
central to the reproduction of inequality. The complexity that attaches to 
the co-existence of equality and inequality, which I alluded to in the 
introduction to this research, is such that I rely on Baker et al (2004). Their 
theorisation establishes a way forward in terms of redressing inequality in 
society. Of particular interest in terms of my thesis is the principle of 
equality of respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004). 
 
Chapter Three: Nuclear Options: Conceptualisations of Marriage 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the history of marriage as an institution in the 
West. In that regard, Chapter Three denotes an important aspect to my 
discourse-historical approach to research (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 
2011). I elaborate on the legal dimensions to marriage that codified and 
naturalised the dominant social meaning of marriage as an institution. This 
history is predicated on the imperative of marital procreation as a necessary 
precursor to family order and stability. I argue that this has morphed into a 
preoccupation with social order and stability. This history on marriage is 
steeped in the ‘logic’ of patriarchy and the attendant reproduction of the 
worst excesses of sexism. There is a significant body of research available 
with regard to the wider feminist critique of marriage. This is quite robust 
in terms of honing in on normative assumptions surrounding the institution 
of marriage that are underpinned by both gender and sexual orientation. 
This has proved useful in terms of facilitating an understanding of many of 
the issues that are at the heart of this thesis, such as the idea that marriage is 
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denoting deficits. This will become clear in Chapter Two. 
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intrinsically heterosexual, for example. While Feminist Theory informs this 
chapter, it is important to make the point that my thesis does not denote a 
feminist analysis per se. My reliance on Feminist Theory is more in 
keeping with my critical and discourse-historical approaches to research, 
particularly in terms of elucidating historical and normative understandings 
of, as well as discriminatory aspects to, the issues that are under 
investigation in my work. 
 
Chapter Four: Irish Ways and Irish Laws: Aspects to Marriage, Family 
and Sexuality 
 
In this chapter, I discuss some of the ways in which certain ‘truths’ in 
relation to the nuclear family paradigm were either challenged or justified 
in Ireland. To that end, I elaborate on aspects to the legalisation of 
contraception, which was a process that began in the early 1970s, and the 
introduction of divorce, which came about as a result of constitutional 
change to Article 41 in the mid to late 1990s. This discussion highlights 
some of the ways in which marriage and family were conceptualised, and 
how such understandings often rationalised the prevailing dominance of the 
nuclear family paradigm in Ireland. Emphasis is placed on parliamentary 
debates pertaining to the introduction or rejection of legislative and / or 
constitutional change. It is important to state that some of the extracts from 
the Oireachtas record are quite lengthy. However, this is a warranted 
feature in Chapter Four because the extracts provide a window into the soul 
of change, in terms of either its support or resistance. Emphasis is also 
placed on the importance of judicial interpretation of our Constitution, 
which arises in the context of the McGee v. Attorney General ruling on 
contraception and the right to marital privacy (see [1974] I.R. pp.284-337). 
This was one of many constitutional cases that were either alluded to, or 
relied upon, throughout proceedings in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan 
in 2006. In Chapter Four, I include some perspectives of the Catholic 
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Hierarchy in Ireland on marriage and family as one institution. While I 
hone in on the interplay between the civil and the canonical, I make no 
reference to any religious perspective on same-sex marriage in my work. 
Any such perspective is irrelevant to the 2006 High Court ruling in 
Zappone and Gilligan. Having said that, Chapter Four provides an 
important socio-cultural and historical dimension to issues pertaining to 
marriage, family and sexuality in Ireland, all of which help to contextualise 
my analysis of that 2006 ruling. Therefore, this chapter also denotes an 
important dimension to the discourse-historical approach that I adopt in this 
thesis (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011). 
 
Chapter Five: The Love That Dare Now Speak Her Name: Critical 
Discourse Analysis of the High Court Ruling in Zappone and Gilligan 
 
This is the most important chapter in my thesis. It denotes a critical 
discourse analysis of the 2006 High Court ruling on same-sex marriage in 
Ireland. It requires an elaboration of important research considerations at 
the outset, many of which pertain to the written text of the judgment. I 
discuss the relevance of different genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) 
that I integrate into my thesis, such as Irish and international case law on 
marriage and family. This integration helps to ground my analysis. After 
elaborating on these considerations, Chapter Five then comprises two 
sections, each corresponding to a strand of the hetero-matrix that requires 
critical analysis. Section One largely hones in on the constitutional position 
vis-à-vis marriage in Ireland, and what I refer to as the ‘marriage as 
intrinsically or inherently heterosexual’ thesis. This was either challenged 
or justified over the course of these High Court proceedings by parties to 
the case. In this regard, the importance of Article 41 of our Constitution 
cannot be overstated. This underscores the salience of the Irish trajectory 
vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition, particularly in terms of the 
extent to which Article 41 has been deliberated upon. This suggests a 
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struggle over the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 
1999) of Article 41, which is precisely what happened in the High Court in 
2006. Both Sections One and Two of Chapter Five pertain to the issue of 
family because it remains inextricably linked to marriage in this 
jurisdiction. Section Two denotes a critical discourse analysis of the second 
strand to the hetero-matrix that is under investigation, i.e. the routine 
pathologisation of gay men and women as parents, and the attendant issue 
of child development, which seamlessly morphs into the issue of child 
welfare. It is within this realm that the concept of difference as deficit (see 
Baumrind, 1995), which I theorise in Chapter Two, is particularly acute. 
Once the ‘truth’ about a seemingly self-evident pathology is implicitly 
invoked, and then ‘rationalised’ and operationalised through discourse, the 
denial of marriage rights becomes entirely ‘logical’. With regard to 
marriage, these two strands to the hetero-matrix help to explain the 
intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality in Ireland. 
 
Chapter Six: Pen Pals, Parish-Pumps, and Putting on an Act: ‘Letters to 
the Editor’, E-Mails from Politicians, and Oireachtas Debates Pertaining 
to Civil Partnership 
 
This chapter comprises three sections, with each pertaining to one genre of 
discourse (see Wodak, 1997b). These are as follows: ‘Letters to the Editor’, 
the publication of which coincided with the proceedings and ruling in 
Zappone and Gilligan in 2006; personal communication with politicians / 
legislators in the Oireachtas vis-à-vis the enactment of legislation in 2004 
that bars same-sex couples from marrying in Ireland; and Oireachtas 
debates surrounding the introduction of the legislative regime for same-sex 
civil partnerships in 2010. Many themes emerge from my analysis of each 
genre, all of which serve to contextualise the 2006 High Court ruling. With 
regard to ‘Letters to the Editor’ in Section One, these include the following: 
the ‘what, when, where, who, why, how, to whom, and with what effect’ 
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(see Wodak, 1997b) dynamics behind the construction of knowledge; the 
reproduction of heterosexual privilege; and the ‘logic’ of the ‘marriage as 
intrinsically heterosexual’ thesis, which is informed by the issues of 
procreation and gender complementarity. In Section Two, my critical 
analysis of the second genre is such that responses from politicians 
regarding the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage invariably serve to 
underscore the routine operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland. 
My analysis in Section Two also points to a malaise within our largely 
parliamentary party-political system, in terms of the abrogation of personal 
responsibility for the enactment of legislation, which has profound 
consequences for a minority cohort of our population. In Section Three of 
Chapter Six, a recurring theme that emerges in my critical analysis of 
Oireachtas debates on civil partnership is the significance of the dominant 
understanding of Article 41 to the wider issue of relationship recognition. 
This denotes an important theme in this chapter, particularly in terms of the 
struggle over the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 
1999) of family in this country. Conceptualisations of the principle of 
equality and the concept of difference, and the ‘logic’ of a two-tier system 
of relationship recognition in Ireland, also arose in some of these 
Oireachtas debates that took place in 2009 and 2010. The relevance and 
discursive wherewithal of each genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) is 
such that they foster a greater understanding of the 2006 High Court ruling 
in Zappone and Gilligan. Therefore, Chapter Six denotes an important 
aspect to my discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 
2001; 2011). 
 
Conclusion: The Last Word: Concluding Thoughts 
 
In answering my research questions, I hone in on the two strands to the 
hetero-matrix of marriage and family as one constitutional, legislative and 
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social institution in Ireland. The crucial dynamics that inform these strands 
centre on the social significance that attaches to the concept of difference, 
which is rooted in the routine reproduction of lesbian and gay inequality in 
Ireland. To that end, I reflect on my theoretical considerations, which are 
linked to the methodological orientation of this research. I reflect on my 
contribution to methodology and theory, and on the utility of critical social 
research in terms of unmasking the myriad ways in which lesbian and gay 
inequality is routinely reproduced in Ireland. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Text Messages and Baggage Claim: Method and Methodology 
 
It would be nice if we could squeeze all we know about discourse 
into a handy definition. Unfortunately, as is also the case for such 
related concepts as ‘language’, ‘communication’, ‘interaction’, 
‘society’ and ‘culture’, the notion of discourse is essentially 
fuzzy. 
 
                                                                        van Dijk, 1997c, p.1 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter elaborates on both the method and methodological 
considerations that underpin this research. These inform my critical 
analysis of text from four genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) in 
Chapters Five and Six, specifically, a constitutional court ruling, letters to a 
newspaper editor, personal communication from legislators, and 
parliamentary debates. In Chapter One, I first highlight the trajectory 
wherein language use became central to understandings of social 
phenomena, such as the reproduction of gender inequality. What emerged 
over time was an understanding of language as denoting social action (see 
Chilton and Schäffner, 1997; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Wodak, 1999). This 
gave rise to a mode of study that is known as Discourse Analysis. I draw 
upon the works of theorists of discourse, including Norman Fairclough, 
Teun A. van Dijk and Ruth Wodak, because these help to determine the 
framework that best suits my research, which is Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA). I elaborate on aspects to this framework that facilitate my analysis, 
including the following: the dynamic that is known as ‘social cognition’ 
(see van Dijk, 1993; 2006); what is referred to as ‘access to discourse’ (see 
Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1993; van Dijk, 1996) and a ‘discourse access 
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profile’ (see van Dijk, 1993); Martín Rojo’s and van Dijk’s (1997) 
theorisation of legitimation; and what is known as the dynamic of ‘us and 
them’ or the ‘us / them distinction’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and 
van Dijk, 1997). I also discuss the utility of the discourse-historical 
approach (DHA) (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011). This requires an 
elaboration on the historical dimension to the research topic that is under 
investigation, such as that already set out in the introduction to this thesis. 
The DHA also requires the integration of material from different genres of 
discourse (see Wodak, 1997b), such as those alluded to above with regard 
to Chapters Five and Six. In Chapter One, I also discuss the important 
dynamic of researcher reflexivity, so as to acknowledge those aspects to 
my presence in the research that invariably impact upon this work. These 
include my understanding of terms that I consistently refer to in this thesis, 
specifically, marriage and family as social institution, marriage equality, 
heteronormativity, and heterosexism. Both my understanding of the Irish 
Constitution (1937) and the role of the State vis-à-vis the protection of 
personal rights are important considerations in this regard. My evolving 
perspective on the wider premise of relationship and family recognition, 
which came about as a result of the ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ of reflexivity, 
denotes another important dynamic in terms of the methodological 
orientation of this research. 
 
Language, Social Cognition, Discourse, Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
The Linguistic Turn 
 
So as to contextualise the dynamic of discourse and its analysis, it is 
important to make the point that language does not denote a neutral or 
descriptive medium (see Gill, 1995, p.166). Rather, it is very much 
connected to social phenomena, such as the routine reproduction of gender 
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inequality. For example, Remlinger (2005, pp.120-126) discusses the use of 
the term ‘girl’ to denote a female, irrespective of her age or maturity. In 
instances where the term ‘woman’ would be appropriate, such language use 
infantilises women. It also normalises a paternalism that tends to emphasise 
powerlessness and subordination. Similarly, the ‘sexual double standard’ is 
operationalised and sustained through language that either affirms or 
denigrates heterosexuality on the basis of gender. Such language use is 
indicative of the power relations that prevail in the context of gender 
(Fischer, 2007, p.55). This hones in on the central premise that “… 
language does not simply reflect social reality; it is also constitutive of that 
reality …” (Litosseliti, 2006, p.3). It is this connection between language 
and social inequality that concerns critical discourse analysts. 
 
The ‘turn to language’ (Fairclough, 2000a, p.164; Gill, 1995, p.166; Parker, 
1990, p.2; Peel, 2001, p.542) is largely conceived of as a mid 20
th
 century 
phenomenon, when a revolution swept across the humanities and social 
sciences with the realisation that language denoted much more than a 
reflection of reality (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, p.12). While Linguistics 
emerged as a discipline that was predicated on the centrality of language, in 
conceiving of language as an abstract competence, it does not take 
cognisance of the socio-historical matrix outside of which language cannot 
exist (see Fairclough, 1989, pp.6-7). This helps to explain the emergence of 
Sociolinguistics, which was influenced by Sociology (see Fairclough, 1989, 
p.7). While this discipline is strong on the ‘what’ questions, its link with 
the positivist tradition is such that it is weak on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions (see Fairclough, 1989, pp.7-8). The feminist critique of 
positivism (Letherby, 2003, pp.63-66), combined with the incorporation of 
gender as a social variable within sociolinguistic research (Wodak, 1997a, 
p.8; Wodak and Benke, 1997, p.127), may explain the genesis of Feminist 
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Linguistics.
55
 Central to this discipline are system-oriented and behaviour-
related approaches to language vis-à-vis gender (Wodak, 1997a, p.8). 
 
The emergence of Pragmatics was associated with the work of analytical 
philosophers, including Searle (1969), who theorised what is referred to as 
‘speech acts’ (see Fairclough, 1989, p.9). The key insight in Searle (1969, 
p.17) is that language is a form of action (see Fairclough, 1989, p.9). This 
is important in that a core theme in discourse analysis is that language is 
action (Chilton and Schäffner, 1997, p.207; Harré and Gillett, 1994, p.28; 
Wodak, 1999, p.186). However, Pragmatics conceives of action as 
emanating solely from the individual (Fairclough, 1989, p.9), thereby 
ignoring its social dynamics. Nonetheless, the establishment of what is also 
conceived of as the ‘uttering as acting’ principle is important, and it is 
central to the Discipline of Critical Language Study (Fairclough, 1989, 
pp.5-9). It seems to be at this juncture that the rich and varied tradition that 
is associated with the phenomenon of language and its social significance 
influenced the emergence of a distinct mode of study that centred on 
language as social practice / social action, i.e. Discourse Analysis (see 
West et al, 1997, p.120). Feminism’s critique of the positivistic and 
androcentric ways of analysing social phenomena, which developed and 
fostered a critical understanding of language and gender, may also have 
been instrumental in this regard. Indeed, two prominent theorists in the 
field of Discourse Analysis have acknowledged the significance of 
Feminism to critical understandings of language in society (see Fairclough, 
1985, p.742; van Dijk, 1993, p.251). 
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 Litosseliti (2006, p.23) and Wodak (1997a, p.7) assert that this discipline developed within Linguistics, 
rather than Feminism per se. 
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Social Cognition 
 
Before elaborating on Discourse Analysis, it is important to be mindful of 
the dynamic of cognition, which facilitates our listening, speaking, reading, 
writing, thinking, sense-making, understanding, and interpreting (see van 
Dijk, 1997c, pp.17-19). Language is a system that is integrated with our 
knowledge of the social world (de Beaugrande, 1997, p.40). Moreover, 
language users share a vast repertoire of socio-cultural knowledge, 
incorporating stereotypes (see White and White, 2006, p.259), attitudes, 
ideologies, norms, opinions, and values, even if they make different uses of 
that repertoire in different contexts (see van Dijk, 1997c, pp.17-31). This 
knowledge is informed by our social positioning as aged, classed, 
gendered, racialised, and sexualised human beings with cultural, historical, 
intellectual, and political baggage. This means that there is no hiding place 
in the neutral or the objective vis-à-vis the construction of knowledge or the 
conducting of research, not least because people can interpret the same 
event in different ways (see van Dijk, 2006, p.162).
56
 This interplay 
between the personal, the social and the cognitive implies that there are 
socially shared representations ‘out there’ (see Parker, 1999, p.3) of social 
groups, social organisation and social relations, all of which presuppose 
what is known as ‘social cognition’ (see van Dijk, 1993, p.257; van Dijk, 
2006, pp.159-177).
57
 For example, it is possible to discern the ideological 
affiliations of speakers when they use different words to refer to the same 
entity, such as black versus nigger, or freedom fighter versus terrorist 
(Sykes, 1985, p.87). These different uses of language denote lexical 
choices (Macgilchrist, 2007, p.78; van Dijk, 2006, p.166; Wang, 2009, 
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 See Cheng (2002, pp.309-317) for an analysis of American and Chinese interpretations of one incident, 
i.e. the mid-air collision of a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet. 
57
 Expressions such as ‘climate of fear’ and ‘public opinion’ implicitly rely upon social cognition. The 
utility of the genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b, p.72) that is known as ‘Letters to the Editor’ can 
implicitly presuppose the presence of a repertoire of socially shared knowledge (see van Dijk, 1997c, 
p.17) that is ‘out there’ (see Parker, 1999, p.3) ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993, p.257; van Dijk, 
2006, pp.159-177). Indeed, the use of the term ‘implicit’ depends on social cognition because the relevant 
text cannot make sense without it. 
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p.755), which signify particular representations of aspects to our social 
world (Fairclough, 1985, p.742) or particular conceptualisations of social 
relations at any given time and place (see Parker, 1990, p.12). Some of 
these terms are more ideologically loaded than others. The use of the term 
‘nigger’, for example, can tap into socially shared knowledge (see van 
Dijk, 1997c, p.17) of morally abhorrent practices, including incitement to 
hatred and slavery, all of which provoke responses and reactions in polity 
and society, including my difficulty in committing that word to print. This 
has its basis in the socio-cognitive. This is not to deny the racially 
motivated social practice that justifies / justified this use of language. 
Rather, it demonstrates that there can be other representations ‘out there’ 
(see Parker, 1999, p.3), including the conceiving of whipping and lynching 
as somehow integral to a particular social order, while abolitionists 
conceived of these practices as both morally and socially repugnant. The 
important point here in terms of my work is that social cognition is 
fundamental to discourse (see van Dijk, 1997c, p.31). 
 
Discourse 
 
Given that for van Dijk (1997c, p.1), the notion of discourse is ‘essentially 
fuzzy’, it is no surprise that a two-volume, seven hundred-page, 
multidisciplinary introduction to discourse studies, of which he is the 
editor, is required to provide an elaborate answer to a deceptively simple 
question: “What exactly is discourse, anyway?” (see Phillips and Hardy, 
2002, p.3; van Dijk, 1997c, p.1) According to Foucault (2004, p.54),
58
 
discourses are “… practices that systematically form the objects of which 
they speak.” These can include the unmarried mother and the illegitimate 
child (see Carabine, 2000, pp.78-93; Carabine, 2001, pp.267-310); the 
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 L’Archéologie du savoir was first published in 1969. 
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‘fake’ refugee or ‘black’ immigration (see van Dijk, 1997a, pp.31-64);59 or 
the dangerous homosexual (see Gouveia, 2005, pp.229-250). Drawing upon 
Foucault, Carabine (2001, p.268) sees discourse as comprising groups of 
related statements that cohere to produce both meanings and effects in 
society. For example, throughout the 19
th
 century in Britain, the discourse 
of bastardy constructed unmarried mothers as both immoral and 
undeserving of poor relief, except through the workhouse (see Carabine, 
2001). This seemingly commonsensical discourse, which normalised the 
State’s regulation of sexuality, also prevailed in Ireland for much of the 20th 
century. It was manifest in what were known as the Magdalene Laundries 
where ‘fallen women’, for example, were incarcerated for transgressing 
prevailing socio-sexual mores.
60
 The persuasiveness of this discourse relied 
upon, and codified, both the status of marriage as an institution that 
denoted the only ‘proper’ mechanism in which legitimate sexual activity 
could take place, and the imperative of marital procreation.
61
 The crucial 
point here is that discourses actively construct the social reality that they 
purport to merely reflect (Riggins, 1997, p.2). “In other words, social 
reality is produced and made real through discourses, and social 
interactions cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourses 
that give them meaning. As discourse analysts, then, our task is to explore 
the relationship between discourse and reality.” (Phillips and Hardy, 2002, 
p.3) 
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 Teun A. van Dijk consistently uses ‘scare quotes’ (see Fairclough, 2000a, p.173; Macgilchrist, 2007, 
p.82) throughout his work. In the above example, my sense is that this is done with a view to critiquing 
the ideological work (see Brookes, 1995, p.464) that brings into being these seemingly logical 
manifestations of immigration policy. 
60
 These institutions denoted Ireland’s 20th century manifestation of the workhouse. Ferriter (2009, p.17) 
makes a rather prescient observation in this regard, i.e. the virtual non-existence of ‘fallen men’ in 
Ireland. The point that I wish to make here is that it was women who tended to bear the brunt of the social 
opprobrium that was heaped on such ‘transgressions’ as pregnancy outside wedlock. 
61
 I discuss these issues in detail in Chapters Three and Four. The imperative of (marital) procreation is 
also a dynamic that I alluded to in the introduction to this research. 
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Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
 
Phillips and Hardy (2002, p.3) state that Discourse Analysis is both a 
method and a methodology; it is a theory that explains how we know the 
social world as well as a means for studying it. Similarly, Wood and 
Kroger (2000, p.x) state that Discourse Analysis “… is not only about 
method; it is also a perspective on the nature of language and its 
relationship to the central issues of the social sciences.” One such issue is 
the phenomenon of social inequality in all its manifestations, including 
those predicated on gender and sexual orientation. Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) focuses on inequality (van Dijk, 1993, p.252). “The aim of 
Critical Discourse Analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often 
obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as 
strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use.” 
(Wodak et al, 1999, p.8) It hones in on the ways in which “… social power 
abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by 
text and talk in the social and political context …” (van Dijk, 2001, p.352). 
This makes it best placed to facilitate an understanding of the issues that 
are under investigation in this thesis, i.e. the intransigence of inequality vis-
à-vis gender and sexual orientation in the realms of marriage and family in 
Ireland. 
 
Similar to the phenomenon whereby children seem to have a tireless 
preoccupation with the world ‘out there’, critical discourse analysts ask a 
lot of questions. While much can be gleaned from a fascination with the 
word ‘why’, a critical orientation vis-à-vis discourse analysis is such that 
our questions can begin with what, when, where, who, why, how, to whom, 
and with what effect (see Wodak, 1997b, p.65). Such questions find a home 
in CDA, the key elements of which imply a focus on pressing social issues 
or problems (see Fairclough, 2001, p.229; Ingulsrud and Allen, 2009, p.80; 
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Resende, 2009, p. 364; van Dijk, 1997g, p.451; Wodak, 1999, p.185), such 
as lesbian and gay inequality. There is a substantial body of literature that 
pertains to CDA, and it includes the work of Norman Fairclough, Teun A. 
van Dijk and Ruth Wodak. While this mode of study cannot be reduced to a 
‘just add critical and stir’ approach to the analysis of discourse, it is 
important to get a sense of what a critical orientation signifies, as the 
following extract suggests: 
 
Critical does not mean detecting only the negative sides of social 
interaction and processes and painting a black and white picture 
of societies. Quite the contrary: Critical means distinguishing 
complexity and denying easy, dichotomous explanations. It 
means making contradictions transparent. Moreover, critical 
implies that a researcher is self-reflective while doing research 
about social problems. Researchers choose objects of 
investigation, define them, and evaluate them. They do not 
separate their own values and beliefs from the research they are 
doing; recognizing … that researchers’ own interests and 
knowledge unavoidably shape their research. Taking such a 
position implies that researchers must be constantly aware of 
how they are analyzing and interpreting. They also need to keep 
a distance from their topic; otherwise, their research turns into 
political action (which is, of course, not in itself a bad thing) or 
becomes an attempt to prove what the researcher already 
believes. The data need to be allowed to speak for themselves. 
 
                                                                        Wodak, 1999, p.186 
 
This is an important quotation, and one that I am mindful of throughout this 
work. I acknowledge that, at the beginning of this research journey, I did 
try to prove precisely what I already believed, i.e. that the High Court 
ruling in Zappone and Gilligan was fundamentally flawed. The salience of 
Wodak (1999) is such that I was impelled to really reflect on my 
assumptions in that regard. These were invariably informed by my politics, 
specifically, my unequivocal support for the introduction of same-sex 
marriage in Ireland. That process of reflection made me acutely aware of 
 57 
the importance of researcher reflexivity, in terms of the ‘thinking’ and 
‘doing’ of critical research. This is not about letting go of my politics or 
about proving political indifference to the research topic (see Wodak et al, 
1999, p.8). Rather, the above extract from Wodak (1999) enabled me to 
negotiate my presence in the research in a meaningful way, without it 
detracting from the utility of critical thinking and the ‘doing’ of critical 
analysis. I will revisit the dynamic of researcher reflexivity later in this 
chapter. Here, I elaborate on those elements of my CDA tool kit that enable 
me to unpack those discursive processes that routinely reproduce inequality 
in society. 
 
CDA: Important Considerations 
 
Because I conduct a critical discourse analysis of a constitutional court 
ruling in Chapter Five, I discuss important aspects to the production of 
discourse by the judiciary and expert witnesses in Chapter One. My critical 
orientation is such that the conducting of this research demands reflection 
on the ways in which such persons can be complicit in the routine 
reproduction of inequality and / or social norms, irrespective of whether or 
not they found for, or testified on behalf of, the plaintiffs or the State in 
Zappone and Gilligan. Similarly, my critical discourse analysis in Chapter 
Six unmasks some of the ways in which politicians / legislators can be 
complicit in the routine reproduction of gay / lesbian inequality and 
heteronormativity in Ireland. Again, the ‘doing’ of critical analysis requires 
reflection on the reproduction of these social phenomena through 
discourse, irrespective of whether or not individual politicians / legislators 
either supported or opposed the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage, 
and either supported or opposed the 2010 civil partnership legislation. In 
terms of methodological orientation, I refer to judges, expert witnesses, and 
politicians or legislators as elites. What sets them apart from other 
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producers of discourse, such as letter writers to newspaper editors, for 
example, is their range of what is referred to as ‘access to discourse’ (see 
Fairclough, 1989, p.62; van Dijk, 1993, p.255; van Dijk, 1996, p.84), and 
the dynamics to what van Dijk (1993, p.256) refers to as a ‘discourse 
access profile’. I will discuss these momentarily. My analysis in Chapter 
Six also incorporates material deriving from the genre of discourse (see 
Wodak, 1997b, p.72) that is known as ‘Letters to the Editor’. Letter writers 
tend to have quite limited access to the production of discourse in society. 
Moreover, this is mediated through the discourse access profile (see van 
Dijk, 1993) of newspaper editors. I will elaborate on these considerations 
momentarily. In Chapter One, I also discuss other elements of my CDA 
took kit that enable me to shed some light on the myriad ways in which 
inequality and social norms are routinely reproduced. These include Martín 
Rojo’s and van Dijk’s (1997, pp.523-566) theorisation of legitimation, and 
the attendant ‘us and them’ thesis (Brickell, 2001, p.223; Martín Rojo and 
van Dijk, 1997, p.539). The ‘us / them’ distinction is linked to the 
ideological wherewithal of difference, which is a concept that I theorise in 
Chapter Two. Because Chapters Three and Four contextualise, in a 
historical sense, the research topic that is under investigation, I also discuss 
my reliance on, and the utility of, the discourse-historical approach 
(Wodak, 1997b, pp.65-87; Wodak, 1999, pp.185-193) in Chapter One. 
 
Discourse Access Profile of Elites: The Judiciary 
 
With regard to the routine production, reproduction and legitimisation of 
social inequality, all of which are interrogated in this thesis, consideration 
of what is referred to as ‘access to discourse’ is important (Fairclough, 
1989, p.62; van Dijk, 1993, p.255; van Dijk, 1996, p.84). For example, van 
Dijk (1996, p.90) highlights the judiciary’s range of access, specifically 
Supreme Court justices, because their decision-making can often denote the 
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last word on important legal, political and social issues that can affect a 
nation. This is because their institutionally granted authority, which is 
derived from the Irish Constitution (1937),
62
 is socially acknowledged and 
supported (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996, p.476). Moreover, “… 
having access to prestigious sorts of discourse and powerful subject 
positions enhances publicly acknowledged status and authority.” 
(Fairclough, 1989, p.64) Indeed, there is a striking parallel between social 
power and discourse access (van Dijk, 1993, p.256). Trappings of the court, 
such as wigs, gowns, gavels, and benches, which are part of what van Dijk 
(1993, p.256) refers to as a ‘discourse access profile’, combined with their 
institutional authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996, p.476) and 
legitimacy, enable the coming into being of the last word on constitutional 
cases, for example. Because Irish society has valid expectations with regard 
to the professionalism and independence of the judiciary, it is important to 
support the integrity of that office. However, “… beyond the scope and the 
range of their discourse access, the power of judges should especially also 
be measured by the personal, social and political consequences of such 
access. Indeed, in the legal domain, their discourse may be law.” (van Dijk, 
1996, p.90) I believe that judges can sometimes fail to recognise the ways 
in which their text and talk can perpetuate oppression in society. I reflect 
on all of these dynamics to the discourse access profile of judges (see van 
Dijk, 1993; 1996) throughout my analysis of the 2006 High Court ruling in 
Zappone and Gilligan in Chapter Five. 
 
Discourse Access Profile of Elites: Expert Witnesses 
 
With regard to the routine reproduction of inequality in society, the 
discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 1993) of expert witnesses warrants 
attention. For example, in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan, the High 
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 See Appendix I for details of Articles 34, 35 and 36 of the Irish Constitution (1937). 
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Court relied on such expertise to the extent that some of it helped to inform 
the outcome of this constitutional case. Aspects to such profiles can include 
the following: professional credentials; affiliation with accredited 
institutions, such as universities or hospitals; professional stature within 
those institutions; patronage, affiliation or membership of think-tanks; and 
maintaining a media profile. It is important to make the point that expertise 
can be independent of these dynamics. Nonetheless, they can presuppose 
authority and credibility within disciplines, such as Psychiatry, for 
example. With regard to these High Court proceedings, my initial interest 
in the testimony of three psychiatrists derived from the manner in which 
their professional profiles necessarily implied that they denoted expert 
knowers, thinkers, interpreters, and testifiers in a case pertaining to the 
right to marry. However, it is the myriad ways in which some expertise 
facilitates the construction and reification of particular ‘truths’ that largely 
informs my CDA in Section Two of Chapter Five. 
 
Discourse Access Profile of Elites: Politicians / Legislators 
 
Here, I highlight some considerations with regard to the discourse access 
profile (see van Dijk, 1993) of politicians, which may impact upon 
parliamentary debate and communication with their constituency.
63
 These 
can include the following dynamics: holding ministerial office; 
responsibility for a crucial portfolio; membership of the governing party; 
party-political allegiance; track record in terms of sponsoring, supporting 
and / or opposing proposed or enacted legislation; maintaining a high-
profile position within the Oireachtas; commanding a national or 
international profile; and maintaining a media profile. What I refer to as a 
‘technologisation’ of ‘parish-pump’ politics has occurred in Ireland such 
that politicians can communicate with a constituency that exceeds its 
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 Both of these dynamics are important in terms of the critical analysis of discourse in Chapter Six. 
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narrow geographical / political boundary. The public can now ‘meet’ 
politicians in the Oireachtas without ever leaving home or venturing to a 
constituency office. This has blurred the line between constituency 
boundary and public representation to the extent that politicians may not 
know the crucial ‘who’ or ‘where’ behind the ‘what’ in electronic 
communication that they receive in their professional capacities.
64
 These 
‘unknowns’ may inform the decision to respond to such communication in 
the first instance, as well as the general tenor of that response. Other 
aspects to response rate and tenor include the following: the extent to 
which an issue has attracted publicity or gained status within public 
discourse; the socio-political backdrop against which initial communication 
took place, such as the looming prospect of a general election; and the 
discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 1993) of both the politician / 
legislator and the member of the public who initiated the contact. I 
reflected on these considerations while conducting critical analyses of the 
following: some of the responses that I received from politicians / 
legislators on foot of correspondence to them vis-à-vis the 2004 enactment 
of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland; some of the 
parliamentary debates that took place with regard to the 2010 enactment of 
civil partnership legislation in Ireland. Sections Two and Three of Chapter 
Six comprise these analyses. 
 
Access to Discourse: Non-Elites / ‘Ordinary’ People 
 
Bergvall and Remlinger (1996, p.473) critique the preoccupation with the 
discourse of elites by stating that in order to “… understand the complex 
and changing nature of our societies, critical discourse analysts must also 
examine how non-elites struggle against simple reproduction of traditional 
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 This refers to whether or not the communication comes from an actual constituent. The ‘parish-pump’ 
nature of Irish parliamentary politics is such that this is a crucial dynamic. I encountered it many times 
over the course of my communication with politicians regarding their voting record vis-à-vis the 2004 ban 
on same-sex marriage, which I discuss in Chapter Six. 
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power systems …”. While Mancini and Rogers (2007, pp.35-50) do not 
couch their CDA in terms of elites and non-elites, their analysis of patient 
narratives in the context of mental health treatment and recovery in the 
United States denotes an important challenge to the dominant discourse of 
medicalisation.
65
 With regard to my thesis, the important point here is that 
resistance to the normative wherewithal of institutionalised heterosexuality 
presupposes a struggle over meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007, pp.75-76; 
Taylor, 2004, p.435; Wodak, 1999, p.191) vis-à-vis the institutions of 
marriage and family in Ireland. It is precisely this struggle, combined with 
my concern about the manner in which heteronormativity and heterosexism 
are routinely justified, that inform my analysis. While I dislike the term 
‘non-elite’ because it suggests a ‘lacking’ that is pathological rather than 
socio-structural, the interpretation of discourse that emanates from people 
who have limited access to the production of discourse denotes an 
important dimension to my work. Here, I refer to the genre of ‘Letters to 
the Editor.’ The act of writing to the print media represents a manifestation 
of what could be seen as ‘counter-power’ by ‘ordinary’ people (see van 
Dijk, 1993, p.256). In that regard, this genre could be conceived of as an 
example of non-institutional discourse or public discourse, albeit with the 
caveat that elite groups in society have access to this mode of discourse.
66
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 Their application of CDA captures a poignancy that can strike at the heart of the taken-for-granted 
assumptions that tend to reify medicalisation. Having said that, their analysis is not meant to negate the 
efficacy of medicine in the treatment of mental illness. Rather, Mancini and Rogers (2007, p.49) assert 
that CDA is well suited to advocacy-based research because of its potential to illustrate practices of 
resistance. 
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 In Chapter Three, I make reference to Professor Casey’s (2008a,b,c) thesis regarding the institution of 
marriage and family. She put forward her views in this genre of discourse. See also Casey (2008d,f) and 
Casey (2008e), the latter of which denotes an ‘Opinion’ piece in a national daily newspaper in Ireland. 
Professor Casey was an expert witness in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan. I discuss important aspects 
to her expertise in Chapter Five. 
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Letters to the Editor 
 
Here, I discuss some important considerations with regard to this genre.
67
 
Cognisance of the gate-keeping role of newspaper editors is perhaps the 
most important aspect to the interpretation of text from this genre. It is 
difficult to discern the percentage of letters that are printed as compared to 
the total volume that is received by an editor. Therefore, published letters 
may or may not be representative of those that are received or pertain to a 
particular topic. It is difficult to determine whether or not an editor’s 
ideological baggage informs the selection of letters for printing. Indeed, the 
selection criteria themselves that are part of this editorial screening process 
are unknown. Another problematic aspect vis-à-vis critical analysis here is 
that editors retain the authority to edit text according to editorial demands. 
This is not meant to suggest that such gatekeepers set out to compromise 
the general tenor of letters, even in instances where the letter writers’ views 
may be at odds with those of editors. Nonetheless, the mystery surrounding 
these aspects to their discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 1993) is 
problematic.  
 
It should be borne in mind that the general tenor of letters might be 
informed by the publicly perceived ideological leaning of both the 
newspaper and its reporting staff. The strength and persuasiveness of its 
‘Opinion’ pieces and ‘Editorials’ are important, both in terms of readership 
volume, which is integral to getting a letter writer’s message ‘out there’, 
and the degree to which such readers might be impelled to put pen to paper 
in the first instance. Another consideration is that letter writers may or may 
not be representative of the general population, in that the genre might only 
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 I draw upon Hull (2001, pp.210-212) in setting out the dynamics of this genre of discourse (see Wodak, 
1997b, p.72), many of which are attributable to her. The significance of Hull (2001) is not limited to her 
analysis of ‘Letters to the Editor’ in the context of generating public debate surrounding same-sex 
marriage in Hawaii. Reading her article enabled me to conceive of dynamics to the genre that appear to be 
almost self-evident, but which were, nonetheless, difficult for me to capture and elaborate on heretofore. 
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impel a cohort that is directly affected by an issue to air their views 
publicly in the letters’ pages. Indeed, civil society groups that were set up 
with regard to a particular social issue might encourage letter writing to 
newspapers. A writers’ strength of opinion, the degree of controversy 
surrounding a topic, and whether or not the issue has entered public 
discourse, are also likely to prompt engagement with an editor and the 
readership through this genre. In this regard, it can be a persuasive mode of 
communication if such opinion is accompanied by intellectual rigour, 
systematic elaboration, and robust argumentation. I was mindful of these 
considerations throughout my CDA of ‘Letters to the Editor’ that were 
published in a national daily newspaper over the course of the proceedings 
and deliberations in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan in 2006.
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Legitimation 
 
Martín Rojo’s and van Dijk’s (1997, pp.523-566) theorisation of 
legitimation in Spanish parliamentary discourse on ‘illegal’ immigration 
proved helpful to my research. The crucial dynamic for them is that elites, 
such as the State, seek normative approval for policies through a series of 
strategies, the aim of which is to demonstrate that such actions are 
consistent with moral order, which is conceived of as the system of laws 
and norms that have been agreed upon by the majority of citizens (see 
Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, pp.527-550). One of the principles in their 
thesis is that legitimation can be accomplished through persuasive 
discourse that commonsensically hones in on institutional dynamics that 
are beneficial for society (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, pp.527-
550). This is applicable to the dominant understanding of marriage and 
family in Article 41 of the Irish Constitution (1937). The legitimacy of the 
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 Some of the above dynamics are relevant to the public consultation process that I alluded to in the Irish 
trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition, wherein advocacy groups engaged with the State 
with a view to furthering the imperative of gay and lesbian equality in Ireland. 
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Irish State’s position in this regard is derived from this authoritative source, 
which comes from the people, and the context within which the meaning of 
Article 41 has been authoritatively interpreted for decades, which is 
through case law in our constitutional courts. In the struggle over the 
meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007, pp.75-76; Taylor, 2004, p.435; Wodak, 
1999, p.191) of Article 41, such as that which obtained in the High Court in 
Zappone and Gilligan, the State commonsensically appealed to 
jurisprudence to both justify its position and sustain its legitimacy.
69
 Martín 
Rojo’s and van Dijk’s (1997) theorisation was also helpful in terms of my 
interpretation of some of the parliamentary debates that took place in 2009 
and 2010 with regard to the introduction of a civil partnership regime in 
Ireland. Of particular interest was the way in which the responsible 
minister justified aspects to the legislation that proved controversial, 
because of the dominant understanding of Article 41. He was often at pains 
to point out that this new legislative initiative was the result of careful and 
competent consideration of case law, which was crucial for its legitimation. 
Moreover, the institutional authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996, 
p.476) of the Office of the Attorney General furthered the ‘truth’ that there 
was no alternative pathway vis-à-vis the formal recognition of same-sex 
relationships. It ultimately proved to be a formulation that was largely 
acceptable to political elites in Ireland.
70
  
 
Negative Representation of the ‘Other’ 
 
Over the course of their theorisation on legitimation, Martín Rojo and van 
Dijk (1997, p.539) also introduce the concept of ‘us and them’, which 
necessitates the positive self-presentation of what is deemed to be the 
‘ingroup’, i.e. government and immigration authorities, and the negative 
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 I will revisit this issue in Chapter Five. 
70
 I will revisit this issue in Chapter Six. 
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presentation of the ‘outgroup’ or the ‘Other’,71 i.e. the routinely 
criminalised ‘illegal aliens’ (Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997, p.526). In her 
critical analysis of the ideological construction of Africa in two British 
newspapers, Brookes (1995, pp.481-487) provides examples of the 
‘negative other’, which corresponds to what is referred to as the 
‘unredeemable darkness of the African condition’, and the ‘positive self-
representation’ of invariably civilised westerners. Such ‘truths’ are akin to 
those that routinely justified colonialism, as both ideology and practice. 
Here, there is a palpable sense of a pathological ‘lacking’ residing in the 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), which is part of a seemingly natural order 
that is determined by historically dominant groups and their vested 
interests. van Dijk (1993, p.263) asserts that this strategy of positive and 
negative representation then serves to justify inequality. The ‘us/them, 
norm/Other distinction’ (Brickell, 2001, p.223) is also routinely deployed 
to legitimate social norms, including heteronormativity. For example, 
Brickell (2001, p.223) remarks on the controversy surrounding the proposal 
to introduce a ‘queer’ television show in New Zealand. Crucially, he asserts 
that the ubiquity of televised heterosexuality was never questioned 
(Brickell, 2001, p.223). While my analysis of the 2006 High Court ruling in 
Zappone and Gilligan partly relies on the ‘logic’ of ‘us and them’ (see 
Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), my focus is not on a 
dominant group’s overtly positive self-representation per se. Rather, it 
centres on the idea that difference implicitly denotes deficiency or 
pathology (see Baumrind, 1995, p.135).
72
 The ‘logic’ of the criminalisation 
of homosexuality in Ireland in the 19
th
 century is an example of this. 
Moreover, conceiving of homosexuality as an orientation that the ‘Other’ 
(see de Beauvoir, 1988) can convert from, rather than to, is indicative of 
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 I elaborate on this concept in my theorisation of equality and difference in Chapter Two. 
72
 I reiterate that Baumrind (1995) does not conceive of difference as necessarily implying deficiency. I 
will revisit this important dynamic in Chapters Two and Five respectively, in terms of my theorisation of 
equality / inequality, and my analysis of the 2006 High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. 
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this seemingly self-evident pathology. Stewart’s (2008, pp.63-83) CDA of 
a series of media advertisements in the United States pertaining to 
‘reparative therapy’ that can ‘treat’ homosexuality critiques this ‘logic’.73 
The general point that I wish to make here is that when there is important 
ideological work to be done (see Brookes, 1995, p.464), such as the 
‘legitimation’ of gay or lesbian inequality and heteronormativity, the 
‘logic’ of ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 
1997), which requires the routine pathologisation of the gay or lesbian 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), is particularly acute.74 
 
Framing 
 
Here, I highlight Smith’s (2007, pp.5-26) analysis of the discursive 
construction and framing of same-sex marriage as a public policy issue in 
Canada and the United States. While she does not place her analysis within 
the realm of CDA, her discussion on framing, which denotes the cognitive 
schema by which people organise information about the social world (see 
Smith, 2007, p.7), is pertinent. It facilitates a focus on the ‘what, when, 
where, who, why, how, to whom, and with what effect’ questions (see 
Wodak, 1997b, p.65) that are central to critical analysis in that “… battles 
over policy are battles over the framing of ideas, especially ideas that 
define a policy problem and its solution.” (Smith, 2007, p.8) For example, 
Helleiner and Szuchewycz (1997, pp.109-130) provide a critical analysis of 
how some of the print media in Ireland once framed the ‘[I]tinerant 
problem’ as a problem that required eradication. Through local print media, 
part of the problem was constructed and reproduced out of a seemingly 
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 Stewart (2008) uses scare quotes (see Fairclough, 2000a; Macgilchrist, 2007) throughout his analysis, 
perhaps to signify his rejection of the ideology that is at the heart of the idea that gay men and lesbians 
can be ‘cured’ of their respective ‘afflictions’. Against the backdrop of the criminalisation of 
homosexuality in Ireland, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (1990, p.32) categorically stated that gay 
men and lesbians were not ‘sick’ and that they did not need to be ‘cured’. 
74
 I will revisit this issue in the context of parenting and child development in Section Two of Chapter 
Five. I reiterate that I will elaborate on the concept of the ‘Other’ in Chapter Two over the course of my 
theorisation of equality, inequality and difference. 
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commonsensical pathology that was associated with the threat of danger, 
dirt and disease (see Helleiner and Szuchewycz, 1997, pp.113-116). In her 
critical analysis of an apartment building circular about homeless persons 
in Brazil, Resende (2009, p.373) finds that “… the real problem is not their 
street circumstances but ‘their remaining near our building’.”75 A core issue 
in my thesis is the struggle over the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007, 
pp.75-76; Taylor, 2004, p.435; Wodak, 1999, p.191) of the term ‘marriage’ 
in Ireland, and whether or not it can encompass a personal rights frame for 
lesbians and gay men that is grounded in the principle of equality. There is 
no statutory definition of the term ‘marriage’ in Ireland (Inter-Departmental 
Committee on Reform of Marriage Law, 2004, p.4). Therefore, the 
courtroom denotes a key site of contestation in this regard. By virtue of 
their institutional authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996, p.476), 
which facilitates their access to the production of discourse, elites have 
continually provided the ‘proper’ definition of marriage in Ireland, which 
helped to bring about the dominant framing of the ‘problem’ of same-sex 
marriage in the High Court in 2006 (see van Dijk, 1996, pp.85-86; van 
Dijk, 1997a, p.34). Here, the almost inevitable conclusion was that there 
could not be a right to same-sex marriage in Ireland, which was the State’s 
position in Zappone and Gilligan. The important point here is that the 
dominant framing of a problem is invariably linked to its solution. 
Therefore, asking the ‘what, when, where, who, why, how, to whom, and 
with what effect’ questions (see Wodak, 1997b, p.65) is crucial, both in 
terms of understanding prevailing social relations and the realisation of 
social change. These dynamics are very much in keeping with a critical 
approach to social research (see Sarantakos, 1994, p.37). 
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 Resende (2009) provides a trenchant critique of the normative framing of this latter ‘problem’. 
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Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) 
 
One way of ensuring that critical analysis is rigorous and systematic 
(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p.259) is to employ a discourse-historical 
approach or methodology to one’s research (Wodak, 1997b, pp.65-87; 
Wodak, 1999, pp.185-193). As stated earlier, this requires the integration of 
texts from as many different genres as possible, as well as the historical 
dimension of the subject matter that is under investigation, into the 
interpretation of discourse (Wodak, 1999, pp.187-188; Wodak, 2001, p.6). 
Wodak (1997b) provides an insight into the application of this approach 
against the backdrop of residual anti-Semitic prejudice in Austria. This 
enabled her and her colleagues to trace in detail the construction of the 
‘Jewish Other’ as it emerged in public discourse during what became 
known as the Waldheim Affair in the 1980s.
76
 Their attendant analysis 
incorporates such dynamics as argumentation strategy, which includes the 
rejection of responsibility and its displacement onto the ‘Other’, and 
resorting to scapegoating, which routinely assigns culpability to the victims 
of prejudice (Wodak, 1997b, pp.73-74). Wodak (1997b, p.74) states: “With 
the exception of prejudice dealing with sexuality, virtually every 
imaginable prejudice against Jews appeared somewhere in our material.” 
Their research demonstrates that a rigorous analysis necessitates a 
contextual, historical and socio-cultural grounding of the issues that are 
under investigation. The discussion in Chapter Three of my research, which 
centres on the evolving institution of marriage in the West, is informed by 
the utility of the DHA. My analysis in Chapter Four, which draws upon the 
historical controversies surrounding contraception and divorce in Ireland, 
facilitates an exposition of the dominant understanding of marriage and 
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 Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, became President of Austria in 1986. 
Over the course of the election campaign, allegations emerged about his military record during World 
War II, specifically, his membership of the Nazi Party and his knowledge of the deportation of Jews (see 
Wodak, 1997b, pp.65-67). In this article, Ruth Wodak is recounting an earlier study that she conducted 
with colleagues, which was published in the 1990s. 
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family that still prevails in this country. Furthermore, the analysis of text 
from the following genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) in Chapter Six 
forms part of this approach to critical analysis, which also facilitates an 
understanding of the dominance of the nuclear family paradigm in Ireland: 
‘Letters to the Editor’ that were published against the backdrop of the High 
Court proceedings and ruling on same-sex marriage in 2006; written 
communication from politicians / legislators with regard to the 2004 ban on 
same-sex marriage; and parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction 
of civil partnership in 2010. These layers of discourse (Wodak, 1997b, 
p.72) cohere to produce a social, political, legal, and constitutional 
contextualisation (see van Dijk, 1997g, p.452) of the struggle over the 
meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage 
and family in Ireland. This contextualisation is then integrated into my 
interpretation of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan (see 
Wodak, 2001, p.6), so as to better understand the myriad ways in which 
gay and lesbian inequality is routinely ‘justified’ in Ireland. 
 
Other CDA Considerations 
 
An interesting application of CDA is Kahu and Morgan’s (2007, pp.134-
146) analysis of the discursive construction of women in a policy document 
that the New Zealand Government commissioned regarding female 
participation in the labour market. By asking the ‘who’ and the ‘with what 
effect’ questions (see Wodak, 1997b), the authors demonstrate the non-
obvious ways (see Fairclough, 2001, p.229) in which language use is 
ideological. Their analysis made me aware of the ways in which seemingly 
trivial aspects to language, such as preposition use, can reinforce social 
inequality. Similarly, Resende (2009, p.374) demonstrates how the use of 
the term ‘just’ can rationalise the actions of an in-group, which compounds 
an out-group’s marginalisation, and then mitigates the gravity of 
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homelessness. Her critical analysis highlights the ways in which language 
use serves to uphold the status quo. Cheng’s (2002, pp. 309-317) analysis 
of the reporting of a spy-plane incident in 2001, and the attendant concern 
over the possibility of a diplomatic crisis emerging between China and the 
United States, made me aware of the discursive wherewithal of the term 
‘if’. While already cognisant of its capacity to justify inequality, I had not 
conceived of it as a face-saving device (see Cheng, 2002, pp.310-311), or 
as an instrument that could absolve blame, or one that could give license to 
what I conceive of as unacceptable. These ‘iffy’ dynamics are pertinent to 
my critical analysis of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan.
77
 All 
of the above examples serve as reminders of the less obvious (see Lazar, 
2005a, p.13) and non-obvious ways (see Fairclough, 2001, p.229) in which 
language use is ideological. 
 
Further Methodological Considerations 
 
Reflexivity 
 
CDA research presupposes that a researcher is self-reflective while 
conducting analyses of social issues (see Wodak, 1999, p.186). This 
dynamic is referred to in the relevant literature as ‘reflexivity’ (see 
Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002, p.158). Reflexivity “… covers varying 
attempts to unpack what knowledge is contingent upon, how the researcher 
is socially situated, and how the research agenda / process has been 
constituted.” (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002, p.118) The following 
conceptualisation of reflexivity is also pertinent:  
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 In particular, I make reference to Extract I of the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, which is 
reproduced at the beginning of Chapter Five. 
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Often condemned as apolitical, reflexivity, on the contrary, can 
be seen as opening the way to a more radical consciousness of 
self in facing the political dimensions of fieldwork and 
constructing knowledge. Other factors intersecting with gender – 
such as nationality, race, ethnicity, class and age – also affect the 
anthropologist’s field interactions and textual strategies. 
Reflexivity becomes a continuing mode of self-analysis and 
political awareness. 
 
                                                                       Callaway, 1992, p.33  
 
Both of these conceptualisations resonate with me. Moreover, they fit 
easily with the requirements for conducting critical analyses of discourse. 
My age, class, ethnicity, gender, global location, nationality, and sexual 
orientation all help to shape my repertoire of knowledge (see van Dijk, 
1997c). This is also informed by familial, social, professional, and cross-
cultural interaction, along with other aspects to social life, such as formal 
education attainment and religious affiliation. These invariably shape my 
perspectives on a myriad of concepts and social issues ranging from 
equality and inequality to marriage and family. All of these dynamics shape 
my sense of self, both as a citizen and as a researcher. My knowledge, 
which comprises an awareness of what I know and what I do not know, 
what I understand and what I do not understand at this point in time, 
informs me as a researcher of social phenomena. It informs every aspect to 
this thesis, from the questions that swirl about on its pages, to the answers 
that are constituted by the research process. It informs both my choice of 
research topic and my rationale for embarking on this research. Moreover, 
my perspective on same-sex marriage informs every aspect to this thesis. 
 
Marriage Equality  
 
This research was borne out of my concern about the routine 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in the context of marriage and 
family in Ireland. This dictates that lesbians and gay men simply do not 
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have the right to marry in Ireland. I disagree with this philosophy. I believe 
that gay men and lesbians do have a right to marry, which is derived from 
Articles 40 and 41 of our Constitution. My perspective is consistent with 
the general premise of what is referred to as ‘marriage equality’ (see Herek, 
2006, pp.607-621; Pillinger, 2008, pp.1-44), which is that the right of gay 
men and lesbians to marry is linked to the fundamental principle of 
equality. 
 
Marriage and Family as Institution 
 
Marriage in Ireland is a civil and social institution that is bound up in a 
legislative and constitutional framework.
78
 Currently, it is inextricably 
linked to the dominant understanding of family, such that both denote one 
heteronormative institution in Ireland, rather than two. The intertwining of 
the legal with the constitutional provides for the attendant rights and 
responsibilities that flow from the civil status of marriage. It is conceivable 
that this constitutional and legislative underpinning may have codified the 
idea that marriage denoted the only ‘legitimate’ form of adult intimate 
relationship in Ireland. This status would have been commensurate with the 
‘gold standard’. My sense is that the imperative of marital procreation, 
which codified the seemingly inextricable link between marriage and 
family in Ireland, also helped to construct an orderly heterosexuality that 
was regulated through this social institution. 
 
Heteronormativity 
 
Heteronormativity dictates that institutionalised heterosexuality denotes the 
standard for legitimate social and sexual relations (Ingraham, 2007, p.199). 
The ‘gold standard’ status of marriage in Ireland, which underscores, and is 
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 See Appendix VI for examples of marriage laws that prevailed in Ireland over the centuries. See 
Appendix I for details of Article 41 of our Constitution, which pertains to marriage and family. Here, I 
wish to state that I am not concerned with religious dimensions to the institution of marriage in this work. 
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underscored by, the dominant understanding of Article 41, is bound up in 
this ‘truth’. It ordained an ever so natural and rational hierarchy of 
relationships that has been continually codified through case law. For 
decades, there was no official space in Ireland for other committed and 
intimate adult relationships, irrespective of the core dynamics that defined 
any of them. Moreover, such relationships could not be deemed to 
constitute ‘proper’ families because of the constitutional position under 
Article 41. This remains the case, notwithstanding the instituting of 
legislative regimes for partnership and cohabitation in 2010. Therefore, a 
hierarchy of adult intimate and familial relationships inheres in the routine 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland. Attendant assumptions 
about sexual activity, human reproduction, biological and social 
parenthood, and gender complementarity fuel the seemingly natural link 
between heterosexuality and marriage, to the extent that marriage at the 
apex of a hetero-hierarchy (see Donovan, 2004, p.25) is ‘just the way it is’ 
(see Ingraham, 2007, p.198). My critical orientation challenges the routine 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland.  
 
Heterosexism 
 
Heterosexism routinely ‘justifies’ a crucial dimension to heteronormativity, 
i.e. dominance and subordination. Lorde (1993, p.17) asserts that it denotes 
“… a belief in the inherent superiority of one pattern of loving over all 
others and thereby its right to dominance …”. It is the social ‘ism’ that 
glosses over or negates egregious practices, such as the 2004 enactment of 
the legislative ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland. The embeddedness of 
heterosexuality vis-à-vis marriage, and the State’s obligation to protect this 
institution, which derives from Article 41, is such that the official 
understanding of the ban holds that it does not denote discrimination on the 
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basis of gender and sexual orientation. My politics are such that I utterly 
disagree with this ‘truth’. 
 
My Politics 
 
Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002, p.148) state that social researchers do not 
conduct research in a state of social isolation, and that we can carry 
intellectual and political baggage. The above conceptualisations provide 
clues as to the political dimension to my research. Taken in conjunction 
with other methodological considerations, they implicitly centre on the 
importance of unpacking socially constituted knowledge so as to critique 
the social relations that dictate that ‘this’, i.e. marriage and family as 
formally and currently constituted in Ireland, is ‘just the way it is’ (see 
Ingraham, 2007, p.198). Irish society must be predicated on the 
unequivocal affirmation and protection of constitutional rights. This is a 
fundamental precept because their denial, in whatever form, diminishes us 
all. Because societies, including Ireland, tend to be governed according to 
social norms that relate to assumptions surrounding criteria, including 
gender and sexual orientation, the imperative of unequivocal vindication is 
at its most acute in the context of minority rights. My belief is that the Irish 
State’s refusal to recognise, affirm, protect, and vindicate the right of 
lesbians and gay men to marry denotes a violation of their personal rights. 
With regard to the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, I believe 
that it is inappropriate to assert that the right of gay men and lesbians to 
marry cannot exist. Moreover, it is simply unacceptable to me, and 
profoundly offensive, to assert that the welfare of children necessarily 
denotes an issue that warrants endless attention and consideration vis-à-vis 
the distribution of marriage rights in Ireland (in the context of lesbianism 
and homosexuality). These two assertions denote ‘truths’ that are at the 
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heart of this High Court ruling.
79
 This critical discourse analysis will 
unpack the ‘logic’ that made these ‘truths’ inevitable. This ‘doing’ is very 
much in keeping with the critical orientation of my research. 
 
Intellectual Baggage 
 
Another aspect to researcher presence could be described as the 
‘intellectual bit’. When I reflect upon core tenets of our Constitution, I do 
so as both a citizen and a researcher with a background in the Discipline of 
Social Policy, rather than in Law. Therefore, I appreciate that complexities 
can attach to a social analysis that alludes to constitutional, judicial and 
legal principles. However, social analyses of Irish jurisprudence, for 
example, are warranted, not least because rulings in cases that come before 
our constitutional courts can have a tremendous impact on the fabric of 
Irish life. I have taken steps to address this dynamic to my formal education 
background, such as initiating contact with academics who have studied 
within the Discipline of Law. Moreover, I invited their feedback on 
Chapter Five of this thesis, which pertains to my analysis of the High Court 
ruling. Notwithstanding my lack of formal training in constitutional law, 
such steps help to ensure that this does not detract from my analysis. 
 
The Importance of Our Constitution 
 
… [T]he Constitution is not merely a document to be quoted and 
misquoted when the electorate is much exercised about personal 
or family rights, but is also the fundamental law of the State 
governing our relationships with each other and with the State 
itself, … 
 
Justice McCarthy, 1986, cited in Byrne and McCutcheon, 2009
80
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 This will become apparent as my analysis evolves in Chapter Five. 
80
 Supreme Court Justice McCarthy’s foreword initially appeared in the first edition of this textbook. 
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While it is important to take cognisance of, and reflect upon, the centrality 
of our Constitution to social life in Ireland, it is also important to state that 
the absence of a law degree or a voting card does not preclude anyone from 
interpreting its tenets. I conceive of the Constitution as a living entity that 
is not consigned to a dusty bookshelf. Previous generations gave it to us, 
and we will pass it on to future generations of children, women and men in 
Ireland. It speaks to me as a woman, a citizen and a researcher. Whilst I 
believe that it is important to respect its fundamental precepts, I struggle 
with dynamics to the Constitution that either enshrine a narrow 
understanding of woman or ignore her altogether.
81
 For example, a strict or 
narrow interpretation of Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 
31, 32, 33, 34, and 35 would dictate that women are precluded from 
assuming crucial posts in the public sphere, such as the presidency or the 
premiership of this country. Notwithstanding the relentless recourse to 
male terms of reference in these articles, and while sexism can prevail, 
gender per se does not preclude attainment of high public office in Ireland. 
This example demonstrates that Ireland has changed in important ways 
since the ratification of our Constitution in 1937. Normative assumptions 
surrounding the role of women in the 1930s are simply unacceptable now 
in the wider society. While I do not support the use of male terms of 
reference to denote the ‘generic whomever’, the sense that the document 
can speak to everyone, and not just to men, highlights our Constitution’s 
capacity to transcend time, in that it is precisely social change that can 
render strict interpretations of the text to be both reductive and redundant.
82
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 In the 1970s, Irish feminist organisations, such as Irishwomen United, called for a review of the 
Constitution with a view to examining the role of women and eliminating gender discrimination (see 
Irishwomen United, n.d.). This organisation’s charter provided a trenchant critique of the inherent 
assumptions about women that underpin conceptualisations of Article 41. 
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 Any textual change to our Constitution requires a referendum, which is ultimately decided by the 
electorate. Another important point here is that the evolving understanding of the dynamic of gender vis-
à-vis our Constitution did not require constitutional change, precisely because of the Constitution’s 
capacity to both reflect, and serve as a catalyst for, social change, often through case law. 
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This is an important consideration vis-à-vis the interpretation of Article 41 
of our Constitution.
83
 
 
My Evolving Perspective on Relationship Recognition 
 
I have long believed that marriage denotes the ‘gold standard’ or ‘diamond 
standard’ in intimate adult relationships. It was not until I began to theorise 
marriage over the course of this research process, by tracing the historical 
aspects to the institution in the West, that I finally understood some 
feminists’ critique of it, which had always eluded me. Reading Vogel 
(1994) was instrumental in this regard, and this will become clear in 
Chapter Three. I subsequently read Norrie (2000) and Stoddard (1997), 
whose elaborations on aspects to the history of marriage crystallised the 
salience of Vogel (1994). Against the backdrop of an emergent debate on 
same-sex marriage in the United States,
84
 combined with my unfamiliarity 
of lesbian and gay politics, one consequence of my initial perspective on 
marriage was that I had presupposed that lesbians and gay men necessarily 
wanted to access this institution so as to acquire formal recognition and 
protection for their intimate relationships. Moreover, I believed that the 
general premise of civil partnership was a device that simply codified a 
two-tier system of relationship recognition, because marriage was 
‘logically’ at the apex.  
 
It was over the course of my elaboration on the institution of marriage that 
I began to appreciate some gay and lesbian opposition to it. Reading some 
of the contributions to a series of articles that comprised three special 
features on marriage in three volumes of Feminism and Psychology 
denoted an important ‘research moment’. I began to gain a better 
understanding of the feminist critique of, not just heterosexual marriage, 
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 I discuss this dynamic in Chapter Five. 
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 I lived in Massachusetts for part of my adult life. 
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but also same-sex marriage.
85
 Donovan (2004), Jeffreys (2004), and Wise 
and Stanley (2004) helped in this regard, and all are opposed to same-sex 
marriage. Bevacqua (2004), as another contributor to the series, is a lesbian 
feminist who supports marriage equality. Her article resonated with me 
because she alluded to a core dynamic that is at the heart of the routine 
operationalisation of marital norms in society, i.e. heterosexual privilege. 
Heretofore, I had never reflected on this, which is precisely the point. 
Feigenbaum (2007) and Wildman (1996) were instrumental in this regard. 
It was at that juncture in the research, having reflected on my own privilege 
as a heterosexual, that my perspective on civil partnership changed. My 
social position was such that, heretofore, it was easy for me to repudiate 
this device because it did not affect me directly. Moreover, I was unaware 
of the positive effects that a civil partnership infrastructure could have on 
gay men and lesbians who sought formal recognition and protection for 
their intimate relationships. I now realise that my privilege blinded me to 
the innovation of civil partnership, which is a mechanism that furthers 
lesbian and gay equality in Ireland. Having said that, Senator Norris’ 
perspective on the civil partnership legislation of 2010 (see Seanad 
Éireann, 2010a) does resonate with me. I argue that these dynamics 
demonstrate that the general premise of relationship and family recognition 
is well suited to understanding the complexity of equality and inequality, 
which I theorise in Chapter Two. 
 
This general process of reflection impelled me to rethink my position on 
marriage. I now believe that it denotes one of many forms of adult intimate 
relationship that warrants recognition and protection from the State. The 
difficulty is that, notwithstanding the instituting of a legislative regime for 
other forms of intimate relationships in Ireland, i.e. partnership and 
cohabitation, a hetero-hierarchy still prevails. Partnership, as is currently 
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 See volumes 13(4) in 2003, 14(1) in 2004, and 14(2) in 2004. 
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constituted in this jurisdiction, is only open to same-sex couples,
86
 while 
marriage is only open to opposite-sex couples.
87
 Marriage remains at the 
apex in that relationship hierarchy, partly because of the dominant 
understanding of Article 41 of our Constitution, and the social positioning 
of lesbians and gay men, particularly in terms of their roles as parents. For 
example, the parent – child relationship is largely ignored in our civil 
partnership infrastructure (see Fagan, 2011, pp.25-28; Ombudsman for 
Children, 2010, pp.1-11; Ryan, 2009, pp.12-15).
88
 With regard to the High 
Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, the dominant understanding of 
lesbian and gay parenthood is implicitly informed by the ‘logic’ of 
difference as deficiency or pathology (see Baumrind, 1995, p.135), which I 
theorise in Chapter Two. Consequently, both the constitutional and 
pathological dynamics ‘commonsensically’ cohere to dictate that gay men 
and lesbians do not have the right to marry in Ireland. ‘This’ is at the root 
of my thesis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discussed my research method and methodology. These 
considerations inform both the theoretical underpinnings of my work, 
which I discuss in Chapter Two, and my critical analysis of text from four 
genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) in Chapters Five and Six. My 
interest in language derives from its wherewithal to actively construct, 
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 See Appendix VII for details of Sections 3 and 7.3(e) of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and 
Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010. 
87
 See Appendix II for details of Section 2.2(e) of the Civil Registration Act, 2004. Here, I reiterate that 
our cohabitation regime is open to all couples, irrespective of sexual orientation. 
88
 Fagan (2011), which I alluded to as part of the Irish trajectory in the introduction to this thesis, denotes 
a trenchant critique of the State’s failure to recognise the relationship between children and their gay or 
lesbian parents, particularly in the context of non-biological or social parenthood. It is important to make 
the point that both of the other studies were written in the context of legislative proposals for civil 
partnership prior to the eventual enactment of that legislation in 2010. The Ombudsman for Children 
(2010) report is quite critical of the lack of adequate protections for children of civil partners in these 
proposals. While Ryan (2009) is quick to make the point that these proposals were not entirely silent with 
regard to children, his thesis seems to be that what is required is a root and branch review of family law, 
paying particular attention to determining the rights and responsibilities of non-biological or social 
parenthood. 
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rather than simply reflect, social relations (see Litosseliti, 2006; Riggins, 
1997), and the premise that language use is central to understandings of 
social phenomena, including the routine reproduction of inequality. What 
has emerged over the course of conducting research on language, which 
began in earnest with the linguistic turn (see Fairclough, 2000a; Gill, 
1995), and which then developed through the emergence of a myriad of 
disciplines (for example, see Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1997a; Wodak and 
Benke, 1997), is the thesis that language use actually denotes social action 
(see Chilton and Schäffner, 1997; Harré and Gillett, 1994; Wodak, 1999). 
This breakthrough gave rise to a field of study that is known as Discourse 
Analysis (see West et al, 1997). My interest in the ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ of 
such action, particularly in terms of the myriad ways in which the 
phenomenon of inequality is routinely produced and reproduced in society, 
is such that the field of Critical Discourse Analysis best suits my work. 
This centres on the intransigence of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland. 
In Chapter One, I elaborated on important dynamics that inform and enable 
critical analysis, including social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006), 
access to discourse (see Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1993; van Dijk, 1996), 
discourse access profiles (see van Dijk, 1993), and the discourse-historical 
approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011). I also discussed elements 
in my CDA tool kit that facilitate my analysis in Chapters Five and Six. 
These include the strategy of legitimation (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 
1997), which is particularly important in terms of elite discourses, and the 
‘logic’ of the ‘us / them’ distinction (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and 
van Dijk, 1997). This latter dynamic is linked to the core concept of 
difference, which, I argue in Chapter Two, is at the heart of the routine 
reproduction of inequality in society. In Chapter One, I also drew attention 
to the important dynamic of researcher reflexivity, with a view to 
acknowledging those aspects to my presence in the research that invariably 
impact upon my work. My evolving perspective on marriage is perhaps the 
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most unexpected ‘finding’ in terms of the ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ of 
researcher reflexivity. This ‘finding’ implicitly and invariably informed my 
understanding of the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family 
recognition, which I discussed in the introduction to this research. Indeed, 
all of the above considerations invariably inform and underpin, not just my 
critical analysis in Chapters Five and Six, but also my theorisation of the 
fundamental principle of equality. 
 
 83 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
In Theory: Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations 
 
Theory is not a superfluous distraction, but a necessity. It is the 
problem-identifier and the information-interpreter in the research 
process. Without it there is no way to explain the facts. 
 
                                                         Gagnon and Parker, 1995, p.3 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter makes plain the conceptual and theoretical framework that 
underpins this research. Here, I make the point that this framework 
informs, and is informed by, my methodological considerations that I 
discussed in Chapter One. Firstly, I tease out understandings of the 
fundamental principle of equality in the relevant literature. I allude to the 
complexity of this principle by elaborating on its co-existence with 
inequality. I identify the relevance and application of theorisations of 
equality and inequality to this thesis, such as de Beauvoir’s (1988)89 
analysis of the ‘Other’, which underscores the ‘logic’ of  ‘us and them’ (see 
Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), and the Baker et al 
(2004) theorisation of what is known as ‘equality of respect and 
recognition’, which I conceive of as fundamental to the premise of 
marriage equality (see Herek, 2006; Pillinger, 2008). In this chapter, I also 
capture the ideological wherewithal of the crucial concept of difference, by 
identifying a number of key strands to it. These are as follows: ‘difference 
as disadvantage’ (see Spicker, 2000); ‘difference as social relation’ (see 
Brah, 1991; 1996); ‘difference to’; ‘difference as deficit / defect / 
deviance’, which derives from Baumrind (1995) and Cameron and 
Cameron (1996); and ‘difference as deployment’, which derives from Brah 
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 Le Deuxieme Sexe, by Simone de Beauvoir, was first published in 1949. 
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(1991). What emerges is a sense that the social significance that attaches to 
the concept of difference is bound up with both the routine reproduction of 
inequality in society, such as that predicated on gender and sexual 
orientation, and the maintenance of social norms, such as heteronormativity 
(see Ingraham, 2007). My understanding in this regard is very much rooted 
in my critical approach to social research.  
 
Theorisation of Equality / Inequality 
 
This thesis centres on the premise that equality is a fundamental principle. 
One dynamic that helps to underscore this is the extent to which supporters 
of civil rights for lesbian and gay persons in Ireland use the principle to 
further their aims and objectives. For example, Zappone (2003) pays 
particular attention to equality in the context of charting a human rights 
agenda. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL, 2006) highlights the 
importance of this principle in relation to the development of family policy. 
Marriage Equality relies on this principle to advocate for lesbian and gay 
rights vis-à-vis marriage and family in Ireland.
90
 This strategy is not unique 
to the Irish context. Rather, it is one that is adopted in other countries with 
a view to furthering civil rights for lesbian and gay persons in general, and 
marriage rights in particular. For example, the Human Rights Campaign is 
the largest civil rights organisation in the United States that strives to 
achieve equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons (see 
Human Rights Campaign, 2011). Access to the institution of marriage is 
one of its core objectives. The enunciation of equality in Article 40 of our 
Constitution, combined with the raft of equality legislation that we have on 
our Statute Books,
91
 imply that this principle is central to the social contract 
between the State and its citizens. Therefore, it is important to theorise 
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 See www.marriagequality.ie 
91
 For example, the Employment Equality Act, 1998, the Equal Status Act, 2000, and the Equality Act, 
2004. See http://acts.oireachtas.ie 
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equality with a view to demonstrating its applicability to this research. That 
the principle is widely conceptualised suggests that there is something 
about it that warrants investigation. 
 
Equality is a contested concept. There could be a consensus on 
the rationale for equality. There could be agreement on which 
groups to focus on in equality strategies. There could be a shared 
concern at the persistence of inequalities and agreement on the 
need for change in the economic, political, cultural and caring 
domains. Yet alongside all this a contest of ideas could coexist – 
essentially about how far society needs to go or should go in 
terms of the level of equality sought and in terms of the 
mechanisms that can be deployed to achieve this level of 
equality. 
 
                                                                 Crowley, 2006, pp.14-15 
 
This statement conveys the complexity of equality in the sense that, 
notwithstanding its theorisation and application over the centuries, the 
many ways in which it can be conceptualised and operationalised at local, 
regional, national, and international levels are such that inequality remains 
a persistent phenomenon. It underscores the complex and contradictory 
nature of the concept of equality, in that the articulation of a rationale for it 
implicitly acknowledges the presence of inequality. Advocating equality 
for gay men, for example, presupposes that they experience some level of 
inequality. While manifestations of that inequality are manifold, such as the 
taint of criminality that still prevails in some jurisdictions (see Bruce-Jones 
and Itaborahy, 2011), they are all attributable to, and dependent upon, a 
state’s understanding of, and commitment to, equality. Moreover, the act of 
decriminalisation alone does not guarantee equality for gay men.
92
 
Therefore, the rationale for equality consistently operates against the 
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 The compelling logic of decriminalisation demands and requires the enactment of anti-discrimination 
and equality legislation that aims to redress the inequalities that derive from the worst excesses of 
heterosexism and homophobia, including the criminalisation of same-sex intimacy. See Waaldijk (2000; 
2004) in this regard. 
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backdrop of some form of inequality in society. This dynamic of co-
existence underscores the complexity of the concept. A pertinent example 
of this in the Irish context is the enactment of Section 37.1 of the 
Employment Equality Act, 1998, which denotes a religious ethos exemption 
clause with regard to the hiring, firing or promotion of personnel.
93
 It is 
particularly acute in the context of gay men and women as teachers in our 
public schools, which are almost entirely funded by the State.
94
 Teachers 
are vulnerable if their sexual orientation is deemed to run counter to the 
ethos of a school, the vast majority of which remain under the patronage of 
the Catholic Church. This law implies that such an employee’s state of 
being, doing, thinking, teaching, and mentoring in a professional capacity 
can necessitate constant caution, regulation and surveillance, because of the 
risk that is posed by what is referred to as the ‘promotion’ of 
homosexuality or lesbianism in schools.
95
 It is one of the most egregious 
manifestations of heterosexism and homophobia in Ireland today. It 
furthers the routine pathologisation of a minority cohort of the population 
because of some overriding imperative that somehow dictates that equality 
legislation cannot go too far. Apart from the personal and professional 
fallout from this legislative exemption, the message that equality is a 
                                           
93
 See Appendix II. 
94
 I use the term ‘almost’ because communities frequently fundraise so as to meet the deficit that arises 
due to the shortfall in funding from the State, which does not meet the costs that are associated with the 
running of our schools. 
95
 The following is an extract from a ‘Letter to the Editor’ of a national daily newspaper regarding 
Taoiseach Reynolds’ announcement of the Irish Government’s intention to decriminalise homosexuality 
in Ireland: “He couched his words in lofty phrases like “equal rights” and “adult responsibility.” Do 
parents realise what these equal rights mean? It means that an active homosexual life style will be 
presented in our educational system as a so-called “normal alternative life style.” After the Government 
has decriminalise[d] homosexual acts for over-17s, then it will be too late to make an objection to 
homosexual information being available in our schools. The Minister for Equality will advise the Minister 
for Education to place homosexual acts on an equal level with heterosexual love. Thus corruption will 
make its way through our integrated curriculum.” Randles (1993) wrote this in her capacity as Honorary 
Secretary of the Christian Family Movement, five years prior to the enactment of the equality legislation 
that contains the religious ethos exemption clause. I argue that an implicit reliance on a seemingly 
commonsensical pathology informs this extract from the letters’ page of The Irish Times, not least in 
terms of the inability to conceive of homosexuality as commensurate with love and intimacy, for 
example. Moreover, it is blindness to the ubiquity of heterosexuality (see Brickell, 2001), and its 
‘promotion’ through children’s textbooks, for example, that is so problematic when there is no classroom 
or staff room for the ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988). Please note that the term ‘taoiseach’ refers to our 
primeminister. 
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principle that can be trifled with is one of its most destructive of socio-
cognitive meanings. It begs an immediate question: why is this 
acceptable?
96
 This throws into sharp focus the phenomenon of inequality 
and a basis for its persistence in Ireland. It underscores the premise that a 
conceptualisation of equality also necessitates an analysis of inequality. 
Both concepts are part of an axis because it is difficult to discuss the former 
without also making reference to the latter.
97
 This theorisation thus far also 
demonstrates that the reproduction of inequality in society is bound up with 
the maintenance of social norms, specifically, heteronormativity. My 
critical discourse analysis, in terms of asking the ‘what, when, where, who, 
why, how, to whom, and with what effect’ questions (see Wodak, 1997b), 
challenges one aspect to the routine operationalisation of heteronormativity 
in Ireland today, i.e. the denial of lesbian and gay equality in the context of 
marriage and family. 
 
Theorisation of Difference 
 
Biological Difference 
 
A popular conceptualisation of equality is that all human beings are 
deemed to be equal and that we all enjoy equal rights (see Barry, 1992, 
p.322). Indeed, Article 40.1 of our Constitution deems all human beings to 
be equal before the law. Similarly, Baker et al (2004, p.23) define equality 
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 Here, it is important to make the point that some legislators have given a commitment to remove the 
threatening wherewithal of this clause from the 1998 legislation. In this regard, see Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Network (2012) and McGreevy (2012). In 2013, Deputy O’Brien of Sinn Féin and Senator Bacik 
of Labour introduced Private Member Bills in the Dáil and the Seanad respectively with a view to 
amending Section 37 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998. With regard to Deputy O’Brien’s initiative, 
i.e. Employment Equality (Amendment) Bill, 2013, see the following links: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2013/1913/b1913d.pdf and 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=22929&&CatID=59. With regard to Senator Bacik’s 
initiative, i.e. Employment Equality (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, 2013, see the following links: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2013/2313/b2313s.pdf and 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=23053&&CatID=59 
97
 Senator Norris’ perspective on our civil partnership legislation also underscores this phenomenon (see 
Seanad Éireann, 2010a). 
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in its most basic sense as “… the idea that at some very basic level all 
human beings have equal worth and importance, and are therefore equally 
worthy of concern and respect.” However, it can be difficult to translate 
this somewhat abstract ideal into practical reality in the sense that, while 
we are all the same, we are also different. While we share common 
characteristics by virtue of our humanity, there are also many differences 
that shape it. Some of these differences do not necessitate a theorisation of 
equality / inequality. Differences in eye colour or hair colour, for example, 
do not attract attention in the way that other biological differences do. It 
begs an immediate question: what is different about these differences? I 
argue that the answer lies in the social significance that attaches to them. 
This is an important point because the social world tends to be governed by 
assumptions that are borne out of the social significance that attaches to 
these differences. Spicker (2000, p.113) underscores this premise in his 
discussion on social inequality, and the idea that its link to difference is 
derived from social relationships. For example, gender is premised on the 
social significance that attaches to biological sex. Wilton (1996, pp.102-
121) provides an analysis of the significance that attaches to the sex organs 
in the human body. These body parts are allocated meaning in society such 
that, in terms of ‘doing gender’ (see Dryden, 1999), a systematic distinction 
is made between those who possess male organs and those who possess 
female organs (see Wilton, 1996, p.104). Wilton’s (1996, p.104) insights 
into the “… heavy burden of signification borne by the human genital 
organs …” strikes a chord with me for two reasons: prior to reading her 
article, I had never consciously attributed the phenomenon of gender 
inequality to such differences in the human body;
98
 her thesis regarding the 
allocation of meaning is significant in terms of the importance that I place 
on the social significance of difference. 
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 Gender inequality conjured up images of the ‘glass ceiling’, debates about female participation in the 
labour market, and gender disparities in wages, for example. However, I had not associated these 
manifestations of inequality with such differences in the female and male body. 
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Difference as Disadvantage 
 
This is not the only dimension to biology that attracts attention or allocates 
meaning in society. For example, assumptions underpinning differences in 
skin colour are embedded within a framework that governs social relations 
in a way that differences in eye colour or hair colour are not. Spicker 
(2000, p.113) states that “… differences imply inequality only if the 
difference leads to disadvantage. Many differences can cause disadvantage 
in social relationships.” Some differences are deemed irrelevant in the 
context of social organisation and social relations, while others are 
considered to be very significant. Differences in biological sex and skin 
colour, for example, operate as signifiers at the level of the social. They 
attract attention in analyses of inequality because such differences are 
linked to the social phenomena of sexism and racism, which have the 
‘logic’ of disadvantage, with its attendant ‘doer’, at the core. Such 
phenomena denote examples of the ideological wherewithal of difference. 
The emphasis on difference is important because it focuses attention on the 
range of inequalities that are experienced by a broad diversity of groups in 
society (Crowley, 2006, p.4). Indeed, equality legislation in Ireland reflects 
this emphasis on difference; Section 6.2 of the Employment Equality Act, 
1998 details nine categories, including gender and sexual orientation, 
which constitute a basis for relying on anti-discrimination protections in 
this jurisdiction.
99
 However, it is the social significance that attaches to 
difference, rather than difference per se, that requires theorisation. 
 
Difference as Social Relation 
 
Here, it is useful to draw upon Brah (1996, pp.115-127) who asserts that 
difference is an analytical category that can be conceptualised in four ways: 
difference as experience, as subjectivity, as identity, and difference as 
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 See Appendix II. 
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social relation. My focus throughout this thesis is on the latter dynamic. 
Brah’s (1996, pp.117-119) thesis on difference as social relation refers to 
the ways in which difference is constituted and organised into systematic 
relations through cultural and political discourses, for example, as well as 
institutional practices. Difference operates as a signifier at the level of the 
social that helps to explain and ‘justify’ inequality. Here, I draw upon 
another analysis that Brah put forward in 1991 so as to tease this matter out 
further: 
 
At the most general level ‘difference’ may be construed as a 
social relation constructed within systems of power underlying 
structures of class, racism, gender and sexuality. At this level of 
abstraction we are concerned with the ways in which our social 
position is circumscribed by the broad parameters set by the 
social structures of a given society. 
 
                                                                            Brah, 1991, p.171  
 
Here, my understanding is that in a world that is dominated by white male 
norms, for example, significance attaches to both the difference between 
whiteness and blackness, and the difference between maleness and 
femaleness. As a dynamic within an analytical framework, difference is 
used to legitimate structures that limit the life chances of those who occupy 
a subordinate position in society. For that position to ‘make sense’ as a 
category, there must be a dominant position that is invariably deemed to be 
the norm. Therefore, a hierarchy inheres in this social organisation. 
Kimmel (2004, pp.1-17) underscores this by asserting that references to 
gender necessarily involve a hierarchy wherein one gender is dominant. 
Similarly, references to gender involve privilege. Carbado (2000, pp.99-
104) documents many gender privileges to underscore his thesis on male 
privilege, which he asserts is neither recognised nor discussed. “We accept 
present-day social gender arrangements, and ideologies about gender as 
necessary, pre-political, and inevitable.” (Carbado, 2000, p.98) This 
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denotes a critique of the philosophy that this hierarchical social order is 
‘just the way it is’ (see Ingraham, 2007, p.198) While the prevailing social 
order is gendered, it also revolves around sexual orientation, as evidenced 
by the seemingly self-evident denial of marriage rights to lesbians and gay 
men in Ireland.  
 
Difference To 
 
There is another dimension to difference that underscores the significance 
of difference as disadvantage (see Spicker, 2000) and difference as social 
relation (see Brah, 1991; 1996), i.e. difference to. For example, with regard 
to gender and its attendant hierarchy (see Kimmel, 2004), it is the idea that 
women are different to men that legitimates the organisation of a social 
world that tends to be governed by male terms of reference. While my 
research pertains to the dynamic of sexual orientation, and the premise that 
social relations tend to be governed by a heterosexist diktat, much can be 
gleaned from analyses of gender and the phenomenon whereby social 
relations tend to be governed by male norms. A particularly cogent analysis 
in this regard is that put forward by Simone de Beauvoir in Le Deuxieme 
Sexe, which was first published in 1949. de Beauvoir (1988, p.16) states: 
“She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the 
essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other.” This 
statement conveys the social significance that attaches to difference, which 
is derived from the normative assumption that women are 
‘commonsensically’ defined in relation to men or according to a male 
diktat. It implies that gender inequality derives from women’s difference to 
men. Moreover, a hierarchy is embedded within this social framework that 
is organised along gender lines. More significance attaches to one gender 
while the other occupies a subordinate position relative to the norm that 
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prevails. This helps to answer two questions that Kimmel (2004, p.2) 
poses: “Why does virtually every society divide social, political, and 
economic resources unequally between the genders? And why is it that men 
always get more?”100 With regard to the realm of employment, for example, 
Wodak (2005, pp.90-95) alludes to the many ways in which men ‘get 
more’ through such dynamics as organisational culture and gate-keeping 
procedures.
101
 The important point here is that the allocation of resources is 
bound up with who has the wherewithal to define, deem, decide, 
differentiate, divide, deny, disadvantage, and discriminate on the basis of 
the social significance that attaches to difference. These are crucial issues 
in terms of the ‘what, when, where, who, why, how, to whom, and with 
what effect’ questions (see Wodak, 1997b) that are at the heart of this 
CDA. 
 
Difference as Deficit / Defect / Deviance 
 
The upcoming theorisation is particularly important in terms of 
understanding the sheer scope and ideological wherewithal of difference. 
Baumrind (1995, pp.130-136) denotes a review of twelve journal articles, 
some of which pertain to the ‘nature v. nurture’ debate in the context of the 
development of homosexuality and lesbianism, while others relate to child 
development in the context of the parenting that is done by lesbians and 
gay men. With regard to whether or not families that are headed by lesbians 
or gay men compare with [my italics] those that are headed by 
heterosexuals, she makes the really important point that differences in 
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 Whilst I agree with Kimmel’s (2004) overall thesis on gender, I disagree with the definitive use of the 
term ‘always’ here. For example, the criminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland over the course of two 
centuries cannot be glossed over. Similarly, O’Connor’s (2009, pp.184-201) analysis of the difficulties 
that are experienced by unmarried fathers vis-à-vis their children underscores another dimension to the 
routine reproduction of gender inequality in Ireland. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that men 
do not always ‘get more’. 
101
 She provides a cogent analysis of the language that was relied upon in letters of recommendation for 
female and male applicants to prestigious positions of authority in medical schools and hospitals in the 
United States. 
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developmental outcomes for children are not code for deficits (see 
Baumrind, 1995, p.133).
102
 She also states that if sexual orientation were 
deemed to be genetically determined, gay men and lesbians would be 
treated not merely as different, but also as deficient or pathological (see 
Baumrind, 1995, p.135).
103
 There are a number of crucial points that need 
to be made here in terms of my theorisation of equality and inequality, and 
the attendant reproduction of social norms. Firstly, it is important to 
disentangle the concept that I refer to as ‘difference as deficit’ from 
differences as deficits (in outcomes). While both are very much interlinked, 
I draw a distinction between difference as a theoretical construct, which 
applies to the former term, and what I conceive of as the practice of that 
theory, which is manifest in the idea that differences (in outcomes) are 
necessarily deficits (with regard to lesbianism and homosexuality). To 
facilitate a theorisation of difference as deficit, I draw upon both the Irish 
Council’s for Civil Liberties (1990) position and Stewart’s (2008) 
perspective regarding the ‘treatment’ and ‘cure’ of lesbianism and 
homosexuality, as if they were ‘diseases’.104 Moreover, I draw upon 
Cameron’s and Cameron’s (1996, pp.1-18) thesis on contagion, which 
holds that homosexuality is a learned pathology that is passed from adult to 
minor in a myriad of ways, including socialisation and seduction.
105
 Here, 
the seemingly self-evident and heteronormative association of disease and 
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 Baumrind’s (1995) use of the term ‘with’, rather than ‘to’, is important in terms of the methodological 
orientation and theoretical underpinning of my work. Her use of language here does not take as given the 
idea that the parenting that is done by heterosexuals necessarily denotes the norm to which ‘Others’ are 
compared to. This important dynamic, which is consistent with my critical perspective and my politics, 
evokes much of the discussion in this chapter, including that surrounding difference to, difference as 
deployment, and the reproduction of social norms. 
103
 The debate surrounding sexual orientation, in terms of whether it is an essence or is socially 
constructed, is immaterial to my research. However, sexual orientation development in children who are 
reared by gay or lesbian parents is an important issue that I discuss in detail in Chapter Five vis-à-vis the 
routine reproduction of heteronormativity in society. 
104
 I alluded to this issue in Chapter One. It is important to state that both the Irish Council for Civil 
Liberties (1990) and Stewart (2008) utterly reject this ‘truth’, as do I. 
105
 Their thesis vis-à-vis the transmission of homosexuality from parent to child seems to rest on the 
following assumptions: religious parents produce religious children; parents who enjoy alcohol produce 
disproportionate numbers of beer-drinking children; and parental smoking is strongly associated with 
childhood smoking (see Cameron and Cameron, 1996, pp.10-11). My politics are such that I utterly reject 
their thesis vis-à-vis homosexuality in its entirety. 
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contagion with homosexuality and lesbianism signifies the discursive 
construction of the ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) who is necessarily 
deficient, defective, and pathological. Cameron’s and Cameron’s (1996) 
‘research findings’ ‘commonsensically’ add deviance to the mix in that the 
term ‘seduction’ raises the spectre of child abuse. While it is difficult to 
engage with such a thesis, it is useful in terms of theorising a core aspect to 
the concept of difference. Drawing upon Baumrind (1995) and Cameron 
and Cameron (1996), in conjunction with the Irish Council for Civil 
Liberties (1990) and Stewart (2008), I put forward a conceptualisation of 
difference as deficit / defect / deviance. In Chapter Five, I argue that this 
denotes a crucial aspect to the continued operationalisation of 
heteronormativity with regard to particular understandings of the parenting 
that is done by gay men and lesbians. Moreover, this theoretical construct 
helps to explain the intransigence of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland 
vis-à-vis marriage and family. 
 
Difference as Deployment 
 
Here, I draw upon my theorisation of equality and inequality thus far with a 
view to elaborating on important aspects to social norms. A two-pronged 
approach is required to maintain norms in society; sustain the idea that the 
unquestioned dominance of a particular norm is perfectly natural, and 
deftly manage all instances of deviation from it. The common denominator 
here with regard to the issues of dominance and deviation is difference, 
particularly difference as social relation (see Brah, 1991; 1996) and 
difference to. There is another dimension to difference that hones in on the 
‘what, when, where, who, why, how, to whom, and with what effect’ 
questions (see Wodak, 1997b) that are central to this research, i.e. the 
deployment of difference. This ‘doing’ can either provide a critique of the 
status quo or it can reinforce it. “We need to disentangle instances when 
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‘difference’ is asserted as a mode of contestation against oppression and 
exploitation, from those where difference becomes the vehicle for 
hegemonic entrenchment.” (Brah, 1991, p.173) Here, there are two strands 
to the deployment of difference; one from individuals or organisations that 
seek to challenge their subordination, which is derived in part from their 
deviation from the norm and their attendant social positioning, and the 
other emanates from those who seek to maintain or sustain social norms. 
Brah’s (1991; 1996) conceptualisation of difference as social relation is 
helpful here because the organisation of difference into systematic and 
hierarchical relations through institutional discourses and practices is 
central to the maintenance of social norms. Those who occupy a privileged 
social position, or those who are privileged by their compliance with a 
dominant social norm, can deploy difference to maintain the fiction that 
privilege is perfectly natural. This process of normalisation can be done by 
honing in on the difference of others and deeming it to be abnormal, 
unnatural and / or pathological, thereby legitimating inequality. Those who 
have the wherewithal to decide on what constitutes abnormal or unnatural 
sexuality have circumscribed the social position of gay men, for example, 
through criminalisation. It is conceivable that ‘truths’ surrounding the 
dangerous homosexual (see Gouveia, 2005) cohered and subsequently 
legitimated this ‘logic’. Similarly, the denial of marriage rights on the basis 
of sexual orientation reinforces the ‘logic’ of heteronormativity. This 
deployment of difference depends on the dominant social position of the 
doer who has the wherewithal to define, deem, decide, differentiate, divide, 
deny, disadvantage, and discriminate.  
 
The second strand of deployment comes to the fore when people who 
occupy a subordinate social position appropriate difference as a mode of 
contestation against their exploitation and oppression (see Brah, 1991, 
p.173). It challenges ‘thinkings’ and ‘doings’ that are derived from 
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dominance, thereby threatening the status quo. Activist organisations in 
Ireland, such as LGBT Noise, for example, are clamouring for an end to 
heterosexism, which is derived from normative assumptions surrounding 
sexuality.
106
 Sustaining heterosexual privilege requires effective 
management of this clamour through continuing social dominance, which 
is actively sustained through legal and political ‘doings’, for example. The 
justification of aspects to our civil partnership regime, which left the 
dominance of the nuclear family paradigm intact, is one example of this.
107
 
The determination of Irish organisations, such as Marriage Equality, in 
refusing to settle for civil partnership is a reminder of the ways in which 
lesbian and gay activists challenge their oppression.
108
 
 
Equality of Respect and Recognition 
 
Here, it is helpful to draw upon a theorisation that offers a way forward in 
terms of redressing inequality in society. Its starting point is the naming of 
the myriad inequalities that people can face. These can include the 
following: inequalities of resources; of respect and recognition; of love, 
care and solidarity; of power; and of working and learning (see Baker et al, 
2004, pp.3-8).
109
 In terms of the applicability of their theorisation to my 
research, inequality of respect and recognition (Baker et al, 2004, pp.5-6) is 
the most salient of these five dimensions to equality / inequality. It 
highlights the significance of language, and the way in which the consistent 
                                           
106
 This organisation campaigns specifically on the issue of marriage equality. See www.lgbtnoise.ie for 
details. 
107
 I refer to the dominant understanding of Article 41 of our Constitution. This dynamic will become 
clear in Section Three of Chapter Six. Here, it is important to reiterate that I welcome the innovation of 
civil partnership. What I reject is the two-tiered system of relationship recognition that leaves 
heteronormativity intact. 
108
 See www.marriagequality.ie  
109
 In the context of resources, Baker et al (2004, pp.4-5) highlight some of the income inequalities that 
can prevail at an international level. With regard to the third dimension, Baker et al (2004, pp.6-7) state 
that this inequality occurs when the expectation of love and care is disrupted, as in the phenomena of 
familial and institutional abuse. Baker et al (2004, p.7) state that the under-representation of women and 
minority cohorts of the population in parliaments is indicative of inequality of power. The fifth dimension 
to their framework focuses on employment and education. The division of labour and the problem of 
illiteracy are considered to be manifestations of this inequality (Baker et al, 2004, pp.7-8). 
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recourse to male terms of reference, for example, to denote persons in 
general, is indicative of the power relations that prevail vis-à-vis gender.
110
 
They also conceive of the criminalisation of homosexuality as a tangible 
expression of inequality of respect (see Baker et al, 2004, p.5). I argue that 
one of the issues at the heart of the criminalisation of homosexuality is 
disrespect for human beings. The general tenor of Randles (1993),
111
 for 
example, which problematised the imperatives of equality and 
decriminalisation, would have been quite different if equality of respect 
prevailed. Difference in sexual orientation could never overshadow all that 
unites us in our humanity if equality of respect prevailed. While Ireland 
decriminalised homosexuality in 1993, homosexual acts remain illegal in 
over seventy countries, and a minority of these carry the death penalty upon 
conviction (see Bruce-Jones and Itaborahy, 2011, pp.9-10). Whether driven 
by heterosexism or homophobia, I argue that such egregious practice could 
never prevail in a country where equality of respect denoted a fundamental 
precept that informed social relations. 
 
Here, it is important to make the point that respect is a principle that 
transcends tolerance, which is a dynamic that Baker et al (2004, pp.23-27) 
discuss in the context of the liberal understanding of equality. I argue that 
the maxim of tolerance is problematic because it is a superficial sensibility. 
Its operationalisation requires the co-existence of ‘us and them’ (see 
Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), which I discussed in 
Chapter One. Its ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ are invariably directed at the 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) or invariably performed in relation to the 
‘Other’. Cloaked in the seemingly natural dominance of ‘us’, it leaves 
                                           
110
 See Letherby (2003, pp.30-34) and Spender (1998, pp.93-99) for analyses of what is known as ‘man-
made language’. I alluded to this phenomenon in Chapter One as I reflected on the importance of our 
Constitution. 
111
 This denoted a ‘Letter to the Editor’ of The Irish Times, which was informed by the ‘looming’ 
prospect of the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland in 1993. The Irish Times is Ireland’s oldest 
national daily newspaper (O’Brien, 2008, p.13). 
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‘them’ intact. With regard to sexual orientation, while tolerance may have 
the wherewithal to counter homophobia, it is incapable of redressing 
heterosexism. I argue that tolerance has to presuppose some level of 
pathology that must inhere in the gay or lesbian ‘Other’ for it to ‘make 
sense’. Tolerance underscores the ‘logic’ of ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 
2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), thereby leaving the social 
phenomena of dominance and subordination intact. The Baker et al (2004, 
pp.34-36) theorisation of equality of respect hones in on this idea that 
tolerance retains dominance:  
 
[D]ominant cultures can ‘tolerate’ subordinate ones, but not vice 
versa. The dominant view is still seen as the normal one, while 
the tolerated view is seen as deviant. There is no suggestion that 
the dominant view may itself be questionable, or that an 
appreciation of and interaction with subordinate views could be 
valuable for both sides. 
 
                                                                    Baker et al, 2004, p.34 
 
This conceptualisation demonstrates that the social practice of tolerance is 
implicated in the maintenance of dominance and subordination. 
Conversely, the principle of respect engenders an appreciation and 
celebration of diversity because difference to the norm, for example, is a 
dynamic that is welcomed and embraced, rather than simply permitted (see 
Baker et al, 2004, p.34). Respect is precisely the sensibility that facilitates 
the attendant issue of recognition. It is important to make the point that 
while Baker et al (2004) do not include the premise of marriage equality in 
their elaboration of equality of respect and recognition, I place this issue 
firmly within this realm of equality. The denial of marriage rights to 
lesbians and gay men denotes one manifestation of inequality of respect 
and recognition in Ireland. If equality in this regard were to prevail, the 
current denial of constitutional recognition and protection for their intimate 
relationships and families would be unacceptable and unsustainable. 
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The principle of respect and recognition in the context of marriage equality 
is about protection and vindication by the State. These are altogether 
different to such notions as seeking respectability and validation (see Wise 
and Stanley, 2004, pp.332-343). Similarly, my position is at odds with the 
belief that relationship recognition denotes a reward for conformity (see 
Wise and Stanley, 2004, p.338) or a government’s regulation of intimacy 
(see Card, 1996, p.6; Ettelbrick, 1997, p.760; Shantz, 2004, p.181). I argue 
that these conceptualisations negate the personal agency that is required to 
actively seek engagement with the State, by choosing a constitutional and / 
or legislative regime that best suits one’s adult relationship and familial 
considerations. 
 
A Way Forward 
 
The different dimensions to inequality as outlined by Baker et al (2004) get 
at the heart of the complexity of the co-existence of equality with 
inequality. Their framework implicitly accepts that significant strides have 
been made in terms of the realisation of equality. Yet, it does not deny that 
inequalities remain. For example, a woman might not experience inequality 
in terms of resources, or working and learning, but she may experience 
inequality of respect and recognition because of the significance that 
attaches to her sexual orientation. Baker et al (2004, pp.33) suggest that the 
above manifestations of inequality are not inevitable. Moreover, they 
believe that it is possible to reduce the current scale of inequality (see 
Baker et al, 2004, p.33). Here, the key lies in recognising that inequality is 
rooted in changing and changeable social structures, and systems of 
domination and oppression, which reproduce, and are reproduced by, 
racism and sexism, for example (Baker et al, 2004, p.33). Since social 
structures have changed in the past, it is conceivable that they could be 
changed in the future (Baker et al, 2004, p.33) Therefore, while their 
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framework acknowledges a status quo that is bound up with many social 
‘isms’, including heterosexism, for example, it recognises the capacity for 
social change. With regard to the realisation of equality of respect and 
recognition (see Baker et al, 2004, pp.34-36), the important point here in 
terms of my thesis is that social change requires a critical questioning of 
heteronormativity and its attendant dominance. My methodological 
framework is crucial in this regard. Moreover, Baker et al (2004) engender 
the notion that heteronormativity, as currently constituted in Ireland, is not 
an immutable force. This engenders hope. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This theorisation helps to explain the intransigence of inequality in society, 
which evokes Crowley’s (2006) reference to its persistence against the 
backdrop of a rationale for equality. In this chapter, I also identified the 
concept of difference as a dynamic that is at the heart of the reproduction of 
inequality in society. In this regard, I honed in on Spicker’s (2000) 
conceptualisation of difference as disadvantage, which was instrumental in 
terms of my coming to grips with the phenomenon of inequality. Brah’s 
(1991; 1996) theses regarding difference as social relation, wherein 
difference is organised into systematic relations through institutional 
practices, facilitated my understanding of the ideological wherewithal of 
difference, in terms of the routine reproduction of inequality and social 
norms. Also relevant in this regard are what I conceive of as difference to 
and difference as deployment, the latter of which derives from Brah (1991). 
These aspects to difference implicitly inform, and are informed by, de 
Beauvoir’s (1988) analysis of the ‘Other’ and Kimmel’s (2004) theorisation 
of gender and hierarchy. Here, I wish to underscore the importance of what 
I refer to as difference as deficit / defect / deviance, which derives from 
Baumrind (1995) and Cameron and Cameron (1996). In Chapter Five, I 
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argue that this latter theorisation of difference is central to understanding 
the denial of marriage rights to lesbians and gay men in this jurisdiction. 
Similarly, inequality of respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) is a 
determining factor in this regard. At this juncture, I also wish to reiterate 
that my theorisation of equality / inequality is very much linked to my 
methodological considerations in Chapter One, particularly in terms of my 
politics and my critical approach to the analysis of discourse. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Nuclear Options: Conceptualisations of Marriage 
 
We all have been witnesses, willing or not, to a lifelong parade of 
other people’s marriages, from Uncle Harry and Aunt Bernice to 
the Prince and Princess of Wales. And at one point or another, 
some nosy relative has inevitably inquired of every gay person 
when he or she will finally “tie the knot” (an intriguing and 
probably apt cliché). 
 
                                                                     Stoddard, 1997, p.754 
 
Introduction 
 
In Ireland, the social institution of marriage has both a constitutional and 
legislative underpinning. So as to contextualise the dominant understanding 
of marriage in this jurisdiction, I draw upon wider conceptualisations of it 
in other Western countries, such as Britain and the United States.
112
 This 
first necessitates an elaboration on the general rationale behind the 
enactment of legislation on marriage, which was largely informed by 
patriarchal imperatives. While specificities to the prevailing legal position 
vis-à-vis marriage in these countries might differ, and while perspectives 
from theorists may differ within each country, the literature does provide 
some sense of both historical and contemporary understandings of marriage 
in the West.
113
 Throughout this chapter, I make reference to the situation 
                                           
112
 By virtue of Ireland’s relationship with England over the centuries, legislation that was enacted there 
often prevailed in this jurisdiction. Similarly, the English system of what is known as ‘common law’, 
which denotes the body of rules that has developed over time through case law (see Judy Walsh’s 
foreword in Pillinger, 2008, pp.3-4), was extended to Ireland by the early 1600s (see Hederman, 1980, 
p.59). Ireland’s common law tradition is still relevant today. Indeed, English case law from the 19th 
century was referred to in Zappone and Gilligan. The important point here is that references to Britain in 
this chapter are relevant to this research, albeit with the caveat that history does not necessarily imply that 
our regime as regards marriage was / is identical to that which obtained / obtains in Britain. I will revisit 
the relevance of English case law to Irish constitutional law in Chapter Five. 
113
 Such conceptualisations are not necessarily universal or applicable to other parts of the world, such as 
the Middle East or South East Asia, for example. Because it was important to place a limit on the range of 
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that prevails in Ireland, in terms of the constitutional and legislative 
framework that underpins marriage,
114
 and how this compares to, or 
contrasts with, other jurisdictions in the West. In Chapter Three, I am not 
concerned with rudimentary or numerical balance in terms of support for, 
or opposition to, the institution of marriage in general, or same-sex 
marriage in particular. Rather, this chapter comprises perspectives on 
marriage that are important in terms of illuminating the struggle over the 
meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage, 
irrespective of whether or not protagonists expressly support or oppose it. 
However, this does necessitate reflexive awareness of the ways in which 
my interpretation of the literature is invariably informed by my evolving 
perspective on marriage and my support for marriage equality. Throughout 
this work, it is necessary to attach the prefix ‘same-sex’ to the term 
‘marriage’ so as to acknowledge the phenomenon of marriage inequality. I 
accept that this takes opposite-sex marriage as the given norm. However, 
this is precisely the situation that prevails in this jurisdiction. I also prefer 
to use the term ‘relationship status’ where appropriate because the default 
term, i.e. ‘marital status’, is problematic. It serves to reinforce an ‘either or’ 
scenario (see Sullivan, 1996, p.182), which tends to ground the expectation 
that marriage is an eventual inevitability for single people who fall in love 
(see Hunter, 2007, p.203).
115
 
 
                                                                                                                           
material that I draw upon, I focus on some Western understandings of the institution of marriage in this 
chapter. 
114
 In Chapter Five, I discuss the constitutional underpinning to marriage in Ireland in more detail. 
115
 The embeddedness of the term ‘marital status’ in Ireland is such that the Central Statistics Office did 
not include the newly created ‘civil status’ in its most recent national census form for 2011. This term 
formally entered our lexicon following the enactment of civil partnership and cohabitation legislation in 
2010. See Appendix VII for details of Section 7.1(a) of this legislation, which defines the term ‘civil 
status’. Even allowing for administrative delays and deadlines in terms of the legislation coming into 
force, the printing of forms, and their timely delivery to households in Ireland, Census 2011 implicitly 
compelled same-sex partners, for example, to either deem themselves single, precisely because they were 
not married, or to consider themselves married, which is currently a legal nonsense for same-sex couples. 
See Appendix IV for details of the Central Statistics Office’s understanding of marital status in Ireland in 
2011. This was identical to that which prevailed for Census 2006 (see Central Statistics Office, 2006; 
2011). 
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Historical Construction of Marriage 
 
Before elaborating on contemporary understandings of marriage, it is 
important to get some sense of its dominant historical conceptualisation in 
the West. This can shed some light on the dynamics of opposition to the 
institution today, be it same-sex or opposite-sex marriage. Marriage is not a 
natural phenomenon (Norrie, 2000, p.364), but it is one that has evolved 
over time according to prevailing social mores, norms and values that can 
differ between countries (see Hunter, 2007, pp.203-207; Norrie, 2000, 
pp.364-365). While it tends to be conceived of as a social institution, 
marriage has a legal underpinning (see Bernstein, 2007, pp.330-333; 
Hunter, 2007, pp.202-203; Norrie, 2000, pp.364-369; Stoddard, 1997, 
pp.753-756).
116
 In Ireland, marriage also has constitutional status, which is 
perhaps indicative of its social standing. Taken in conjunction with each 
other, Articles 41.1.1, 41.1.2, and 41.3.1 of our Constitution stipulate that 
the marital family is a moral institution that denotes the necessary basis of 
social order in Ireland, to the extent that the State is obliged to protect it 
against attack.
117
 Vogel’s (1994, pp.76-89) understanding of the dominant 
historical conceptualisation of marriage helps to explain this general 
preoccupation with marriage as indispensable to socio-moral order (see 
Gallagher, 2003; Hug, 1999, pp.1-75; Santorum, 2003). Moreover, it forms 
the basis, and gets to the heart of, much of the opposition to marriage, both 
as social institution and social practice. Vogel (1994, p.80) states the 
following: 
 
                                           
116
 See Appendix VI for a sample listing of 19
th
, 20
th
 and 21
st
 century legislation on marriage in Ireland. 
117
 I reiterate that the relevant articles in the Irish Constitution (1937) are reproduced in Appendix I. The 
constitutional underpinning of marriage in Ireland is a crucial dynamic. This will become apparent in 
Chapter Five. 
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The emphasis on ‘order’ has little to do with the demands on a 
wife’s domestic duties. Her subordination is not justified by the 
need of forcing her to attend to the care of household and 
children. Rather, the task at hand is to construe a power that will 
secure the unity of marriage, as well as the tranquillity of civil 
society, against the adverse consequences of a wife’s 
independence of will. But why should women be the particular 
target of this concern with order and disorder? What does the 
social order have to be protected against? What, indeed, is the 
meaning of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’? The predominant motif for 
committing women to the strictest rules of obedience and 
submission must be sought in the belief that only the coercive 
sanctions of the law will enable a husband to ensure the sexual 
fidelity of his wife. This assumption runs as a persistent theme 
through legal arguments from the seventeenth to the nineteenth 
centuries. 
 
                                                                        Vogel, 1994, p.80
118
 
 
This is quite a profound insight that hones in on the rationale behind the 
creation of a legal framework that legitimated male dominance and control 
over women. The spectre of chaos that could be wrought by independent 
woman was such that man had to be master over the physical space in 
which she moved (see Hederman, 1980, p.55; Vogel, 1994, p.81).
119
 By 
constraining her liberty, the law empowered him to protect his right of 
exclusive access to her body, thereby guaranteeing female virtue, which 
was integral to the purity of his bloodline (Vogel, 1994, p.81). The anxiety 
that could be provoked by the loss of certainty about paternity (Vogel, 
1994, p.81), which was integral to the safe and secure bequeathing of 
property to successive generations, helps to explain the genesis of the 
following: laws on adultery (Norrie, 2000, p.367)
120
 and the inherent 
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 Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2 suggest that, at the time of drafting the Constitution, the Irish State did 
reflect on women’s association with order in the domestic sphere. These articles, which were ratified by 
the majority of the electorate in 1937, remain intact. 
119
 Please note that Hederman (1980) writes with regard to the situation that prevailed in Ireland vis-à-vis 
marriage. 
120
 Adultery refers to the adulteration of the male bloodline (Norrie, 2000, p.367; Stoddard, 1997, p.754). 
In McGee v. Attorney General, which I discuss in Chapter Four, Irish judges alluded to the adultery laws 
that prevailed in the United States in the context of the State’s encroachment into the marital bedroom. As 
regards the situation in Ireland in the 1970s, Justice Griffin stated: “Adultery and extra-marital sexuality 
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gender disparity in them (Stoddard, 1997, p.754); 
121
 laws prohibiting 
bigamy and polygamy (Bernstein, 2007, p.331);
122
 the bringing into being 
of illegitimacy (Norrie, 2000, p.367);
123
 what is known as the ‘marital-rape 
exemption’ that was codified in law (Finkelhor and Yllo, 1985, pp.1-12; 
see also Hederman, 1980, p.55; Smyth, 1983, pp.135-136); expectant 
husbands’ preoccupation with female virginity124 and fertility;125 the 
expectation that it is woman who surrenders her family name upon 
marriage;
126
 and the normalisation of male ownership of woman as if she 
were a piece of property (see Hederman, 1980, pp.55-59).
127
 The children 
                                                                                                                           
are not, as such, crimes here.” (see [1974] I.R. pp.284-337, at p.334) However, adultery constitutes 
grounds for the granting of a judicial separation, for example, in this jurisdiction (see Ryan, 2009, p.16; 
Smyth, 1983, p.90; see also Section 2.1(a) of the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, 1989). 
Adultery constitutes grounds for the dissolution of what is known as a ‘covenant marriage’ in the United 
States, which denotes a ‘super-sizing’ of the traditional variety, and a reaction to the blasé or ‘test-drive’ 
approach to marriage in the midst of a ‘divorce culture’ in that country (see Fee, 2007, pp.430-436). 
121
 A woman who engaged in sexual relations with a man who was not her husband committed adultery, 
while a man was legally incapable of committing adultery, except as an accomplice to an ‘errant’ wife. 
Instead, he committed fornication (see Stoddard, 1997, p.754). The ‘errant’ wife, rather than husband, 
conjures up the notion that it is woman who is at the centre of the male preoccupation with social chaos 
and disorder, which Vogel (1994) captures so remarkably. 
122
 See Appendix II for details of Section 2.2(b) of the Civil Registration Act, 2004, which holds that 
bigamy denotes an impediment to marriage in Ireland. 
123
 The status of illegitimacy was abolished in Ireland with the enactment of the Status of Children Act, 
1987 (see Seanad Éireann, 1986a, paras. 2198-2199). 
124
 Marlowe (2008) highlights a recent case in France in which a court granted a civil annulment to a 
groom on the basis that his bride lied to him about her virgin status. The reader is given no indication as 
to the man’s status in this regard. 
125
 Writing in the American context, Bernstein (2007, p.331) states that upper-class men who needed 
legitimate heirs could divorce their wives for their failure to produce children. She makes the rather 
prescient point that male infertility was not a consideration in the past. Similarly, in rural Ireland, it was 
woman who necessarily bore the responsibility for a childless marriage (see Arensberg and Kimball, 
1968, pp.130-132). The phenomenon that was known as the ‘country divorce’, which came to an end in 
the 1930s, dictated that it was barren woman as wife who was ‘sent back’ to her parents by her 
(necessarily fertile) husband (see Arensberg and Kimball, 1968, p.132). This denotes one of the most 
egregious examples of doing gender in marriage (see Dryden, 1999). That such a practice was somehow 
deemed to be perfectly acceptable serves to underscore the normative assumptions that underpinned 
gender in Ireland at the time. It may also be indicative of an internalisation of patriarchal power that 
wreaked hopelessness in woman due to the embeddedness of that hierarchal social order in which the 
worst excesses of sexism ‘made sense’. 
126
 Choi and Bird (2003, p.450) and Laennec and Syrotinski (2003, p.455) challenge this assumption. 
McDonnell (2004) cites an instance in America wherein a man, who sought to assume his wife’s surname 
upon marriage so as to prevent her family name from dying out, was viewed with suspicion by the 
relevant authority to the extent that it instigated a criminal investigation to determine whether or not he 
was a ‘wanted man’! It is a fascinating example of the rootedness of gendered social expectations, which 
are ‘out there’ ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006) vis-à-vis marriage and family. See Almack 
(2005, pp.239-254) for an analysis of the decision-making processes that are taken by lesbian couples in 
relation to their family names / children’s surnames. She highlights the absence of readily available socio-
cultural guidelines vis-à-vis naming conventions, and the power that is associated with naturalised 
assumptions about biological motherhood. 
127
 In a trenchant critique of the defence of what is referred to as ‘mistaken belief in consent’ in the 
context of the perpetration and prosecution of the crime of rape in Britain, Jamieson (1996, p.59) states: 
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of a marriage were also part of a husband’s property portfolio over whom 
he exercised power (see Hederman, 1980, p.55). The above laws 
underpinned the overriding imperative to protect male vested interests, in 
terms of the safe and secure transfer of family finances through legitimate 
lines of succession, thereby ensuring the stability of the (marital) family 
(name) for generations (see Norrie, 2000, p.367).
128
 
 
Notwithstanding the role of personal agency, the above dynamics are 
largely indicative of the gendered relations that prevailed within the 
institution of marriage. These were necessarily hierarchical, thereby 
underscoring Kimmel’s (2004) thesis. They denoted the seemingly ordered 
blueprint for doing gender in marriage (see Dryden, 1999), which codified 
this hierarchy. They required and reinforced the twin imperatives of 
dominance and subordination, which invariably served to normalise not 
just the inviolability of the / his family name, and the attendant 
preoccupation with human reproduction, but also the construction of 
woman as the conduit for the reproduction of male power and privilege. It 
helps to explain the phenomenon of arranged marriage, where woman was 
passed from one family to another so as to secure vested interests.
129
 This 
seemingly natural gendered order vis-à-vis marriage became embedded 
over time, such that it wrapped up male power and privilege in the guise of 
tradition (see Barrett and McIntosh, 1990, p.55). It is conceivable that the 
                                                                                                                           
“It is as if because a woman has sex with a man on one occasion he can reasonably assume consent on a 
subsequent occasion. In this sense the law remains close to a view of women as men’s sexual property.” 
128
 Norrie (2000, p.367) also makes the point that children needed to know that their fathers were not 
spreading their seeds, and therefore, children’s inheritances. It seems that this expectation was also a 
source of family stability. 
129
 Referring to the situation that prevailed in Ireland up to the 18
th
 century, Inglis (1997, p.9) states the 
following: “Sexuality was tied into a fixation of reproducing and developing kinship ties, names and 
possessions. The control of sexuality largely took place through the control of marriage … It was firmly 
tied to the transmission and circulation of wealth. It was about setting definite relations and strict 
regulations about who could get married to whom, when, where and on what basis. [Footnote omitted.] It 
was an era of arranged marriages, of designated inheriting sons and dowried daughters.” See also Curtin 
et al (1992, pp.85-95) in this regard. It is important to make the point that this social practice, insofar as it 
related to the family farm, lasted well into the 20
th
 century in Ireland. See Arensberg and Kimball (1968, 
pp.94-117) for an elaboration on matchmaking in Ireland in the 1930s. Here, marriage was the conduit to 
the reproduction of patriarchy. 
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following expectations vis-à-vis marriage today denote the routine 
operationalisation of patriarchy through heterosexuality: man proposes; 
woman promises herself to man in engagement; woman implicitly declares 
that she is virginal; man walks down the aisle with his daughter; man does 
not change his family name. The degree to which these ‘gender doings’ are 
taken for granted and romanticised is perhaps indicative of the sheer 
breadth of institutionalised patriarchy and heterosexuality in the West. 
 
Order and Stability 
 
Here, drawing upon Norrie (2000, p.367), I wish to make an important 
point in relation to the twin imperatives of order and stability, which were 
grounded in many of the above marriage laws. The concept of family order 
and stability appears to have morphed somewhat in that it now tends to be 
divorced from matters that relate solely to succession. Order and stability 
are now part of a socio-cognitive repertoire of knowledge (see van Dijk, 
1997c) about marriage and family, which dictates that it is the nuclear 
family paradigm itself that is now the seemingly self-evident precursor to, 
and guarantor of, social order and stability. The dominant understanding of 
Article 41 of our Constitution both reflects and ordains this. The important 
point here is that this new repertoire of knowledge about order and stability 
now constitutes much of the contemporary heterosexist opposition to same-
sex marriage in Ireland. This will become clear as my analysis evolves. 
 
Procreation 
 
The dominant historical conceptualisation of marriage shaped, and was 
shaped by, male privilege, with its attendant legitimation of women’s 
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oppression.
130
 This hinged on the imperative of procreation, which helped 
to codify the logic of gender complementarity with other hierarchically 
ordered role rules for doing gender in marriage (see Dryden, 1999). This 
normalised the inherence of heterosexuality to the institution of 
marriage.
131
 “The intended purpose of marriage has historically been for 
procreation, and so the law regulates the sexual lives of married couples 
and unmarried individuals with that goal in mind.” (Bernstein, 2007, 
p.330)
132
 This helps to explain the controversy that was engendered by 
(artificial) contraception in Ireland and the manner in which it convulsed 
polity and society for decades.
133
 However, it was not just the rule of law 
that regulated sexuality in Ireland. The social opprobrium that was heaped 
on unmarried women as mothers in Ireland, and the State’s collusion in 
their enforced displacement from ‘civil’ society by virtue of incarceration, 
underscored the normative imperative of marital procreation and the 
attendant assumption that woman was still at the centre of disorder.
134
 
 
Procreation can also inform current understandings of marriage in Ireland. 
In its submission to the Oireachtas Committee that examined the relevance 
                                           
130
 It is important to make the point that children and men can also experience oppression in marriage. For 
example, Coulter (2010a) and Gallagher (2010) refer to the horrific abuses that were visited on children in 
nuclear families by their parents, the latter of whom were subsequently arrested, tried, convicted and 
sentenced for these crimes in Ireland. 
131
 I acknowledge and accept the importance of procreation for society. However, I argue that the manner 
in which this imperative is effortlessly relied upon to underpin the centrality of heterosexuality, marriage 
and gender complementarity to family is problematic. For example, procreation hinges on biological 
complementarity, rather than on gender complementarity per se. The distinction is important. Gender is a 
social construct (DeFrancisco and Palczewski, 2007, p.xiv); it refers to the social significance that 
attaches to biological sex. I will revisit the dynamic of gender complementarity in my analysis of 
heterosexist opposition to same-sex marriage in Chapter Six. 
132
 Bernstein (2007) writes with regard to the United States where marital status denoted the crucial 
dynamic vis-à-vis controls over access to contraception. See Planned Parenthood Federation of America 
(2000) for commentary on the Supreme Court rulings that led to the legalisation of contraception in the 
United States, i.e. Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 and Eisenstadt v. Baird in 1972. 
133
 The distinction between artificial forms of contraception, which were eventually legislated for in 
Ireland, and natural methods of contraception will become clear in Chapter Four. It derives from the 
Catholic Church’s opposition to artificial forms of birth control. 
134
 Against the backdrop of the intertwining of Church and State, which I allude to in Chapter Four, 
Magdalene Laundries managed these ‘problem women’ (see Smith, 2009). At the intersection of the legal 
with the social, Inglis (2002, pp.5-24) provides an analysis of what became known as the Kerry Babies 
Case, which revealed an alarming prejudice towards unmarried woman as mother in Ireland in the 1980s. 
I will revisit this latter dynamic in Chapter Four. 
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of the Constitution vis-à-vis the family in Ireland, the organisation that is 
known as Amen
135
 supported the prevailing definition of marriage as a 
union of man and woman, and stated that the institution exists for the 
protection of the next generation and for dealing with issues, such as 
succession rights (see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 
2006, p. A25).
136
 Similarly, the Irish organisation that is known as 
European Life Network
137
 stated the following vis-à-vis its opposition to 
same-sex marriage and its belief that the marital union of one man and one 
woman is fundamental to society: “Sexuality exists for the expression of 
love between husband and wife and for the procreation of children within 
the covenant of marriage. […] Procreation is the key to the survival of the 
human race, and must therefore be protected.” (see All-Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution, 2006, pp. A60-A61) Both of these 
submissions implicitly draw upon the historical understanding of marriage 
that was codified in many of the laws that I highlighted earlier. 
 
Additional Marriage Laws 
 
Here, I highlight other ways in which family life was regulated through the 
institution of marriage, such that many social ‘isms’ were continually 
reproduced in the West. For example, the ‘logic’ of racism informed the 
enactment of anti-miscegenation laws in the United States because some 
state governments feared that allowing interracial couples to marry would 
                                           
135
 This Irish organisation provides support to male victims of domestic abuse and their children. See 
http://www.amen.ie/index.html in this regard.  
136
 For full details of its written submission to the committee, see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution (2006, pp. A21-A27). In the introduction to my thesis, I discussed the work of this 
committee over the course of my elaboration on the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family 
recognition. See Joint Committee on the Constitution (2005a) for details of Amen’s oral submission to the 
public hearings that were held in relation to the complexities of Article 41 of our Constitution vis-à-vis 
the family today. 
137
 This is a pro-life and pro-family (nuclear / marital family) organisation that is based in Ireland. See 
www.europeanlifenetwork.org in this regard. As well as a written submission that was published in 2006 
(see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 2006, pp. A59-A64), European Life Network 
also made an oral submission to the public hearings that were held in 2005 in relation to Article 41 of our 
Constitution (see Joint Committee on the Constitution, 2005c). 
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produce mixed-race children, thereby diluting whiteness (Bernstein, 2007, 
p.331). Female American citizens lost their citizenship upon marriage to a 
man who was not American, which combined the potent brew of sexism 
and racism with xenophobia (Bernstein, 2007, p.331). Conversely, 
American men did not lose their citizenship upon marriage to a woman 
with a different nationality (Bernstein, 2007, p.331). In Ireland, marriage to 
an Irish man as citizen meant that a foreign woman was entitled to Irish 
citizenship (Smyth, 1983, p.87) upon lodging a declaration with the 
relevant authorities.
138
 However, a foreign man who married an Irish 
woman as citizen had to first go through the process of naturalisation 
(Smyth, 1983, p.87).
139
 Prior to the enactment of the Domicile and 
Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act, 1986, a married woman in Ireland 
was legally deemed to have her husband’s domicile, which denied her the 
right to retain her independent domicile (see Seanad Éireann, 1986b, paras. 
212-214; Smyth, 1983, pp.87-88). These examples are indicative of the 
myriad ways in which gender intersected with marital status in the West. 
 
The Criminalisation of Homosexuality 
 
One of the most destructive of laws that relied upon, and affirmed, the 
‘logic’ of heteronormativity was the criminalisation of homosexuality. 
Writing in the context of the United States, Eskridge (1999, p.161) makes 
the point that the rationale behind criminalisation was that sexual acts had 
to be gendered, heterosexual, marital, and procreative, as well as 
consensual and mutual. Similar to contraception, sodomy was deemed to 
undermine marriage because it was, by its nature, antithetical to 
procreation; it denoted a denial of the imperative of marital procreation (see 
                                           
138
 See Section 8 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956. 
139
 See Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1956. The relevant sections in 
the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1986 are such that citizenship and naturalisation are now 
articulated in largely gender-neutral terms. See Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this 1986 legislation. 
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Eskridge, 1999, p.161). What is interesting about the 19
th
 century 
legislation that criminalised homosexuality in Ireland is that it did not 
expressly invoke the heteronormative assumptions that are evident in the 
first four considerations above. Rather, it implicitly relied upon the 
seemingly self-evident deviance of gay men by linking bestiality with their 
sexual orientation.
140
 Similarly, a number of states in the U.S. also relied 
upon the ‘logic’ of bestiality to criminalise homosexuality (see Rivera, 
1979, pp.949-951). This is important and relevant in the sense that some of 
the prevailing opposition to the introduction of same-sex marriage in 
Ireland and the United States is implicitly informed by the ‘logic’ of 
bestiality that ‘necessarily’ arises with regard to the ‘suspect’ gay ‘Other’ 
(see de Beauvoir, 1988).
141
 Here, the concept of difference as deviance, 
which I theorised in Chapter Two, ‘legitimates’ the reproduction of both 
heteronormativity and inequality on the basis of gender and sexual 
orientation. This suggests that, notwithstanding the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality in both jurisdictions, in 1993 and 2003 respectively, the 
destructive wherewithal of a normatively imposed deviance remains.
142
 In 
Chapter Five, I argue that this is one dynamic that is at the root of the 
intransigence of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland in the context of 
marriage and family. 
 
The Evolving Nuclear Family Paradigm 
 
Hunter (2007, p.204) attributes the change in conceiving of marriage as an 
economic necessity to the rise in individualism, and the development of 
industry and wage labour in the second half of the 19
th
 century, which 
meant that people were no longer compelled to marry for survival. It seems 
at this juncture that love as the dominant paradigm in marriage came into 
                                           
140
 See Appendix II for details of Sections 61 and 62 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861. 
141
 I will revisit this issue later in this chapter. 
142
 I make reference to the decriminalisation of homosexuality in the United States later in this chapter. 
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being (see Bernstein, 2007, p.332; Hunter, 2007, p.204). This transition, 
coupled with an emergent realisation that children were a labour of love,
143
 
rather than a source of labour, may have formalised the separation of 
spheres into public and private, both of which demanded attention that was 
predicated on gendered roles and expectations. What I refer to as the 
‘constitutionalisation’ of a prescriptive role for woman as wife and mother 
in the Irish family, against the backdrop of seemingly endless possibilities 
for men, irrespective of their civil status, is indicative of this separation.
144
 
This orderly division of labour between husband and wife (Barrett and 
McIntosh, 1990, p.28) is predicated on the appropriation of woman’s 
labour as wife and mother in the nuclear family.
145
 
 
Children: Care, Development and Welfare 
 
With regard to the wider issue of same-sex marriage, the above reliance on 
gender complementarity is important. It informs and codifies normative 
assumptions surrounding marriage and family, particularly in the context of 
parenthood. I argue that the historical and contemporary preoccupation 
with the gendered ‘who’ behind the care of children has morphed 
somewhat into an emphasis on the ‘what’, i.e. child development and child 
                                           
143
 There is a gendered dimension to caring labour in that it tends to be largely undertaken by women. See 
Daly (2004); Drew et al (1998); Orme (2001); and Ungerson and Kember (1997) for discussion. 
O’Connor’s (2009) analysis of the difficulties that are experienced by unmarried fathers vis-à-vis their 
children’s care sheds light on another dimension to gender in the context of family. 
144
 Article 45 of our Constitution incorporates women and men within the realm of work, and it seems to 
acknowledge the importance of this in the context of familial responsibilities. However, as stated in 
Chapter One, a strict interpretation of Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 
and 35 presupposes that important public office holders are men. None of these articles are concerned 
with the private sphere. Article 41 refers to woman who ‘self-evidently’ morphs into mother in the private 
sphere. This almost imperceptible sleight of hand vis-à-vis woman (Barry, 1984, pp.2-3) serves to 
constitutionalise the gendered division of labour in Ireland. 
145
 The embeddedness of this division is such that it is replicated in today’s formal labour market where 
women dominate the services or ‘servicing of others’ sector. The Central Statistics Office (2010) provides 
information with regard to the prevailing situation in Ireland , specifically, women’s over-representation 
in clerical and secretarial occupations, and under-representation at senior levels in the health and 
education sectors, notwithstanding the higher participation rates of women in both of these fields. It is 
also important to make the point that debates about the reconciliation of family life with working life 
really only came into being when women, en masse, began to defy gendered role expectations that were 
‘out there’ ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006). 
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welfare in the context of the parenting that is done by lesbians and gay 
men. The prevailing dominance of the nuclear family paradigm, with the 
attendant rootedness of gender complementarity, are such that the demand 
for marriage equality has shifted attention away somewhat from gender and 
childcare per se. Instead, the issues of child development and child welfare 
have now become centre-stage because of the (non-normative) sexual 
orientation of parents. These have become important issues with regard to 
the distribution of marriage rights in this jurisdiction. For example, 
Professor Casey, who testified for the State in the matter of Zappone and 
Gilligan in 2006, asserted in a ‘Letter to the Editor’ of The Irish Times in 
2008,
146
 that there is overwhelming evidence indicating that children tend 
to do best when raised by a married mother and father (Casey, 2008a). This 
perspective hones in on the married status of parents. However, her 
position then turns into one that is grounded in biology when she states that 
there is a formidable body of research that confirms the common sense 
intuition that children tend to do best when raised by their two biological 
parents (see Casey, 2008b,c). This maxim then evolves into an emphasis on 
the children’s married biological parents (see Casey, 2008c). I argue that 
these ‘Letters to the Editor’ of The Irish Times, which were written in the 
context of the debate on same-sex marriage in Ireland, presuppose that it is 
both a particular adult relationship status and biological ties to children that 
denote the optimal family environment. This then facilitates Casey’s 
(2008b) belief that marriage in its current form warrants special status and 
support from the State (see also Iona Institute, 2007; 2010).
147
 The 
subtleties that constitute her emergent position as regards marriage and 
                                           
146
 The Irish Times is our oldest national daily newspaper (O’Brien, 2008, p.13). It holds an important role 
in public discourse in that some of its columnists have a public profile, such that their views can form part 
of our national broadcaster’s coverage of current affairs on radio and television. Similarly, contributions 
to its letters’ pages are often alluded to in this broadcaster’s current affairs programming, particularly in 
relation to controversial social and political issues. Persons with intellectual capital, such as academics, 
for example, regularly write ‘Opinion’ pieces and ‘Letters to the Editor’ in The Irish Times. For example, 
see Casey (2008a,b,c,d,e,f) in relation to the debate that is taking place in Ireland in relation to marriage 
and family in the context of the push for marriage equality. 
147
 Professor Casey is a patron of the Iona Institute (see Byrnes, 2007; Ramsay, 2007). 
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family are pertinent, not least because she testified as an expert witness in 
Zappone and Gilligan with regard to child development research (see 
Casey, 2008c). This was an issue that ‘commonsensically’ entered the fray 
in terms of making a determination on the right of two women to have their 
marriage recognised in this jurisdiction.
148
 This is indicative of the extent to 
which marriage and family are conceived of as one inseparable institution 
in Ireland. 
 
Slippery Slope Arguments 
 
Here, I elaborate on some of the ‘slippery slope’ arguments that invariably 
enter the fray in the debate on same-sex marriage. All of them rely on the 
‘logic’ of difference as deficit / defect / deviance, which I theorised in 
Chapter Two by drawing upon Baumrind (1995) and Cameron and 
Cameron (1996). I reiterate that this strand of difference denotes a key 
aspect to the routine operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland. 
 
Bestiality 
 
The most offensive of the ‘slippery slopes’, and one that really hones in on 
the reactionary discourse surrounding same-sex marriage, is what I refer to 
as the ‘what’s next’ thesis. This suggests that the right to marry one’s cat or 
dog is next on the agenda (see Fee, 2007, p.435; Hull, 2001, p.216; Hunter, 
2007, p.204).
149
 This ‘whatever it is’, and variants of it, have been 
repeatedly suggested to me over the course of this research, both in 
                                           
148
 I will revisit this issue in Chapter Five. Particular attention will be paid to the manner in which the 
issue of child development seamlessly morphed into the issue of child welfare. I argue that this is 
extremely problematic. 
149
 Commenting on the divisive campaign surrounding the constitutional referendum on marriage in 
Hawaii in the late 1990s, Hull (2001, p.216) states that one of the media advertisements implied that the 
right to marry one’s children would be next if the introduction of same-sex marriage was not stopped. 
Hunter (2007, p.204) states that the historical arguments opposing interracial marriage in the United 
States in the 1960s mirror those now opposing same-sex marriage, and that the right to marry one’s 
sibling now appears to constitute the ‘logical’ progression of this agenda. 
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response to a seminar that I gave in relation to same-sex marriage, and 
during protests that I initiated outside the Oireachtas, which were informed 
by the 2004 enactment of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage.
150
 
Those reactions still manage to engender hopelessness in me with regard to 
the realisation of equality of respect (see Baker et al, 2004) for lesbians and 
gay men in Ireland. That people could rely on bestiality so as to ground 
their ‘whatever it is’ instils a pessimism in me that is difficult to counter. It 
suggests that there is a repertoire of knowledge (see van Dijk, 1997c) ‘out 
there’ ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006) vis-à-vis lesbians 
and gay men in Ireland, which implicitly relies on a ‘logical’ 
pathologisation that gives a seemingly commonsensical coherence to such a 
perspective. Moreover, it suggests that the articulation of such a sentiment 
is ‘acceptable’ because it is ‘safe’ to do so. This suggests that the stain and 
stench of criminalisation, which raised the spectre of bestiality, still lingers 
in Ireland, twenty years after we decriminalised homosexuality in 1993. 
 
Bigamy 
 
The ‘problem’ of same-sex marriage is such that the Irish organisation, 
European Life Network, raises the spectre of bigamy if the ‘standard of 
one-man, one-woman marriage’ is interfered with in Ireland, because there 
will be ‘no logical stopping point’ in terms of redefining marriage (see All-
Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 2006, p. A62). This 
organisation relies on the ‘logic’ of ‘slippery slope’ theses in general, and 
the historical understanding of marriage in particular, to construct a 
seemingly self-evident threat to the institution of marriage, if its 
constitutional and legislative underpinning is interfered with. Given my 
earlier discussion in this chapter about the certainty of a husband’s 
                                           
150
 The ‘what’s next’ thesis does not countenance a denial of marriage rights to persons on the basis of 
their (hetero) sexual orientation. The point that I wish to make here is that the ban on same-sex marriage 
is as ridiculous as the instituting of an opposite-sex ban. 
 117 
progeny, it is conceivable that monogamy is derived from this patriarchal 
imperative,
151
 and that this may have informed the enactment of legislation 
on bigamy in the West, including Ireland. This 19
th
 century law has stood 
the test of time in that bigamy is still illegal in Ireland (see Barrington, 
2009, p.57).
152
 Moreover, I am not aware of any public imperative to repeal 
it. Therefore, the taint of criminality that is so routinely deployed here, 
presumably to give ‘commonsensical’ coherence to this organisation’s 
position, is quite disturbing. It is difficult to understand the network’s 
rationale for invoking the spectre of bigamy against the backdrop of its 
support for the State’s position vis-à-vis marriage, as is currently 
constituted in Ireland (see its submission to the All-Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution, 2006, pp. A59-A64). Given the State’s 
obligations under Article 41 of our Constitution,
153
 the ‘logic’ of legislated 
for, and constitutionally sound, bigamy has to come from a source other 
than the State. It may hinge on a lesbian / gay demand for a repeal of the 
law on bigamy, of which I am unaware. It may rely on a socio-cognitive 
repertoire of knowledge (see van Dijk, 1997c) about the ‘necessarily’ 
promiscuous ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), which is a dynamic that 
Senator Norris alluded to in his powerful contribution to the Oireachtas 
record vis-à-vis civil partnership in Ireland (see Seanad Éireann, 2010a). 
 
Polygamy 
 
With regard to her opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States, 
Gallagher’s (2003) aversion to what she refers to as the ‘new unisex 
marriage vision’ is such that she deems polygamy to be ‘better’ than gay 
marriage in that at least polygamy represents “… an attempt to secure 
                                           
151
 I conceive of monogamy as fundamental to an intimate adult relationship. See Jackson and Scott 
(2004) for a critique of monogamy. 
152
 See Appendix II for details of Section 57 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. 
153
 This will become apparent in Chapter Five. 
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stable mother-father families for children.”154 Here, the uncritical 
acceptance of the necessarily gendered and heterosexualised imperatives of 
marriage, procreation and parenthood, actively construct the seemingly 
self-evident instability of families that are headed by married same-sex 
couples. The sheer ordinariness of this remark is quite extraordinary. It 
‘commonsensically’ attaches instability to the latter type of family in a 
context where it simply cannot attach to polygamists, who have to be in 
opposite-sex marriages for Gallagher’s (2003) thesis to make sense. The 
extent to which such broad generalisations may make sense ‘out there’ is a 
measure of the rootedness and toxicity of heteronormativity, which is at the 
heart of much of the opposition to same-sex marriage.
155
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I contextualised the dominant understanding of marriage in 
Ireland by drawing upon wider understandings of this social institution, 
which has evolved over time in the West according to prevailing social 
mores, norms and values. In this regard, Chapter Three denotes an 
important aspect to my discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 
1999; 2001; 2011), which I discussed in Chapter One as part of my 
methodological considerations. In Chapter Three, I first elaborated on the 
historical underpinnings of marriage, which derived from deeply embedded 
patriarchal assumptions. These were implicitly grounded in an irrational 
                                           
154
 Maggie Gallagher co-wrote a book regarding marriage with Professor Waite, who testified as an expert 
witness in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan. See Waite and Gallagher (2000). 
155
 Commenting on Lawrence v. Texas two months prior to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on this case in 
June 2003, which centred on the criminalisation / decriminalisation of homosexuality, Republican Senator 
Santorum is reported to have stated that if the court were to endorse a right to consensual gay sex within 
the home, that would imply a right to bigamy, polygamy, incest, adultery, and anything (see Anon., 
2003b). At the time, he was chairman of the Republican Conference in the U.S. Senate and he was third 
in line for his party’s leadership (see Anon., 2003b). The timing, thrust and tenor of this remark, as if it 
were perfectly acceptable, betray a characteristic that really does not befit a public representative. His 
remark suggests a reliance on some understanding of homosexuality that is ‘out there’ ‘in’ social 
cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006), which may form part of the routine operationalisation of 
heteronormativity in the United States. It is so repugnant to human dignity that it engenders hopelessness 
in me with regard to the realisation of equality of respect (see Baker et al, 2004). 
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fear or suspicion of female sexuality, which ‘commonsensically’ produced 
the discourse of family order and stability. These dynamics ‘justified’ the 
creation of a legislative framework underpinning marriage, which 
enshrined male dominance and control over women. It helps to explain the 
genesis of gendered laws on adultery, for example, and the patriarchal 
preoccupation with virginity and fertility. It also helps to explain the 
imperative of marital procreation. The instituting of the status of 
illegitimacy codified this imperative as ‘truth’ by ‘self-evidently’ 
producing the antithesis of (marital) family order and stability, i.e. 
unmarried woman with child. In this chapter, I suggested that what has 
been conceived of as the general imperative of social order and stability 
derives from the preoccupation with family order and stability. Indeed, 
Article 41.1.2 of our Constitution conceives of the marital family as the 
‘necessary basis of social order’. This helps to explain why the issues of 
contraception and divorce engendered such controversy in Ireland in the 
late 20
th
 century. I now elaborate on these controversies in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Irish Ways and Irish Laws: Aspects to Marriage, Family and Sexuality 
 
As a society we must acknowledge our continuing immaturity in 
the area of sexuality. How sexuality is acknowledged, expressed, 
recognised and not celebrated in our society is something with 
which we must come to terms. 
 
                          Senator Boyle, Seanad Éireann, 2010a, para. 163 
 
Introduction to Chapter 
 
This chapter elaborates on some of the constitutional and legislative 
developments that took place in this country with regard to the issues of 
contraception and divorce. This will shed some light on the normative 
construction of marriage and family in Ireland. Therefore, my upcoming 
analysis is in keeping with my discourse-historical approach to research 
(see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011). My focus in Chapter Four is on the 
ways in which such developments were largely conceived of as being either 
contrary to, or supportive of, the imperative to protect marriage and family, 
and the imperative to recognise and vindicate personal rights. This chapter 
denotes an elaboration on events that occurred over a period of three 
decades, from the 1970s onwards. It relies primarily on text from two 
genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b), i.e. parliamentary debates and 
court rulings. I also make reference to what could be conceived of as an 
institutional discourse vis-à-vis contraception and divorce emanating from 
the Catholic Church in Ireland. Identifiable themes emerge throughout the 
two sections of this chapter, and all are relevant to this research. They 
include the following: the role and responsibility of the judiciary and the 
legislature, wherein our constitutional courts and national parliament 
denote two distinct and independent spheres of governance; the dominant 
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understanding of family, i.e. the nuclear family paradigm; the 
preoccupation with social chaos and disorder in the wake of the perceived 
destruction of the marital family; and the significance of both our 
Constitution and constitutional court rulings. This elaboration in Chapter 
Four demonstrates that there are parallels between historical controversies 
surrounding the issues of contraception and divorce, which centred on 
marriage, family and sexuality, and the controversy that surrounds same-
sex marriage in Ireland today. 
 
Section One: Contraception 
 
Introduction 
 
To say that the issue of contraception convulsed both Irish polity and 
society for decades is not an overstatement. This section provides the 
reader with some sense of those dynamics. The focus is not on the merits or 
otherwise of proposed or enacted legislation on contraception per se. I do 
not provide an exhaustive analysis of the myriad debates that took place on 
this issue. Similarly, this section does not denote a comprehensive analysis 
of the landmark Supreme Court ruling in McGee v. Attorney General. 
Rather, I elaborate on aspects to the constitutional and legislative pathways 
surrounding contraception that characterise the struggle over the meaning 
(see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage and 
family in Ireland, against the backdrop of determining and realising a 
constitutional right. These issues are at the heart of Articles 41 and 40 of 
our Constitution respectively. Much of the controversy surrounding 
artificial contraception in Ireland stemmed from the vociferous opposition 
of the Catholic Church, which exercised tremendous influence over Irish 
polity and society for decades. Because of this dynamic, I include aspects 
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to the Church’s position on the matter so as to contextualise my analysis.156 
This hones in on the seamless interplay between the civil and the canonical, 
which was informed by a particular conceptualisation of marriage and 
family. Whilst I rely on rather lengthy quotations at times, particularly with 
regard to extracts from Oireachtas debates that took place in the 1970s and 
1980s, they are all warranted. They serve to contextualise the struggle over 
the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of 
Articles 40 and 41 of our Constitution, which were at the heart of the 
proceedings, the deliberations and the ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. 
 
Perspectives on Contraception 
 
Whyte (1980, p.24) states that after the Civil War in Ireland in the 1920s, 
the hierarchy was quite pessimistic about the state of the country.
 
While 
bishops’ pastoral letters detailed denunciations of intemperance, violence 
and other evils, the issue that sparked the most alarm was the decline in 
sexual morality (Whyte, 1980, p.24). This tended to be attributed to what 
was deemed the bad book, the indecent paper, foreign dancing, and the 
immodest fashion of female dress (Whyte, 1980, pp.25-27).
157
 While the 
Government was eager to protect Catholic moral values in the fledgling 
Free State (Whyte, 1980, p.36),
158
 Hug (1999, p.78) asserts that from the 
1920s, the hierarchy put pressure on the Government to impose and 
regulate a Catholic construction of sexuality. In relation to artificial 
contraception, Church teaching deems it to be immoral because it 
contravenes the primary purpose of sexual activity within marriage, which 
                                           
156
 In my discussion, the term ‘Church’ refers specifically to the Catholic Church. Moreover, references to 
the hierarchy or bishops infer membership of the Catholic Church. 
157
 The latter dynamic implies either an obsession with female sexuality or a deliberate heightening of 
female sexuality so as to validate a particular canonical standpoint, which could then justify government 
policy against the backdrop of the intertwining of Church and State. See Cahill (2005, pp.181-182) for a 
discussion on the manner in which some supporters of traditional family values in the United States 
heighten the sexuality of lesbians and gay men in an effort to mobilise opposition to anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
158
 The Free State refers to the formation of our own sovereignty after achieving Independence from 
Britain. 
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is procreation (see Hug, 1999, p.76; Ranke-Heinemann, 1990, pp.260-
261).
159
 This philosophy is evident in the following extract:  
 
Artificial methods are equivalent to claiming a dominion over the 
sources of life that belongs only to God. They can also be seen to 
diminish the total gift of one partner to the other. The unitive and 
procreative meanings of the sexual act are divided from each 
other and so marital intercourse is made less than what God 
intended it to be. This is contrary to God’s will for marriage and 
the couple. 
 
                    Archbishop McNamara, cited in O’Toole, 1986, p.32  
 
Because the line between Church and State was often blurred in Ireland, the 
enactment of aspects to legislation such as the Censorship of Publications 
Act, 1929 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935 can be seen as 
denoting government attempts to allay episcopal anxieties about the decline 
in morality (see Whyte, 1980, p.49). Section 16 of the 1929 legislation 
prohibited the printing, sale and distribution of publications that advocated 
contraception, while Section 17 of the 1935 legislation prohibited the 
importation and sale of contraceptives in Ireland.
160
 
 
The publication of two articles in The Irish Times in 1971 may have been 
pivotal in terms of generating public discourse about the role of the State 
vis-à-vis contraception. The first article reported on the proceedings of a 
conference pertaining to civil law and morality where the following 
perspective was articulated: 
 
                                           
159
 See Hug (1999, pp.85-87) for a discussion on the papal encyclical entitled Humanae Vitae, which 
holds that because sexual acts need to be open to procreation, artificial contraception intrinsically 
contradicts the moral order. 
160
 See http://www.bailii.org 
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Even though the laws do not forbid the practice of contraception 
– this would be an intolerable invasion of privacy – they do 
interfere with the provision of contraceptives. … The question of 
the contraceptive law cannot be debated on the objective morality 
or immorality of contraception itself. If the original law took its 
stand on this it was not entitled to do so. Neither can the question 
be decided by the private conscience of the legislators because 
the law must reflect a general consensus of the people to whom it 
applies. 
 
                                                                                   Anon., 1971a 
 
This extract provides a sense of what could be conceived of as an 
alternative understanding of the laws on contraception that prevailed in 
Ireland at the time. It also serves to contextualise an upcoming perspective 
from a well-known archbishop. The second article in The Irish Times 
attributed the following remarks to Senator Robinson who, along with two 
colleagues in the Seanad, sought to change the law on contraception:
161
 
“The criminal law, by prohibiting the availability of contraceptives in the 
country, effectively prevents people from following their own consciences 
in the matter without the risk of being criminals. This is a Civil Rights 
issue.” (Anon., 1971b) Here, the senator’s conceptualisation of the issue is 
clear. Moreover, she implicitly understood that her role as a legislator was 
important in terms of furthering decriminalisation in this area. These 
combined rumblings that were aired in The Irish Times may have prompted 
the subsequent publication of a well-known archbishop’s pastoral letter 
regarding contraception and the law. The following denotes an extract from 
Archbishop McQuaid’s letter to the faithful in his diocese:  
 
                                           
161
 Three senators tabled proposals that would have amended / repealed the criminal law on contraception 
that prevailed in Ireland at the time. However, these were ultimately rejected (see Seanad Éireann, 1971). 
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By contraception is meant every action which, in anticipation of 
the marriage act, or in the accomplishment of that act, or in the 
development of the natural consequences of that act, proposes, 
either as an end or as a means, to make procreation impossible. 
… Any such contraceptive act is always wrong in itself. To 
speak, then, in this context, of a right to contraception, on the 
part of an individual … is to speak of a right that cannot even 
exist. When one considers the use of marriage by Christians who 
have received the Sacrament of Marriage, the natural use of 
marriage is not only a reasonable, responsible and planned 
action; it is also a sanctified act that can merit an increase of 
God’s grace and a reward in eternal life. This is the authentic 
teaching of the Church, guardian, by Christ’s own appointment, 
of the Sacrament of Matrimony. … If they who are elected to 
legislate for our society should unfortunately decide to pass a 
disastrous measure of legislation that will allow the public 
promotion of contraception and an access, hitherto unlawful, to 
the means of contraception, they ought to know clearly the 
meaning of their action, when it is judged by the norms of 
objective morality and the certain consequences of such a law. … 
One can conceive no worse fate for Ireland than that it should, by 
the legislation of our elected representatives, be now made to 
conform to the patterns of sexual conduct in other countries. … It 
may well come to pass that, in the present climate of emotional 
thinking and pressure, legislation could be enacted that will 
offend the objective moral law. Such a measure would be an 
insult to our Faith; it would, without question, prove to be 
gravely damaging to morality, private and public; it would be, 
and would remain, a curse upon our country. 
 
                                 Archbishop McQuaid, cited in Anon., 1971c 
 
This extract conveys the breadth and depth of the power of the Catholic 
Church in Ireland at that time in our history, not least because it normalises 
the seemingly commonsensical intertwining of Church with State. The 
effortless conflation of the civil with the canonical instils an arrogance that 
presumes an authority to speak the ‘truth’, not just to the huddled masses, 
but also to the legislature. There is also an interesting parallel here between 
the positioning of the imperative of marital procreation that then dictates 
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that a right cannot exist, and the State’s framing of the issue of same-sex 
marriage in Zappone and Gilligan.
162
 
 
Pathway from Illegal to Legal: McGee v. Attorney General 
 
With regard to contraception, the Irish pathway from the criminal to the 
constitutional was paved by the actions of Mary McGee. She was a married 
woman and mother whose pregnancies had been marred by serious 
difficulties. On the basis of medical advice against future pregnancy, she 
opted for a contraceptive device that necessitated the importation of a 
spermicide. When customs officials seized one such order in 1971, she 
sought recourse through the courts (see Hug, 1999, pp.94-97). Her case 
came before the High Court in 1972, where Justice O’Keeffe held that the 
rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution did not include a right to 
privacy (see [1974] I.R. pp.284-337, at pp.289-293). She appealed this 
decision to the Supreme Court, where the majority held in McGee v. 
Attorney General that the ban on the importation of contraceptives 
constituted an unjustified invasion of the personal right to privacy in 
marriage (Connolly, 2003, p.239; Hug, 1999, p.97).  
 
While Chief Justice FitzGerald dismissed her Supreme Court appeal (see 
[1974] I.R. pp.284-337, at p.305), he made the following observation: 
“There is no definition of the word “family” in the Constitution.” (see 
[1974] I.R. at p.302) Similarly, Supreme Court Justice Griffin, who found 
for the plaintiff (see [1974] I.R. at p.336), stated the following over the 
course of his deliberations in McGee: “The word “family” is not defined in 
the Constitution but, without attempting a definition, it seems to me that in 
this case it must necessarily include the plaintiff, her husband and their 
children.” (see [1974] I.R. at p.334) These interpretations of Article 41 of 
                                           
162
 I will revisit this issue in Section One of Chapter Five. 
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our Constitution are important, and I will refer to them throughout this 
thesis. Also of significance here in terms of the production and 
dissemination of ‘truth’, is that while these two judges deliberated over the 
same legal facts in the same constitutional case, their rulings were entirely 
different in terms of the eventual outcome for the plaintiff.
163
 The following 
extract from these proceedings may shed some light on this phenomenon. 
For the majority, Justice Walsh stated:  
 
According to the preamble, the people gave themselves the 
Constitution to promote the common good with due observance 
of prudence, justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom 
of the individual might be assured. The judges must, therefore, as 
best they can from their training and their experience interpret 
these rights in accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice 
and charity. It is but natural that from time to time the prevailing 
ideas of these virtues may be conditioned by the passage of time; 
no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all 
time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts. 
 
                                                 Justice Walsh, [1974] I.R. at p.319 
 
Here, Justice Walsh makes a crucial point about the relevance of prevailing 
social mores and norms in the context of judicial interpretation of our 
Constitution. There is a sense that this is the dynamic that breathes life into, 
and maintains the relevance of, this important document. Nonetheless, 
while the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan asserted that the Constitution 
was a living instrument that should be interpreted in line with modern 
social and legal conditions, the High Court held in 2006 that there were 
limits to its reinterpretation (Kilkelly, 2006).  
 
Another insight that is garnered from Justice Griffin’s ruling in McGee 
derives from aspects to his interpretation of Article 40.3.1, which pertains 
to the role of the State vis-à-vis the respect, defence and vindication of the 
                                           
163
 Similarly, the overturning of the High Court ruling on appeal underscores this phenomenon. 
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personal rights of Irish citizens.
164
 An important background dimension 
here is that Justice Griffin invoked the High Court ruling in Ryan v. 
Attorney General (see [1965] I.R. pp.294-353), in which Justice Kenny 
ruled that the right to marry denoted a personal right deriving from Article 
40, even though it is not expressly enumerated in our Constitution (see 
[1965] I.R. at p.313; see also [1974] I.R. at pp.332-333).
165
 In McGee, 
Justice Griffin ruled that “… the guarantee of the State in its laws to respect 
the personal rights of citizens is not subject to the limitation “as far as 
practicable” nor is it circumscribed in any other way.” (see [1974] I.R. at 
p.334) This is a profound statement. What could be seen as a classic ‘get 
off the hook’ clause for the State, which forms part of the English text of 
Article 40.3.1, was deemed to be unacceptable by a Supreme Court judge. 
Justice Griffin’s rationale in this regard derived from the Irish language 
version of Article 40.3.1.
166
 Here, there is an implicit reliance on Article 8.1 
of our Constitution, which stipulates that the Irish language denotes our 
national language, and Article 25.5.4, which holds that in case of conflict 
regarding the text of the Constitution, the text in our national language shall 
prevail.
167
 In the context of determining the right to marital privacy with 
regard to the issue of contraception, Justice Griffin held that the Irish 
language text of Article 40.3.1 meant that there was a guarantee to not 
interfere with citizens’ constitutional rights (see [1974] I.R. at pp.334-335). 
He subsequently held that invoking the criminal code in the context of 
contraception constituted “… an unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the 
conduct of the most intimate of all their personal relationships.” (see [1974] 
                                           
164
 This is a fundamental precept, and one that I allude to throughout my work. My methodological 
orientation is consistent with this philosophy. 
165
 The Supreme Court accepted Justice Kenny’s interpretation of Article 40 (see [1965] I.R. at pp.344-
345). It is an established precept that our personal rights extend beyond those that are expressly stated in 
Article 40 of our Constitution. 
166
 See Appendix III for details. 
167
 Here, I acknowledge the significance of de Londras (2006) in terms of my knowledge and 
understanding of this Irish language dynamic. Justice Griffin did not make express reference to Articles 8 
or 25 over the course of his deliberations in McGee. Therefore, the importance of this was lost on me 
when I first read the McGee judgment, because I was unaware of the point that de Londras (2006, p.1) 
had made at that time in the research process. 
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I.R. at p.335) This extract is important in terms of my upcoming 
interpretation of two extracts from parliamentary debates surrounding 
proposed legislation on contraception. There are also some general points 
that are important in terms of Justice Griffin’s ruling in McGee. Firstly, the 
right to marry denotes a constitutional right in this jurisdiction. That this 
then presupposes that the right to marital privacy also denotes a 
constitutional right is important because it acknowledges not just the scope 
of Article 40, but also that of the right to marry. Justice Griffin’s 
perspective on the role of State vis-à-vis the vindication of constitutional 
rights, particularly in the context of the enactment of legislation, is also 
profound. These dynamics engender hope in terms of the push for marriage 
equality in Ireland. 
 
The general significance of McGee lies in the creation of a public space 
that validated the detachment of hetero-sex from procreation, albeit with 
the caveat that this was conceptualised in terms of marital privacy, rather 
than privacy per se. This is important in the context of prevailing social 
norms in the sense that, prior to the McGee ruling, this separation was 
largely unthinkable. It is conceivable that this Supreme Court ruling 
contributed to the gradual normalisation of the detachment of sex from 
marriage and family in contemporary Irish society,
168
 not least because it 
impelled the legislature to confront its justification for prohibition.
169
 
 
                                           
168
 Here, I refer to the manner in which sexual activity can occur outside marriage and without it being 
open to procreation. 
169
 It is also important to acknowledge the courage of Mary McGee and her counsel, whose actions and 
determination brought about the Supreme Court case in the first instance. 
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Oireachtas Debates on Contraception 
 
Extract I 
 
A legislative proposal that the Government put forward in 1974 provided 
for the sale of contraceptives in pharmacies to married persons (see Dáil 
Éireann, 1974a, paras. 285-290). Deputy Flanagan, who was a member of 
the governing party, was a vocal opponent of the Control of Importation, 
Sale and Manufacture of Contraceptives Bill, 1974. He articulated the 
following during a parliamentary debate on the matter: 
 
This Bill is an attack on the family. It is an attack on society. It 
means to smash the family to its very foundation. … This Bill is 
an attack on the family under the guise of rights of citizens, civil 
rights, constitutional requirements. […] Anything that is 
unnatural damages our society. The Church has the wisdom of 
ages as well as the authority of God behind all its teachings but 
what have the other side to show? They have nothing to show 
only the evil and disastrous consequences that follow from the 
wrecking of family life and the complete disorganisation of the 
family as a unit. … Why should we have to change our laws, to 
adopt laws that have proved disastrous in other countries in 
regard to this matter? … I agree that it is this House which 
should be the judge of the common good. Interpretation of the 
law is the duty of the Supreme Court. It was believed and 
intended that the Legislature should be able by its own judgment 
to decide —not the courts. The courts are there to interpret the 
laws but have not the responsibility this House carries. The 
Legislature have the responsibility of working in the public 
interest and of seeing in the fashioning of laws that the rights of 
the individual, as an individual, and the rights of the community 
do not conflict and are properly co-ordinated. That is the legal 
position. At no time did this House ever hand over to the 
Supreme Court the right to legislate. … I want to tell the Minister 
for Posts and Telegraphs and every other Minister that the Irish 
Hierarchy are all busy men who do not dabble in politics. In the 
numbers of years that I have been a Member of this House I have 
had no knowledge of the Irish Hierarchy ever telling legislators 
what should be done or what should not be done. Occasionally 
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they issue statements as to what the true moral law is in relation 
to certain aspects of legislation. … I accept Humanae Vitae in all 
its form, because I accept the advice so readily and freely given 
by the Holy Father, in relation to the granting and giving of 
God’s greatest gift, the gift of life. … I would ask the legislators 
to reply to the one question addressed to them by the Irish 
Hierarchy and that is whether this legislation, weighing up all 
circumstances, will do more harm than good to the society in 
which we live. If they calmly study it, they must conscientiously 
answer that a Bill of this kind is not in the best interests of our 
present day Irish society and will not be in the interests of the 
common good but will be a means of planting the seeds of 
immorality and will also be encouraging and giving State 
recognition to what is unnatural. They will be recognising as 
right what the Church in its wisdom through the ages, has taught 
to be wrong. That is the responsibility of legislators. 
 
                 Deputy Flanagan, Dáil Éireann, 1974b, paras. 926-952 
 
It is important to make the point that this extract denotes one of many 
contributions to Oireachtas debates surrounding contraception at the time. I 
include it here because it denotes a fascinating framing of a social issue that 
hones in on relevant aspects to this research. Perhaps the most pertinent in 
terms of discourse is the seemingly self-evident way in which a particular 
‘truth’ is postulated, verified and justified by an authority that is derived 
from legislative office. It presumes to speak for a particular constituency 
through the use of all-inclusive terms such as ‘we’ and ‘our’. This helps to 
normalise a necessarily unproblematic conflating of the civil with the 
canonical. Inevitably and ever so rationally, this accords with what is 
deemed to be the proper functioning of the legislature. Yet, there is an 
attempt to assuage fear about the intertwining of Church and State. 
Nonetheless, it is precisely their inextricable linking that enables the above 
‘truth’ regarding familial / social chaos and destruction to come into being. 
Moreover, it all hinges on the seemingly commonsensical incompatibility 
between a particular conceptualisation of family, which is derived from 
Article 41, and the realisation of a constitutional right, which is derived 
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from Article 40, although reference to these articles is not expressly made 
in the above extract from the Dáil record. 
 
The ‘commonsensical’ invoking of disorder and destruction is a recurring 
theme in much of the prevailing heterosexist opposition to same-sex 
marriage. For example, Representative Barr stated the following with 
regard to this issue in the United States in 1996: “The very foundations of 
our society are in danger of being burned. The flames of hedonism, the 
flames of narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are licking at the 
very foundations of our society: the family unit.” (see Congressional 
Record, 1996, p. H7482; see also Cahill, 2005, p.169) Similarly, Deputy 
Flanagan’s above reference to ‘State recognition to what is unnatural’ 
informs some of the discourse surrounding heterosexist opposition to same-
sex marriage in Ireland. It arose in two ‘Letters to the Editor’ of The Irish 
Times that were published over the course of the High Court proceedings in 
Zappone and Gilligan, although opposition was framed in terms of the 
State’s duty to protect marriage because its very nature is procreative. This 
then produced the ‘truth’ that marriage cannot be redefined and that the 
State has no role to play vis-à-vis the recognition of same-sex relationships 
(see Larkin, 2006; Mulligan, 2006). 
 
Perhaps the most problematic aspect to the above extract from the 
Oireachtas record is the effortless way in which it posits ‘truth’ about the 
workings of the Supreme Court. Here, I reflect upon Justice Griffin’s 
assertion in McGee regarding the role of the State vis-à-vis the enactment 
of legislation and the vindication of constitutional rights. My sense is that 
the above extract from the Oireachtas record suggests unease about those 
words and their resonance beyond the Supreme Court. Moreover, there is 
no sense here that it is precisely the abdication of responsibility with regard 
to issues that the legislature is reluctant to confront, such as those 
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pertaining to sexuality, that requires citizens to seek redress through the 
courts (see Seanad Éireann, 1976, paras. 1077-1078). The Oireachtas 
ultimately rejected the Control of Importation, Sale and Manufacture of 
Contraceptives Bill, 1974, facilitated, in part, by Deputy Flanagan’s and 
Taoiseach Cosgrave’s vote against it as members of the governing party 
that proposed and drafted the legislation (see Dáil Éireann, 1974c, paras. 
1266-1269; Ferriter, 2009, pp.419-420). 
 
Extract II 
 
It took a further five years before legislation was enacted that provided for 
family planning services with the attendant availability of artificial 
contraceptives under certain conditions (see Dáil Éireann, 1979, paras. 320-
335). As part of his review of the Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979, the 
new minister tabled amendments in 1985 that would go some way towards 
providing a comprehensive family planning service for those who required 
it (see Dáil Éireann, 1985a, para. 2582). For instance, the Health (Family 
Planning) (Amendment) Bill, 1985, provided for the sale of non-medical 
contraceptives without a prescription to persons over the age of eighteen 
through authorised outlets (see Dáil Éireann, 1985a, paras. 2587-2589). 
Deputy Flanagan made the following contribution to the debate on this 
proposed legislation: 
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… [C]ontraception and divorce constitute the destruction of the 
family as the fundamental unit of society. … This is a matter for 
the legislators, and our fundamental right is to legislate for the 
common good. … I am speaking for the people who cherish 
traditional Christian values, proper upbringing and, above all, the 
family as a fundamental unit of society. … Our Constitution 
guarantees protection for the family as the fundamental unit of 
society, but I wonder if this contraceptive Bill, as I call it, should 
not be examined by the Supreme Court to see if this is not an 
intrusion on the family and if it is not failing to protect the 
family, because making contraceptives available to young 
members of a family, in my opinion, is failing to protect the 
family, the fundamental unit of society. … It is the duty of men 
and women in public life to listen to the truth and, when the truth 
is spoken, to act on it. If churchmen do not give guidance to 
public representatives and alert their consciences, where else can 
advice and guidance come from? […] I say to those who have 
been critical of some of the statements made by the bishops — 
passing reference to this was made by the Minister this morning 
— that the Church has a very clear duty to proclaim the moral 
law and the official teaching of the Church on these issues and to 
address legislators and people alike; and when the Church points 
out what is right and wrong then it is a matter for the legislator as 
to whether he heeds the warning and the consequences to Irish 
society. This Bill is solely the responsibility of Parliament. […] 
This Bill will hurry the people down the slippery slope of moral 
decline. I as a legislator will have no hand act or part in speeding 
up the moral decline of the nation. … I regard the family as being 
based on marriage but the family the Minister is referring to in 
the Bill is the single unmarried teenager, who is being provided 
with facilities for family planning although he or she is not a 
family. … To me a family is the result of a union between man 
and woman after marriage. … The Bill before us is part of the 
overall plan of a small but very powerful group of politicians 
who are being advised internationally to smash the family. 
 
             Deputy Flanagan, Dáil Éireann, 1985a, paras. 2618-2638 
 
This extract evokes the general tenor of Deputy Flanagan’s earlier 
contribution to the Dáil record. Here, the responsibility that attaches to 
public representation and legislative accountability demands an authority 
that presumes to speak the ‘truth’ to a constituency comprising people who 
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are deemed to necessarily share the same belief system with regard to 
marriage, family, sexuality, and religion. This authority turns into 
arrogance when it is informed by a seemingly commonsensical deference 
to an unelected constituency, i.e. the Church. A particular definition of the 
family that is deemed to derive from our Constitution ordains the ‘truth’ 
about the necessarily destructive wherewithal of legislation pertaining to 
human sexuality, although it is conceived of here in terms of morality. This 
conflation of sexuality with morality, or more precisely, conflating 
immorality with the detachment of sex from marriage and family, fosters 
an arrogance that presumes authority on the unconscionable and the 
potentially unconstitutional.
170
 Nonetheless, the successful passage of this 
legislation through the Oireachtas, albeit by a slim majority (see Dáil 
Éireann, 1985b, paras. 452-456; Hug, 1999, p.118), meant that the 
separation of sexual activity from both marriage and procreation was now 
reflected in Irish law. 
 
Section One: Concluding Remarks 
 
This discussion focused on aspects to the legalisation of contraception in 
Ireland. It highlighted important themes, such as what could be conceived 
of as dominant understandings of marriage and family, the preoccupation 
with social chaos, and the significance of constitutional court rulings. 
Moreover, one legislator’s understanding of the marital family implicitly 
invoked tension between Articles 40 and 41 of our Constitution. This is an 
important point that recurs in Chapters Five and Six, both in terms of my 
analysis of the 2006 High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, and my 
                                           
170
 Here, I refer to Deputy Flanagan’s remark about referring the proposed legislation to the Supreme 
Court. Under Article 26 of our Constitution, the President of Ireland can refer a bill to the Supreme Court 
so as to ascertain whether the proposed legislation, either in part or in its entirety, is repugnant to the 
Constitution. If the Supreme Court finds that part or all of the proposed legislation is repugnant to the 
Constitution, the President must refuse to sign it into law. Therefore, the proposed legislation cannot 
become law in Ireland. See Barrington (1992, p.169) in this regard. See also Appendix I for details of 
Article 26 of the Irish Constitution (1937). 
 136 
analysis of some Oireachtas debates that took place in 2009 and 2010 in 
relation to the introduction of civil partnership in Ireland. An additional 
point here relates to two important elements in my CDA tool kit, i.e. access 
to discourse (see Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1993; van Dijk, 1996) and the 
discourse access profiles (see van Dijk, 1993) of elites. With regard to the 
issue of contraception, the above discussion implicitly captured the access 
and profiles of archbishops, judges and legislators, and how these were 
implicitly relied upon to posit a myriad of truths about constitutional rights 
and the role of the State vis-à-vis their vindication. Many of the themes that 
emerged in Section One of Chapter Four are also apparent in the 
circumstances surrounding the eventual introduction of divorce in Ireland 
in the 1990s, which is the focus of immediate analysis. 
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Section Two: Divorce 
 
Introduction 
 
Of the two issues that are the subject of analysis in this chapter, divorce is 
most aligned to marriage and family because it acknowledges the 
phenomenon of marital breakdown. While the legislature effectively 
banned divorce in the 1920s (see Dáil Éireann, 1925), absolute prohibition 
was not enshrined until the ratification of our Constitution in 1937. In this 
section, I first outline the circumstances surrounding the coming into being 
of the constitutional ban on divorce. I then discuss aspects to the 
constitutional referenda that took place in 1986 and 1995 by honing in on 
institutional, political and public discourse vis-à-vis divorce in this 
jurisdiction. Similar to my discussion on contraception, this section is not 
meant to denote a comprehensive analysis of divorce per se. Rather, I 
highlight aspects to Oireachtas debates, for example, surrounding divorce 
that emphasised the struggle over the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; 
Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage and family in Ireland in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Decades later, this struggle was apparent in the matter of 
Zappone and Gilligan. 
 
The 1937 Constitutional Ban on Divorce 
 
While addressing the Seanad in 1981 about the importance of our 
Constitution keeping pace with social change, Taoiseach FitzGerald of Fine 
Gael made reference to former Taoiseach de Valera’s drafting of this 
document amid the hierarchy’s hostility towards his ruling Fianna Fáil 
party (see Seanad Éireann, 1981, paras. 180-181).
171
 de Valera’s dilemma 
                                           
171
 Fianna Fáil was the dominant political party in Ireland for decades. I reiterate that the term ‘taoiseach’ 
refers to our primeminister. 
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was such that if the hierarchy publicly opposed the Constitution, it was 
assumed that the referendum that was required to ratify it would be 
defeated. Therefore, compromise with the Church was crucial so as to 
nullify any opposition. While the legislature did debate the issue (see Dáil 
Éireann, 1937, paras. 1882-1887), it acquiesced to the hierarchy’s 
insistence that a ban on divorce was warranted. It was subsequently 
enshrined in our Constitution, thereby furthering the intertwining of the 
civil with the canonical. 
 
The First Referendum on Divorce in 1986 
 
While constitutional change pertaining to divorce did not take place in 
Ireland until 1996, following the outcome of the 1995 referendum, the 
impetus for change began in the 1970s. For instance, one of the country’s 
main political parties, i.e. Fine Gael, called for the removal of the ban at its 
annual congress in 1978 (see Dáil Éireann, 1986a, para. 450). A 
referendum to remove the ban was first put to the people in 1986. The most 
vocal opposition to divorce came from the Catholic Church. It tended to 
focus on two issues: protection of the institution of marriage and family; 
and the concept of indissolubility. Archbishop McNamara stated the 
following in an interview that was published prior to the holding of the first 
referendum: 
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Marriage in our Constitution has been understood as a life-long 
commitment and this understanding was accepted by western 
society in general until comparatively recently. … In Irish 
Constitutional law the institution of marriage is seen as being 
antecedent to the State and its laws. It is outside the competence 
of the State to determine the nature of marriage as dissoluble: 
that would be to completely reverse the whole tradition which 
recognises that families are not made by the State, that the 
meaning of marriage is not adjustable to what circumstances at a 
particular time may seem to some to demand. To suggest that the 
State has the power to determine the meaning and nature of 
marriage is something I could not accept. The family, as 
designed by God, and as understood by the tradition in which 
western legal systems have their roots, is based on the union of 
man and woman in marriage for life. This is the family as 
understood in Articles 41 and 42 of the Irish Constitution. … If 
divorce legislation were to be introduced, it would seem to 
conflict with the whole tenor of what the Constitution has to say 
in regard to marriage and the family, and not just with the 
existing Constitutional prohibition on divorce. The introduction 
of divorce and re-marriage could well lead to increasing pressure 
that the very notion of marriage and the family as understood by 
the Constitution should be changed. There is a fundamental 
question at issue here. 
 
                    Archbishop McNamara, cited in O’Toole, 1986, p.22 
 
This extract is quite contradictory in that, on one level, there seems to be an 
imperative to distinguish the civil and the canonical from the constitutional. 
Making the rather prescient point that marriage existed prior to the drafting 
and ratification of our Constitution underscores this philosophy. However, 
his reliance on a particular conceptualisation of constitutional law then 
seems to create tension between the civil and the canonical. Yet, he relies 
on the constitutional to conflate the civil with the canonical. In terms of my 
thesis, a number of important issues emerge from the above extract. Firstly, 
the Irish State does have the competency to determine in some way the 
meaning of marriage. The enactment of legislation over three centuries 
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with regard to this institution is testament to that.
172
 That this meaning can 
be contested in constitutional cases or referenda does not detract from that. 
Secondly, the mere holding of the referendum on divorce, irrespective of its 
outcome, was an indication to the people that the State was prepared to 
concede the notion that the prevailing constitutional position did not 
necessarily protect the institution of marriage. Moreover, the holding of the 
referendum implied that the suggested change to Article 41 was intended to 
be consistent with the State’s obligation to protect marriage and family. 
The following extract from the Oireachtas record underscores all of these 
points, and all are relevant to my thesis: 
 
Those who support the introduction of divorce risk the accusation 
of being anti-family and anti-marriage. That glib, facile smear is 
all pervasive against those who wish to see change. I find it 
disturbing because it is far from being the truth. It is from a 
profound sympathy with those families who are trapped in 
broken marriages and of those families who are forced to exist 
outside of marriage that I advocate divorce. I do not go for the 
hypocrisy of annulments, giving a cloak of sanctity to further 
liaisons. That is theological hypocrisy that I as a Catholic, a 
legislator and, more particularly as a married person, find 
patronising, repulsive and unacceptable. Above all else, the 
annulment process, the criteria used and the ultimate agreement 
to granting the annulment are, in my view, destructive of 
marriage. It is the kind of divorce I do not want to see here. All 
of us would prefer to live in a society in which every family was 
happy and every marriage a success but we know that, despite 
good intentions, marriage vows and the force of legal and social 
sanctions, marriages break down. No amount of theological 
analyses, the application of social principles or a veneer of 
compassion can eliminate the fact that marriages break down, 
irretrievably, irrevocably and in totality. I find it difficult to 
understand how people cannot accept that simple human reality. 
… Marriages have always broken down. They broke down 
before 1937 and they have broken down since then but in the past 
economic and social pressures kept the parties in a failed 
marriage under the same roof. … The choice is clear. We can 
continue to do nothing on the basis that the legal concept of 
                                           
172
 See Appendix VI for some details in this regard. 
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indissolubility of marriage is more important than giving formal 
legal protection to an increasing number of families, or we can 
face the reality of marriage breakdown in our society and provide 
a mechanism whereby the parties in a failed marriage and 
involved in second unions can have redress and protection at law. 
… The proposed referendum will give the majority of Irish 
people an opportunity to vote on the kind of political democracy 
they wish to see develop in this island. The present prohibition 
on divorce in the Constitution conflicts with what a significant 
minority of people on this island consider to be a civil right. … 
The minority Churches believe in the indissolubility of marriage 
but yet see no contradiction in allowing divorce as a civil right. Is 
the legal concept of the indissolubility of marriage more 
important than the principle of respecting the rights of 
minorities? […] It is argued that if divorce is introduced, the 
legal concept of a permanent, indissoluble marriage and family 
home will be revoked and marriage will become a temporary 
arrangement at the mercy of one partner. … Despite the legal 
concept of the indissolubility of marriage, marriages are breaking 
down and increasingly informal families are being formed 
outside marriage. … The legal concept of a permanent marriage 
is not preventing marriage breakdown. The prohibition on 
divorce is preventing informal families from benefiting from the 
legal protection which our society affords to families based on 
marriage. … I reject — and this is a personal view which I do not 
propose to impose on everybody — the assertion that divorce 
will have a devastating effect on the constitutional rights and the 
protection of every married family in the State. … Divorce, 
unlike annulment, does not have the effect of establishing that a 
marriage never existed. A marriage which ends in divorce was a 
valid marriage. It does not go through the hypocrisy of 
annulment which says that the marriage never existed. That is a 
piece of theological hair-splitting I have never been able to 
understand. A marriage which ends in divorce was a valid 
marriage for the period it lasted and therefore is entitled to the 
continuous protection of the State where necessary. 
 
             Deputy Desmond, Dáil Éireann, 1986b, paras. 1320-1329 
 
While this quotation denotes a rather lengthy extract from the Dáil record, 
it is warranted. It deems proposed constitutional change to Article 41 
consistent with the imperatives to affirm and protect marriage, family, and 
minority rights. Here therefore, there is no invoking of tension between 
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Articles 40 and 41. Moreover, such change is not deemed to be tantamount 
to altering the meaning of marriage. While the extract suggests that the 
notion of family diversity might have been inconceivable at the time, the 
minister’s willingness to confront an important social, legal and 
constitutional issue is quite apart from what could be seen as sanctimonious 
hand-wringing regarding the status quo. The above extract from the 
Oireachtas record is also important in terms of reflecting on the State’s role 
vis-à-vis its obligations under Articles 40 and 41 of our Constitution. This 
was a recurring theme in the 2009 and 2010 parliamentary debates on civil 
partnership that I allude to in Chapter Six. Indeed, the responsible minister 
was acutely aware of this imperative. It was also manifest in the struggle 
over constitutional rights in the context of marriage that was played out in 
the High Court in 2006. This will become apparent in Chapter Five. 
Notwithstanding Deputy Desmond’s powerful contribution to the Dáil 
record, the first referendum on divorce was defeated in 1986. 
 
The Second Referendum on Divorce in 1995 
 
Another issue that arose with regard to the enactment of civil partnership 
legislation in 2010 is the now prevailing text of Article 41.3.2 of our 
Constitution, which was successfully put to the people in 1995. I refer to 
the drafting of the constitutional clause on divorce, the wording of which 
was commensurate with the reform that the Government envisaged. In an 
effort to assuage fears about what is referred to as a ‘quickie divorce 
culture’, which did concern the Oireachtas (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, paras. 
18-56), the responsible minister deemed it appropriate to set out the 
conditions for granting divorce in the proposed clause so that any future 
changes, post a (successful) second referendum, would have to be put to 
the people (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, paras. 18-22). It is also important to 
make the point that the minister deemed the proposed change to Article 41 
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to be consistent with protecting the institution of marriage and family in 
Ireland (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, para. 18). Of significance here is that the 
record shows that he did conceive of one institution, rather than two. This 
supports the premise that marriage and family are inextricably linked in 
Ireland. The complexity associated with drafting constitutional 
amendments on social issues is such that Deputy Keogh, who supported the 
lifting of the ban on divorce, repeatedly stated in the Oireachtas that it was 
a mistake to insert the conditions pertaining to the granting of a divorce 
decree into the Constitution (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, paras. 33-43). “In this 
case experience has relentlessly shown that the Constitution should not be 
used when legislative action is more appropriate.” (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, 
para. 34) This implies that it is inappropriate to enshrine complex 
amendments pertaining to controversial social issues in our Constitution. 
While it was necessary for the people to decide on whether or not to 
remove the ban on divorce in the first instance, Deputy Keogh’s 
perspective was that the Oireachtas should decide the conditions upon 
which divorce could be obtained (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, paras. 33-43). 
Her party’s amendment, which was introduced over the course of this 
parliamentary debate (see Dáil Éireann, 1995, para. 33), was not accepted. 
Of interest here is that the clause on divorce that was accepted by the 
people in 1995 informed the drafting of the section on dissolution that is 
contained in our civil partnership legislation.
173
 
 
Prior to referendum day, the leader of the Christian Solidarity Party,
174
 Dr. 
Casey,
175
 stated the following:  
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 This will become apparent in Section Three of Chapter Six. 
174
 The Christian Solidarity Party, which has its headquarters in Dublin, seeks to inspire and strengthen 
Irish society with Christian social thinking. One of its aims is to underpin the (marital / nuclear) family as 
the fundamental unit group of society. For details, see 
http://comharcriostai.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=2 
175
 Please note that I am not referring to Professor Casey, who testified as an expert witness for the State 
in Zappone and Gilligan. 
 144 
Marriage, as it currently exists in this country, is a permanent and 
exclusive union of one man and one woman, constituted by the 
complete and unconditional gift of each to the other. Once 
divorce is introduced into a jurisdiction, it has the effect of 
making all marriages conditional affairs. This has the paradoxical 
result that, instead of permitting those who are separated from 
their spouses and cohabiting with another person to achieve the 
dignified status of marriage, it transforms all existing marriages 
into a kind of co-habitation! 
 
                                                                                     Casey, 1995 
 
This extract implicitly takes as given the notion that marriage denotes the 
‘gold standard’ in terms of adult intimate relationships. This invariably 
normalises a tiered system of relationship recognition. Moreover, in the 
struggle over the meaning (see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 
1999) of marriage, his ‘truth’ is quite paternalistic because it presupposes 
that parties to a marriage lack the personal agency to conceptualise what 
their relationship actually means to them. 
 
The second referendum on divorce passed by a slim majority of just over 
nine thousand votes (Hug, 1999, p.73). Writing at a time when the second 
referendum’s outcome was unknown, O’Toole (1995) made the following 
observation: “A narrow victory for either side today will leave Irish society 
in a condition of rather sour stalemate.” He stated that if the ‘yes’ side won 
by a narrow margin, it would do so in the sobering knowledge that almost 
half of the electorate did not share its belief about the direction that Irish 
society was taking (O’Toole, 1995). It is a salient point and one that 
warrants reflection, given the margin in favour of removing the ban. The 
issue was such that it literally divided the country. Today, the issue that 
divides us is the family (see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution, 2006, p.122), specifically, the right to access the institutions 
of marriage and family, which requires unequivocal legislative and 
constitutional recognition and protection.  
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Section Two: Concluding Remarks 
 
My discussion regarding the pathway towards the formal recognition of 
irretrievable marital breakdown highlighted themes that are relevant to this 
research. The most important of these is the role and responsibility of the 
Oireachtas vis-à-vis its obligations in relation to Articles 40 and 41 of our 
Constitution. Similarly, it was clear that the struggle over the meaning (see 
Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage was a 
dynamic that prevailed as much in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s, as it did 
in 2006, over the course of the High Court proceedings in Zappone and 
Gilligan. 
 
Conclusion to Chapter Four 
 
In this chapter, I focused on two social issues that engendered considerable 
controversy in Ireland in the context of marriage and family, i.e. 
contraception and divorce. In drawing upon genres of discourse (see 
Wodak, 1997b), my analysis shed some light on the normative construction 
of what has become the dominant conceptualisation of marriage and family 
as one social institution with both a constitutional and legislative 
underpinning in Ireland. This dynamic is at the centre of my upcoming 
analysis in Chapter Five. Therefore, the identifiable themes that emerged 
from my analysis in Chapter Four are important and relevant. These 
include the role and responsibility of the legislature in Ireland, which are 
dynamics that also arise in Chapter Six. The significance of our 
Constitution, in terms of the principle of interpreting it with regard to 
prevailing social mores, is another important dynamic. It is a mechanism 
that makes our Constitution as relevant to the people of Ireland today, as it 
was at the time of its ratification in 1937. This chapter also links back to 
important considerations in Chapter Three, by alluding to the social chaos 
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and disorder that was deemed to derive from the legalisation of 
contraception and divorce in Ireland. These issues were sometimes framed 
in terms of the destruction of the (marital) family, which is a dynamic that 
is antithetical to the general provisions that are contained in Article 41 of 
our Constitution. Specifically, under Article 41.3.1, the State is obliged to 
both guard the institution of marriage with special care and to protect it 
against attack. In 2006 in the High Court, this became a crucial 
consideration with regard to the distribution of marriage rights in this 
jurisdiction. I now elaborate on this dynamic in Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
176
 
 
The Love That Dare Now Speak Her Name: Critical Discourse Analysis 
of the High Court Ruling in Zappone and Gilligan
177
 
 
Extract I 
 
The final point I would make on this topic is that if there is in 
fact any form of discriminatory distinction between same sex 
couples and opposite sex couples by reason of the exclusion of 
same sex couples from the right to marry, then Article 41 in its 
clear terms as to guarding the family provides the necessary 
justification. The other ground of justification must surely lie in 
the issue as to the welfare of children. Much of the evidence in 
this case dealt with this issue. Until such time as the state of 
knowledge as to the welfare of children is more advanced, it 
seems to me that the State is entitled to adopt a cautious approach 
to changing the capacity to marry albeit that there is no evidence 
of any adverse impact on welfare. 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter denotes a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the 2006 Irish 
High Court ruling in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan v. Revenue 
Commissioners and Attorney General (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513). 
While it draws and builds upon the myriad themes that have been identified 
and elaborated upon thus far, the unfolding of this chapter is very much 
reliant on my methodological and theoretical considerations. This chapter 
demonstrates some of the ways in which lesbian and gay inequality is 
routinely legitimated through discourse, thereby accounting for its 
                                           
176
 I am indebted to Dr. Ní Mhuirthile, Dr. O’Mahony, Dr. Parkes, and Professor Kilcommins from the 
Faculty of Law in University College Cork for their assistance regarding various constitutional, judicial 
and legal principles that are alluded to in this chapter. Any errors or omissions remain my responsibility. 
177
 An excerpt from the poem Two Loves, which was written by Lord Alfred Douglas, informs the title of 
this chapter: “Have thy will, I am the love that dare not speak its name.” See Belford (2001, pp.221-222). 
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intransigence in Ireland. Here, I reiterate my support for the premise of 
marriage equality (see Herek, 2006; Pillinger, 2008) and my belief that it 
denotes an important aspect to the principle of equality of respect and 
recognition (see Baker et al, 2004). My politics are such that I do not 
support the Irish State’s position in the matter of Zappone and Gilligan. 
This informs my rationale for critiquing the last word (see van Dijk, 1996) 
on the issue of marriage inequality in this jurisdiction, which came into 
being in December 2006 on foot of this High Court ruling.
178
 Drawing 
upon the premise that language is social action (see Fairclough, 1989; 
Wodak, 1999), this CDA demonstrates that this court case denotes a key 
site in terms of both the routine operationalisation of heteronormativity and 
the reproduction of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland. Here, lexical 
choice (see Macgilchrist, 2007; van Dijk, 2006) constructs the reality that it 
purports to merely reflect (see Riggins, 1997). It demonstrates how 
important ideological work (see Brookes, 1995), such as preserving the 
institution of marriage as a bastion of heterosexual privilege, assumes a 
seemingly self-evident and commonsensical coherence to the extent that 
the negative representation of the ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), which it 
often necessitates (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), is deemed to be 
acceptable. Given the imperative of reform that underscores the plaintiffs’ 
action in this case, the seemingly benign imperative of heteronormativity 
requires relentless legitimation (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997) in 
court. This trifles with the fundamental principle of equality because it 
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 In this jurisdiction, it falls upon the judiciary in the High Court and the Supreme Court to formally 
interpret our Constitution. In this regard, see Justice Walsh’s ruling in McGee v. Attorney General ([1974] 
I.R. pp.284-337, at p.318) and Justice McCarthy’s ruling in Norris v. Attorney General ([1984] I.R. 
pp.36-104, at p.98). I accept that judges in our constitutional courts can have the last word (see van Dijk, 
1996) on matters that come before them, albeit with the caveat that the appeal mechanism is an important 
principle. It is important to make the point that the electorate can also have the last word (see van Dijk, 
1996) on matters pertaining to our Constitution by way of referendum. This can occur following a 
Supreme Court ruling, for example, as happened in the wake of Attorney General v. X and Others (see 
[1992] 1 I.R. pp.1-93), which pertained to the issue of abortion. It is also important to make the point that 
the Oireachtas has a responsibility to enact legislation that gives wide effect to Supreme Court rulings and 
the outcomes of constitutional referenda. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the Irish Government to 
draft the wording of clauses that are put to the people in such referenda. The general point that I wish to 
make here is that there are many dimensions to making a determination on the last word. 
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requires the justification of inequality (see van Dijk, 1993), in this instance, 
on the basis of gender and sexual orientation with regard to the right to 
marry. 
 
Justice Dunne’s statement at the beginning of this chapter (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248) captures the essence of this ideological 
venture in a compelling way. Respect for her institutional authority (see 
Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996), which derives from Articles 34 and 35 of 
our Constitution,
179
 makes it difficult to countenance the heterosexism and 
homophobia that dress up the unspeakable as self-evident or 
commonsensical truth. Extract I of the reported judgment denotes the last 
word (see van Dijk, 1996) on the matter of marriage inequality in 
Ireland.
180
 The force of this extract from the court record, which fails to 
take cognisance of the premise of equality of respect and recognition (see 
Baker et al, 2004), compels me to unravel the layers of justification 
throughout these proceedings, which brought the ‘logic’ of 
heteronormativity, with its attendant ‘othering’ of lesbianism and 
homosexuality, into being. To that end, there are two crucial and 
interlocking elements that require critical analysis in this chapter, i.e. (1) 
the notion that the institution of marriage is inherently heterosexual (see 
Koppelman, 1997a, pp.51-95),
181
 and (2) the routine pathologisation of 
lesbians and gay men. Normative approval (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 
1997) was sought and accomplished through a series of discursive 
strategies and institutional practices that were deployed in the High Court, 
including Justice Dunne’s responsibility for upholding our Constitution 
under Article 34. Her institutional authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 
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 See Appendix I for details of all articles to the Irish Constitution (1937) that are alluded to in this 
CDA. 
180
 This is not meant to suggest that the High Court ruling is reducible to Extract I, or that the outcome of 
the case hinged entirely on Extract I. The point that I wish to make here is that I conceive of Extract I as 
denoting a core element of this chapter. 
181
 Please note that Koppelman (1997a) unequivocally supports the principle of marriage equality. See 
also Koppelman (1997b, pp.1-33) and Koppelman (2004, pp.5-32). 
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1996) facilitated the construction and operationalisation of a justificatory 
heteronormativity, which conceived of marriage inequality as being not just 
‘commonsensical’, but also legal and constitutional. This critical research 
unpacks layers of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b), which are primarily 
predicated on constitutional, legal, judicial, and social scientific principles, 
in an attempt to explain the intransigence of inequality vis-à-vis gender and 
sexual orientation in Ireland. 
 
Important Research Considerations 
 
The Official Court Record / Reported Judgment 
 
Here, I highlight some important research considerations that pertain to this 
CDA. Firstly, the court record that I am reliant upon, which is also known 
as the reported judgment, comprises Justice Dunne’s December 2006 
recounting of the October 2006 evidence pertaining to both the plaintiffs’ 
and the State’s positions, and her elaboration on the rationale behind her 
eventual ruling in this case. This record does not denote a verbatim account 
of what transpired in the courtroom vis-à-vis evidence. For instance, it does 
not contain Dr. Gilligan’s testimony. Justice Dunne indicated that it was 
not necessary to set it out because it did not differ in any material respect 
from that of Dr. Zappone (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 21). 
Similarly, it omits evidence that was put forward by an American 
theologian who was based in a university in the United States. Justice 
Dunne did not recount his testimony on the basis that it did not advance the 
plaintiffs’ case to any extent (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 29). 
The important point here is that my reliance on the recounting feature does 
not preclude me from being mindful of the gaps that are ‘out there’ 
between the spoken text that constituted the actual proceedings that took 
place in October 2006, and the court record that was compiled in December 
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2006. That record was initially made available as an ‘unreported judgment’ 
through the Courts Service website.
182
 In 2008, The Irish Reports reported 
this judgment with the official citation as follows: [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513. I rely on this reported judgment throughout this CDA. 
 
Another important consideration is that the recounting feature has a 
tendency to morph the voices of expert witnesses and lawyers, for example, 
into one, i.e. Justice Dunne’s. This is not meant to suggest that the reported 
judgment is necessarily at odds with the actual proceedings by virtue of an 
incorrect interpretation of testimony on her part. The important point here 
is that the attribution of text demands constant rigour on my part. It implies 
that I cannot unequivocally state that the text that was articulated by an 
expert witness, for example, is identical to the text that was deployed by 
Justice Dunne in her recounting of that expert testimony. Furthermore, the 
recounting feature is such that it can, on occasion, be difficult to determine 
the precise protagonist of an extract from the court record, i.e. whether it 
emanated from counsel for the State or from an expert witness who 
testified on behalf of the State, for example. Where applicable, and in 
keeping with the rigour that this CDA requires, I will make that known to 
the reader. 
 
While this chapter is quite detailed, I have compiled a number of 
appendices that contain relevant information that supplements my analysis. 
The reader can consult these appendices where necessary. Lastly, it is 
important to bear in mind that while this research does not denote a CDA 
of the written evidence that was submitted, the testimony that was 
articulated and recounted, or the case law that was relied upon per se, this 
research often necessitates an analysis of these dynamics. 
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 See the following link: 
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/597645521f07ac9a80256ef30048ca52/a4fe4e30eef239258025727900
40d30c?OpenDocument 
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Expert Witnesses 
 
Here, I introduce the experts whose testimony I most refer to in my 
analysis. These are important considerations in terms of their discourse 
access profiles (see van Dijk, 1993) and their range of access to discourse 
(see Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1993; van Dijk, 1996). 
 
Professor Casey, who was called as an expert witness for the State, is a 
well-known psychiatrist in Ireland. She is attached to the Mater 
Misericordiae Hospital in Dublin and University College Dublin (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 46). She is a regular contributor to 
current affairs programmes in the Irish media and she is a columnist in a 
national daily newspaper. She is also a patron of the Iona Institute (see 
Byrnes, 2007; Ramsay, 2007). In Chapter Three, I discussed her 
contribution to the construction of normative assumptions surrounding the 
nuclear family paradigm in Ireland (see Casey, 2008a,b,c). Because this 
took place in the correspondence columns of The Irish Times, which is 
deemed to be the paper of record in Ireland (O’Brien, 2008, p.13), it 
denotes a layer of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) that can possibly shed 
some light on the general tenor of Professor Casey’s testimony in Zappone 
and Gilligan. 
 
Professor Green is a psychiatrist and lawyer who testified on behalf of the 
plaintiffs in this case (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 31). He has 
conducted research studies pertaining to the parenting that is done by 
lesbians and gay men, and the issue of child development (for example, see 
Green, 1978; Green, 1982; Green et al, 1986). Since the 1970s, which 
marked the beginning of the reliance on expert testimony regarding 
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homosexuality and lesbianism in child custody cases in the United States, 
Professor Green has testified in this regard (see Rivera, 1979, p.898).
183
 
 
Professor Kennedy is Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital in 
Dublin. He is also attached to the Dept. of Forensic Psychiatry in Trinity 
College Dublin. He is a regular contributor in the Irish media to discussions 
pertaining to mental health. He testified for the plaintiffs in this case (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 24). 
 
Professor Nock was a demographer and sociologist who was attached to the 
University of Virginia in the United States.
184
 He was co-founder of the 
Center for Children, Families, and the Law at this university, which fosters 
collaborative and multidisciplinary research and teaching on issues 
regarding children and families (see Nock, 2001, p.3). The inclusion of his 
2001 affidavit as evidence in Zappone and Gilligan is indicative of a 
growing international trend towards conceiving of expert knowledge 
regarding lesbian or gay parenting as relevant to determining their right to 
marry.
185
 
 
Professor Waite is a sociologist who is attached to the University of 
Chicago in the United States. Her research interests pertain to the social 
institution of marriage and family. She is co-author of Waite and Gallagher 
(2000), which was briefly alluded to over the course of these High Court 
proceedings. She testified on behalf of the State in Zappone and Gilligan 
(see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 62 and 68). 
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 I will revisit this issue later in this chapter. 
184
 My understanding is that Professor Nock is deceased. 
185
 It is important to state that I rely on Professor Nock’s sworn testimony in an affidavit, rather than on 
direct testimony per se in the Irish High Court. In Section Two of Chapter Five, I will revisit this wider 
issue of research on child development being submitted as evidence in court cases pertaining to the right 
to marry. 
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Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) 
 
In this chapter, I integrate evolving Irish case law on marriage and family 
into this analysis because it is at the core of the dominant understanding of 
Article 41 of our Constitution. This is a dynamic that I have consistently 
alluded to throughout this thesis. Normative assumptions surrounding the 
nuclear family paradigm dictate that marriage is inherently heterosexual. 
This denotes the first strand in the hetero-matrix that requires critical 
analysis. I also highlight jurisprudence from international cases that were 
alluded to throughout these proceedings. This facilitates an understanding 
of the 2006 High Court ruling. The pathologisation of the lesbian or gay 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) denotes the second strand to the hetero-
matrix that requires critical analysis. So as to understand the myriad ways 
in which this was discursively achieved in an Irish court, I discuss some 
events that may have precipitated the routine inclusion of evidence 
pertaining to child development in contemporary court cases pertaining to 
same-sex marriage. I also elaborate on the primary research material 
pertaining to child development that was relied upon in Zappone and 
Gilligan. These considerations are consistent with my discourse-historical 
(see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011) and critical approaches to research. 
 
DHA: Primary Research Studies 
 
Because reported judgments do not tend to include bibliographies, it proved 
difficult to source all of the primary research material that was relied upon 
over the course of these proceedings. Nonetheless, I did locate much of the 
literature, which can be categorised according to four themes: same-sex 
relationship recognition (see Herek, 2006; Wintemute and Andenaes, 
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2001); lesbian and gay parenting
186
 (see American Academy of Pediatrics, 
2002; Anderssen et al, 2002; Brewaeys et al, 1997; Golombok et al, 1983; 
Golombok and Tasker, 1996; Green, 1978; Green et al, 1986; Nock, 2001; 
Stacey and Biblarz, 2001a); lesbian and gay mental health (see King et al, 
2003; Mays and Cochran, 2001; Warner et al, 2004); and heterosexual 
marriage (see Waite and Gallagher, 2000). With the exception of 
Wintemute and Andenaes (2001), which I refer to momentarily, none of 
this material specifically alludes to the situation that prevails in Ireland vis-
à-vis these themes. However, the studies informed the testimony of many 
of the expert witnesses in this case. Much of the evidence in Zappone and 
Gilligan centred on child development, although Justice Dunne conceived 
of the issue in terms of child welfare towards the end of her deliberations 
(see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248). Moreover, she was ultimately 
persuaded by particular interpretations of these child development studies 
(for example, see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 216), which implicitly 
relied upon a justificatory heteronormativity. Therefore, these studies are 
central to this research. In Section Two of Chapter Five, I provide some 
details of these studies with a view to elaborating on their significance. 
 
Here, I discuss dynamics to the other research studies. At the outset, it is 
important to state that I do not integrate all of the above research into this 
CDA. Moreover, as my analysis evolves, it will become clear that some 
texts are more relevant than others in terms of that integration. Wintemute 
and Andenaes (2001) denotes an edited collection of writings from 
academics, activists and legal practitioners in Africa, Asia, Australasia, 
Europe, Latin America, North America, and the Middle East, regarding 
relationship and family recognition in the context of lesbians and gay men. 
                                           
186
 I accept that the terms ‘gay parenting’ and ‘lesbian parenting’ are reductive in that they necessarily 
posit such sexual orientations as defining characteristics that are somehow relevant to parenthood. 
However, the heteronormative backdrop, which pathologises such parenting precisely on that basis, 
necessitates the use of such terms. 
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While the collection includes a chapter pertaining to Ireland (see Flynn, 
2001), this largely focuses on the development of anti-discrimination and 
pro-equality legislation vis-à-vis sexual orientation. Flynn (2001) also 
alludes to the Norris v. Attorney General ruling, and he elaborates on the 
constitutional position vis-à-vis equality (Article 40) and marriage and 
family (Article 41) in Ireland. Herek’s (2006) article is based on research 
that formed part of the American Psychological Association’s amicus 
curiae briefs,
187
 which were submitted to courts in the United States in 
cases that challenged the constitutionality of state laws denying marriage 
rights to same-sex couples. While this study was put to Professor Casey 
over the course of her cross-examination as an expert witness for the State, 
and while she proffered her expertise on part of it, she stated that she was 
unfamiliar with same (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 54-55). 
Therefore, the relevance of Herek (2006) to this thesis is limited to the 
construction of Professor Casey as an expert knower and testifier, rather 
than a focus on the study per se. The Waite and Gallagher (2000) study, 
which serves to underscore the ‘gold-standard’ status of marriage in its 
traditional sense, is somewhat peripheral in that it was briefly alluded to 
over the course of Professor Waite’s cross-examination as an expert 
witness for the State (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 68). Its 
relevance is limited to the way in which it facilitates her stature as an 
expert knower and testifier on both the conducting of social scientific 
research and the institution of marriage as is currently constituted.  
 
Mental Health Studies 
 
With regard to the research studies pertaining to mental health, I argue that 
they are irrelevant to this court case. However, my position does warrant 
                                           
187
 This term means ‘friend of the court’. It is a facility that allows a third party, such as the American 
Psychological Association, to offer its expertise in an area that is pertinent to a legal proceeding wherein 
the organisation is not an actual party to the matter that is before the court (see Irish Human Rights 
Commission, 2011). 
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some commentary in terms of both my critical and discourse-historical 
approaches. Under cross-examination, Professor Casey elaborated on 
research studies that were conducted by King et al (2003), Mays and 
Cochran (2001), and Warner et al (2004), which pertain to the dynamic of 
gay and lesbian mental health in Britain and the United States.
188
 However, 
there is what I refer to as a ‘textual gap’ in the reported judgment in that 
Justice Dunne does not detail Professor Casey’s evidence regarding same, 
save to say that a general discussion ensued as to their findings (see [2008] 
2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 52). Therefore, while the record indicates that 
there is spoken text ‘out there’, it is ‘not there’ in written form, which is 
perhaps indicative of its peripheral nature to this case. Nonetheless, I argue 
that it is the operationalisation of heterosexism and homophobia, with the 
attendant manifestations of inequality and stigma, for example, that 
constitute risk factors for lesbian and gay mental health. None of the above 
three studies explored the premise of relationship and family recognition, 
specifically, same-sex adult intimate relationships and / or relationships 
between children and their gay or lesbian parents.
189
 It is within these 
realms that the phenomena of heterosexism and homophobia are 
particularly acute.
190
 This is borne out by particular interpretations of 
evidence regarding parenting and child development that I will elaborate on 
in Section Two of Chapter Five. Professor Kennedy did allude to the social 
perception of homosexuality in his elaboration on the historical 
conceptualisation of homosexuality in the West, with its attendant legacies 
of inequality and stigma (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 24-27). 
This implicitly relies on the phenomenon of social cognition (see van Dijk, 
                                           
188
 If the dynamic of mental health were deemed to be of import to these proceedings, the Equality 
Authority’s (2002, pp.31-39) position paper or the research that was conducted by the Gay and Lesbian 
Equality Network / Nexus Research Cooperative (1995, pp.72-75), for example, could have warranted 
attention in the High Court. Both of these are Irish studies that formed part of the Irish trajectory vis-à-vis 
relationship and family recognition that I discussed in the introduction to this research. 
189
 Cursory references were made to the issue of adult relationships, but only in terms of identifying the 
research cohorts, such as respondents who were in cohabiting relationships, for example. In this regard, 
see Mays and Cochran (2001, p.1871). 
190
 See Valiulis et al (2008, pp.24-55) for a poignant and potent analysis of the impact of social stigma on 
lesbian and gay parenting in Ireland. 
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1993; 2006), which I discussed in Chapter One. It also evokes some of the 
concepts that I theorised in Chapter Two, including difference as social 
relation (see Brah, 1991; 1996) and inequality of respect and recognition 
(see Baker et al, 2004). Therefore, Professor Kennedy’s testimony could be 
conceived of as informing public opinion about the coalescence of these 
social dynamics at the level of the personal. Moreover, it implicitly hones 
in on the importance of the historical dimension of an issue to the general 
project of discourse analysis. However, bearing in mind the caveats 
regarding the recounting feature, neither of these two psychiatrists 
appeared to posit the notion that the issue that warrants attention is not 
homosexuality or lesbianism per se, but rather the ideological imperative of 
heteronormativity, which, I argue, is antithetical to gay and lesbian health. 
Nowhere in the reported judgment is there a sense that either of these 
psychiatrists utilised their discourse access profiles (see van Dijk, 1993) to 
call for the conducting of socio-cognitive research that could highlight the 
range of assumptions, biases and opinions that prevail vis-à-vis 
institutionalised heterosexuality in Ireland. The weight of their professional 
credentials, which implicitly informed their stature as expert witnesses, 
seems to have been incapable of providing an elaboration on the 
phenomenon that I consider to be instrumental to the pathologisation of 
homosexuality and lesbianism in Ireland today. 
 
DHA: Important Case Law 
 
Irish Case Law 
 
While many court cases were alluded to or relied upon throughout these 
High Court proceedings, the integration of all of them into my CDA is not 
feasible. The following cases, some of which I already referred to, 
comprise important elements of Irish case law that are most pertinent to 
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this research: Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (see [1866] L.R. 1 P. and D., 
pp.130-138);
191
 Ryan v. Attorney General (see [1965] I.R. pp.294-353); 
McGee v. Attorney General and Revenue Commissioners (see [1974] I.R. 
pp.284-337); Murray and Murray v. Ireland and Attorney General (see 
[1985] I.R. pp.532-545); T.F. v. Ireland, Attorney General and M.F. (see 
[1995] 1 I.R. pp.321-381); B. v. R. (see [1996] 3 I.R. pp.549-555); and D.T. 
v. C.T. (see [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. pp.321-388). It is important to make the 
point that this CDA does not constitute a legal analysis of these cases per 
se. However, the inclusion of such jurisprudence is important in terms of 
elucidating core themes that are at the heart of the deliberations in Zappone 
and Gilligan, such as the dominant conceptualisation of marriage and 
family as one institution in Ireland. This jurisprudence contextualises 
Justice Dunne’s ruling. It is directly relevant to Articles 40 and 41 of our 
Constitution, the meaning of which both parties to this case struggled over 
(see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) throughout these 
proceedings. Therefore, the accretion of such case law over time denotes an 
important part of my discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 
1999; 2001; 2011). It helps to explain an integral backdrop to the prevailing 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland, which routinely 
‘justifies’ lesbian and gay inequality vis-à-vis marriage and family. 
 
International Case Law 
 
This CDA also requires some commentary on the phenomenon whereby 
court rulings, which were handed down in other jurisdictions, were 
consistently alluded to in the High Court. Where no Irish precedence exists 
with regard to a matter that comes before an Irish court, such as same-sex 
marriage, counsel can cite foreign case law, particularly if it emanates from 
                                           
191
 While this case was determined in England prior to achieving Irish Independence, it forms part of Irish 
case law on marriage. Personal communication with an academic from the Faculty of Law in University 
College Cork clarified this point. 
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a jurisdiction with a similar common law heritage. While references to 
international cases serve to situate the clamour for both the reform and the 
upholding of current marriage laws in Ireland within international 
jurisprudence, such case law is not binding in this jurisdiction.
192
  
 
Counsel for both the plaintiffs and the State referred to Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health (see [2003] Mass. 440, paras. 309-395; see 
also [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 124 and 148, for example), which I 
already alluded to in the introduction to this thesis. This case led to the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts in the United States. In 
this chapter, I rely on Justice Sosman’s dissenting judgment (see [2003] 
Mass. 440, paras. 309-395, at paras. 357-363) because it captures the 
weight that is wrought by the ‘logic’ of heteronormativity. This is an 
important dynamic in terms of the routine reproduction of lesbian and gay 
inequality vis-à-vis marriage and family.  
 
Another case that formed part of the international trajectory vis-à-vis 
relationship recognition, as well as being referred to in the Irish High 
Court, was Wilkinson and Kitzinger v. Attorney General (see [2006] 
EWHC 2022, paras. 1-131; see also [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 133 
and 147, for example). The plaintiffs in this British case, as with the 
plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan, relied on the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). Dr. Zappone’s and Dr. Gilligan’s reliance on the 
ECHR implies obligations on the part of the Irish State. These are derived 
from our ratification of the ECHR in 1953, as well as the premise that it 
now forms part of Irish law following the enactment of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 (see Walsh and Ryan, 2006, pp.38-
41; see also [2007] IEHC 470, p.30, para. 93). However, the manner in 
                                           
192
 I am indebted to one of the reviewers of this chapter for clarification on these aspects to international 
jurisprudence. 
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which the ECHR was incorporated into Irish law is such that our 
Constitution remains a superior source of law (see Hogan, 2004, pp.33-34; 
Walsh and Ryan, 2006, p.40).
193
 This means that if aspects to the ECHR 
conflict with principles that are elucidated in our Constitution, the latter 
will prevail (Walsh and Ryan, 2006, p.40).  
 
This dynamic does raise questions about the ‘what, when, where, who, 
why, how, to whom, and with what effect’ (see Wodak, 1997b) backdrop. 
However, it is not possible to integrate all relevant case law into this CDA. 
Moreover, while international jurisprudence was consistently alluded to in 
the High Court, I reiterate that it is not binding in this jurisdiction. While I 
refer to international cases in this chapter, my focus is largely on (some) 
Irish jurisprudence, particularly if it pertains to Article 41 of our 
Constitution. This approach is informed by the premise that the dominant 
understanding of Article 41 is at the core of the routine operationalisation 
of heteronormativity in Ireland. 
 
Here, I acknowledge that many of these considerations could have been 
elaborated on in Chapter One. However, given the level of detail, and its 
immediate relevance to my analysis of the High Court ruling, their 
consideration is most appropriate here. The remainder of this chapter 
focuses on the two interlocking elements that require critical analysis, i.e. 
(1) the premise that the institution of marriage is inherently heterosexual, 
and (2) the routine pathologisation of gay men and lesbians. Both of these 
factors helped to bring about Justice Dunne’s ruling in Zappone and 
Gilligan. 
 
                                           
193
 I am indebted to an academic within the Faculty of Law in University College Cork for helping me to 
understand this principle. 
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Section One: Marriage as Inherently Heterosexual 
 
One aspect to heteronormativity that requires critical analysis is the 
premise that marriage is inherently heterosexual. Its rationality tends to be 
based on the idea that marriage in the West has always constituted the 
legal, social and sexual union of a man and woman (see Gallagher, 2004, 
pp.45-46).
194
 Justice Peterson’s ruling in Baker v. Nelson (see [1971] 191 
N.W. 2d., pp.185-187), which I discussed earlier in this thesis, underscored 
what I refer to as the ‘since the beginning of time’ thesis. This is then taken 
to mean ‘until the end of time’. The timelessness of this paradigm appeals 
to the seemingly self-evident conceptualisation of marriage as intrinsically 
heterosexual. The rootedness of this normative assumption helps to codify 
a lesbian and gay incapacity to marry, which ‘commonsensically’ brings 
the legislative apparatus of legitimation into being in Ireland, i.e. the Civil 
Registration Act, 2004. This ‘logically’ stipulates that incapacity or 
impediment.
195
 This CDA demonstrates how this ideological work (see 
Brookes, 1995) was accomplished in an Irish courtroom through a reliance 
on language and case law. 
 
The Definition of Marriage 
 
Extract II 
 
The degree to which the State sought to establish the non-existence of the 
plaintiffs’ right to marry is an interesting aspect to the case. It suggests the 
taking root of a palpable fear that this right might inhere in lesbian and gay 
                                           
194
 While Gallagher (2004, p.46) does not conceive of the institution as being incapable of change, the 
basis of her overall thesis is that marriage is inherently heterosexual. I reiterate that she co-wrote a 
publication on marriage with Professor Waite. It was in that regard that reference to her perspective on 
same-sex marriage was made over the course of Professor Waite’s cross-examination in Zappone and 
Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 68). 
195
 I elaborate on the ideological wherewithal of this legislation in Chapter Six. 
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persons.
196
 This guided the elaboration of the State’s position in the High 
Court. A manifestation of its ‘marriage as inherently heterosexual’ thesis is 
evident in the following extract from the reported judgment:  
 
Counsel argued that the term marriage in the Constitution is 
emphatically confined to a union of a man and woman and does 
not encompass a relationship of two persons of the same sex. 
Accordingly, in applying the established method of interpreting 
the Constitution it was argued that the plaintiffs do not have a 
right to marry which is protected either expressly or impliedly by 
the Constitution, the plaintiffs’ relationship does not constitute a 
marriage within the meaning of the Constitution … 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 143 
 
Here, the State’s position betrays the ease with which inequality of respect 
and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) can be ‘justified’. Its emphatic 
argumentation is interesting because the text in Article 41 does not 
expressly confer any such restriction. Firstly, the term ‘marriage’ is not 
defined in our Constitution (All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution, 2006, p.123; Working Group on Domestic Partnership, 2006, 
p.23). Furthermore, the term ‘man’ is not evident in Article 41. Given the 
general tenor of aspects to the document, which I alluded to in Chapter 
One, this absence is noteworthy. Conducting a purely textual analysis of 
Article 41 elicits the following details vis-à-vis gender: a female tenor can 
be derived from the terms ‘her’, ‘woman’ and ‘mothers’, which are 
mentioned once in the relevant sub-clauses; it can also be discerned from 
the pronoun ‘their’ because it is written in the context of the gender specific 
term ‘mothers’; each of the three references to ‘spouses’ are contained in 
the provision pertaining to divorce, but none are gender specific; there are 
two references to ‘person’ that are not gender specific; and the references 
                                           
196
 Whilst I conceive of the right to marry as one that inheres in Irish citizens, I accept that it is subject to 
justifiable limitation by the State (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 72-73), such as on the basis of 
age and capacity to consent. 
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to ‘either or both of them’ and ‘other party’ in relation to divorce suggest 
that there are two persons at the heart of the marriage contract, none of 
whom are gender specific. This latter point implies that bigamy and 
polygamy are precluded from the constitutional conceptualisation of 
marriage in Ireland. This should, but does not, put paid to the utterly 
spurious claims that are made by organisations, such as the European Life 
Network, which I highlighted in Chapter Three. 
 
Established Method  
 
Before elaborating further on the dynamic of gender, it is important to 
explain what is meant by the ‘established method of interpreting the 
Constitution’ in Extract II above. It is generally accepted that both the past 
and present are relevant, both in terms of our understanding of the 
document and determining its meaning. The method of historical 
interpretation of our Constitution applies to such articles as those pertaining 
to the scope of the presidency and parliament, for example. Here, the key 
point is that courts carefully adhere to the text of the Constitution, often 
with a view to maintaining the integrity of what the framers and ratifiers 
intended when such matters as power or procedure, for example, are at 
issue (see Hogan and Whyte, 1994, p. cxiii). It is also the case that the Irish 
Constitution is not stuck in what is referred to as the ‘permafrost’ of 1937, 
and that it is a ‘living instrument’. In this regard, the general consensus is 
that the drafters of the document left some articles deliberately vague, such 
as those pertaining to equality and personal rights, for example. The 
rationale behind this was that their ambit could be realised over time 
through the accretion of case law (see Hogan and Whyte, 1994, p. cxiii).
197
 
I will revisit this issue in the context of dominant understandings of 
Articles 40 and 41 of our Constitution. 
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 Please note that I rely on Hogan and Whyte (1994) for this elaboration in its entirety. 
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Extract III 
 
The myriad of non-gender specific terms in Article 41, against a marked 
absence of any reference to the gender and marriage specific terms of 
‘husband’ and ‘wife’, is significant. It suggests that either the specificities 
of gender vis-à-vis marriage did not preoccupy those who drafted and 
ratified the Constitution, or that those dynamics were so self-evident that 
they warranted no elaboration. My earlier reference to some of the 
idiosyncrasies of the Irish institution of marriage indicates that it was 
gendered and necessarily hierarchical (see Kimmel, 2004). For example, 
long before divorce was constitutionalised and legalised in Ireland in the 
1990s, the phenomenon of the ‘country divorce’ (see Arensberg and 
Kimball, 1968), which I alluded to in Chapter Three, honed in on the 
imperative of marital procreation. This helped to codify the ‘natural’ 
complementarity of the binaries of male and female, which was implicitly 
predicated on heterosexuality. This would have been quite pronounced in 
an age prior to technological advances in fertility treatment and the 
enactment of legislation on adoption.
198
 The following extract from the 
reported judgment, which was attributed to the State, denotes another 
attempt to underscore the ‘marriage as inherently heterosexual’ thesis:  
 
It was submitted that in looking at the provisions of Article 41 as 
a whole there could be no doubt that what is in mind is the family 
constituting a mother, father and the children of a heterosexual 
marriage. 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 150  
 
Here, the State’s repeated overture with regard to the seemingly self-
evident understanding of Article 41 is striking. Lest there be any doubt, the 
gender specific term ‘father’ does not appear anywhere in Article 41. While 
                                           
198
 This refers to the Adoption Act, 1952. 
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the term ‘mother’ evokes a relational tie, which comes into being ‘in the 
home’, it is not expressly articulated in the context of any relational tie with 
a putative father and / or spouse. Furthermore, the term ‘children’ is 
enunciated just once in the section on divorce, which did not come into 
being until 1996, as stated in Chapter Four. Having said that, the sheer 
scope and rigidity of the discourse surrounding marital procreation in 
Ireland cannot be underestimated or ignored. It produced not just the ‘sent 
back’ and ‘fallen’ woman (see Arensberg and Kimball, 1968; Ferriter, 
2009, respectively), but also the ‘flaunting it’ woman, ‘superwoman’, and 
the ‘slut-hunt’.199 Similarly, the dominance of the male breadwinner / 
female dependent paradigm needs to be considered. Given this backdrop, 
Article 41 codified the conflation of marriage and family in Ireland. With 
its reference to the family that is based on marriage, which is an important 
point,
200
 it brought the nuclear paradigm into constitutional being, without 
expressly articulating a definition for either marriage or family.  
 
                                           
199
 See Inglis (2002, p.5-24) for an elaboration on the opprobrium that the State heaped on Joanne Hayes, 
whose ‘sexual voraciousness’ as an unmarried woman and mother sparked a witch-hunt for similarly 
transgressive women, following the deaths of babies in Ireland in 1984. (This explains my use of the term 
‘slut-hunt’). In what became known as the Kerry Babies Case, the dominant socio-cognitive thesis at the 
time was that she was capable of carrying concurrent pregnancies following sexual intercourse with two 
men as fathers with different blood types within the space of forty-eight hours. (This explains my use of 
the term ‘superwoman’). The routine pathologisation of woman as unmarried mother was such that the 
State seemed incapable of conceiving of any rationale for the conducting of a man-hunt in the context of 
the perpetration of infanticide in Ireland. Eileen Flynn, as an unmarried woman and teacher who 
‘flaunted’ her pregnancy, also fell foul of the system in the early 1980s, when her private life was 
‘commonsensically’ linked to the terms of her employment in a Catholic school in Ireland (see Cummins, 
1984; O’Regan, 1984; see also O’Driscoll, 2010; Slater, 2008). (This explains my use of the term 
‘flaunting it’ woman). Both of these relatively recent events are manifestations of the degree to which the 
imperative of marital procreation operated in Ireland. This is a dynamic that cannot be underestimated, 
notwithstanding the massive social change that has taken place here since the ratification of our 
Constitution in 1937. Eileen Flynn’s legal battle is a case in point in that the legislative apparatus that 
would have ensured that she lost her case, i.e. the religious ethos exemption in employment legislation, 
which I discussed in Chapter Two, was not enacted until 1998 (see O’Driscoll, 2010). That she did lose 
her case suggests that there was something else ‘out there’ ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 
2006) that impelled the High Court to dismiss her legal action, which was predicated on the Unfair 
Dismissals Act, 1977. See Justice Costello’s ruling in Eileen Flynn v. Sister Mary Anna Power and the 
Sisters of the Holy Faith ([1985] I.L.R.M., pp.336-343). 
200
 This helps to explain why families that are not based on marriage, such as those that are headed by 
cohabiting couples, for example, are not deemed to be ‘proper’ families within the (dominant) meaning of 
Article 41. 
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Important Case Law on Marriage: Hyde v. Hyde 
 
The ability to impose a definition (see Connell, 1987, p.107) on marriage in 
the Constitution, where none exists (see All-Party Oireachtas Committee 
on the Constitution, 2006; Working Group on Domestic Partnership, 2006), 
denotes an important aspect to the State’s case in Zappone and Gilligan. It 
can best be explained by the general tenor of case law on marriage that 
dates back to the 19
th
 century. The common law definition of marriage 
(Barrington, 2009, p.44) that prevailed in Ireland at the time indicates that 
gender and other specificities were at the heart of this legal contract. In 
Hyde v. Hyde (see [1866] L.R. 1 P. and D., pp.130-138), which was alluded 
to throughout these proceedings (for example, see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513, at paras. 83, 130 and 227), Lord Penzance stated the following with 
regard to the fundamental characteristics that underscore the universality of 
marriage as an institution in Christendom: “I conceive that marriage, as 
understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all 
others.” (see [1866] L.R. 1 P. and D., pp.130-138, at p.133) The prescience 
of Lord Penzance’s ruling is that he understood that his conceptualisation 
did not necessarily extend to, or prevail in, other jurisdictions. Moreover, 
he conceived of this definition against the backdrop of the availability of 
divorce in England.
201
 However, the Hyde formulation also highlights the 
ease with which the civil could intertwine with the canonical. These latter 
two points evoke my earlier discussion in Chapter Four with regard to 
divorce and contraception respectively. I refer to the following: Deputy 
Desmond’s contribution to the Dáil record with regard to his understanding 
of marriage, notwithstanding the holding of the first referendum on divorce 
in 1986 (see Dáil Éireann, 1986b); Deputy Flanagan’s contributions to the 
Dáil record in the context of proposals to enact legislation on contraception 
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 Divorce was available in England since the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (see 
Norrie, 2000, p.364). 
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in 1974 and 1985, and the dynamics that informed his opposition to that 
legislation (see Dáil Éireann, 1974b; 1985a). 
 
Important Irish Case Law on Marriage 
 
Some of the cases that the State relied upon to underscore the specificity of 
gender to marriage in Ireland are similar to the Hyde formulation. They 
include Justice Costello’s ruling in the High Court in B. v. R., which was 
made prior to the passing of the divorce referendum in 1995: “Marriage 
was and is regarded as the voluntary and permanent union of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion of all others for life.” (see [1996] 3 I.R. 
pp.549-555, at p.554; see also [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 129) 
Notwithstanding the premise that marriage is not defined in our 
Constitution (see APOCC, 2006; WGDP, 2006), this excerpt from B. v. R. 
does underscore the State’s ‘marriage as inherently heterosexual’ thesis, in 
that it implicitly codifies the common law ban on same-sex marriage that 
was effectively established in Hyde (see Barrington, 2009, p.44). 
 
Excerpts from other constitutional cases are important, notwithstanding the 
absence of any express reference in them to the specificity of gender as 
regards marriage and the Constitution. Justice Dunne relied on them over 
the course of her concluding remarks to underscore the ‘since the beginning 
of time’ thesis (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 238). They include 
the High Court ruling in Murray and Murray, which was a case that 
centred on the right of a husband and wife, both of whom were 
incarcerated, to beget children (see [1985] I.R. pp.532-545). Justice 
Costello stated that “… the Constitution makes clear that the concept and 
nature of marriage, which it enshrines, are derived from the Christian 
notion of a partnership based on an irrevocable personal consent, given by 
both spouses which establishes a unique and very special life-long 
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relationship.” (see [1985] I.R., at pp.535-536) Here, it is conceivable that 
the lack of an express reference to gender in the Murray formulation was 
informed by the self-evident gender of the plaintiffs in that case. This 
definition of marriage was alluded to throughout proceedings in Zappone 
and Gilligan (for example, see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 84, 118 
and 128). Moreover, it was deemed a constituent part of the self-evident 
‘truth’ that marriage is confined to persons of the opposite sex (see [2008] 
2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 238). I am not suggesting that the Murray 
formulation necessarily implied a gender-neutral understanding of marriage 
at that time. Indeed, the opposite is most likely the case. For instance, 
homosexuality was still criminalised in Ireland in the 1980s, which denotes 
the time period that Murray and Murray came before the High Court. The 
point that I wish to make here has more to do with the circularity of the 
‘since the beginning of time’ and ‘until the end of time’ theses. This 
dictates that marriage has always been confined to opposite-sex couples 
because marriage has always denoted the union of a man and woman (see 
Ennis, 2010, p.32). This rather pedantic argument, which has somehow 
acquired coherence, is incapable of acknowledging that, for centuries, 
legislation and case law has either implicitly or expressly excluded lesbian 
and gay couples from the institution of marriage (see Ennis, 2010, p.32). 
This ‘logic’ is precisely the issue that is at the heart of Zappone and 
Gilligan. 
 
The Supreme Court adopted the Murray formulation in T.F. v. Ireland (see 
[1995] 1 I.R. pp.321-381, at p.373),
202
 which serves to codify its 
importance vis-à-vis Irish jurisprudence on marriage. Counsel for the 
plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan drew upon this excerpt with a view to 
furthering their claim that this understanding of marriage could now be 
                                           
202
 The plaintiff in this case sought to test the constitutionality of aspects to the Judicial Separation and 
Family Law Reform Act, 1989. 
 170 
conceived of as being equally applicable to same-sex couples today (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 85 and 128). However, Justice Dunne 
relied on T.F. v. Ireland to reiterate the premise that confining the 
institution to opposite-sex couples has always constituted the definition of 
marriage (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 238). She underscored this 
by relying on the Supreme Court decision in D.T. v. C.T. (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at para. 238), which pertained to the matter of financial 
provision after the granting of a divorce decree (see [2003] 1 I.L.R.M. 
pp.321-388). In that case, Justice Murray stated that “… marriage itself 
remains a solemn contract of partnership entered into between man and 
woman with a special status recognised by the Constitution. It is one which 
is entered into in principle for life.” (see [2003] 1 I.L.R.M., at p.374; see 
also [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 86) With regard to evolving Irish 
case law on marriage, gender expressly re-enters the frame at this juncture. 
 
Extract IV 
 
In keeping with my discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 
1999; 2001; 2011), it was important to integrate the above excerpts into this 
CDA because they denote an important cog in the heteronormative wheel 
that brought about Justice Dunne’s ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. Indeed, 
it is through the accretion of case law from Murray and Murray v. Ireland, 
T.F. v. Ireland and D.T. v. C.T., for example,
203
 that the seemingly self-
evident logic of the ‘since the beginning of time’ thesis on marriage is 
made plain:  
 
                                           
203
 Justice Dunne alluded to these three cases to inform Extract IV of the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 238). 
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Marriage was understood under the Constitution of 1937 to be 
confined to persons of the opposite sex. That has been reiterated 
in a number of the decisions which have already been referred to 
above … That has always been the definition. The judgment in 
D.T. v. C.T. … was given as recently as 2003. Thus it cannot be 
said that this is some kind of fossilised understanding of 
marriage. … The definition of marriage to date has always been 
understood as being opposite sex marriage. How then can it be 
argued that in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts that 
definition be changed to encompass same sex marriage? 
 
           Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 238-241 
 
This extract signifies the inexorable pull of the ‘since the beginning of 
time’ and ‘until the end of time’ theses. Having said that, it is important to 
acknowledge the definition of marriage that prevailed at the time in Irish 
case law, as set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in D.T. v. C.T.. Justice 
Dunne’s institutional authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996) was 
such that she could not ignore it. She was obliged to take cognisance of 
Justice Murray’s understanding of marriage in D.T. v. C.T. (see [2003] 1 
I.L.R.M., at p.374). Nonetheless, she could have chosen to re-work that 
definition.
204
 Indeed, counsel for the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan 
asserted the following vis-à-vis the conceptualisation of marriage in D.T. v. 
C.T.: “… [W]hile that dictum was worthy of respect and deference 
nonetheless it was simply a dictum and is not and could not be binding on 
this court given that the issue of homosexual marriage was not before the 
court in that case.” (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 200). With 
regard to Extract IV above, I am mindful of Brah’s (1996) theorisation of 
difference as social relation, where difference is constituted and organised 
into systematic relations through institutional practices. In this instance, 
such practices can circumscribe the right to marry. I agree with Norrie 
(2000, p.364) that “[i]t is entirely circular to say that marriage by definition 
is heterosexual because that is how marriage is defined.” It is as if laws and 
                                           
204
 I am indebted to one of the reviewers of this chapter for informing me of this general principle. 
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case law on marriage come into being ‘by themselves’. The ‘silver lining’ 
here is that courts have been known to overturn their own precedence, and 
judges have been known to change their minds on hitherto dogmatic legal 
assumptions.
205
 This fosters hope. 
 
Linking Article 41 with Article 40 
 
My analysis thus far indicates that Article 41 constructs marriage as being 
implicitly, rather than intrinsically, heterosexual. That shortcoming 
represents a challenge for the State, which is compounded by the plaintiffs’ 
assertion of their constitutional right to marry under Article 40. Heretofore, 
heteronormativity dictated that implicitness sufficed. Indeed, its 
conclusiveness with regard to marriage was such that the soundness of 
precluding same-sex couples required no precedential support or logical 
reasoning (see Walsh and Ryan, 2006, p.91).
206
 However, this court action 
brought the tension between the expressly articulated and the implied into 
being. The fear on the part of the State that is generated by this tension is 
palpable. It is grounded in the realisation that the act of interpretation can 
actualise the implicit. This may not be problematic for the State in terms of 
the accretion of case law on Article 41. However, the pitfall potential vis-à-
vis judicial interpretation of Article 40 was such that it could not 
countenance the realisation of either the implicit or the explicit, insofar as 
the plaintiffs’ rights were concerned. Only a ‘proper’ reading of the 
Constitution, as evidenced by the State’s overture in Extract II above about 
                                           
205
 Kirby (2009, pp.1-4) shows that a High Court judge can question the taken-for-granted legal dogma 
that is deemed to derive from Hyde. Retired Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court happens to be 
gay. He is now a supporter of marriage equality. See Ryan (2004, p.18-19) for commentary on the 2002 
unanimous decision that was taken by the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom. Here, the court overruled its own precedence. Similarly, in relation to Lawrence v. Texas in the 
United States, Denniston (2003) and Robertson (2003) highlight the significance of the Supreme Court’s 
overturning of the precedence that it set in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick. 
206
 It is important to make the point that Walsh and Ryan (2006) was published prior to the High Court 
proceedings in Zappone and Gilligan taking place in 2006. 
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applying the ‘established method’ (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 
143), could yield that unequivocal outcome for the State. 
 
The idea that a ‘proper’ reading cannot possibly validate the plaintiffs’ 
assertions denotes one aspect to the State’s position. In Extract II above, 
the implicit appeal to Justice Dunne to fulfil her professional obligation 
with regard to the interpretation of the Constitution produces the ‘logic’ of 
the State’s assertion that the plaintiffs do not have a right to marry. Its 
position is that the right to same-sex marriage does not exist (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 140). Ingenuity inheres in invoking this non-
existent right. It rationalises the idea that there is a difference between 
ascertaining an unenumerated right and redefining a right that is deemed to 
derive from the Constitution (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 239). 
This was promulgated by the State and accepted by Justice Dunne (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 239). The coherence of this position 
implicitly relies on the ‘logic’ of ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín 
Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), which I discussed in Chapter One. The following 
extract from the reported judgment, which was enunciated against the 
backdrop of established jurisprudence in B. v. R. and D.T. v. C.T., 
demonstrates the manner in which this ideological work (see Brookes, 
1995) vis-à-vis Articles 40 and 41 was accomplished: 
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Extract V 
 
Having referred to those decisions, counsel for the defendants 
submitted that the inescapable fact is that, so far as the plaintiffs 
are concerned, whatever the principle of interpretation may be 
the institution of marriage has been repeatedly and consistently 
interpreted as involving opposite sex couples and not same sex 
couples. It was urged on the court that the contention of the 
plaintiffs, that there is some [my italics] right to marry distinct 
from the [my italics] right to marry in the context of a marriage 
recognised by the Constitution, is unsustainable, without any 
authority whatsoever and inconsistent with the plain wording and 
meaning of the Constitution. The right to marry is a right to 
marry in the form recognised by [the] Constitution and given the 
special protection contained in Article 41. No questions of 
recognition arise it was submitted and no questions of inequality 
arise because if the interpretation placed on the right to marry by 
the defendants is correct it is simply a right to marriage by 
heterosexual couples and not same sex couples and thus it is 
submitted the plaintiffs’ claim must fail on that ground. 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 157 
 
Fear engendered in the State by a potentially untoward interpretation of the 
Constitution may have taken root here. Therefore, the State needed to 
affirm the inviolability of marriage as currently constituted by the dominant 
understanding of Article 41. This is achieved through the ‘logic’ of 
difference and ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van 
Dijk, 1997). This constructs an orderly, yet entirely false, dichotomy 
between cohorts of the population on the basis of sexual orientation. Here, 
there is no appreciation of the idea that the personal relationships that 
people strive to form so as to meet their needs for love, intimacy and 
family, lay at the core of sexual orientation (Herek, 2006, p.617). The 
strategy is accomplished through the vague and arbitrary ‘some’ in Extract 
V above, the potency of which becomes pronounced when it is juxtaposed 
with ‘the’ right to marry. It instils the idea that the plaintiffs’ right cannot 
possibly exist because it is clearly unidentifiable from the inescapably 
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‘plain wording and meaning’ of Articles 40 and 41. That the State can 
place a cohort of the population outside constitutional protection on the 
basis of sexual orientation is a measure of the toxicity of heteronormativity 
in Ireland. That this can be done so effectively with the use of the term 
‘some’ is indicative of the ideological wherewithal of discourse. 
 
Extract I 
 
The ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997) 
thesis, which is predicated on the ‘logic’ of difference, also underscores 
Extract I of the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 
248). Here, it is possible to discern fear as regards the potential for a charge 
of discrimination vis-à-vis sexual minorities as a consequence of this High 
Court ruling.
207
 To assuage that fear, normative approval must be sought 
and achieved (see Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). This is done through 
the ideological wherewithal of difference, specifically, the ‘entirely 
sensible’ division of cohorts of the population on the basis of sexual 
orientation. The coherence of the strategy is such that difference 
‘necessarily’ constitutes a risk factor as regards the clear intent of Article 
41. For example, it grounds the heterosexist assumption that lesbians and 
gay men will weaken or wreak havoc on the institution if their right to 
marry is constitutionalised.
208
 As guardian of the Constitution, Justice 
Dunne cannot allow this to happen. The term ‘if’ in Extract I operates as a 
face-saving device (see Cheng, 2002) that gets her off the hook of 
intolerance. Here, the pathological, rather than the professional, justifies the 
inequality that may or may not arise as a result of her ruling. The bringing 
into being of this doubt, as if the perpetration of inequality were 
inconceivable, is indicative of the vulnerability of minority rights in 
                                           
207
 In relation to marriage, a former justice of the Australian High Court has stated that it is discriminatory 
to deny a legal civil status to citizens because of their sexual orientation (see Kirby, 2009, p.2). 
208
 See the written submission of Muintir na hÉireann to the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution (2006, pp. A192-A195). 
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Ireland. The seemingly legitimate preclusion of the ‘Other’ (see de 
Beauvoir, 1988) from constitutional protection as regards Articles 40 and 
41, on a basis that requires no precedential support, logical reasoning (see 
Walsh and Ryan, 2006, p.91) or empirical evidence (see Irish Council for 
Civil Liberties, 2006, p.15), underscores the toxicity of heteronormativity 
in Ireland, and the ease with which inequality of respect and recognition 
(see Baker et al, 2004) is discursively achieved. 
 
Thus far, this CDA has demonstrated the myriad ways in which the 
‘marriage as inherently heterosexual’ thesis is underscored through the use 
of a series of discursive strategies and institutional practices. I argue that 
these then justify the unjustifiable, i.e. inequality of respect and recognition 
(see Baker et al, 2004) vis-à-vis lesbians and gay men as spouses. The 
remainder of this chapter focuses on the heteronormative pathologisation of 
lesbians and gay men as parents. 
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Section Two: Lesbian / Gay Parenting and Child Development 
 
The second element in the hetero-matrix that requires critical analysis is the 
routine ‘othering’ of lesbian and gay persons as parents. I argue that a 
presumed deficiency or pathology (see Baumrind, 1995, p.135), which is 
grounded in deeply embedded heteronormative assumptions about this 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), is at the heart of that aspect to the High 
Court ruling that centred on the issue of child welfare. Against the 
backdrop of prevailing jurisprudence on Article 41, the ideological 
wherewithal of difference creates a space wherein the mere invoking of 
child welfare (without evidence of adverse impact) was sufficient to 
‘justify’ marriage inequality in Ireland, as evidenced in Extract I of the 
reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248). The manner 
in which this was accomplished is now the focus of critical analysis. It was 
largely achieved through what I refer to as the ‘we simply do not know’ 
thesis (about the ‘necessarily suspect’ ‘Other’), the presumed rationality of 
which was a deciding factor in this case, as evidenced by Justice Dunne’s 
concluding remarks: 
 
Extract VI 
 
I have to say that based on all of the evidence I heard on this 
topic I am not convinced that such firm conclusions can be drawn 
as to the welfare of children at this point in time. It seems to me 
that further studies will be necessary before a firm conclusion 
can be reached. 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 216 
 
This perspective presupposes that research studies on lesbian and gay 
parenting will need to be conducted into infinity and beyond until such 
time as pathological deficiencies (see Baumrind, 1995, p.135) in the gay 
and lesbian ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) can be unequivocally 
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disproved. It is symptomatic of the inexorable pull and persuasiveness of 
the ‘since the beginning of time’ thesis and the rootedness of the nuclear 
family paradigm. The routine inclusion of child development research, 
which denotes a body of knowledge that was deemed to be entirely relevant 
to these proceedings, underscores the normative inseparability of marriage 
and family as one institution in Ireland. That its interpretation facilitated a 
deliberation on child welfare is indicative of the toxicity of 
heteronormativity in Ireland. The morphing of doubt that inheres in the ‘we 
simply do not know’ in Extract VI above, into the unequivocal conviction 
that is evident in Extract I of the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at para. 248), denotes an important aspect to this CDA. 
 
Important Research Considerations 
 
Here, I elaborate on important issues with regard to research studies 
pertaining to gay and lesbian parenthood, and child development. I accept 
that cases that have come before our constitutional courts are socially 
significant, irrespective of whether or not they have found for the plaintiffs 
in actions against the State. The social significance of the matter before the 
court in Zappone and Gilligan is such that it cannot be reduced to the 
particularities of the Registrar General’s or Revenue Commissioners’ 
responses to the plaintiffs’ concerns in 2004.209 Because the ramifications 
of this ruling extend beyond the plaintiffs, neither of whom is a parent,
210
 it 
can be argued that there is a rationale for deeming such studies to be 
relevant to the matter before the court. At the beginning of this research 
process, it would have been unthinkable for me to utter such a remark. I 
                                           
209
 I discussed these dynamics in the introduction to this thesis. 
210
 Because of the extent to which evidence pertaining to parenting was relied upon in the High Court, I 
contacted one of the plaintiffs with a view to determining their status as parents. While I considered this 
contact to be an invasion of their privacy, I did not want to make an incorrect assumption regarding that 
status. It was the only way that I could make that determination because the court record is silent on the 
matter. Personal communication confirmed that neither of the plaintiffs in this case are parents. 
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firmly believed that their inclusion unquestioningly conflated the right to 
marry with the right to parent. Against a constitutional and legislative 
backdrop, this invariably served to underscore the ‘gold standard’ status of 
the nuclear family paradigm in Ireland. However, upon reading the report 
that Fagan (2011, pp.1-46) undertook on behalf of Marriage Equality
211
 and 
the report by the Ombudsman for Children (2010, pp.1-11), both of which 
allude to the difficulties that arise when the right to partner is conceived of 
in isolation from the right to parent, my perspective changed. I now 
understand the folly of what amounts to a false dichotomy between 
cohabitant, partner or spouse on the one hand, and parent and child on the 
other. It is not a matter of conflating the terms that denote an adult status. 
Rather, it is about acknowledging that some gay and lesbian persons in 
Ireland, irrespective of their civil status, are also parents (see Valiulis et al, 
2008, pp.24-55). I believe that all families, irrespective of the sexual 
orientation of biological or social parents, have a right to the recognition 
and protection that can be accorded by our constitutional and legislative 
regimes. 
 
Having said that, I argue that the preponderance of research studies ‘out 
there’ that pertain to lesbian and gay parenting is problematic. Against the 
backdrop of deeply embedded heteronormative assumptions, it presupposes 
that there is something about this issue that warrants endless attention, 
analysis, interrogation, and investigation. Research studies tend to be 
invariably informed by the imperative to either prove or disprove the 
difference as deficit thesis (see Baumrind, 1995), which derives from the 
discursive construction of the ‘necessarily pathological’ ‘Other’ (see de 
Beauvoir, 1988). Some researchers ‘prove’ contagion, i.e. the idea that 
                                           
211
 In the context of families that are headed by gay men or lesbians in civil partnerships, its audit 
demonstrates what effectively amounts to the State’s wilful non-recognition of such parent-child 
relationships. This is grounded in the inability to conceive of the family as anything other than that 
presupposed in the dominant understanding of Article 41. I referred to this report in my elaboration of the 
Irish trajectory vis-à-vis relationship and family recognition. 
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homosexuality is a learned pathology that is passed from adult to minor in 
various ways, including socialisation and seduction (see Cameron and 
Cameron, 1996, pp.1-18).
212
 Other research studies that compare lesbian or 
gay parenthood to the norm seem eager to prove either the ‘no differences’ 
thesis or the idea that any manifestation of difference does not denote 
deficiency on the part of lesbians or gay men (see Stacey and Biblarz, 
2001a, pp.162-164). Against this backdrop, the ‘we simply do not know’ 
maxim about the ‘suspect’ ‘Other’ takes as given the notion that social 
research will need to be conducted into perpetuity so as to unequivocally 
prove that one cohort, i.e. the interrogated lesbian or gay ‘Other’ (see de 
Beauvoir, 1988), is capable of measuring up to the unquestioned norm. 
This perpetual dynamic may account for the preponderance of such 
research in the first instance, in that their findings are never enough 
(because of the seemingly self-evident need for caution). All of this is very 
problematic in terms of the construction of knowledge and the ‘who’ 
behind it. Moreover, the quest for answers does not seem to require critical 
reflection on the great unasked question and unremarked upon 
phenomenon, i.e. the parenting that is done by heterosexual adults. I am not 
suggesting that such an orientation necessarily denotes a variable that must 
be interrogated in the context of the right to parent. Rather, my point is that 
until such time as the operationalisation of heteronormativity, as it pertains 
to parenthood, warrants similar attention and analysis, the gay or lesbian 
‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) will remain perpetually pathological, and 
always ‘out there’ in the research study or the courtroom, waiting to be 
proven or unproven. 
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 In Chapter Two, I drew upon this report with a view to facilitating my theorisation of difference as 
deficit / defect / deviance. I use scare quotes for the term ‘prove’ because their findings range from the 
alarmist to the illogical. Here, I reiterate their thesis vis-à-vis the transmission of homosexuality from 
parent to child, which seems to rest on the following assumptions: religious parents produce religious 
children; parents who enjoy alcohol produce disproportionate numbers of beer-drinking children; and 
parental smoking is strongly associated with childhood smoking (see Cameron and Cameron, 1996, 
pp.10-11). Irrespective of the merits or otherwise of any of these hypotheses, it is difficult to engage with, 
or apply intellectual rigour to, such findings in the context of the development of (non-normative) sexual 
orientation. The seemingly self-evident association of contagion with the development of a non-normative 
sexuality signifies the discursive construction of the gay ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988). 
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Here, it is important to make one more point, which pertains to my 
understanding of child development and child welfare. I associate the term 
‘child development’ largely with physical, psychological, cognitive, 
personal, and social development. Relevant dynamics in this regard include 
language acquisition, formal education attainment, peer-group relations, 
and inter-personal skills. The term ‘child welfare’ has a very specific 
connotation that largely encompasses the protection and safety of children, 
particularly in relation to the risk or perpetration of abuse, neglect, 
violence, and / or abandonment. It can demand attention from the State in 
terms of invoking the criminal code, for example. While child development 
and child welfare are interlinked, I reject their seemingly self-evident 
conflation in the High Court. I argue that it denotes a very problematic 
aspect to the High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, and that it is 
indicative of the utter toxicity of heteronormativity in Ireland.  
 
Historical Backdrop 
 
It is becoming apparent that “… children occupy the symbolic, emotional 
centerfold in much of the contemporary controversy …” (Stacey, 2004, 
p.529) surrounding same-sex marriage. This is particularly acute in the 
courtroom where the inclusion of research studies pertaining to lesbian or 
gay parenting in same-sex marriage cases may denote an internationally 
recognised institutional practice vis-à-vis the submission of evidence and 
its interpretation, as happened in Ireland in 2006. I argue that this is rooted 
in a perpetual anxiety about the ‘necessarily suspect’ ‘Other’ (see de 
Beauvoir, 1988), and the need to either affirm or allay it. Here, in keeping 
with my discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 
2011), I offer a possible explanation for the genesis of this practice. 
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Beginning in the 1950s in the United States, anxieties about lesbianism and 
homosexuality came to the fore in courtrooms in the context of custody 
proceedings in the wake of divorce, where concerns about child welfare 
largely centred on the sexuality of the non-heterosexual parent (see Rivera, 
1979, pp.883-904). This needs to be understood against the backdrop of the 
criminalisation of same-sex intimacy that prevailed in many states (see 
Rivera, 1979, pp.949-950), and the rationale behind it, i.e. acts must be 
gendered, heterosexual, marital, and procreative (see Eskridge, 1999). The 
imperative of marital procreation and the attendant issue of gender 
complementarity,
213
 combined with the embeddedness of prescriptive roles 
in terms of doing gender in marriage (see Dryden, 1999), would have 
underscored normative assumptions about the sexual orientation of parents. 
What happened in the United States in the 1970s is that gay and lesbian 
persons as parents began to rail against courts’ preoccupation with the 
presumed immorality of same-sex intimacy, and they began to vigorously 
defend their right to parent (Rivera, 1979, pp.897-898).
214
 This denotes an 
example of the deployment of difference so as to contest and counter the 
phenomena of heterosexism and homophobia in society (see Brah, 1991). 
This sparked a growing trend in the inclusion of expert testimony on 
homosexuality and lesbianism as evidence in court proceedings, of which 
Professor Green, who testified in Zappone and Gilligan, was at the 
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 Here, I wish to reiterate that the normatively imposed seamless coalescence between procreation, 
which relies on biological complementarity, and gender complementarity, which is a social construct that 
is relied upon in the context of rearing children, is often at the root of heterosexist opposition to same-sex 
marriage. 
214
 For some judges, this preoccupation turned into prurience. Rivera (1979, p.898) alludes to a case in 
Ohio in 1974 involving a lesbian wherein the judge asked an expert witness, i.e. Professor Green, how the 
sex act between lesbians was accomplished? Such voyeurism in a person who had the institutional 
authority (see Bergvall and Remlinger, 1996) to decide on the matter before the court is a measure of the 
toxicity of heteronormativity. Somewhat similarly, Cretney (2006, p.1) alludes to a case that attracted 
much publicity in Britain in 1953 in which three men were convicted of same-sex intimacy with 
consenting partners, the latter of whom claimed immunity from prosecution in return for their evidence. 
Cretney (2006, p.1) makes the point that one of the convicted men was in love with his accuser, and that 
prosecuting counsel saw fit to read aloud his love letters in open court. Such voyeurism is indicative of 
the toxicity of heteronormativity, which, in this instance, required an extreme and vulgar public salving. 
For wider discussion on this case, see Wildeblood (1956). 
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forefront (see Rivera, 1979, pp.897-904).
215
 Professor Kennedy’s testimony 
in Zappone and Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 24-28) is 
indicative of that initial trend and its extension beyond matters of child 
custody.  
 
In Ireland today, while the issue of child custody might be stereotypically 
predicated on gender (see Coulter, 2010b; Holmquist, 2010; Reilly, 2004) 
rather than on sexual orientation per se,
216
 Rivera’s (1979) thesis as it 
pertained to the United States is such that the imperative to investigate the 
(non-hetero) sexual orientation of parents in the context of child custody 
came into being. It is also at this juncture that Professor Green emerged as 
both an expert witness and as a medical / social researcher. Indeed, his 
studies, along with others that he conducted with colleagues, allude to this 
site of contestation (see Green, 1982, p.7; Green et al, 1986, pp.182-183). 
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 Having said that, Rivera (1979, p.901) makes reference to a custody case in California in 1977 in 
which the court refused to allow the introduction of evidence regarding the issue of sexual preference, 
because the judge held that the fitness to parent of both the mother and father denoted the only relevant 
issue before the court. While I understand the general rationale behind the introduction of expert evidence 
on homosexuality and lesbianism, albeit with a caveat as to what actually constitutes expert evidence and 
testimony in the first instance, the prescience of that judge’s perspective cannot be overstated, although 
again with the caveat as to who ultimately decides on such fitness. Rivera (1979, p.900) also makes 
reference to a custody case in Maine in 1976 in which the court held that the mother was intelligently 
seeking to minimise, if not totally eliminate, the impact of her lesbian lifestyle on her children, i.e. she did 
not flaunt her lesbianism. This evokes the idea of contagion (see Cameron and Cameron, 1996) with its 
attendant fear of the unrepentant and transgressive ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988). In this case, that fear 
seems to have been allayed by the submission to the court of a highly favourable report by a child 
psychiatrist (see Rivera, 1979, p.900). This general deference to experts is, to some extent, grounded in 
heteronormative hysteria about the ‘necessarily pathological’ ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988), and that 
sense of ‘we simply do not know’. 
216
 I am not suggesting that gender should be a determinant of the fitness to parent. My point is that in the 
1970s in Ireland, it would have been inconceivable to conceptualise the issue of child custody in the 
context of parental sexual orientation. The operationalisation of heteronormativity against the backdrop of 
an absence of divorce, the rigidity of expectations surrounding gender, and the criminalisation of 
homosexuality, would have put paid to that. Having said that, Smyth (1983, p.151) does allude to the 
issue of custody rights in the context of lesbian parents against the backdrop of social prejudice that 
attached to lesbianism in Ireland in the early 1980s. While Valiulis et al (2008, pp.49-51) highlight the 
vulnerability of gay fathers in Ireland today, they make the point that it is difficult to determine whether 
this stems from sexual orientation / gay identity or whether that vulnerability is derived from the general 
position of fathers vis-à-vis the family law system. In Ireland, court proceedings pertaining to family 
matters are held in camera, which means that hearings are conducted in private (see Holmquist, 2010), 
and that details of the proceedings cannot be reported on by the media (see Coulter, 2010b). Therefore, it 
is difficult to unequivocally determine at a national level the extent, or otherwise, of the operationalisation 
of heteronormativity within the family law system as regards determining such matters as child access, 
care, custody, guardianship, and maintenance. See Coulter (2007, pp.48-49; 2010b) for a brief discussion 
on the operationalisation of gender in the family courts in Ireland. This derives from the embeddedness of 
the male breadwinner / female dependent paradigm. 
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Moreover, it was in the late 1970s that both the conducting of research 
comparing children of lesbian or gay parents with those of heterosexual 
parents, and the publication of that research in renowned professional 
journals, first began (Patterson, 1992, p.1029). It is conceivable that all of 
these elements coalesced, and created a context in which the elaboration of 
such research findings in courtrooms became inevitable, once the right to 
marry became as contested a concept as the right to parent. 
 
Notwithstanding the body of knowledge on child development that has 
emerged over a number of decades, heteronormative anxieties are still 
rooted in the seemingly rational ‘we simply do not know’ thesis, the 
ingenuity of which derives from the false, yet very effective, dichotomy 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk 
(1997). Justice Sosman’s dissenting judgment in Goodridge (see [2003] 
Mass. 440, paras. 309-395, at paras. 357-363) is a case in point.
217
 It 
demonstrates that the rather heavy burden of proof, which is in a perpetual 
state of being against a normative backdrop, necessitates interminable, yet 
arguably futile, social scientific endeavour. This is because certain research 
findings, irrespective of the strength of their methodological and theoretical 
considerations, are never enough. This ensures the persuasiveness of the 
false dichotomy between what Justice Sosman referred to as the ‘recent, 
perhaps promising, but essentially untested alternate family structure’ and 
the ‘proven successful family structure’ (see [2003] Mass. 440, at para. 
361). While this wider body of knowledge continues to resound in 
courtrooms, the inexorable pull of the ‘we simply do not know’ thesis 
makes it difficult to conceive of the ‘why do we need to know’ question. It 
makes it difficult for judges and social scientists to reflect on one 
fundamental premise, i.e. we all belong to the (one human) family. 
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 Most of the excerpt from Justice Sosman’s ruling that is contained in Appendix XII formed part of 
what denoted the Irish State’s references to American case law in Zappone and Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at paras. 186-193). 
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Integration of Research Studies 
 
This is the backdrop that helps me make sense of research studies 
pertaining to lesbian / gay parenting and child development, particularly 
those that were alluded to, or relied upon, in Zappone and Gilligan. These 
are as follows: American Academy of Pediatrics (2002, pp.341-344); 
Anderssen et al (2002, pp.335-351); Brewaeys et al (1997, pp.1349-1359); 
Golombok et al (1983, pp.551-572); Golombok and Tasker (1996, pp.3-
11); Green (1978, pp.692-697); Green et al (1986, pp.167-184); Herek 
(2006, pp.607-621);
218
 Nock (2001, pp.1-81); and Stacey and Biblarz 
(2001a, pp.159-183). These studies in their entirety provide a sense of 
some of the issues that are ‘out there’ at an international level, which 
concern social and medical researchers (and judges) who are interested in 
the dynamic of child development in the context of gay or lesbian 
parenthood. The issues that arise in these studies are as applicable to 
Ireland as they are to the experience that prevails in such countries as 
Britain or the United States. For example, in the context of donor 
insemination in Belgium and the Netherlands, Brewaeys et al (1997) 
highlight the difficulties that lesbians can face vis-à-vis access to fertility 
treatments, and the dearth of legislation with regard to the regulation of 
fertility clinics. These were issues that O’Connell (2003, pp.88-100) 
discussed in the context of the prevailing situation in Ireland.
219
 The 
salience of Golombok et al (1983) and Golombok and Tasker (1996) is that 
they effectively denote a longitudinal study wherein participating families 
in the former study, which originated in the late 1970s, were followed up in 
the latter study in the early 1990s. Therefore, their cumulative findings 
                                           
218
 I already made reference to this study in Chapter Five. 
219
 Another example of this arose in the matter of J. McD. v. P. L. and B. M., which pertained to the 
guardianship of a minor child. The case involved a lesbian couple comprising both the biological and 
social mothers of the child. The biological father of the child was the other party to the case. The High 
Court record for this case indicates that an Irish fertility clinic refused its services to the biological mother 
on the basis that she was not in a heterosexual relationship (see [2008] IEHC 96, at p.4). Please note that 
this is an unreported judgment. 
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pertain to child development over a number of decades. This is important in 
terms of debunking the ‘we simply do not know’ maxim. The timeline of 
the Green (1978) study suggests that Professor Green, who testified for the 
plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan, was at the cutting-edge of this type of 
research. An important dimension to the interpretation of Green et al 
(1986) in the High Court is that some expert witness testimony for the State 
misconstrued basic information about its research cohorts. The report that 
was compiled by Dr. Perrin and other medical doctors and consultants, as 
part of the Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health 
(see American Academy of Pediatrics, 2002), suggests that the Discipline 
of Medicine acknowledges the importance of child development research. 
It denotes a brief overview of some of the issues that tend to be 
investigated in research pertaining to lesbian or gay parenthood and child 
development, including children’s gender identity, for example. Nock 
(2001) denotes an affidavit that was initially sworn into evidence in 
Halpern et al v. Attorney General of Canada et al (see [2003] 65 O.R., 3d, 
161, paras. 1-158). Its inclusion as evidence in Zappone and Gilligan is 
indicative of a growing international trend towards conceiving of expert 
knowledge regarding lesbian or gay parenting as relevant to determining 
the right (of lesbians and gay men) to marry.
220
 Nonetheless, Nock’s (2001) 
review of the Green et al (1986) study, part of which makes reference to 
the research cohorts that took part in the 1986 study, is not consistent with 
basic information that is contained in that study. Both Anderssen et al 
(2002) and Stacey and Biblarz (2001a) denote reviews of over twenty 
studies pertaining to families that are headed by gay or lesbian parents.
221
 
Furthermore, the Stacey and Biblarz (2001a) review problematises 
                                           
220
 See Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP (2011) for reference to the myriad affidavits that were filed with the 
court in Halpern, including one that Stacey and Biblarz (2001b) submitted. I will elaborate on the 
significance of their affidavit later in the chapter. 
221
 I do not use the terms ‘gay family’ or ‘lesbian family’ because they make assumptions about the sexual 
orientation of minors who are reared in families that are headed by gay or lesbian parents. See Gabb 
(2004, pp.175-176) in this regard. 
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heteronormative assumptions that can pervade research on lesbian or gay 
parenting. 
 
All of the above research studies and reviews are important because they 
denote evidence that informed expert testimony in Zappone and Gilligan. 
Most of them were introduced over the course of Professor Green’s 
testimony, cross-examination and re-examination (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at paras. 31-44). Exceptions in this regard were Nock (2001) 
and Herek (2006), which were introduced as part of Professor Casey’s 
testimony and cross-examination (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 
48 and 54 respectively). It is important to reiterate that my thesis does not 
denote an analysis of these reviews and studies per se. Nonetheless, the 
High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan was informed by particular 
understandings of that research. The task here is to balance the importance 
of their integration into this CDA, as part of my discourse-historical 
approach, with the elaboration of core aspects to those reviews and studies 
that best serve the rationale behind this CDA, which is informed by my 
critical approach to social research. The dynamics that largely guide the 
importance and integration of child development studies, or reviews of 
such research studies, are the extent to which their inclusion as evidence 
and their interpretation in the High Court did the following: reinforced 
deeply embedded heteronormative assumptions; either challenged or 
justified the ‘we simply do not know’ maxim (about the ‘necessarily 
suspect’ gay or lesbian ‘Other’). These denote key aspects to the second 
strand of the hetero-matrix that ‘justified’ the denial of the right of two 
women to have their marriage recognised in this jurisdiction. That issue is 
child welfare, as evidenced in Extract I of the reported judgment (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248).
222
 
                                           
222
 It is important to acknowledge that the plaintiffs’ submissions to the High Court made reference to the 
issue of child welfare. The backdrop here is that counsel for the plaintiffs sought to determine what 
justifications the State might possibly advance in terms of the State’s own position on the matter that 
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Extract VII 
 
Notwithstanding the bona fides of researchers, I reiterate that part of my 
concern about the conducting of research pertaining to lesbian or gay 
parenthood is that it tends to presuppose that there is necessarily a question 
or a problem that needs to be answered or addressed. It is in the areas of the 
formation and development of gender identity and sexual orientation in 
children who are reared by such parents that this is particularly acute (see 
Stacey and Biblarz, 2001a, p.163). The following extract from the reported 
judgment denotes a heterosexist preoccupation with gender and sexuality, 
and an uncritical acceptance of what is deemed to constitute the norm: 
 
None of the children had gender identity confusion, wished to be 
of the other sex or consistently engaged in cross-gender 
behaviour. For older children in the study there were no 
differences in sexual attraction or self-identification as 
homosexual. The children showed no differences in personality 
measure, peer group relationship, self-esteem, behavioural 
difficulties or academic success. 
 
                     Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 35 
 
In this extract, Justice Dunne recounts Professor Green’s testimony 
regarding the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review. Here 
however, the recounting feature is problematic because it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                           
would eventually come before the High Court. This was unclear from the defence that was initially filed 
by the State. So as to make that determination, plaintiffs’ counsel looked to the international context and 
the ways in which authorities in other jurisdictions have justified restricting the right to marry to 
heterosexual couples. Four potential justifications were identified: (1) procreation denotes a central 
feature of marriage; (2) the welfare of children; (3) the definitional argument; (4) social disapproval of 
homosexuality / lesbianism by the majority of the population (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 74-
79). On the basis of the evidence that was outlined in court, Justice Dunne asserted that the State did not 
advance the ‘procreation argument’ or the ‘majority view argument’ to support its position vis-à-vis the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in Ireland (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 80). She 
then stated the following: “In essence therefore the arguments on behalf of the plaintiffs were narrowed 
down to the definitional argument and the issue in relation to the welfare of children.” (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at para. 81) While my thesis addresses both of these latter issues, the important point here is 
that it was a particular understanding of what the State might advance, in terms of justifying restrictions 
on the right to marry, that informed the plaintiffs’ counsel’s decision to refer to the issue of child welfare 
in Zappone and Gilligan. However, I argue that none of the evidence that was discussed in this case 
pertained to child welfare. Rather, it centred on the issue of child development. 
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discern who precisely made reference to what appears to be one research 
study in Extract VII above. This is misleading because the corresponding 
text in the 2002 report demonstrates that this extract conflates many 
research studies that were conducted throughout the 1980s and 1990s by 
different (teams of) researchers.
223
 Moreover, it is difficult to determine 
whether the above extract constitutes Professor Green’s verbatim evidence 
or whether it is simply meant to denote a summary of his testimony. Either 
way, it is problematic because it ignores basic details that are contained in 
the 2002 report, the inclusion of which was deemed to be pertinent to this 
High Court case. For example, the silence over the number of children who 
formed the research cohorts, i.e. over three hundred (see American 
Academy of Pediatrics, 2002, p.342), combined with the glossing over of 
the detail that these studies were conducted over a period of two decades, 
expose the lack of intellectual rigour that can attach to the ‘we simply do 
not know’ thesis about the ‘suspect’ or ‘possibly pathological’ ‘Other’. 
Nonetheless, the seemingly self-evident rationality of this hypothesis 
ultimately proved to be a deciding factor in terms of the eventual outcome 
in Zappone and Gilligan. I now provide a critical analysis of each sentence 
/ research finding in the above extract from the reported judgment. 
 
Extract VII 
 
The first sentence in Extract VII of the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. 
pp.417-513, at para. 35), and the 2002 report that it derives from, implicitly 
take as given, until proven otherwise, the idea that lesbian and gay 
parenthood raises the spectre of gender dysphoria / gender identity disorder 
                                           
223
 Appendix X contains the abstract of this report, which was reproduced as part of Professor Green’s 
expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at 
para. 35; see also American Academy of Pediatrics, 2002, p.341). This appendix also comprises text 
pertaining to children’s gender, psychological, sexual orientation, and social development as reported by 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002, p.342), and cited in these High Court proceedings. It 
provides a sense of the overall tenor of the studies’ findings that are contained in that 2002 report / 
review. Please note that footnotes in the original text are omitted in the appendix. 
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(see Foy v. An t-Ard Chláraitheoir, [2007] IEHC 470, paras. 1-118). This 
tends to conflate or confuse gender and (non normative) sexualities. 
Moreover, no indication is given as to the prevalence of this condition in 
children who are reared by heterosexual parents. This is a reasonable 
expectation because the journal’s abstract makes reference to such a cohort. 
This underscores the idea that ‘we do not need to know’ about heterosexual 
parenthood and any link to gender dysphoria in children who are reared by 
such parents. The general imperative to prove the ‘no differences’ thesis 
(see Stacey and Biblarz, 2001a, pp.162-164) leaves this silence intact. 
Rather than investigate the phenomenon of gender dysphoria, or interrogate 
the normative assumptions that surround it, all of which I accept are 
irrelevant to the matter before the Irish High Court, such silence creates a 
rather murky space where panic can set in. There, a presumed pathological 
parenthood, which operates as the seemingly natural starting point of 
scientific endeavour, has to be disproved. In the reported judgment, neither 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) nor Professor Green offer an 
explanation as to why this is the case, or why the research finding about not 
finding this condition warranted a research question in the first instance. 
Yet, the study has to form part of expert testimony and evidence in a 
courtroom because ‘we simply do not know’. Crucially, no explanation is 
offered in the High Court as to why the non-development of gender identity 
disorder is relevant to the issue of child welfare. I reiterate that this latter 
issue denoted the second ground for justifying the ban on same-sex 
marriage in Ireland, as evidenced by Extract I of the reported judgment. 
 
Here, I refer again to the first sentence / research finding in Extract VII of 
the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 35), and the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review that it comes from. The 
reader is not provided with any explanation as to why children or 
adolescents who are reared by gay or lesbian parents would wish to be of a 
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different gender, or would engage in cross-gender behaviour, to the extent 
that such phenomena would denote research findings deriving from 
research questions. Such findings about non-findings do nothing to disturb 
the rootedness of heteronormativity and gender complementarity, which 
seem to self-evidently denote the blueprint as regards the rearing of 
children. I argue that it is precisely these dynamics that problematise gay 
and lesbian parenting in the first instance. The imperative to prove the ‘no 
differences’ thesis (see Stacey and Biblarz, 2001a) is so persuasive, that no 
explanation is given as to why these findings about phenomena that do not 
arise are somehow relevant to the issue of child welfare. The routine 
morphing of child development issues into a matter of child welfare, in a 
case that centred on the right of two women to marry, neither of whom is a 
parent, demonstrates the ease with which heteronormativity is ‘justified’ in 
this jurisdiction. 
 
Extract VII 
 
The second sentence in Extract VII of the reported judgment in Zappone 
and Gilligan is also problematic. Bearing in mind the difficulties with the 
recounting feature, I reiterate that this research finding was presented over 
the course of Professor Green’s testimony (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at 
para. 35). This research finding from the American Academy of Pediatrics 
(2002) review presupposes that a person’s self-identification as gay is 
necessarily of scientific interest in a way that heterosexuality is not. The 
latter is not remarked upon. That socio-cognitive silence can mean that the 
onset of teenage homosexuality ‘naturally’ constitutes an issue that requires 
attention and analysis by medical or social researchers. No indication is 
given as to why that might be the case. Moreover, there is a failure to 
interrogate the heteronormative assumptions that are embedded in research 
questions in the first instance, which then inform such research findings. 
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Having said that, it must be acknowledged that Professor Green has, 
elsewhere, challenged the presumption that homosexuality is ‘second best’ 
(see Green, 1982, p.7). Nonetheless, the research finding from the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review does underscore the idea 
that it is in the formation and development of sexual orientation in 
teenagers, who are reared by lesbian or gay parents, that heteronormative 
anxiety is particularly acute (see Stacey and Biblarz, 2001a, p.163). The 
reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan is silent as to the relevance of 
this research finding, about ‘no differences’ in issues pertaining to (homo) 
sexuality, to the issue of child welfare.  
 
Extract VII 
 
The last sentence / research finding that is contained in Extract VII above 
(see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 35) denotes the interpretation of six 
research studies, including Golombok et al (1983), by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (2002, p.342). The 1983 study compared two 
cohorts of parents, as female heads of families, and their children on a 
range of measures within the areas of parenting and child development. 
The heterosexual cohort is initially identified by the status of those within it 
as both single and a parent (see Golombok et al, 1983, p.554). Here, 
women’s sexual orientation does not need to be made plain at the outset. 
However, it seems to be self-evident that the lesbian cohort of parents in 
the study needs to be immediately identified through the lens of sexual 
orientation, i.e. the lesbian group (see Golombok et al, 1983, p.554). This 
grounds the idea that it is a particular sexual orientation, rather than the 
variable of sexual orientation per se, which is at the root of social scientific 
endeavour vis-à-vis parenthood and childhood. Against the backdrop of 
heteronormativity, where such presumptions ‘make sense’, this aspect to 
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the research design of Golombok et al (1983) warranted no elaboration in 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review of same.  
 
My analysis of Extract VII from the reported judgment demonstrates the 
utility of integrating research material into the analysis of text. My critical 
analysis unearthed a deafening silence within the reported judgment that 
transcends a mere textual gap. I problematised the seemingly self-evident 
rationality of the ‘we simply do not know’ and the ‘we do not need to 
know’ theses, both of which inform, and are informed by, the relentless and 
routine operationalisation of heteronormativity in society. 
 
Extract VIII  
 
The following extract from the reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan 
was largely made with reference to Professor Casey’s testimony about the 
importance of adhering to standard methodological conventions in the 
conducting of social scientific studies, and its attendant relevance to the 
research that formed part of Professor Green’s expert evidence: 
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Professor Casey explained that in the affidavit sworn by 
Professor Nock, he detailed in the first part of it the 
methodological approaches to be used in epidemiological 
research of the sort that is concerned with gay and lesbian 
parenting and the second part of his report dealt with individual 
studies published in that area and he critiqued each one pointing 
to the strength and weaknesses of the particular reports. A long 
discussion then ensued as to the methodology involved in 
carrying out social research. The discussion ranged over 
probability samples, snowball sampling, cross-sectional studies 
and longitudinal studies. There was an explanation as to the need 
for controls in relation to studies in order to avoid confounding 
factors. Reference was made to the study of which Professor 
Green was a co-author in 1986 in which it was noted that 78% of 
the lesbian parents studied were living with a partner at the time 
and that only 10% of the heterosexual mothers who were studied 
had partners living with them at the time. Professor Casey 
commented that this was an obvious potential confounding factor 
for which one needed to have a control. It was also noted that so 
far as such studies have been conducted there appeared to be no 
studies conducted into the role of parenting by gay men. Having 
referred to all of these matters, Professor Casey commented that 
the various studies cited by Professor Green do not meet the 
criteria required for good epidemiological studies. They did not 
use probability or random sampling, they were of small sample 
size by and large and there were confounding factors in some of 
the studies. Only one of the studies referred to was a longitudinal 
study. As a result she was of the view that one had to be very 
cautious in making broad generalisations about the findings of 
these studies in regard to the general population. A reference was 
made to the affidavit of Professor Nock to that effect and I 
quote:- 
“In my opinion the only accepted [my italics] conclusion at this 
point is that the literature on this topic does not constitute a solid 
body of scientific evidence.” 
Having regard to the evidence as it now stands, she could not 
draw the conclusion that children were not affected by the 
consequences of a same sex partnership. She stated that the only 
conclusion she could draw is that we do not know and need 
studies that are more rigorous than those that are available at the 
moment. 
 
               Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 48-51  
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In this extract from the reported judgment, emphasis is placed on the 
importance of conducting rigorous social scientific research. This is a 
premise that generally recommends itself to researchers who are interested 
in social phenomena. What this CDA now seeks to demonstrate is how an 
over thirty-year-old repertoire of social scientific knowledge that is 
positively disposed to lesbian and gay personhood and parenthood, can 
somehow be reduced to the ‘coherence’ of ‘we simply do not know’. The 
seemingly self-evident logic of this ‘truth’, which is grounded in the 
seemingly self-evident imperative of caution (about the ‘suspect’ ‘Other’), 
ultimately persuaded Justice Dunne to ‘legitimate’ the exclusion of same-
sex couples from the institution of marriage in this jurisdiction (see [2008] 
2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 221). This will become clear as my critical 
analysis evolves.  
 
The first cog in the evidential wheel is the repeated reference to 
‘confounding factor(s)’. These were made in relation to the interpretation 
of Professor Green’s testimony as well as the Green et al (1986) study, 
which Professor Green conducted with colleagues in the United States.
224
 I 
argue that the most pressing ‘confounding factor’ informed Professor 
Kennedy’s testimony in the High Court (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at 
paras. 24-28), i.e. the historical conceptualisation and criminalisation of 
same-sex intimacy in the West, with its attendant legacies of inequality and 
stigma.
225
 Against the backdrop of deeply embedded heteronormative 
assumptions in the United States at the time that Green et al (1986) 
conducted and published their study,
226
 a gay or lesbian parent risked not 
just social opprobrium, but also that of judges whose preoccupations with 
                                           
224
 Appendix XI contains relevant excerpts of the Green et al (1986) study. 
225
 While this underscores the salience of Professor Kennedy’s evidence, it is important to question the 
relevance of mental health to the matter before the court. That three psychiatrists testified in this case is 
also a dynamic that warrants critical reflection. 
226
 For example, decriminalisation at a federal level did not take place until 2003 on foot of the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence v. Texas. See Denniston (2003) and Robertson (2003) in this regard. 
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the ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988) exposed the vulnerability of some 
parents in child custody cases. Neither medical nor social research is 
conducted in a vacuum. Therefore, researching what was effectively a 
hidden and frightened cohort of the population (see Patterson, 1992, 
p.1026) may have been difficult in the 1980s. It is unlikely that a research 
team that was concerned about child development and child custody, 
against a heteronormative and possibly homophobic backdrop, could have 
the luxury of employing a large-scale research design, the methods of 
which satisfied the criteria for ‘good epidemiological studies’. It begs an 
immediate question: What precisely does the Discipline of Epidemiology 
have to do with child development in the context of lesbian or gay 
parenthood?
227
 This was neither remarked upon nor addressed in the 
reported judgment. That does not make it peripheral to this analysis. It is a 
dynamic that is as important as Professor Casey’s admission under cross-
examination that “… she herself had not carried out or published any 
studies on same sex relationships.” (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 
52)
228
 It is at this juncture that Stacey’s and Biblarz’s (2001b) affidavit in 
the matter of Halpern (see [2003] 65 O.R., 3d, 161, paras. 1-158) comes to 
the fore.
229
 It denotes a detailed and trenchant rebuttal of Nock (2001), the 
latter of which informed Professor Casey’s assertions in Extract VIII of the 
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 “Epidemiological studies measure the prevalence and risk factors and outcomes of particular 
conditions.” (Professor Casey, cited in [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 46) My understanding is that the 
Discipline of Epidemiology is concerned with the development and prevention of such illnesses as cancer 
and diabetes. While there is a social dimension to this, associating medical research regarding disease 
prevalence and prevention with social research pertaining to lesbian and gay parenthood in the context of 
child development is problematic. It normalises the seemingly self-evident association between contagion 
and pathology (see Cameron and Cameron, 1996) with child development and (some) parents. 
Furthermore, even if (homo) sexual orientation were a ‘condition’, we do not know the specificities of its 
prevalence in Ireland. The latest census of the population, which took place in 2011, did not ask 
respondents about their sexual orientation (see Central Statistics Office, 2011). Ticking the ‘marital 
status’ box in the census form does not enlighten demographers as to the prevalence of any sexual 
orientation in this country. Therefore, when considering the merits of conducting ‘good epidemiological 
studies’ on demographically hidden cohorts of the population, it is important to reflect on why 
demographers do not ask such questions in the context of nationwide surveys in the first instance. Here, I 
wish to acknowledge the salience of Stacey and Biblarz (2001b) whose thesis informed these 
considerations. This will become clear momentarily. 
228
 Here, the use of the term ‘relationships’ is strange because such research does not necessarily yield any 
insight into the dynamic of lesbian or gay parenthood. 
229
 Please note that this affidavit did not denote evidence in Zappone and Gilligan. 
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reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, 
at paras. 48-51). Stacey and Biblarz (2001b, p.6) make the rather prescient 
point that Professor Nock, in his 2001 review of research studies pertaining 
to same-sex parenthood and child development, unquestioningly and 
inappropriately applied the research model that works best in his discipline, 
i.e. Demography, to an entirely different discipline, i.e. Developmental 
Psychology. It is unfortunate that Stacey’s and Biblarz’s (2001b) affidavit 
did not denote evidence in Zappone and Gilligan. It could have challenged 
the persuasiveness of Professor Nock’s (2001) affidavit and the attendant 
testimony of Professor Casey, such that Justice Dunne might not have 
relied on their expertise to the extent that she did (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513, at paras. 215-221). This will become apparent as my analysis evolves. 
 
Extract VIII 
 
Another cog in the evidential wheel relates to excerpts from Extract VIII of 
the reported judgment that are incorrect. One of these errors is rooted in 
misreading, rather than misinterpreting,
230
 Green et al (1986), relevant 
excerpts of which are contained in Appendix XI. Specifically, I refer to the 
reliance on percentages in Extract VIII of the reported judgment (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 49), which misrepresented basic details 
about the research cohorts that took part in the Green et al (1986) study. 
This would have been obvious from the most cursory reading of the study. 
Because of the recounting feature, it is difficult to determine who precisely 
was responsible for these inaccuracies and their articulation in the High 
Court, over the course of expert testimony vis-à-vis an affidavit and a 
research study.
231
 Extract VIII fails to show that while fifty-six percent of 
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 Here, I wish to emphasise the dynamic of misreading. The mistake was not derived from multiple 
interpretations of the 1986 study. Rather, it was a matter of literacy. 
231
 Because the statement was made over the course of Professor Casey’s direct testimony, rather than her 
cross-examination, I do not attribute it to counsel for the plaintiffs. Neither do I attribute the statement to 
Justice Dunne because it is inconceivable that her interpretation of Green et al (1986) would form part of 
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the lesbian cohort in the 1986 study did live with their partners, twenty-two 
percent lived with female roommates (see Green et al, 1986, p.172). 
Moreover, Extract VIII fails to show that the ten percent figure with regard 
to the heterosexual cohort actually refers to female roommates and 
relatives, such as a sister or a mother (see Green et al, 1986, p.172). The 
relevant excerpt from Extract VIII of the reported judgment is predicated 
on the conflation of female lovers with female roommates, and male lovers 
(who did not exist) with female relatives and female roommates. What is 
interesting about Professor Nock’s (2001) affidavit, which is referenced in 
Extract VIII above, is that it contains the same incorrect information about 
the Green et al (1986) study (see Nock, 2001, pp.60-61).
232
 This is an 
important point, not least in terms of Professor Nock’s discourse access 
profile (see van Dijk, 1993), which implicitly facilitated the inclusion of his 
sworn testimony / affidavit as evidence in court cases pertaining to the right 
to marry, as happened in Zappone and Gilligan. This error was repeated in 
the High Court. Another important point here is that Professor Casey 
proffered her expertise on the Green et al (1986) study in court, as 
evidenced in Extract VIII above (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 48-
51). Her discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 1993), which implicitly 
informed her stature as an expert knower, thinker, interpreter, and testifier 
in a constitutional court, presupposes that she would have apprised herself 
of that 1986 study prior to commenting on it. The absence of any apparent 
cross-examination of Professor Casey in this regard may have created a 
space where caution and doubt prevailed as regards the methodological 
strength of Green et al (1986), and perhaps the rigour of Professor Green’s 
testimony in the High Court. The importance of this dynamic will become 
clear as my analysis evolves. 
                                                                                                                           
the articulation of testimony regarding written evidence. She made plain her adjudication of the evidence 
in its totality in December 2006. This was partly based on what others articulated in court in October 
2006, including expert witnesses and senior counsel. I am grateful to a member of the Faculty of Law in 
University College Cork for clarifying this principle vis-à-vis evidence. 
232
 In this regard, see Appendix XVI. 
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Extract VIII 
 
Here, I discuss another error in Extract VIII of the reported judgment (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 48-51), specifically, the statement about 
the possible lack of studies regarding the parenting that is done by gay 
men. Notwithstanding its tentativeness, the claim is patently false. Its 
ingenuity derives from its caution and imprecision, which inhere in the 
phrase ‘there appeared to be’. It manages to chip away at the foundations of 
the over thirty-year-old repertoire of social scientific knowledge 
surrounding child development in the context of lesbian and gay parenting. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty with the recounting feature, the precise 
‘who’ behind the statement could have been an expert witness. The precise 
‘what’ behind it could have been an affidavit. However, the latter is 
implausible because Professor Nock reviewed a number of research studies 
that centred on the parenting that is done by gay men (for example, see 
Nock, 2001, pp.57-58 and p.66). This critical analysis now requires a brief 
look at some of the primary research that can reject the persuasiveness and 
veracity of that caution and imprecision, if it emanated from an expert 
witness for the State. 
 
Here, I reiterate that most of the research studies that were alluded to over 
the course of these High Court proceedings were introduced over the 
course of Professor Green’s direct testimony, cross-examination and re-
examination (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 31-44). One exception 
in this regard was Nock (2001), which was elaborated on as part of 
Professor Casey’s direct testimony and re-examination by counsel for the 
State (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 48-50 and para. 59 
respectively). The reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan also 
indicates that prior to giving evidence, Professor Casey was furnished with 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review, Professor Nock’s 
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(2001) affidavit, and a statement of Professor Green’s evidence (see [2008] 
2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 52). Each of these sources can contradict the 
statement regarding the parenting that is done by gay men, which is 
contained in an excerpt from Extract VIII above (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513, at para. 49). The following examples ably demonstrate this dynamic. 
 
The most cursory reading of Professor Green’s evidence indicates that the 
American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) reviewed research studies 
pertaining to gay men and their children (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at 
para. 35). The abstract to that 2002 review, which contains a reference to 
gay parents, was read out to Professor Green over the course of his 
testimony (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 35).
233
 The reported 
judgment indicates that Professor Casey, under cross-examination, 
proffered her expertise on the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) 
review (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 53). It is a reasonable 
expectation that she would have apprised herself of the 2002 review, on 
foot of receiving it, and prior to proffering that expertise. Nonetheless, the 
inexorable pull of the ‘we simply do not know’ thesis was such that the 
persuasiveness of the aforementioned caution and imprecision in Extract 
VIII prevailed. This will become apparent as my analysis evolves. 
 
The Stacey and Biblarz (2001a) review of research studies denoted part of 
Professor Green’s re-examination by counsel for the plaintiffs (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 43-44) and Professor Casey’s cross-examination 
by counsel for the plaintiffs (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 56-57). 
Over the course of Professor Green’s re-examination, reference was made 
to gay parents (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 43). Moreover, a 
minority of the studies that comprised this 2001 review (see Stacey and 
Biblarz, 2001a, p.169) pertained to gay male parenting, including Bailey et 
                                           
233
 See also Appendix X in this regard. 
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al (1995, pp.124-129). This particular team of researchers interviewed gay 
fathers and their adult sons with a view to determining the latter’s sexual 
orientation (see Bailey et al, 1995, p.125). Another important point here is 
that the Bailey et al (1995) study also formed part of the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (2002, p.342) review and Professor Nock’s (2001, 
pp.78-79) review of child development research. 
 
In his affidavit, Professor Nock (2001, p.80) also reviewed a research study 
pertaining to gay fathers that was conducted in the mid to late 1970s, over a 
period of three years, in Canada and the United States (see Miller, 1979). 
Therefore, this study would have been at the cutting-edge of this type of 
research in North America by virtue of its timeline. Miller (1979, pp.544-
545) conducted in-depth interviews with both gay men as fathers whose 
age range from youngest to oldest spanned forty years, and their minor or 
adult children who ranged in age from young teenagers to persons in their 
thirties.
234
 
 
The above examples are important in terms of the construction of 
knowledge and expertise on behalf of the State in Zappone and Gilligan. I 
reiterate that, prior to giving evidence, one such expert witness was 
furnished with sources of information that problematise the statement 
regarding gay male parenting that forms part of Extract VIII above (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. 417, at para. 49). These sources are as follows: the American 
Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review; Professor Nock’s (2001) affidavit; 
and a statement of Professor Green’s evidence (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-
513, at para. 52). Therefore, my critical analysis demonstrates the lack of 
                                           
234
 Other minor children were not interviewed due to the following: ethical considerations regarding their 
incapacity to consent; their inability to understand the nature of the research; their lack of knowledge 
about their fathers’ sexual orientation; and the attendant issue of such parents’ right to confidentiality (see 
Miller, 1979, p.545). See Appendix XIV for a brief, yet quite potent, excerpt from this study. 
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intellectual rigour that attaches to the ‘we simply do not know’ thesis.235 
Nonetheless, this informed the eventual outcome of this High Court case. 
This will become clear presently. 
 
Extract VIII 
 
The final aspect to my critical analysis of Extract VIII above (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 48-51) concerns the inclusion of, and reliance on, 
Nock (2001). It is important to state that the text of the relevant excerpt 
from this affidavit is as follows: “However, in my opinion, the only 
acceptable [my italics] conclusion at this point is that the literature on this 
topic does not constitute a solid body of scientific evidence.” (Nock, 2001, 
p.47) The term ‘accepted’, which forms part of Extract VIII above (see 
[2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 50), means established or time-honoured, 
while the term ‘acceptable’ means adequate or satisfactory. Here, the 
difficulty that attaches to reliance on the recounting feature is particularly 
acute, because a determination on the precise ‘who’ behind the variance in 
text cannot be made. It could be any or all of the following persons: judge, 
lawyer, expert witness, transcriber. However, the excerpt from Nock (2001, 
p.47) was used to bolster Professor Casey’s critique of Professor Green’s 
evidence, which pertained to research studies and reviews that were 
published over a period of four decades, from 1978 to 2002.
236
 The term 
‘accepted’ in Extract VIII manages to neutralise the caveat that inheres in 
the phrase ‘at this point’. It creates a gulf between ‘proper’ research that 
necessarily adheres to time-honoured conventions that are established and 
                                           
235
 Here, it is important to refer to the Anderssen et al (2002) review of research studies, which was 
discussed over the course of Professor Green’s testimony (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 36). 
Appendix XIII contains the abstract to this 2002 review. Please note that the reported judgment in 
Zappone and Gilligan is not entirely consistent with this abstract. Bearing in mind the recounting feature, 
the reported judgment is incomplete in that it omits three studies regarding gay male parenting that this 
research team in Norway reviewed, including Bailey et al (1995) and Miller (1979), which I alluded to in 
this chapter. A thorough elaboration of Anderssen et al (2002) in the High Court, incorporating the scope 
of Miller (1979), for example, both in terms of its timeline and its research cohort, would have helped to 
undermine the ‘logic’ of the ‘we simply do not know’ thesis. 
236
 In this regard, I refer to Green (1978) and American Academy of Pediatrics (2002). 
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maintained through a ‘solid body of scientific evidence’, and the ‘never 
enough’ that informs the ‘we simply do not know’ thesis. The ideological 
wherewithal of this distinction is such that the seemingly self-evident 
recourse to the Disciplines of Demography, Epidemiology, Mathematics, 
and Psychiatry cohered and ‘made sense’ in a constitutional case that 
centred on the right to marry. 
 
Extract IX 
 
The inexorable pull of the powerfully persuasive percentages in Extract 
VIII of the reported judgment was such that the misreading of basic 
information in the Green et al (1986) study was repeated again in the High 
Court. Here, I refer to the recounting of Professor Waite’s testimony as an 
expert witness for the State. Its significance, in terms of the import that 
Justice Dunne placed on it, cannot be overstated. This will become clear 
presently. 
 
She was critical of Professor Green’s 1986 study in relation to 
the outcome for children in terms of sexual identity and 
relationship to their peers which involved a comparison between 
children brought up by gay parents, 78% of whom had a partner, 
and children brought up by heterosexual parent[s] of whom only 
10% had a partner and she commented that one could not do a 
comparison in such circumstances. She said that it was extremely 
important to have a full picture of the methodology used for a 
particular study and the controls used to exclude confounding or 
biased factors. Her comment was as follows:-  
“No one should pay any attention to studies that are poorly done. 
They are just some stories, they really are not science.”  
Finally she indicated that she did not come to her views from any 
kind of ideological viewpoint in relation to these issues. 
 
                     Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 67  
 
Here, the ideological distinction between ‘science’ and ‘stories’ could not 
be more acute. The repeated error, which initially denoted part of my 
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critical analysis of Extract VIII of the reported judgment, is utterly 
spurious. Moreover, it could have been immediately discerned from the 
most cursory reading of Green et al (1986), on which Professor Waite 
proffered her expertise. In that regard, it is a reasonable expectation that 
she would have apprised herself of the 1986 study so as to inform her 
interpretation of it in the High Court. Indeed, her discourse access profile 
(see van Dijk, 1993), which implicitly informed her stature as an expert 
witness in a constitutional court, presupposes this. Moreover, I argue that it 
is precisely at the point when an expert is impelled to assert that her 
position is not derived from ideology, that the morphing of a study into 
‘just some story’ becomes ideological. It is precisely that protagonist’s 
agenda that is ultimately served by the distinction between science and 
story in the first instance. The consequence of this repeated error will 
become apparent momentarily. 
 
Extract X 
 
Perhaps the best way of concluding this critical discourse analysis 
regarding the second strand to the hetero-matrix is to include the following 
extract from the reported judgment: 
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The evidence of Professor Green was somewhat controversial. 
Certainly he was challenged extensively on the conclusions 
drawn by him as a result of the studies to which he referred. I 
think it is important to be clear as to the value and weight to be 
attached to his evidence. […] As has been described earlier he 
was vigorously cross-examined in relation to the methodology of 
the studies he relied upon and the ability to draw conclusions 
from those studies having regard to the methodology employed 
in the studies. That criticism extended not just to the studies he 
had reviewed but to those he himself had been involved in. […] 
Having considered his evidence carefully, taking on board the 
evidence that I also heard from Professor Casey and from 
Professor Waite, I think that one must have some reservation in 
relation to the conclusions drawn by Professor Green. The 
phenomenon of parenting by same sex couples is one of 
relatively recent history. […] [S]o far as the evidence is 
concerned it seems to me that the research into this topic which is 
of significant importance is not developed to the extent that one 
could draw such firm conclusions as Professor Green has 
expressed. The evidence of Patricia Casey largely dealt with the 
issue of the methodology employed in the various studies 
described by Professor Green. As is clear from my comments on 
the evidence of Professor Green, I accepted her evidence in 
relation to the question of methodology used for conducting the 
research relied on by Professor Green and commented upon in 
the affidavit of Professor Nock. It is not necessary to comment 
further on that issue. 
 
           Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at paras. 215-220 
 
This extract is informed by the persuasiveness of the ‘we simply do not 
know’ thesis. It implicitly hinges on the ‘logic’ of a possibly deficient and 
pathological ‘Other’ (see Baumrind, 1995). Against the backdrop of deeply 
embedded heteronormative assumptions, it seems that this ‘suspect’ ‘Other’ 
must always be under objective scrutiny in the ‘hard sciences’, such as 
Demography or Mathematics, for example. Its inexorable pull is derived 
from the seemingly self-evident rationality of Professor Nock’s affidavit 
and the expert testimony of Professors Casey and Waite. I reiterate that 
Nock (2001), which initially denoted sworn testimony in Halpern, contains 
incorrect information about the research cohorts that took part in the Green 
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et al (1986) study (see Nock, 2001, pp.60-61). This error was repeated in 
the Irish High Court over the course of expert witness testimony for the 
State. Yet, their evidence ‘self-evidently’ cohered to raise the spectre of 
doubt about Professor Green’s evidence, experience and expertise. In this 
regard, Extract X of the reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan is 
particularly potent. Against the backdrop of prior critical analysis, it speaks 
volumes ‘by itself’. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter denoted a critical discourse analysis of the High Court ruling 
in Zappone and Gilligan. Its aim was to explain the intransigence of lesbian 
and gay inequality in Ireland in the context of marriage and family. I 
identified two crucial and interlocking elements that required analysis in 
this regard, i.e. (1) the premise that the institution of marriage is inherently 
heterosexual and (2) the routine pathologisation of lesbians and gay men. 
To that end, I integrated case law and primary research into my analysis. 
This was in keeping with my discourse-historical approach to research (see 
Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011). Indeed, both the accretion of case law 
on Article 41 of our Constitution, and the routine inclusion / interpretation 
of child development research in determining the right to marry, ably 
demonstrated the salience and utility of the DHA to critical research. It 
helped to explain the rootedness of deeply embedded heteronormative 
assumptions that inform the following theses: ‘marriage as inherently 
heterosexual’; ‘since the beginning of time’; ‘until the end of time’; ‘we 
simply do not know’; and ‘we do not need to know’. I subjected all theses, 
and the discourses that underpin them, to critical analysis in an effort to 
explain the intransigence of gay and lesbian inequality in Ireland. Their 
toxicity in terms of heteronormativity is derived in part from the extent to 
which the dominant understanding of marriage is bound up with the 
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dominant understanding of family in our Constitution. While the plaintiffs 
relied on Articles 40 and 41, the ‘coherence’ of these theses is such that 
these were precisely the texts that ‘commonsensically’ placed the plaintiffs 
outside the realm of constitutional protection vis-à-vis Articles 40 and 41. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Pen Pals, Parish-Pumps, and Putting on an Act: ‘Letters to the Editor’, 
E-Mails from Politicians, and Oireachtas Debates Pertaining to Civil 
Partnership 
 
This is not about equality alone but about balance in our 
Constitution, namely, on the one hand the protection of marriage 
and on the other the issue of equality. 
 
Minister Ahern, Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, 
and Women’s Rights, 2010b, Section 170 
 
Introduction 
 
Informed by both my methodological and theoretical considerations, this 
chapter elaborates on some of the ways in which the general public and the 
political class in Ireland conceptualised different aspects to adult 
relationship and family recognition. This chapter is organised into three 
sections, with each comprising one genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b). 
Firstly, I draw upon ‘Letters to the Editor’ of The Irish Times that were 
published over the course of the High Court proceedings in October 2006 
and the December 2006 ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. The second genre 
pertains to communication that I received from members of the Oireachtas 
from April 2009 to December 2009 on foot of correspondence from me 
regarding the 2004 enactment of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage. 
Lastly, I elaborate on aspects to some of the Oireachtas debates that took 
place from December 2009 to July 2010 vis-à-vis the proposed introduction 
of a civil partnership regime for same-sex couples in Ireland. The utility of 
each genre is such that they all serve to highlight the myriad ways in which 
equality of respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) is either affirmed 
or denied. While the genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) are all inter-
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connected, each of them has a particular focus. In Section One, the material 
that I garnered from the letters’ pages of a national daily newspaper helps 
to determine how ‘ordinary’ people, who tend to have limited access to the 
construction of public discourse, framed the issue of same-sex marriage in 
Ireland in 2006. In Section Two, I rely on a corpus of material that I 
garnered from deputies and senators in relation to the 2004 legislative ban 
on same-sex marriage. My critical analysis in that regard sheds some light 
on the political culture in Ireland that militates against taking personal 
responsibility for the enactment of legislation. I argue that this is relevant in 
terms of the intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality in this jurisdiction. 
In Section Three of Chapter Six, I focus on the myriad ways in which the 
new legislative regime of civil partnership for same-sex couples was either 
legitimated or challenged against the backdrop of heteronormativity in 
Ireland. Therefore, my attention is drawn to the wider issue of relationship 
recognition, rather than same-sex marriage per se. My analysis of material 
from each genre adds an important and relevant dimension to this thesis, in 
that they all invariably serve to contextualise the issue of marriage equality 
/ inequality in Ireland. Furthermore, my critical analysis in Chapter Six 
helps to ground my analysis in Chapter Five. 
 
One final point that I wish to make here pertains to relevant political party 
affiliation. Fianna Fáil, which has dominated Irish parliamentary politics 
for decades, presided over the enactment of the legislative ban on same-sex 
marriage in 2004. While in coalition with the Green Party, Fianna Fáil was 
also responsible for the enactment of civil partnership and cohabitation 
legislation in 2010. Fine Gael, Labour and Sinn Féin were in opposition 
during these time periods. I make reference to these political parties 
throughout Chapter Six. 
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Section One: Letters to the Editor: Important Considerations 
 
The utility of the ‘Letters to the Editor’ genre of discourse (see Wodak, 
1997b) is that it can provide a sense of the socio-cultural repertoire of 
ideologies, norms, opinions, values (see van Dijk, 1997c), and stereotypes 
(see White and White, 2006) that are ‘out there’ ‘in’ social cognition (see 
van Dijk, 1993; 2006) at a particular time and place in relation to a myriad 
of social issues. It manages to catch a glimpse or gauge the temperature of 
the public mood on controversial issues, which tend to arouse interest and 
elicit response from readers of national daily newspapers, for example. The 
genre is of particular interest to discourse analysts in that such letters 
denote a body of knowledge that is produced by people who tend to have 
limited access to the production of discourse in the public sphere. The Irish 
Times, which is Ireland’s oldest national daily newspaper (O’Brien, 2008, 
p.13), has long been the main alternative voice in the Irish print media (see 
Whyte, 1979, p.73). Its letters’ pages offer an important and lively forum 
for the airing of views on matters that have courted controversy (see 
Gageby, 1979, p.132; Whyte, 1979, p.73). The Irish Times is also deemed 
to be the paper of record in Ireland (Brady, 2005, p.2; O’Brien, 2008, p.13). 
Such factors steered me in the direction of the ‘Letters to the Editor’ 
section of this newspaper with a view to capturing a snapshot in time of the 
public mood in Ireland in relation to the issue of same-sex marriage in 
general, and the Zappone and Gilligan ruling in particular. 
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Letters to the Editor: Table 
 
Name Yes No Unclear Positive Negative Themes 
Barrett (2006a)   X P  Language, Meaning 
Barrett (2006b)   X P  Human Reproduction 
Burke, C. (2006)   X P  Rearing of Children, Gender 
Corrigan (2006) X     Equality, Role of the State 
D’Alton (2006)   X P  Meaning of Marriage 
Doran and Puri (2006)   X N/A N/A Critical of Letter Writers 
Doyle (2006)   X N/A N/A Element of Privilege 
Drury (2006)   X  N Use of Language, Irish Constitution 
Eivers (2006)   X P  Child Development Research 
Farrell (2006)   X P  Child Development Research 
Fitzgerald (2006)   X P  Rearing of Children 
Garrahy (2006) X     Irish Constitution, ECHR, Equality 
Hanifin (2006) X     Equality, Children 
Harty (2006)   X P  Recognition as Citizen 
Hayes (2006)   X P  Civil Partnership, Adoption 
Hemmens (2006) X     Irish Constitution 
Hughes (2006)   X  N Familial Relationships 
Ingoldsby (2007)  X    Moral Decadence, Civil Partnership 
Kelleher, I. (2006a)   X P  Reproduction, Fertility 
Kelleher, I. (2006b) X     Meaning of Marriage, Love 
Kelleher, I. (2006c) X     Meaning of Marriage, Love 
Kelleher, T. (2006)  X    Children, Social Cohesion 
Kelly (2006)   X P  Irish Constitution, Living Instrument  
Kenny (2006a)   X P  Canadian Law 
Kenny (2006b) X     Equality, Civil Partnership 
Keogh (2006)  X    Intrinsically Heterosexual 
Larkin (2006)   X  N Definition of Marriage, Complementarity 
Lyon (2006) X     Labour Party’s Position 
Maguire (2006)   X  N Definition of Marriage 
Mathews-McKay and 
Keane (2006) 
X     Equality, Irish Constitution, Courage of the 
Plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan 
McBride (2006) X     Equality, Children 
McCarron and  
Kenny (2006) 
  X P  Child Development Research 
McCarthy (2006)   X P  Love, Family 
McGovern (2006) X     Right to Marry, Homosexuality 
McPhillips (2006)   X N/A N/A Element of Privilege 
Mooney (2006)   X  N Difference To 
Mullen (2006) X     Legislative Process, Judiciary 
Mulligan (2006)  X    Definition of Marriage 
O’Byrne (2006)   X N/A N/A Critical of a Letter Writer 
O’Callaghan (2006a)  X    Meaning, Complementarity 
O’Callaghan (2006b)  X    Meaning, Complementarity 
O’Connell (2006)   X P  Role of the Judiciary 
O’Driscoll (2007)   X P  Rearing of Children 
O’Flanagan (2006) X     Equality, Privilege, Irish Government 
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Name Yes No Unclear Positive Negative Themes 
O’Reilly (2006)  X    Human Reproduction, Marriage / Family 
Philips (2006)  X    Irish Constitution, Marriage / Family 
Reilly (2006)   X P  Relationship Recognition 
Wilkins (2006) X     Irish Constitution, Equality 
Windle (2006a)  X    Difference To, Human Reproduction 
Windle (2006b)  X    Difference To, Human Reproduction 
 
I initially sought to organise the material on the basis of unequivocal 
support for, and opposition to, same-sex marriage. However, I soon 
realised that this rather narrow preoccupation with reducing the material to 
a simplistic ‘yes’ or ‘no’ distracted me from the utility of this genre. 
Having said that, it is important to provide the reader with some sense of 
the themes that characterise the material. With this in mind, I compiled a 
table that is largely organised according to what I perceive as those letters 
that are firmly in the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps as regards marriage equality, 
together with a column pertaining to those writers whose perspectives are 
less clear. I do not wish to attribute an incorrect perspective to a letter 
writer. This helps to explain the volume of letters in this latter column. 
Nonetheless, so as to enable them to ‘speak’ in some way to the reader, I 
have organised them into those that I deem to be positively (P) or 
negatively (N) disposed to marriage equality. It is not possible to categorise 
the letters from Doran and Puri (2006), Doyle (2006), McPhillips (2006), 
and O’Byrne (2006), because perspectives on this issue are not discernible. 
It is important to state that my categorisation of letters is mine alone. 
Elements to it may be directly at odds with a letter writer’s intent or 
perspective. Similarly, the themes that I ascribe to the material may be at 
odds with those of a particular writer’s intent or perspective. These issues 
will become clear as my analysis evolves. 
 
A letter writer indicated that one of the joys of reading The Irish Times was 
his grounded expectation that it consistently publishes a diverse range of 
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opinion on social issues (see Murray, 2008).
237
 The material that comprises 
this genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) attests to that. Initially, both the 
High Court case and a number of ‘Opinion’ pieces in this newspaper, 
including O’Brien (2006) and Reville (2006a), prompted the airing of 
views in the letters’ pages. These letters were, for the most part, positively 
disposed to same-sex marriage and lesbian / gay parenting. These letters 
then impelled others to put pen to paper. The general tenor of many of 
these letters was largely supportive of relationship and family recognition. 
Those who provided a negative critique tended to frame their responses 
around the dominant understanding of marriage and the imperative of 
procreation. What is interesting about this ‘public conversation’ thus far is 
that, for much of October 2006, which coincided with the High Court 
proceedings in Zappone and Gilligan, there was scarcely a mention of the 
court case. This trend continued throughout November 2006 in the letters’ 
pages. What characterises this timeline is the extent to which O’Callaghan 
(2006a) triggered a barrage of responses from letter writers. O’Callaghan 
(2006a) denoted a response to the most prolific writer in terms of published 
responses over the entirety of my search, i.e. Kelleher (2006a,b,c). None of 
the published responses to O’Callaghan (2006a) supported her perspective, 
which centred on the dominant understanding of marriage and the 
imperative of gender complementarity. The general tenor of the response to 
O’Callaghan (2006a) was such that she defended and reiterated her position 
(see O’Callaghan (2006b). Subsequently, there was a considerable lull in 
the ‘public conversation’, as mediated through the letters’ pages of The 
Irish Times, which was broken by letter writers who supported or opposed 
the December 2006 ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. What is interesting 
                                           
237
 Murray’s (2008) letter was prompted by Casey’s (2008e) ‘Opinion’ piece in The Irish Times, which 
pertained to the debate on marriage and family in Ireland. Professor Casey, who was an expert witness for 
the State in Zappone and Gilligan, included her professional credentials in her letter. However, Murray 
(2008) stated that, in failing to publish her affiliation with the Iona Institute, the newspaper failed to 
disclose important information to the reader that is directly relevant to interpretations of such opinion and 
analysis on social issues, including marriage and family. 
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here is that one letter that supported the ruling, i.e. Philips (2006), triggered 
a relatively large response from people who criticised her perspective, 
which alluded to the prevailing struggle over the meaning (see 
Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of marriage. This 
dynamic, which is very much related to the production of discourse, 
exercised the minds of many letter writers immediately after the High 
Court ruling in 2006. 
 
In my upcoming analysis in Section One, my attention is drawn to those 
letters whose theme(s) and / or tenor are unexpected. I allude to the 
reproduction of privilege and the complexity of a party-political dimension 
to the realisation of marriage equality in Ireland. Both of these dynamics 
help to explain the intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality. The 
‘marriage as inherently heterosexual’ thesis, which I discussed in Chapter 
Five, also emerges in the material, particularly in relation to procreation 
and gender complementarity. Both of these issues tend to inform 
heterosexist opposition to marriage equality. The process of legitimation, 
which denotes part of my methodological considerations that I discussed in 
Chapter One, is evident in terms of the construction of knowledge. 
Moreover, many of these themes evoke much of my analysis in Chapter 
Five. 
 
Theme: Making and Legitimating Claims 
 
The Labour Party’s Position(s) on Marriage Equality 
 
The legitimating of claims in the context of a party-political dimension to 
marriage equality denotes one of the most unexpected themes in this 
analysis. Here, it is important to make the point that letters can be written 
in personal and professional capacities. However, the reliance on 
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professional credentials so as to validate an opinion requires some caution. 
Details supplied by Hanifin (2006), who supports marriage equality, 
suggest that she was speaking in a professional capacity as a Labour Party 
official when she responded to an ‘Opinion’ piece by O’Brien (2006), 
which pertained to the importance of gender complementarity vis-à-vis the 
begetting and rearing of children in the marital family. Hanifin (2006) 
stated: 
 
To deny same-sex couples the right to marry because together 
they will not create children would be as wrong as it would be to 
deny two people who are not going to have children for whatever 
reasons to marry. … Opposite-sex couples should not be seen as 
superior human beings just because they conform to the 
traditional idea of a union. Same-sex couples are equal and 
deserve to be treated equally. 
 
                                                                                   Hanifin, 2006 
 
Her party-political credentials as Women and Equality Officer denote a 
particular discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 1993) with an attendant 
authority. Their use presupposes familiarity with the Labour Party’s 
position on important dimensions to the principle of equality, including 
marriage equality. The difficulty for Hanifin (2006) is that she implicitly 
sought to articulate this in a context where Labour’s position per se was not 
expressly espoused. In this regard, Lyon (2006) asked the following:  
 
Is Ms Hanifin speaking in an official capacity? And if she is, 
does this represent a change of party policy since February 2004, 
when Labour TDs abstained from a vote on a Sinn Féin 
amendment (to the Civil Registration Bill) which would have 
allowed for same-sex marriage? 
 
                                                                                      Lyon, 2006 
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An important backdrop here is a Dáil vote pertaining to a Sinn Féin 
amendment that sought to remove the proposed ban on same-sex marriage 
from the Civil Registration Bill, 2003 as it progressed through the 
Oireachtas (see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, para. 1009).
238
 Section 2.2(e) of the 
Civil Registration Act, 2004 denies same-sex couples the right to marry in 
this jurisdiction. In January 2010, a high-profile member of the Labour 
Party informed me, on foot of communication to him, that the rationale 
behind this party’s abstention from the Dáil vote derived from legal advice. 
This advice indicated that passing this amendment would not have made 
same-sex marriage legally permissible in Ireland. If this response denoted a 
constituent part of the Labour Party’s position on marriage equality at that 
time, it is conceivable that this would have been supported by 
documentation. Labour Party officials, including its officers, might have 
had access to such documentation. Moreover, this seeking of advice on the 
matter suggests that the party might have been apprised of the possibility 
that the proposed ban would trigger a vote in the Dáil when it did. This 
would presuppose prior knowledge of the ban’s insertion into the proposed 
legislation in 2004. The important point here with regard to Hanifin (2006) 
is that professional credentials that may have been used to validate 
opposition to the denial of marriage equality, actually served to hone in on 
the complexity of Labour’s position at the time. The legislative ban on 
same-sex marriage came into being on Labour’s watch. Moreover, the Dáil 
record shows that its deputies did not attempt to stop it at a crucial stage in 
the legislation’s passage through the Oireachtas (see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, 
para. 1009). The absence of a published response in the letters’ pages of 
The Irish Times over the period of my search underscores the complexity of 
Labour’s position, which Lyon (2006) captured. This analysis also 
                                           
238
 In May 2009, on foot of communication by me to Sinn Féin, Wendy Lyon alerted me to that party’s 
attempt to remove the clause banning same-sex marriage from the 2003 proposed legislation at its Report 
and Final Stages in 2004. I will revisit this issue in Section Two of Chapter Six. 
 217 
demonstrates the utility of integrating text from another genre, in that it 
facilitated a more rigorous analysis of ‘Letters to the Editor’.  
 
It can be argued that a similar fate befell what is otherwise a rather potent 
letter that Mathews-McKay and Keane (2006) wrote in their capacities as 
Co-Chairs of Labour LGBT. They drew upon the following themes: our 
Constitution is a ‘living instrument’ that is not stuck in the ‘permafrost’ of 
1937 (see Hogan and Whyte, 1994); the significance of the Zappone and 
Gilligan case extends beyond a taxation code that does not recognise the 
plaintiffs as a married couple; and the right of gay men and lesbians to 
marry is bound up with the principle of equality (see Mathews-McKay and 
Keane, 2006). In the following extract, they set down a marker: 
 
If the Constitution is to be valued as a living document, the onus 
is on all of us to ensure that legislators do not exclude, divide or 
commodify us. This groundbreaking case [Zappone and 
Gilligan] has created links and sparked a flame among political, 
social and queer activists across the country who recognise that 
now is the time for civil society and those with power to ensure 
that security and fairness, justice and equality are conceptualised 
and realised for all of us who are being marginalised. 
 
                                                 Mathews-McKay and Keane, 2006 
 
Both Co-Chairs implicitly sought to validate their core arguments and align 
them with Labour Party policy vis-à-vis marriage equality when they used 
their party-political credentials. This can presuppose symmetry between the 
Labour Party, its LGBT membership, and party policy on important issues 
such as the realisation of rights. However, it is difficult to ‘square’ the 
rallying call that is apparent in the above extract with the ‘circle’ that 
denotes the Labour Party’s rationale for its action / inaction in the Dáil vis-
à-vis the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage. This should have been 
apparent to both of them by virtue of their discourse access profiles (see 
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van Dijk, 1993). Similar to Hanifin (2006), Mathews-McKay and Keane 
(2006) underscored the complexity of Labour’s position on marriage 
equality. Moreover, their initiative is at odds with the inertia that inheres in 
Labour’s self-imposed powerlessness in terms of its inability to place the 
ban on the legislature’s agenda at the time, so as to debate it at a crucial 
stage in the legislative process in February 2004. 
 
The Imperative of Mis/Representation 
 
The following example hones in on the ‘who’ behind the construction of 
‘necessarily valid’ scientific knowledge. The impetus behind McCarron’s 
and Kenny’s (2006) letter was an ‘Opinion’ piece by Reville (2006a) in 
The Irish Times. At the time of writing, he was Associate Professor of 
Biochemistry in University College Cork. Reville (2006a) stated that there 
was very significant scientific evidence available indicating that both 
parents and children fare best in stable married families. However, in not 
substantiating his claim, Reville (2006a) implicitly drew upon his discourse 
access profile (see van Dijk, 1993), which underscores, and is underscored 
by, his ‘Under the Microscope’ column in The Irish Times. Indeed, he 
implicitly deemed his assertion to be self-evident.
239
 This prompted 
McCarron and Kenny (2006) to challenge him in their letter, which drew 
upon the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review to substantiate 
their perspective. This seems to be positively disposed to lesbian / gay 
parenting and same-sex marriage. The difficulty with McCarron’s and 
Kenny’s (2006) letter does not become apparent until one reads Doran and 
Puri (2006), who were robust in their criticism of the recourse to the 
professional so as to validate the personal. The contact details provided by 
                                           
239
 In a subsequent column within this genre, Reville (2006b) sought to redress this oversight in the 
context of lesbian and gay parenting by drawing upon Nock (2001) and the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (2002). These denoted reviews of child development research studies. They also denoted 
written evidence in Zappone and Gilligan. I referred to them throughout my critical analysis in Section 
Two of Chapter Five. 
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McCarron and Kenny (2006) to the Editor of The Irish Times implied that 
they were associated with the Children’s Research Centre in Our Lady’s 
Children’s Hospital in Dublin.240 This strategy implicitly relied on social 
cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006) in terms of a public consensus 
surrounding the general importance of paediatric research. However, in 
doing that, they ‘crossed a line’. This becomes apparent in the following 
extract from Doran and Puri (2006), who, at the time of writing, held the 
positions of Chief Executive and Director of Research at the centre 
respectively:
241
 
 
A letter in your edition of October 4th appeared to represent 
viewpoints belonging to or developed in the Children’s Research 
Centre. Nobody here is authorised to express any views, 
particularly personal views, that purport to represent, come from, 
or might be construed as somehow being associated with or 
resulting from any work that is carried out in or from The 
Children’s Research Centre. This centre has done no research or 
investigative work of any kind on this or any related topic. The 
letter seemed to indicate that work of that nature has been carried 
out here and that hypotheses have been formed or conclusions 
arrived at relating to children and marriage. It may have seemed 
to have credibility because our address was printed below the 
authors’ names. Moreover, it issued a challenge on a subject of 
great controversy that could be interpreted as issuing from the 
Children’s Research Centre. We have never discussed this 
subject and we certainly have no “corporate” view on it. 
 
                                                                      Doran and Puri, 2006  
 
Here, Doran and Puri (2006) challenged McCarron and Kenny (2006) in a 
public forum, and unravelled what effectively amounted to a false truth-
claim by the latter. That Doran and Puri (2006) ‘survived’ editorial 
screening, and were subsequently published in a letters’ page, leads me to 
accept their bona fides. The converse is the case for McCarron and Kenny 
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 See http://www.nationalchildrensresearchcentre.ie/ 
241
 Professor Puri is still affiliated with this centre. See National Children’s Research Centre (2012). 
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(2006). Here, the imperative of ‘address-dropping’ was used to further the 
twin objectives of credibility and validity. McCarron and Kenny (2006) 
drew upon the American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) review to 
substantiate their perspective. This was ‘grounded’ in their apparent 
professional affiliation with the Children’s Research Centre. This implicitly 
relied on social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006), and the attendant 
capacity of The Irish Times reader to ‘join the dots’ between Irish and 
American paediatric research. This constructed a seemingly credible and 
definitive perspective on child development in the context of marriage. It 
came into being, even though it does not exist (see Doran and Puri, 2006). 
Such is the ideological wherewithal of discourse. 
 
Theme: The Reproduction of Privilege 
 
The reproduction of privilege denotes an important theme that emerges 
from the analysis of text within this genre. One of the most potent 
reminders of privilege is the extent to which it remains unchecked and 
unseen by those who benefit from its routine operationalisation in society 
(see Wildman, 1996). I suspect that neither of the writers of the following 
two extracts are aware of the privilege that is required to utter such 
statements in the first instance, which is precisely the point: 
 
Surely same-sex couples have the right to be as miserable as the 
rest of us. 
 
                                                                                     Doyle, 2006 
 
I really can’t understand all the fuss and debate regarding “same-
sex marriage” in your letter pages recently. I’ve been having the 
same sex, with the same woman, for the past 24 years, and we 
are very happily married. 
 
                                                                             McPhillips, 2006 
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While these statements appear to be ‘tongue-in-cheek’, they are indicative 
of the phenomenon of privilege and its reproduction in society. Its 
normalisation is such that advocating marriage equality, for example, 
which has the capacity to destabilise heterosexual privilege to its core, risks 
undermining the fundamental principle of equality. Windle (2006a) 
demonstrated this while attempting to evoke the general tenor of Hanifin 
(2006) and McBride (2006), both of which denoted responses to O’Brien’s 
(2006) ‘Opinion’ piece regarding gender complementarity. Windle (2006a) 
asserted the following with regard to both letters: 
 
[Both letters] were packed full of the usual woolly rubbish on 
equality that we hear so often these days. While an individual’s 
sexuality is their own business, the idea that heterosexual couples 
and homosexual couples should be treated as equals is plain 
ridiculous. 
                  
                                                                                 Windle, 2006a   
 
The kernel of his letter pertained to the imperative of procreation without 
an expressly articulated reference to marital procreation. The important 
point here in the context of privilege is that no one on the receiving end of 
inequality, criminalisation or pathologisation would write such a statement. 
This is because privilege facilitates unawareness of the resilience of social 
systems of oppression, such as heterosexism and homophobia. Here, 
privilege normalises the seemingly self-evident rationality of the ‘us / 
them’ distinction (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997) and 
the concept of difference, which pervade Windle’s (2006a) letter in its 
entirety. 
 
The general tenor of the response that Windle (2006a) engendered in Harty 
(2006), McGovern (2006), O’Byrne (2006), and Reilly (2006), impelled 
him to clarify his position. He stated: 
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Firstly, I have nothing against homosexuals. … The problem for 
me arises when we try to equate fully the idea of a heterosexual 
relationship with one between homosexuals. Society can 
continue only if people have children. Heterosexuals in general 
have the capacity to reproduce. … I don’t have any major 
objection to a civil union that gives equal rights on certain issues 
like inheritance. However we cannot make two things equal 
where they are clearly not in all aspects, even if they are in very 
many others. 
 
                                                                                 Windle, 2006b 
 
While Windle (2006b) did omit the ‘but’ in his ‘I have nothing against 
homosexuals’ perspective, he does not comprehend the privilege that such 
a statement commands in the first instance. There is also an inability to 
appreciate that it is biology, rather than (hetero) sexual orientation per se, 
that triggers procreation. In the above extract, the over-arching imperative 
of ‘heterosexuality-only’ reproduction is such that he conflates or confuses 
the principle of equality with the dynamic of sameness. This facilitates the 
slippage into the ‘logic’ of difference as deficit (see Baumrind, 1995) and 
difference to, thereby codifying ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín 
Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). Indeed, I argue that his use of the all-inclusive 
‘we’ merely compounds the disjuncture between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This 
general strategy then normalises the instituting of a two-tier system of 
relationship recognition. Moreover, it is precisely the phenomenon of 
heterosexual privilege that dictates the ‘who’ with the wherewithal to set 
the limits of this tiered infrastructure with its taken-as-given ‘diamond 
standard’ that does not need to be named. Windle (2006b) did not trigger a 
published response in the letters’ pages of The Irish Times over the course 
of my search’s timeline. 
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Theme: Marriage as Inherently Heterosexual 
 
Windle (2006a,b) relies on, and underscores, the ‘since the beginning of 
time’ thesis, which I alluded to in Chapter Five. This was highlighted in 
another response to Hanifin (2006) in the letters’ page:  
 
[She] would have us believe that the State should recognise 
same-sex couples as having a “right to marry”… The fact is that 
it is not within the power of the State to do this; it cannot 
recognise a right where none exists. Marriage is by nature always 
an exclusive, and in principle procreative, union between one 
man and one woman. … To attempt to redefine marriage in order 
to “fit everyone in”… is ultimately a move to undermine it 
completely. 
 
                                                                                Mulligan, 2006 
 
Here, the manner in which the issue is framed evokes that adopted by 
Archbishop McQuaid in relation to the ‘looming’ prospect of liberalising 
our laws on contraception (see Anon., 1971c), as highlighted in Chapter 
Four. It is also similar to that adopted by counsel for the State in Zappone 
and Gilligan, who asserted that the right to same-sex marriage does not 
exist (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 140). The above extract 
implicitly invokes many of the concepts that I have already theorised in this 
work, including difference as social relation (see Brah, 1991; 1996), 
difference to, difference as deficit (see Baumrind, 1995), and ‘us and them’ 
(see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). Moreover, Mulligan 
(2006) implicitly presupposes that furthering equality of respect and 
recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) will undermine the institution of 
marriage. This implicitly relies on a pathological ‘lacking’ in one entire 
cohort of the population, members of which can never quite measure up to 
the rigours of the normative ‘diamond standard’. 
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Theme: Gender Complementarity 
 
The references to procreation in the context of the debate on same-sex 
marriage, including those articulated by Mulligan (2006) and Windle 
(2006b), highlight an important issue that emerges in this genre of 
discourse (see Wodak, 1997b), i.e. the rearing of children. This issue is at 
the heart of the second strand to the hetero-matrix vis-à-vis the institution 
of marriage and family, as evidenced in Chapter Five. In response to 
Kelleher (2006b), which largely pertained to the meaning of marriage, 
O’Callaghan (2006a) asserted the following: 
 
Finally, in the debate on same-sex marriage I believe it is time 
we looked at the rights of the overwhelming majority of fathers 
and mothers who love and care for their children. For to argue 
that a child will fare just as well with two mothers or two fathers 
as with their own parents, as same-sex advocates are forced to 
argue, is to tell each father and each mother in our society that 
their role is so insignificant that they can be replaced and that this 
won’t affect their child in any way. In addition, this replacement 
is not even by someone of their own sex, but by someone of the 
opposite sex who assumes their role. Surely this is a great 
disservice to the overwhelming majority of mothers and fathers 
who selflessly care for their children? 
 
                                                                         O’Callaghan, 2006a 
 
Here, the rootedness of gender complementarity is such that O’Callaghan 
(2006a) assumes an expertise in terms of elaborating on the ‘natural’ 
division of the population into ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín 
Rojo and van Dijk, 1997). Her conflation of marriage and family, as if they 
denote one social institution, normalises the idea that the terms ‘spouse’, 
‘parent’, ‘lesbian’, and ‘gay man’ are mutually exclusive. It facilitates the 
routine pathologisation of a parent on the basis of gender. The ordinariness 
of this fosters the presumption that love is tantamount to selfishness when 
gay men and women ‘set their sights’ on marriage and family. This 
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dynamic has crept into the discourse surrounding heterosexist opposition to 
same-sex marriage in Ireland. Professor Casey, who testified in Zappone 
and Gilligan, conceives of this as the ‘adult happiness and fulfilment’ 
model, which derives from what she refers to as the ‘adult equality’ 
position (see Casey, 2008e). In a similar vein, it is conceived of as the 
‘personal fulfilment’ model, which reflects the ‘my needs are no longer 
being met’ thesis (see O’Brien, 2006).242 It is important to state that 
O’Brien (2006) attributes what could be described as a ‘test-drive’ 
approach to marriage (see Fee, 2007, p.432) to heterosexuals. The 
difficulty here is that this general diminution of marriage is then necessarily 
linked to the introduction of same-sex marriage. Both Casey’s (2008e) and 
O’Brien’s (2006) seemingly relevant theses to the debate on marriage 
equality are then framed in contra-distinction to a child-centred approach to 
marriage and family. This ‘logic’ is difficult to counter precisely because of 
a socio-cognitive awareness of the importance of child development. 
O’Callaghan (2006a) implicitly draws upon this aspect to social cognition 
(see van Dijk, 1993; 2006) to support her position, which, I argue, is 
grounded in deeply embedded assumptions and expectations vis-à-vis 
gender and parenting. She implicitly conceives of the phenomenon of 
social parenting as a profound vulnerability for advocates of marriage 
equality. Yet, she is blind to the fundamental flaw in her own argument, i.e. 
reconciling the issue of (non-biological) ‘replacement’, which is a term that 
is taken directly from her letter, with the issue of adoption in marital 
families. 
 
Her letter triggered responses from D’Alton (2006) and Kelleher (2006c), 
whose letters centred on understandings of marriage, and from Burke 
(2006) and Fitzgerald (2006), who wrote with regard to the rearing of 
                                           
242
 This ‘Opinion’ piece triggered responses in the letters’ pages from Hanifin (2006) and McBride 
(2006). 
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children. The following denotes an extract from Burke (2006) who 
challenges normative assumptions that are derived from the seemingly self-
evident truth of gender complementarity: 
 
Am I to gather from this that Ms O’Callaghan judges ability to 
nurture purely on the basis of gender? Or that she believes that 
offending people is what should be taken into account in issues 
such as this, rather than the good of the child? … It is ridiculous 
to think that someone is a good parent because of their gender. 
 
                                                                                     Burke, 2006 
 
I suspect that O’Callaghan (2006a) did not set out to be offensive. Yet, this 
is the dynamic that she engenders in me. This stems from my belief that 
such sentiments as those expressed by O’Callaghan (2006a) diminish us all 
as a society. It also derives from my reading of the Valiulis et al (2008) 
study, which captures the utter despair that is wrought by the destructive 
force of heteronormativity, which is grounded in the paradigmatic ‘truth’ of 
gender complementarity. Moreover, that sense of utter desolation in lesbian 
and gay parents who took part in the 2008 study is particularly acute 
precisely because of the extent to which they love their children.
243
  
 
The following denotes part of O’Callaghan’s (2006b) response to Burke 
(2006): 
 
                                           
243
 I acknowledge that the 2008 study was published after the publication of O’Callaghan (2006a) in the 
letters’ page of The Irish Times. 
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Caitríona Burke (Nov 10th) asks if I judge ability to nurture 
purely on the basis of gender. On this matter I would agree with 
Ms. Burke that to do so would be “ridiculous”. However, it 
would be equally ridiculous to deny the empirically observable 
influence of gender in nurturing. Men and women are equal but 
they are different – hence the value of gender studies and social 
and psychological research on male/female differences. 
 
                                                                        O’Callaghan, 2006b 
 
Here, O’Callaghan (2006b) makes an important point in relation to gender 
equality and difference, and the tendency to conflate or confuse equality 
with sameness. O’Callaghan (2006b) is also supportive of the general 
imperative of conducting social research on issues pertaining to gender. 
The difficulty, in terms of the debate on marriage equality and lesbian / gay 
parenthood, is the way in which difference is constructed as a ‘sound’ basis 
for inequality. O’Callaghan (2006a,b) implicitly conceives of difference as 
a fundamental prerequisite for parenthood, but only in the limited context 
of the binaries of female and male, rather than in terms of differences 
between two women as mothers, for example. The ‘safety’ of gender 
complementarity provides respite from such ‘chaos’. However, the 
rootedness of this paradigm is such that O’Callaghan (2006a,b) is oblivious 
to the destruction that is wrought by heteronormativity in Ireland, as 
evidenced in Valiulis et al (2008), albeit after the publication of her letters. 
O’Callaghan (2006b) did not trigger a published response in the letters’ 
pages. 
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Section Two: Legislators’ Communications: Important Considerations 
 
Notwithstanding the plethora of marriage laws that have been enacted by 
legislators over the centuries, there is no statutory definition of marriage in 
Ireland (see Inter-Departmental Committee on Reform of Marriage Law, 
2004, p.4; see also [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 120).
244
 This 
effectively means that the responsibility for defining marriage has been left 
to the courts (Inter-Departmental Committee on Reform of Marriage Law, 
2004, p.4). This helps to explain the accretion of case law that constructs 
the dominant understanding of marriage in our Constitution. Towards the 
end of her deliberations in Zappone and Gilligan, Justice Dunne conceived 
of the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage as being indicative of 
what marriage is [my italics] and how it should be defined (see [2008] 2 
I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 243).
245
 This conceptualisation influenced my 
decision to contact politicians in the Oireachtas with a view to determining 
the impetus behind the ban. Specifically, I sought to discern the general 
rationale behind the enactment of Section 2.2(e) of the Civil Registration 
Act, 2004. The recourse to communicate with them, and the expectation 
that they would respond to me, denotes one of the few ways in which 
‘ordinary’ people can be involved in the production of discourse. It 
presupposes that politicians have a discourse access profile (see van Dijk, 
1993) that encompasses their institutionally granted authority (see Bergvall 
and Remlinger, 1996) as both legislators and public representatives.  
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 In March 2012, on foot of a written enquiry from me to the General Register Office, an employee 
indicated that this situation still prevails in Ireland. 
245
 I use italics here because my belief is that it is quite extraordinary to define what marriage is in terms 
of what it is not (officially) or in terms of the ‘who’ that the institution excludes, rather than those that it 
currently includes. The legislative impediment to marriage between couples of the same sex does not 
define what marriage is in Ireland. It is analogous to defining civil partnership simply on the basis that it 
excludes heterosexuals. The legislative impediment to civil partnership between opposite-sex couples 
does not define what civil partnership is in Ireland. See Appendix VII for details of Section 7.3(e) of the 
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 2010. 
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It is important to state that I maintain the anonymity of my respondents. 
Over the course of my contact with them, I did not always identify myself 
as a researcher. At the time, I had not conceived of their responses as text 
within a genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) that I could integrate into 
my thesis. The salience of the discourse-historical approach (see Wodak, 
1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011) in this regard had not registered with me. Having 
said that, their profession presupposes a public persona and regular contact 
with the public. Therefore, relying on their responses to me, which inform 
my upcoming analysis, does not denote an ethical breach. It is important to 
make the point that, throughout my communication with legislators in 
2009, I provided them with sufficient details about the legislation so as to 
facilitate informed responses from them. An additional consideration here 
is that the relevant clause that bars same-sex couples from marrying in 
Ireland was not debated in either the Dáil or the Seanad prior to the 
legislation’s enactment in 2004. 
 
Here, I elaborate on important themes that emerged from the critical 
analysis of text from this genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b), 
specifically, a lack of awareness about the ban on same-sex marriage, 
confusion about the legislation, the imperatives of party-political allegiance 
and affiliation, and the seemingly self-evident recourse to civil partnership. 
In Section Two, I demonstrate how these dynamics underscore the routine 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland. Firstly, I argue that some 
Irish legislators might have been unaware of the ban in the proposed 
legislation as it progressed through the Oireachtas. This dynamic, along 
with a level of confusion about the legislation, help to explain the relative 
failure of Irish parliamentary politics at the time to place the issue of 
marriage equality firmly on the legislature’s agenda. This analysis also 
demonstrates the extent to which the ban, which codifies marriage 
inequality, was implicitly deemed to be immaterial to other rather narrow 
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preoccupations, such as party-political allegiance. I argue that this was a 
device that allowed politicians to get off the ‘hetero-hook’ when enquiries 
about their voting record on the 2004 ban became unpalatable. The last 
theme to emerge in Section Two is the imperative to latch on to the device 
of civil partnership. The attraction to appear at the vanguard of relationship 
recognition at the time, by situating civil partnership at the top of the 
legislature’s agenda, was considerable. However, I argue that these 
politicians merely succeeded in making plain their own vulnerability vis-à-
vis their voting record. This underscores their complicity in the routine 
operationalisation of heteronormativity in Ireland.  
 
Theme: Lack of Awareness About the 2004 Legislative Ban 
 
The upcoming response came from one of two senators whom I had 
initially contacted about the ban and the absence of debate on it in the 
Oireachtas. His support for marriage equality influenced my decision to 
contact him in the first instance. His assistant relayed the following 
response in April 2009: 
 
[Name] as you saw didn’t speak on this Act and doesn’t 
remember it as being a Bill that related to any kind of gay rights 
issue. Judging by the text of the debates on the Bill it’s [sic] key 
purpose seemed to relate to reform of registration of births, 
deaths etc and as this was clearly something that most people 
wanted, perhaps this overshadowed the same-sex marriage issue? 
 
                                                                  Respondent One, 2009a 
 
Here, the general imperative behind the legislation was prioritised. This 
created a safe space where the issues at the core of my communication 
could be sidelined. It excused the lack of rigorous legislative scrutiny by 
appealing to the legislation’s wider remit as if this were a reasonable 
explanation for the absence of debate on the ban. The general tenor of the 
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senator’s response suggested that he might not have known about the ban. 
At the time, I found it difficult to come to grips with this possibility, 
precisely because of his politics regarding the principle of marriage 
equality, which he supports. This informed my decision to contact his 
assistant as to the senator’s knowledge of the ban. I received the following 
response from her in May 2009:  
 
With regards to whether or not he was aware of the proposed ban 
in Section 2.2(e), as I said in the previous email [name] doesn’t 
remember it as being a Bill that related to any kind of gay rights 
issue. Judging by the text of the debates on the Bill its key 
purpose seemed to relate to reform of registration of births, 
deaths etc. 
 
                                                                  Respondent One, 2009b 
 
It ‘speaks’ volumes ‘by itself’.246 
 
On foot of this correspondence, which suggested a lack of awareness about 
the 2004 legislative ban, from the office of a supporter of marriage 
equality, I initiated contact with other senators and deputies. I asked them 
about their knowledge of the ban and the absence of debate on the ban in 
the Oireachtas. Arising out of correspondence that I received from the 
office of a Sinn Féin deputy, which highlighted that party’s attempt in the 
Dáil to delete the ban from the proposed legislation in 2004, I revised my 
questions to Dáil deputies. I asked them why they voted to keep the ban 
intact.
247
 
                                           
246
 It is important to make the point that the extract ‘speaks’ ‘by itself’ primarily because of prior critical 
analysis. I will discuss some of the other senator’s correspondence to me in the context of the recourse to 
civil partnership. 
247
 I alluded to this in Section One of Chapter Six. See Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs 
(2004b) for details of amendment 9. It was at Committee Stage that the express ban on same-sex marriage 
was inserted into the proposed legislation on 3
rd
 February 2004. See line 9, page 10, of the amended Civil 
Registration Bill, 2003: http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2003/3503/b35a03d.pdf Dáil 
deputies would have been provided with copies of this proposed legislation in its entirety prior to the Dáil 
vote vis-à-vis the ban taking place at the Report and Final Stages of the legislation’s passage through the 
Oireachtas. See Dáil Éireann (2004l) at paragraph 1009 for details of the Dáil vote that took place on 10
th
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The following response from a senator in May 2009 demonstrates her lack 
of awareness of the ban at the time that the legislation progressed through 
the Seanad:  
 
I was not aware of this proposed ban prior to voting on this Bill. 
 
                                                                    Respondent Two, 2009 
 
While her candour is appreciated, I argue that this response is indicative of 
the extent to which the ban denoted an insignificant dynamic to her as a 
legislator. She failed to respond to any of my subsequent enquiries that 
sought an explanation for the seemingly self-evident rationality of her lack 
of awareness of the ban, which I conceive of as an instrument of inequality. 
 
Theme: Party-Political Affiliation and Allegiance 
 
Candour is also evident in the following response from a Dáil deputy, 
which I received in November 2009: 
 
Don’t recall. I presumed it was the agreed decision at the time[.] 
 
                                                                  Respondent Three, 2009 
 
This denotes the entirety of the rationale behind his vote to keep the ban 
intact. An important backdrop here is that he had repeatedly ignored prior 
correspondence from me. I indicated to him in July 2009 that because the 
ban denoted a highly discriminatory measure, the decision to expressly ban 
same-sex marriage warranted a response from him as a legislator in the 
Oireachtas. This is what makes his response so unexpected, and its honesty 
so unappealing. I argue that it is indicative of the extent to which minority 
                                                                                                                           
February 2004. This vote, which sought to counter Sinn Féin’s attempt to remove the ban, ensured that 
the ban remained in the legislation. This legislation now prevails in this jurisdiction. 
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rights in Ireland can pale into insignificance when they are implicitly 
deemed to be immaterial to parliamentary party decision-making. There is 
no impetus here to get to the heart of his action in the Oireachtas, or to 
understand its consequences for those who are directly affected by the ban. 
 
The following October 2009 response from a deputy also hones in on what 
seems to be the litmus test for casting one’s vote in the Dáil, i.e. 
unquestioning and overarching allegiance to the parliamentary party, 
irrespective of its consequences: 
 
The Government’s Civil Registration Bill is scheduled to be 
published before Christmas when I am sure all matters will be 
debated again. The amendment that you refer to was proposed by 
a Sinn Féin T.D. in advance of the Government’s proposals and 
on that basis was opposed by all Government Parties. 
 
                                                                   Respondent Four, 2009 
 
Here, there is confusion between the legislation that was the subject of my 
enquiry and what may be the Government’s proposals on civil partnership 
at the time. This then glosses over the absence of debate on the ban as if 
that non-event came into being ‘by itself’, rather than by the governing 
party, of which he was a serving member in the Dáil. His use of the term 
‘again’ demonstrates an inability to understand the substance of my 
enquiry. It also implies that the ban was so immaterial to him that he either 
forgot that there was no Dáil debate on it, or that he did not need to check 
the Dáil record pertaining to the Report and Final Stages of the Civil 
Registration Bill, 2003 (see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, para. 1009). 
 
The two upcoming responses came from a former senator who was a 
serving deputy at the time of our correspondence. An important backdrop 
here is that while his parliamentary party seems to have abstained from the 
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Dáil vote on the ban (see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, para. 1009), he voted as a 
senator on a number of aspects to the legislation as it progressed through 
the Seanad (see Seanad Éireann, 2004e, para. 877; Seanad Éireann, 2004h, 
paras. 1011 and 1017; Seanad Éireann, 2004k, para. 1201). In August 2009, 
I received the following response from him: 
 
Fine Gael arrived at a decision which I, as a member of the 
Parliamentary Party, supported. I expressed my personal opinion 
at parliamentary party meetings and being a supporter of the 
democratic process, I upheld the decision taken by my party. 
 
                                                                  Respondent Five, 2009a 
 
On foot of receiving the above response, which did not address the 
substance of my enquiry, I repeatedly asked him to elaborate on his party’s 
position on the issue. I received the following response in December 2009: 
 
Further to your recent correspondence, it is unfortunate that we 
cannot be of more assistance. As I outlined in my previous email, 
the decision was made by the parliamentary party and 
spokesperson at that time. As a democratic party we debate Bills 
and make collective decisions on them and we do not revisit 
them thereafter, unless in considerably changed circumstances. 
 
                                                                  Respondent Five, 2009b 
 
Here, the all-inclusive ‘we’ endorses a position that is deemed to derive 
from party-political membership. I argue that the capacity to rely on this so 
as to resolve the ‘problem’ of my enquiry, without ever having to actually 
name the core dynamics to its resolution, is indicative of the wherewithal of 
party-political allegiance. Both responses fail to elucidate the following: 
Fine Gael’s position, and whether or not it relates to the ban on same-sex 
marriage; his party’s apparent abstention from a vote on the ban in the Dáil 
in 2004; the absence of debate on the ban in both Houses of the Oireachtas; 
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his ‘personal opinion’, and whether or not it relates to his votes on aspects 
to the legislation as it went through the Seanad.
248
 
 
The following July 2009 response denotes the first of two responses that I 
received from a deputy’s assistant. I argue that it demonstrates the recourse 
to the safety of the parliamentary party in a different way: 
 
On behalf of [name], I wish to acknowledge your correspondence 
regarding the Civil Registration Act 2004. This bill fell within 
the purview of the Department of Social and Family Affairs and 
[name] has asked that I forward your comments to the office of 
Ms Mary Hanafin TD, Minister for Social and Family Affairs in 
order that she might consider same and reply directly to you with 
any observations she may have. 
 
                                                                    Respondent Six, 2009a 
 
Here, reliance on the expectation of ministerial collegiality creates a space 
where it becomes reasonable to redirect political responsibility to a party 
colleague. There is a certain safety and arrogance in that. It facilitates the 
morphing of my communication, which pertained to his vote on the 2004 
ban, into something that is incidental to him. It absolves him of any 
accountability for his own action and inaction in terms of his vote in the 
Dáil. I subsequently asked him to answer my direct questions. His assistant 
sent the following response in September 2009: 
 
                                           
248
 I tried to determine the circumstances surrounding Fine Gael’s apparent abstention from the Dáil vote 
on the ban, but to no avail. I received the following response from a Fine Gael deputy in April 2010 in 
this regard: “Further to your recent emails, it is unfortunate that we cannot be of more assistance. This the 
[sic] decision was made by the parliamentary party and spokesperson at that time. As a democratic party 
we debate Bills and make collective decisions on them and we do not revisit them thereafter, unless in 
considerably changed circumstances.” This may denote Fine Gael’s ‘stock-in-trade’ answer to enquiries 
from the Irish public. It is almost identical to that provided by her parliamentary party colleague in the 
Seanad. She never responded to my subsequent enquiry, which sought to determine Fine Gael’s position 
on the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland. 
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[Name] has asked that I advise you that in the instance you have 
cited he voted in support of the Government. 
 
                                                                    Respondent Six, 2009b 
 
Here, party allegiance engenders safety. It enables a legislator to absolve 
himself of political and personal responsibility. The wherewithal to detach 
oneself from a legislative issue, by attaching oneself to government and 
party policy, as if these come into being ‘by themselves’, suggests a 
malaise within our political system. This has social consequences that 
extend beyond the routine operationalisation of heteronormativity in this 
jurisdiction. It is a dynamic that warrants critical reflection in terms of our 
expectations for our constitutional and parliamentary democracy. 
 
Theme: The Recourse to Civil Partnership 
 
While our civil partnership legislation was not signed into law until July 
2010, it was presented as a Bill to the Oireachtas in June 2009.
249
 
Moreover, other incarnations of civil partnership were previously proposed 
in the Oireachtas (for example, see Dáil Éireann, 2006; Dáil Éireann, 
2007a,b,c,d).
250
 Therefore, the general premise of relationship recognition 
in the context of gay and lesbian couples was already ‘out there’ in the 
legislative and political air in Ireland, before the current regime was put in 
place in 2010, and before I contacted politicians in 2009 vis-à-vis the 2004 
ban on same-sex marriage. This context warrants consideration in terms of 
the interpretation of the upcoming responses.  
 
                                           
249
 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Bill, 2009. See Civil Partnership 
Bill 2009 (Number 44 of 2009) for details. 
250
 Bill entitled an Act to provide for the recognition and registration of civil unions, and to provide for 
related matters. Deputy Howlin of the Labour Party sponsored this Private Member Bill. See Civil 
Unions Bill 2006 (No 68 of 2006) for details. 
 237 
The first response came from the second of two senators whom I initially 
contacted in April 2009. My decision to contact him was informed by his 
support for the realisation of gay rights in general, and the premise of 
relationship recognition for same-sex couples in particular.
251
 I received 
this response from him in May 2009:  
 
Thank you for your inquiry about the Civil Registration Bill. This 
is not of course the Civil Partnership Bill and although I tried to 
introduce questions about the recognition of same sex 
relationships under this heading this manoeuvre was rejected. 
 
                                                                 Respondent Seven, 2009 
 
This response immediately muted my enquiry. It rendered its substance, i.e. 
the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage, to be immaterial. Although 
I made no reference to civil partnership in my communication, he inferred 
that I needed to know, but did not know, the difference between these two 
pieces of legislation. He did not provide me with information as to the 
‘who’ and the ‘why’ behind what he implicitly deemed to be the ‘what’ of 
my enquiry, i.e. civil partnership and the rejection of his attempt to place it 
on the legislature’s agenda. In attempting to deflect attention away from the 
particulars of my enquiry, he made apparent his confusion about the 
legislation. 
 
The following July 2009 response from a senator demonstrates the utter 
confusion that was engendered by my contact with her: 
 
                                           
251
 I have subsequently determined that he supports marriage equality. 
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I have received your email concerning the Civil Registration Act 
2004. I am aware of the concerns of many in the community 
regarding the bill and I will endeavour to bring these concerns to 
the attention of the Minister for Justice Dermot Ahern TD. I am 
sure you will agree that this bill goes some way towards 
rectifying the discrimination present in society against members 
of the gay community. 
 
                                                                  Respondent Eight, 2009 
 
Her response is quite extraordinary. She seems to confuse the legislation 
that was the subject of my enquiry, which pertained to marriage, with civil 
partnership. I cannot unequivocally attest to this point because she never 
responded to any subsequent correspondence from me that sought clarity 
on this. Similarly, my repeated requests for confirmation as to whether or 
not she brought what she deemed to be my concerns to the minister went 
unanswered. The timing of her response does suggest that civil partnership 
may have been on her radar as a legislator. However, I argue that the 
disconnect with regard to the consequence of the 2004 legislative ban on 
same-sex marriage is profound, particularly since she implicitly alluded to 
a socio-cognitive awareness of lesbian and gay discrimination in Ireland. 
 
The upcoming example denotes the most curious vis-à-vis the imperative to 
invoke civil partnership. I received identical responses from two deputies in 
November 2009. 
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As you will be aware, the Civil Partnership Bill 2009 raises 
complex legal issues in the context of the special protection 
which the Constitution guarantees to marriage and in relation to 
the equality rights protected by Article 40.1 of the Constitution. 
The Bill has been carefully framed to balance any potential 
conflict between these two constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
This Bill is the most radical development in family law since 
divorce and will deliver many positive, solid changes in the lives 
of same sex couples. 
 
                                                                 Respondent Nine, 2009a 
                                                                 Respondent Ten, 2009a 
 
These responses implicitly take as given the seemingly self-evident 
rationality of ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 
1997), which I discussed as part of my methodological considerations in 
Chapter One. I argue that this is precisely the dynamic that brings 
‘conflict’, and the attendant preoccupation with ‘balance’, into being. 
Because civil partnership is conceived of here as a device that ingeniously 
manages any ‘potential conflict’ by keeping the ‘special protection’ for 
marriage intact, both deputies implicitly support the ‘logical’ 
implementation of a two-tier system of relationship recognition in Ireland. 
My position is that there is nothing ‘radical’ about that. 
 
The following extract denotes the second response from one of these 
deputies, which I received in November 2009: 
 
Bunreacht na h-[É]ireann confers a special status on marraige 
[sic]. It sets out marraige [sic] as a union between one man and 
one woman. Section 2.2(e) of the Civil Registration Act 2004 is a 
reflection of this. 
 
                                                                   Respondent Ten, 2009b 
 
His response conjures up the idea that the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex 
marriage came into being ‘by itself’. However, this is at odds with the 
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Oireachtas record (see Dáil Éireann, 2004l, para. 1009). It also evokes the 
circularity of the definitional argument in relation to the social institution of 
marriage, and its sheer inability to acknowledge the systematic exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage in Ireland, i.e. marriage denotes a contract 
between a woman and man because it has always been confined to woman 
and man (see Ennis, 2010). The discrimination deriving from the 
definitional argument, notwithstanding the absence of a constitutional or 
legislative definition for the term ‘marriage’ in Ireland (see All-Party 
Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, 2006; Working Group on 
Domestic Partnership, 2006; and Inter-Departmental Committee on Reform 
of Marriage Law, 2004), was precisely the issue that was at the heart of the 
plaintiffs’ case in Zappone and Gilligan, which I discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
In November 2009, I received the following response from the other deputy 
who initially sent me the other identical response: 
 
The Constitution sets out that marriage is a union between one 
man and one woman. The Civil Registration Act 2004 takes 
account of this. … Any change to the Constitution would require 
a referendum. 
 
                                                                 Respondent Nine, 2009b 
 
Here, the ban on same-sex marriage helps to determine what marriage is, 
which may account for the lack of a statutory definition for marriage in 
Ireland (see Inter-Departmental Committee on Reform of Marriage Law, 
2004). Moreover, there is no sense here that change to our Constitution, if 
necessary, requires action from legislators in terms of the decision to hold a 
referendum on marriage in the first instance. I argue that invoking the 
imperative of a constitutional referendum serves to deflect attention away 
from what I consider to be a real impediment to marriage equality in 
Ireland, i.e. the legislative position, rather than the constitutional position 
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per se.
252
 In taking as given the idea that the converse is the case, i.e. 
introducing same-sex marriage first necessitates constitutional change, the 
above legislator seeks to both minimise the consequence of the 2004 
legislation, and his role in bringing it about in the first instance. 
 
                                           
252
 My position is that we will never have marriage equality in Ireland until Section 2.2(e) of the Civil 
Registration Act, 2004 is either repealed by the legislature or declared unconstitutional by the courts. 
O’Mahony (2012) makes the point that the realisation of marriage equality in Ireland does not require a 
constitutional referendum, and that it is precisely the Oireachtas that can legislate for marriage equality 
without actually holding a referendum. 
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Section Three: Civil Partnership Debates: Important Considerations 
 
Section Three draws upon some of the Oireachtas debates that took place 
between December 2009 and July 2010 in relation to the introduction of 
civil partnership legislation in Ireland. Given the extent to which the State 
has largely wrung its hands with regard to matters pertaining to sexuality, 
the enactment of this legislation does denote a very important milestone in 
terms of the realisation of gay and lesbian rights vis-à-vis the premise of 
relationship recognition. Reflecting on my privilege, which derives from 
my normative sexual orientation, combined with my no longer conceiving 
of marriage as the ‘gold standard’ in adult intimate relationships, enable me 
to now conceive of civil partnership in this way. This denotes an important 
methodological consideration as regards the orientation of my upcoming 
analysis. 
 
It is important to make the point that my analysis in Section Three does not 
centre on what is contained in, or what is omitted from, the legislation per 
se. Rather, it centres on some legislators’ perspectives on the measure. 
These were articulated in 2009 and 2010, as the legislation progressed 
through both Houses of the Oireachtas. Because the legislation largely 
enjoyed cross party support, most of the upcoming perspectives are 
positively disposed to the general premise of relationship recognition. The 
negative perspectives largely derive from the struggle over the meaning 
(see Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999) of relationship 
recognition in general, and civil partnership in particular. All of the 
upcoming extracts are invariably informed by the dominant understanding 
of the constitutional position vis-à-vis marriage and family in Ireland. This 
is an indication of the extent to which Article 41 dominates public 
discourse in Ireland with regard to the general premise of relationship and 
family recognition. Because of that, it is important to acknowledge the 
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mammoth task that the minister and his department set in terms of bringing 
this legislation forward. 
 
All of the extracts from the Oireachtas debates that feature in Section Three 
provide an interesting backdrop against which the 2006 High Court ruling 
in Zappone and Gilligan can be better understood. The following themes 
emerge from these extracts: the dominant understanding of Article 41 of 
our Constitution; understandings of marriage and family; the premise of 
relationship and family recognition; the premise of marriage equality; the 
two-tier system of relationship recognition; the principle of equality and the 
concept of difference; the imperatives of procreation and gender 
complementarity; what I refer to as the ‘red herring’ in the debate, which is 
the recognition of relationships such as those of siblings who live together; 
the implicit reliance on social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006); and the 
significance of language. Many of these themes arose elsewhere in my 
thesis. Moreover, they all inform the wider debate about adult relationship 
and family recognition in Ireland. Many of the extracts that I rely upon are 
quite lengthy. However, my critical analysis warrants this feature. While 
some of the extracts are quite descriptive, they do provide the reader with 
some sense of the general tenor of the debate, and some of the specificities 
to the legislation on civil partnership in Ireland. 
 
Theme: The Significance of Language 
 
The following extract from a debate that took place in January 2010 is one 
of the most extraordinary that I have encountered over the course of this 
research: 
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Those in the gay community who are concerned that their 
relationship is not referred to as marriage should note that in 
practical terms, the provisions that apply to the celebration of a 
civil marriage ceremony between a heterosexual couple are 
exactly the same provisions which apply to the celebration of a 
civil partnership ceremony between a gay couple. In other words, 
the relationship is marriage in everything but name. The Bill 
plays with semantics in the hope it is constitutionally on the right 
side of Article 41. 
 
                              Deputy Shatter, Dáil Éireann, 2010a, para. 890 
 
Here, an understanding of the particularities to civil ceremonies is such that 
it facilitates a rather simplistic conflation of partnership with marriage. This 
is at odds with the general rationale behind instituting the legislative regime 
in the first instance, which centred on the creation of a new and distinct 
form of relationship recognition. In using the term ‘concerned’ in the 
context of positioning partnership, so as to determine what it can be, or 
what it may not be, or what it can compare to, the deputy implicitly takes as 
given the notion that a hierarchical ordering inheres in the now prevailing 
legislative infrastructure regarding relationship recognition. This is 
underscored by the idea that civil partnership can somehow lack the 
necessarily sought after symbolism that inheres in the ‘gold standard’. 
Deputy Shatter’s comments are quite extraordinary, particularly in view of 
the upcoming extract. This problematises the legislative response to same-
sex adult relationships, which were, immediately heretofore, commensurate 
with ‘marriage in everything but name’. 
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In the context of gay couples, the legislation prescribes all sorts 
of legal protections, extends various important statutory 
provisions to them and sets out the legal remedies available when 
the relationship breaks up. … The Bill is apparently in denial that 
there are gay couples who have children. One may have a gay 
couple who has gone through a civil partnership registration and 
within the relationship there might be a child from a previous 
relationship that they both parent for many years. An issue arises 
about whether the non-biological parent has any obligations to 
that child in the same way as in a marriage a husband may be 
regarded as having obligations to a child fathered by someone 
else prior to the marriage taking place. … I cannot understand the 
proposed legislation. … We have had a myriad of family law 
legislation that recognises that when marriages break up and 
when the courts are addressing the consequences of the break up, 
they must not only provide protection for spouses, particularly 
dependent spouses, but also for dependent children. Why does 
the legislation ignore the position of dependent children? … Is 
there a fear that there would be some public backlash because we 
acknowledged reality? People engage in a myriad of different 
relationships of various natures and children in all circumstances 
should be treated equally. No child should ever be discriminated 
against because of the circumstances of their parents or because 
of the nature of the status of their parents or their parents’ 
relationship. 
 
                     Deputy Shatter, Dáil Éireann, 2010a, paras. 891-892 
 
Here, it is important to invoke an earlier point that I made with regard to 
associating the right to marry with the right to parent. In terms of my 
evolving perspective on this issue, I indicated the significance of Fagan 
(2011) and the Ombudsman for Children (2010), who make plain the short-
sightedness of conceptualising the right to partner in isolation from the 
right to parent. A critique of this phenomenon is to the fore in the above 
extract. Indeed, Deputy Shatter identifies a lack of forethought in the 
proposed regime in terms of not establishing responsibilities with regard to 
children. The point that I wish to make here is that none of ‘this’ is a game 
of semantics. The legislation actively constructs and codifies a particular 
reality precisely because partnership is not marriage. This dynamic, which 
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is to the fore in the above extract, makes Deputy Shatter’s earlier comments 
all the more perplexing. 
 
Theme: Marriage as the ‘Gold Standard’ 
 
The following extract from a debate that took place in January 2010 draws 
upon many themes that I have highlighted in my thesis thus far, including 
the constitutional position vis-à-vis marriage and family, the ‘since the 
beginning of time’ maxim, procreation and gender complementarity, 
difference to, and equality of respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 
2004): 
 
This is landmark legislation, which I welcome. … As in 1993, 
when homosexuality was decriminalised, he [Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform] has decided to go the whole way, 
with the obvious caveat of the status of marriage. Other than that, 
it is a thorough-going piece of legislation. … My belief is that 
this legislation provides the substance of equality, though the 
status of marriage is missing. There are two groups of critics. On 
one hand are those from the gay and lesbian community who 
complain that it does not include conferral of the status of 
marriage. On the other side critics say the legislation, to all 
intents and purposes and in substance, amounts to marriage and 
they oppose it for that reason. There is common ground in our 
understanding of the Constitution that a constitutional 
referendum would be required to introduce the status of same-sex 
marriage. It is better to take this step now. … A view which has 
some backing from the wisdom of ages is the one that marriage 
as we understand it today is probably the best framework for 
procreating and rearing children. A same-sex marriage or 
partnership cannot procreate children. I am aware that children of 
heterosexual marriages may endure appalling circumstances and 
that children of same-sex partnerships may have a near-ideal 
upbringing but I am talking about the average situation. It will 
ultimately be for the people to decide if the differences which 
exist are vital and overriding factors or whether the status of 
marriage should be conferred on same-sex couples. 
 
                         Deputy Mansergh, Dáil Éireann, 2010a, para. 894 
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Here, the ‘gold standard’ status of marriage, with an attendant hierarchical 
system of relationship recognition, is codified in many ways. The 
legislation is initially conceived of as going ‘the whole way’ in terms of 
relationship recognition. Yet, this conceptualisation, irrespective of what it 
actually means, is seen in the context of marriage, which is precisely the 
issue that is not dealt with in the legislation. Deputy Mansergh then 
conceives of it in terms of realising substantive equality. Yet, he implicitly 
concedes that this ‘thorough-going piece of legislation’ does not achieve 
equality of respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) by virtue of the 
symbolism that inheres in the status of marriage, which again, is not 
provided for in the legislation. While Deputy Mansergh seems to be 
positively disposed to the idea of securing marriage rights for same-sex 
couples, I argue that he implicitly relies on the safety of knowing that 
marriage equality cannot be delivered through this legislation. This will 
become clear as my analysis evolves.  
 
Similar to the way in which Deputy Shatter drew upon the dynamic of 
concern in relation to same-sex relationship status and marriage, Deputy 
Mansergh’s reliance on the term ‘complain’ underscores the idea that there 
is a necessarily sought after status ‘out there’, which only makes sense 
against the backdrop of a normalised hierarchical ordering of intimate adult 
relationships. His reference to the holding of a referendum is interesting for 
two reasons: firstly, he relies on a safety net that is constructed out of the 
perceived wisdom of the political class to not hold it now, which makes 
marriage equality currently unachievable if it can only be attained or 
delivered by way of a referendum;
253
 secondly, he situates difference, 
rather than equality, as a potentially crucial determinant in a referendum. It 
                                           
253
 I reiterate that O’Mahony (2012) asserts that the realisation of marriage equality in this jurisdiction 
does not require a constitutional referendum. I also argue that consistent invoking of the seemingly self-
evident constitutional position vis-à-vis same-sex marriage serves to deflect attention away from a real 
impediment to marriage equality in Ireland, i.e. the prevailing legislative position. 
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underscores the way in which difference is constructed as a basis for 
inequality and its reproduction. This has a whiff of ‘us and them’ (Brickell, 
2001; Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), and its ‘logic’ is firmly predicated 
on the imperative of procreation.  
 
Here, I refer to a personal perspective of the deputy that is validated by the 
all-inclusive ‘we’ in the above extract. By drawing upon the seemingly 
logical ‘no need to define’ ‘average situation’, the sense and meaning of 
which implicitly relies on social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006), 
Deputy Mansergh manages to both explain away a social phenomenon and 
routinely insult a cohort of parents whose difference operates as a signifier 
at the level of the social (see Brah, 1991; 1996). In this instance, it 
necessarily negates their capacity to provide ideal environments in which to 
rear their children. The ‘logic’ of this perspective hinges on the imperative 
of procreation. I now rely on the utility of the discourse-historical approach 
(see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011) to highlight a perspective that is 
decidedly at odds with that created at the outset in the above extract. In an 
‘Opinion’ piece for The Irish Times, Senator Mansergh stated the 
following:
254
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 Mr. Mansergh served as a senator prior to becoming a deputy in the last administration, which 
dissolved in 2011. 
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While personal happiness and loving relationships are important, 
it would be difficult to argue that, even if same-sex relationships 
could be institutionalised, they would have the same social value 
or utility as a marriage capable of procreation and rearing 
children, or even that same-sex couples could on average be 
equally satisfactory as adoptive parents. … It is another thing to 
ask people to give formal public sanction, approval and 
incentives to private relationships in a manner that would put 
them on, or close, [sic] to, a par with marriage. Much of the 
problem is created by the modern habit of treating sexuality as 
the key validation of relationships, and relegating to second place 
all other aspects and indeed relationships that have no sexual 
content. 
 
                                                                               Mansergh, 2004 
 
Deputy Mansergh stated the following in the foreword to an Iona Institute 
(2007) publication, which detailed the rationale for continuing State 
support for the institution of marriage in Ireland, along with the importance 
of instituting a legislative regime that could recognise different forms of 
caring relationships that were premised on economic dependency, rather 
than on sexual intimacy: 
 
It is ironic that, whereas in an earlier phase of liberalisation the 
mantra was that Church and State should stay out of the 
bedroom, many of the proposals for the recognition of civil 
partnerships positively invite the State back into the bedroom. 
Determinants of social and tax status, outside of marriage, 
should, it is claimed, be based on the evidence of sexual 
intimacy. It could be argued that it is human companionship that 
it is in the interest of society to encourage, rather than sexual 
intimacy unconnected to procreation, which within and as 
regards the law is surely a private matter. 
 
                       Deputy Mansergh, cited in Iona Institute, 2007, p.3 
 
Both of these extracts from two genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) 
‘speak’ volumes ‘by themselves’. I include them here because they denote 
a historical and discursive record that establishes a pattern of thought in 
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relation to the general imperative of relationship recognition. In its entirety, 
the above extract from the Oireachtas record denotes quite a schizophrenic 
understanding of marriage and equality. While reading the beginning of 
that extract, I initially believed that Deputy Mansergh had had an epiphany 
with regard to marriage equality, because of my familiarity with his 2004 
and 2007 comments. Those prior sentiments turn the schizophrenic into 
crystal clear clarity. Such is the utility and salience of the discourse-
historical approach (see Wodak, 1997b; 1999; 2001; 2011) to research. 
 
Theme: Non-Sexual Relationships 
 
I believe that the issue of dependency between persons in non-sexual 
relationships is entirely peripheral to the issue of civil partnership. Deputy 
Mansergh now seems to also hold this view, as the following extract from a 
January 2010 debate suggests: 
 
Like Deputy Flanagan, I would have some regret concerning the 
matter to which he referred, but I also accept the argument that 
perhaps this is not the appropriate context to address it. Perhaps 
another context should be chosen to address issues regarding the 
situation of siblings, they being a brother and sister who have a 
certain status. … When I spoke on this matter on a previous 
occasion, the Leas-Ceann Comhairle took grave exception to any 
equation of siblings with same sex partners. So be it, and I 
respect that argument but that area needs to be examined.  
 
                         Deputy Mansergh, Dáil Éireann, 2010a, para. 895 
 
It is important to acknowledge this point, not least because it is indicative 
of an evolving perspective on the part of Deputy Mansergh that I welcome. 
Having said that, it does not detract from my analysis. It is also important 
to state that this non-sexual yet familial dynamic did concern some 
legislators over the course of this legislation’s passage through the 
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Oireachtas. Here, I include one such extract from a debate that also took 
place in January 2010: 
 
There are many brothers and brothers, brothers and sisters and 
sisters and sisters living together, especially in rural areas, with 
property in common. … It is strange that two strangers who 
come together through love or whatever and who remain together 
for three years or more will now be in a position legally to inherit 
everything, whereas others who have lived together for 30 or 40 
years are not. 
 
                         Deputy Crawford, Dáil Éireann, 2010b, para. 419 
 
I argue that this perspective betrays a baffling understanding of the 
rationale behind the introduction of this legislation. The seemingly 
commonsensical conflating of civil partnership with sibling relationships is 
extraordinary. A measure of this is the extent to which the conceiving of 
this extract in the context of the coming together of a woman and man in 
marriage would be deemed utterly bizarre. While the ‘whatever’ in the 
above extract appears to be quite arbitrary, it denotes a diminution of the 
coming together of civil partners. Here, there is a whiff of the ‘anything 
goes’ remark that was attributed to Republican Senator Santorum in the 
context of a pending U.S. Supreme Court ruling on homosexuality (see 
Anon., 2003b). I end this particular discussion by including an extract from 
the Oireachtas record that was articulated in December 2009. It equates 
with my own view on this issue: 
 
Conjugal relationships are unique. It upsets and annoys me when 
people blur the distinction between a loving conjugal relationship 
and that of any pair of people living together for convenience or 
mutual support. It denies the essence of the relationship, which is 
fundamental. We should be very clear and not obfuscate on that 
absolute point. 
 
                               Deputy Howlin, Dáil Éireann, 2009, para. 121 
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It ‘speaks’ ‘by itself’. 
 
Theme: The Imperative to Uphold the Constitution 
 
Divorce and Dissolution 
 
The upcoming extract hints at the extraordinary ‘hoops’ that had to be 
‘jumped through’ so as to uphold the constitutional imperative that attaches 
to marriage. In Chapter Four, I highlighted an Oireachtas debate regarding 
the drafting of the constitutional provisions on divorce that are now 
codified in Article 41.3.2. One such provision, which relates to the prospect 
of reconciliation between spouses, was at the heart of the matter that was 
debated by Minister Ahern and Deputy C. Flanagan.
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 The latter sought to 
include amendments to the civil partnership legislation at Committee Stage. 
These would have expressly required legal professionals and the courts to 
be satisfied that no reasonable prospect of reconciliation could obtain 
between civil partners in the event of their seeking dissolution of their civil 
partnership. Deputy C. Flanagan stated the following: 
  
What we have done in the judicial separation and divorce 
legislation should be mirrored or replicated in the Bill before us. 
It is important that where there is a possibility of a reconciliation, 
certain measures should be taken without recourse to court 
proceedings or without embarking on a process that will 
ultimately lead to an order of dissolution. … They [the 
amendments] create a possibility of engaging in mediation of a 
type that will perhaps give rise to a more harmonious dissolution 
than the current adversarial option. In the context of public policy 
formulation, we should reflect options that the law has given in 
the cases of heterosexual couples. 
 
Deputy C. Flanagan, Select Committee on Justice, Equality, 
Defence, and Women’s Rights, 2010a, Section 108 
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 Please note that this is not the same deputy that I referred to in Chapter Four vis-à-vis a perspective on 
proposed contraception legislation. 
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This extract serves to contextualise the minister’s upcoming response, 
which is grounded in the constitutional position vis-à-vis marriage, its 
privileged status, and the State’s obligation to protect it. The minister stated 
the following in March 2010:  
 
The amendments would bring civil partnership closer to marriage 
and risk upsetting the constitutional balance. The Attorney 
General has advised specifically in this regard. His advice is that, 
in considering a decree of dissolution, unlike the position on 
marriage and divorce, the courts should not be required to 
consider the prospect of reconciliation. … Given the strong 
advice provided on maintaining key distinctions between 
marriage and civil partnership, I cannot accept the amendments. I 
accept that it is right and proper for legal advisers to advise 
clients to discuss the possibility of reconciliation or mediation 
but including it in a Bill potentially might run the risk of 
attracting a constitutional challenge which would be 
counterproductive to the purposes of the Bill. We are dealing 
with the Bill having regard to the constraint of the constitutional 
imperative to recognise the special protection given to marriage. 
 
Minister Ahern, Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, 
and Women’s Rights, 2010a, Section 108 
 
This extract is fascinating in terms of what can and cannot be done in 
relation to the instituting of a new legislative regime, because of the 
dominant understanding of marriage in Article 41. Nonetheless, the 
distinction that prevails between the two systems of relationship 
recognition instils the notion that both are quite distinct from other adult 
relationships, such as those between adult siblings. Given the controversy 
that surrounded the introduction of divorce in Ireland, which I alluded to in 
Chapter Four, it is interesting that its provisions in Article 41 are now 
conceived of as being central to the imperative of protecting marriage. The 
divorce provisions are now so embedded in the dominant understanding of 
the institution, that they form part of the apparatus that sets marriage apart 
from civil partnership. 
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Marital Status and Civil Status 
 
This imperative to set marriage apart from partnership is to the fore in a 
debate that took place between a number of senators and the minister in 
July 2010. It pertained to the setting up of a new civil status in the 
legislation that would replace that which prevailed at the time, i.e. marital 
status.
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 A minority of senators were of the view that bringing in this new 
umbrella term, i.e. ‘civil status’, was completely at odds with the rationale 
behind maintaining a distinction between partnership and marriage. They 
proposed amendments to the legislation that would retain the term ‘marital 
status’. The following extract underlines this point: 
 
It is a fact that marriage under our Constitution is regarded as 
special and to be protected in a particular way. It flows from this 
that one would seek that any legislation touching on marriage or 
other relationships would maintain the centrality of marriage as 
the preferred social norm. That is, if one likes, the elephant in the 
room — the underlying constitutional position. It is a position 
which the Government is not ready to deny, at least not yet. … It 
[changing ‘civil status’ to ‘marital or civil status’] does not 
undermine any of what the Bill actually provides for but it selects 
a kind of nomenclature that sends out a cultural and social 
message about the centrality of marriage. 
 
                        Senator Mullen, Seanad Éireann, 2010b, para. 262 
 
Much of this argument is quite persuasive, given the general reluctance of 
the political class to actually seek to change the ‘underlying constitutional 
position’, with its attendant necessity of maintaining two distinct regimes 
of relationship recognition. Having said that, the manner in which the 
above extract is framed is problematic. It takes as given the seemingly self-
evident ‘truth’ of the ‘gold standard’. This dynamic was quite prominent in 
the overall debate that took place between a small number of senators and 
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 See Appendix VII for details of Section 7.1(a) of the legislation, which provides for this new civil 
status. 
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the minister in July 2010. Over the course of that debate, I was struck by 
the extent to which the senators relied on the social significance of 
language and the phenomenon of social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 
2006) in order to advance their perspectives, as the following rather lengthy 
extract demonstrates: 
 
Marriage is not only the foundation stone for the family, but it is 
also for society. This has been the case for many generations. We 
need to be extremely careful that we do not jettison an institution 
that has stood society in good stead for many generations and 
many centuries. … We are proposing to delete the paragraph that 
defines civil status. We feel that putting civil status in is creating 
the equivalence between marital status and civil partnership 
status, to which we object. We have replaced it with what we 
think is a reasonable amendment, which replaces it with marital 
status and civil partnership status. I do not want to anticipate the 
Minister’s response, but I hope we will not be reducing the 
importance of marital status to society down to an issue of 
administrative convenience. The child focus of marriage is the 
main reason — perhaps the only reason — it enjoys the unique 
constitutional protection that is specified therein. It puts an onus 
on the State to protect it in unique ways and to give it the 
necessary financial and other supports in order to maintain it as 
the priority that it has for society. It follows obviously from this 
that the State must respect marriage. We are of the view that this 
particular amendment, and the change in the wording, is 
inconsequential for the thrust of the intent of the Bill to bring 
benefits to civil partnership between people in same sex 
relationships who commit to each other. However, we think it is 
very important for the signal that society gets from the Minister, 
the Government and these legislative Houses. … I ask that the 
Minister concede this particular amendment, which does not 
cause any particular difficulties from the point of view of a 
genuine distinction, if the intent of this Bill is to recognise clearly 
the distinction between the marital status and the civil partnership 
status, and that they are not all left under the same heading of 
civil status, which insinuates the equivalence we will not and 
cannot support for reasons I have outlined. 
 
                 Senator Walsh, Seanad Éireann, 2010b, paras. 256-257 
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While the extract is quite lengthy, it hones in on the rationale behind the 
‘gold standard’, which is at the heart of much of the heterosexist opposition 
to same-sex marriage in Ireland. Senator Walsh’s perspective also evokes 
sentiments that were expressed by Deputy Flanagan decades ago regarding 
his opposition to the enactment of legislation on contraception.
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 The 
seemingly self-evident rationality of difference as social relation (see Brah, 
1991; 1996), difference to, and ‘us and them’ (see Brickell, 2001; Martín 
Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), are also palpable in the above extract. Having 
said that, I was initially persuaded by Senator Walsh’s position vis-à-vis 
maintaining a distinction between civil status and marital status. It may be 
indicative of the extent to which marriage is normalised that this seemed 
plausible to me, albeit with the caveat that I did problematise the term 
‘marital status’ in the context of Census 2011. The rationale behind the 
minister’s resolve to not accept the amendments pertaining to 
reconciliation, in the event of a dissolution of a civil partnership, also led 
me to believe that he would be amenable to retaining the term ‘marital 
status’ in addition to inserting the term ‘civil status’ into the legislation. 
This would maintain the distinction between the two regimes, which was a 
government imperative. It was not until I read the following extract that I 
understood the prescience of the minister’s position:   
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 This is not the same person who articulated an earlier perspective on civil partnership in this chapter. 
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What we are dealing with here is terminology. To date, the 
discussion has revolved around the change from using the term 
“marital status” to the overarching term “civil status”. This does 
not in any way constitute a downgrading of marriage in any 
sense, nor could it, because of the very views we have expressed 
in regard to the special status of marriage as per the Constitution. 
As has previously been said, “civil status” means single, married, 
separated, divorced, widowed, in a civil partnership or being a 
former civil partner in a civil partnership that has ended by death 
or being dissolved. Again, I point out it is an overarching term 
which includes both marital and civil partnership status. … [I]f 
we pass this Bill civil partners could be obliged to record 
themselves on a census form as single under the marital status 
designation, if we accept the Senator’s suggestion, and as civil 
partners under the civil partnership status. Therefore, they would 
be designated on the same form as having both states. Should 
single people record themselves under both states or only under 
one status which conforms to their particular sexual orientation? 
 
               Minister Ahern, Seanad Éireann, 2010b, paras. 263-264 
 
The minister’s response is quite profound in its simplicity. Although I was 
aware of Senator Walsh’s earlier reference to ‘administrative convenience’ 
in the extract that immediately precedes the above extract from the 
minister, I did not understand the senator’s point at the time. The minister’s 
position is entirely plausible. 
 
The Family 
 
Another issue that arose during Committee Stage in March 2010 was the 
dominant understanding of the family in Article 41 of our Constitution. The 
following rather lengthy extract from the Oireachtas record highlights some 
of the complexities that can arise when legislating for civil partnership 
against this backdrop: 
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In formulating the civil registration scheme for same-sex 
partners, the Government was mindful of the implications for 
children. On the advice of the Attorney General, the Government 
concluded it would not be appropriate that the Civil Partnership 
Bill should develop principles regarding children that would have 
implications wider than those in respect of same-sex partners. 
Apart from constitutional difficulties, issues which arise 
pertaining to children and their welfare are so significant that it 
would not be appropriate to address them on a piecemeal basis 
without a thorough review of all the implications such changes 
might have for children and for those who might be affected by 
such changes. To comply with the constitutional imperative to 
protect the family it is necessary to differentiate the recognition 
being accorded to same-sex couples who register their 
partnership with the special recognition that is accorded under 
the Constitution to persons of the opposite sex who marry. While 
we need to respect the entitlement to equality that same-sex 
partners enjoy under Article 40.1 of the Constitution, we also 
need to respect the special protection that Article 41 gives to 
marriage. As I have stated many times, the Bill has been 
carefully drafted to balance any potential conflict between these 
rights. In particular, the Attorney General has advised that 
constitutional difficulties arise in respect of children in civil 
partnerships. His advice is that giving a family unit that is not 
based on marriage a constitution, that is, two adults who are co-
parents of children, and authority, that is, full parental powers, 
rights and duties to adopt, which are substantially identical to that 
of the family would probably be viewed as reneging on the 
guarantee to protect the family. 
 
Minister Ahern, Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence, 
and Women’s Rights, 2010a, Section 127 
 
One interesting aspect to this extract is that it evokes some of the identical 
sentiments that were expressed in November 2009 by two deputies, i.e. 
Respondent Nine (2009a) and Respondent Ten (2009a), which I critiqued 
in Section Two of Chapter Six. On one level, I am sympathetic to the 
minister and the task that he was charged with in terms of instituting this 
new regime against the backdrop of Article 41. Nonetheless, the ‘hoops’ 
that had to be ‘jumped through’ so as to uphold the Constitution seem 
extraordinary. It is a dynamic that is at odds with the relative inertia that 
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has prevailed vis-à-vis the holding of a constitutional referendum, if one 
were deemed necessary to alter the dominant and prevailing understanding 
of Article 41.
258
 However, the last two sentences in the above extract 
disturb my complacency. They make me question the rationale that excuses 
the seemingly commonsensical creation of arbitrary distinctions between 
cohorts of the population so as to achieve ‘balance’. The idea that division 
conquers, or that Articles 40 and 41 could be out of synch, but only in the 
context of same-sex relationship and family recognition, make me question 
the entire ‘balancing act’. I accept that there are difficulties that stem from 
the phenomenon of social parenting, for example. However, this is not a 
dynamic that is unique to lesbian or gay parenting. To be fair to the 
minister, I get the sense that he implicitly concedes this point at the 
beginning of the above extract. However, the idea that this entire 
‘balancing act’ produces a ‘truth’ that ‘logically’ dictates when a family is 
not a family makes me question the edifice that cannot crumble.
259
 The 
following extract, which the minister articulated in July 2010, provides the 
answer:  
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 Here, it is important to acknowledge the work of the Constitutional Convention and its April 2013 vote 
recommending that the Government should hold a referendum vis-à-vis marriage equality. 
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 It is conceivable that one implication of the dominant understanding of the term ‘family’ in our 
Constitution is that civil partners cannot live in a ‘family’ home. Rather, our civil partnership regime is 
such that they live in what is referred to as a ‘shared home’. My sense is that this informs Senator Norris’ 
comments vis-à-vis the ‘family home’ and this legislation, which I highlighted at the beginning of my 
thesis (see Seanad Éireann, 2010a). See Appendix VII for details of Sections 27(a) and (b) of the civil 
partnership legislation pertaining to the ‘shared home’. 
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Public discussion since the Bill was published has concentrated 
on a number of specific areas of which the most fundamental is 
why we have not decided to open civil marriage to same-sex 
couples. My clear legal advice on this area has consistently been 
that it would not be constitutionally sound to legislate for same-
sex marriage without holding a constitutional referendum on the 
definition of family. Marriage may not be expressly defined in 
the Constitution, but it has always been understood in common 
law as being between a man and a woman, ideally for life. I do 
not believe the necessary political and social consensus exists to 
make such a constitutional referendum desirable. The all-party 
Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Constitution concluded that a 
referendum to change the definition of family would be 
extremely divisive and would by no means be certain of success. 
When I was party to the Commission on the Family, its report 
was unable to define the family as such. 
  
                        Minister Ahern, Seanad Éireann, 2010b, para. 255 
 
Here, the mechanism that is conceived of as the solution in terms of the 
introduction of same-sex marriage cannot be called upon because of a 
perception of what is ‘out there’ (see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on 
the Constitution, 2006, p.122) ‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 
2006). Yet, in the context of legal advice, the minister implies that the 
outcome of a referendum could facilitate the enactment of legislation on 
same-sex marriage. Therefore, he seems to be sending two contradictory 
messages regarding a referendum outcome. Because the Government 
decides on the holding of a referendum, and the attendant wording of the 
proposed clause(s), it is strange that politicians can surmise about an 
outcome when the language that brings it into being has never been 
formulated or put to the people. What is also strange in the context of the 
realisation of marriage equality is that the struggle over meaning (see 
Macgilchrist, 2007; Taylor, 2004; Wodak, 1999), which is at the heart of 
any referendum campaign, concerns two words, i.e. marriage and family, 
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neither of which are defined in our Constitution.
260
 I argue that this 
‘balancing act’ in its entirety helps to explain both the resilience of 
heteronormativity and the intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality in 
Ireland. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter relied upon three genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) so 
as to shed some light on the myriad ways in which the general public and 
the political class in Ireland framed the premise of relationship recognition. 
While these genres are inter-connected, each of them had a particular focus. 
The ‘Letters to the Editor’ genre primarily centred on the 2006 High Court 
ruling in Zappone and Gilligan, and the justifications for the realisation or 
denial of marriage equality. Core themes that emerged in Section One were 
the routine reproduction of heterosexual privilege and the extent to which it 
goes unnoticed, the complexity of the Labour Party’s position on marriage 
equality, the construction of ‘valid’ knowledge, and the ‘marriage as 
inherently heterosexual’ thesis, which honed in on the issues of procreation 
and gender complementarity. What surprised me most about the second 
genre of discourse was the extent to which deputies and senators did not 
address the issue that was at the core of my correspondence to them, i.e. the 
2004 enactment of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland 
without any debate in the Oireachtas. Some of these legislators seemed to 
be either unaware of the ban or implicitly held the view that it somehow 
came into being ‘by itself’. Other politicians implicitly deemed the issue to 
be immaterial to what appeared to be more important considerations, such 
as party-political allegiance and alliance. These dynamics served to 
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 In relation to the term ‘marriage’, see All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution (2006, 
p.123) and the Working Group on Domestic Partnership (2006, p.23). In relation to the term ‘family’, see 
Chief Justice FitzGerald’s and Justice Griffin’s rulings in McGee (see [1974] I.R. pp.284-337, at pages 
302 and 334 respectively). 
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emphasise their involvement in the operationalisation of heteronormativity 
in Ireland. Some legislators latched on to the device of civil partnership, as 
if this somehow addressed my enquiries about the 2004 ban on same-sex 
marriage. Their seemingly commonsensical recourse to a progressive piece 
of legislation, in the context of enquiries about the enactment of what I 
conceive of as regressive legislation (in Section Two), makes their 
responses unacceptable to me. In providing extracts from Oireachtas 
debates that took place in 2009 and 2010 in relation to civil partnership, I 
highlighted legislators’ perspectives on its proposed introduction in Ireland. 
Many of the extracts that are contained in Section Three alluded to the 
principle of equality, and all of them were invariably derived from the 
prevailing and dominant understanding of marriage and family in our 
Constitution. These issues were to the fore in my critical discourse analysis 
of the 2006 High Court ruling in Zappone and Gilligan. Indeed, many of 
the themes that emerged in Section Three highlighted the complexity of the 
State’s position vis-à-vis relationship recognition in Ireland. 
Notwithstanding the advent of civil partnership, the backdrop of Article 41 
is such that the State remains rooted to the inevitability of a hierarchical 
model of relationship recognition in this jurisdiction. What happens on foot 
of the Constitutional Convention’s 2013 recommendations could change 
that at some point in the near future. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Last Word: Concluding Thoughts 
 
The final point I would make on this topic is that if there is in 
fact any form of discriminatory distinction between same sex 
couples and opposite sex couples by reason of the exclusion of 
same sex couples from the right to marry, then Article 41 in its 
clear terms as to guarding the family provides the necessary 
justification. The other ground of justification must surely lie in 
the issue as to the welfare of children. Much of the evidence in 
this case dealt with this issue. Until such time as the state of 
knowledge as to the welfare of children is more advanced, it 
seems to me that the State is entitled to adopt a cautious approach 
to changing the capacity to marry albeit that there is no evidence 
of any adverse impact on welfare. 
 
                   Justice Dunne, [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248 
 
Introduction 
 
At this juncture in the research, I reflect on my research questions. These 
are as follows: Given the importance that is placed on the principle of 
equality, how can the intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality in Ireland 
be explained? Specifically, what accounts for the persistence of gay and 
lesbian inequality with regard to the institutions of marriage and family in 
Ireland? In this regard, I am inexorably drawn to the above extract from the 
reported judgment in Zappone and Gilligan, which I discussed in Chapter 
Five. I reflect on the two grounds that ‘justify’ the prevailing ban on same-
sex marriage, i.e. guarding the family and child welfare. Justice Dunne 
invoked these imperatives with regard to determining the distribution of 
marriage rights in this jurisdiction.
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 Specifically, in the context of same-
sex marriage, they legitimate the perpetration of discrimination, as if 
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 It is important to state that there are other considerations in this regard, such as the accretion of case 
law on marriage and family in Ireland, which I elaborated on in Chapter Five. 
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lesbians and gay men somehow remain outside the realm of constitutional 
protection vis-à-vis Articles 40 and 41. At the heart of this manifestation of 
inequality is the ‘logic’ of the ‘us / them’ distinction (see Brickell, 2001; 
Martín Rojo and van Dijk, 1997), which is underpinned by the ideological 
wherewithal of difference, and the attendant reproduction of social norms. 
This is where theory and methodology coalesce. They cohere with a view 
to explaining and understanding the routine reproduction of inequality of 
respect and recognition (see Baker et al, 2004) in Ireland.
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 What follows 
in this conclusion is an elaboration of additional methodological and 
theoretical considerations that came to me as I reflected on my research. 
 
Methodological Discoveries 
 
Reflecting on my presence in this research has led to unexpected findings. 
Conducting this research impelled me to reflect on my heretofore, 
unquestioned belief that marriage denoted the ‘gold standard’ vis-à-vis 
intimate adult relationships and family. I no longer hold this view. 
Researching material for Chapter Three led to this epiphany. Vogel’s 
(1994) elaboration on the patriarchal underpinnings of the institution of 
marriage was instrumental in this regard. While researching material for 
Chapter Three, I also began to appreciate that some gay women and men 
oppose marriage as an institution, largely because of its heterosexist 
trappings (for example, see Peel and Harding, 2004). The strength of the 
marriage equality (see Pillinger, 2008) agenda in Ireland, which is rooted in 
lesbian and gay activism, is such that, prior to undertaking this research, I 
was unaware of lesbian or gay opposition to marriage. It is also important 
to state that my taken-for-granted assumptions about the ‘gold standard’ 
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 Here, I reiterate that Baker et al (2004) do not discuss the premise of marriage equality in their 
theorisation of equality of respect and recognition. Nonetheless, I place this issue firmly within this 
dimension to equality. 
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implicitly informed my presumption that all gay men and women 
necessarily demand marriage equality. 
 
It is at this juncture in the research that both the ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ of 
researcher reflexivity become challenging. As I write this conclusion, 
totally unexpected ‘would’ questions emerge, which are invariably 
informed by ‘what’, ‘who’, and ‘why’. These are as follows: Would 
marriage equality ‘be’ a premise, and would it have anything to do with 
lesbianism and homosexuality, if the demand for it were not ‘out there’? 
Would I conceive of same-sex marriage as an equality issue, and would I 
unequivocally support the premise, if the demand for it did not exist in 
Ireland? Would my heterosexual privilege be such that marriage equality 
would not even register in my consciousness, if the demand for it had not 
reached the High Court in 2006? These questions are disconcerting for two 
reasons: they disturb both the methodological and theoretical foundations 
of my thesis; it is difficult to answer them, save to say that it was consistent 
engagement with the research that brought about these questions in the first 
instance. The important point here, in terms of my methodological 
considerations, is that researcher reflexivity, over the course of conducting 
critical research, can bring with it very unexpected challenges and 
outcomes. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 
In terms of my theorisation of equality, a dynamic that warrants 
consideration here is whether or not the premise of marriage equality would 
have anything to do with the principle of equality, if some gay or lesbian 
persons did not seek the right to marry. What makes it an equality issue? Is 
it the premise itself, or is it the demand for it? If the latter obtains, does the 
precise ‘who’ behind the demand inform the answer? In attempting to 
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answer these questions, I suggest that the 2004 enactment of the legislative 
ban on same-sex marriage made marriage equality a socio-political issue in 
Ireland. I accept that the accretion of common law and case law over time 
largely conceptualised marriage as a heterosexual institution. This then 
implied that same-sex couples could not marry in Ireland. However, a line 
was crossed in 2004, and it is one that is simply unacceptable to me as an 
Irish citizen.  
 
Having said that, on foot of their initial submissions to the court in 2004, 
the plaintiffs in Zappone and Gilligan did not directly challenge this 
legislation in the High Court in 2006 (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at 
paras. 74-82 and para. 244).
263
 Whilst I do not know the precise rationale 
behind the enactment of the ban, my position is that the legislation is 
implicitly predicated on the ideological wherewithal of difference, with its 
attendant reinforcing of heteronormativity. This helps to explain why same-
sex marriage has become an equality issue in Ireland. In Chapter Two, I 
theorised the principle of equality, largely through core aspects to the 
concept of difference. These were as follows: difference as disadvantage 
(see Spicker, 2000); difference as social relation (see Brah, 1991; 1996); 
difference to; difference as deficit / defect / deviance, which derives from 
Baumrind (1995) and Cameron and Cameron (1996); and difference as 
deployment, which derives from Brah’s (1991) theorisation.264 Here, 
difference operates as some kind of signifier that triggers the normative and 
routine operationalisation of practices that might otherwise be socially 
unacceptable. The denial of marriage equality is an example of this, 
whether on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, or on the basis of the 
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 One explanation for this is that Section 2.2(e) of the Civil Registration Act, 2004 did not come into 
effect until December 2005 (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 244). Here, I reiterate that the plaintiffs 
in Zappone and Gilligan have initiated a new High Court action in which they will challenge the 
constitutionality of this legislation. 
264
 As stated in Chapter Two, the ‘who’ behind the ‘thinking’ and ‘doing’ of difference is a key issue. 
Here, difference as deployment denotes a ‘vehicle for hegemonic entrenchment’ (see Brah, 1991, p.173), 
so as to further, rather than challenge, the reproduction of social norms. 
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imperatives of guarding the family and protecting children (as if marriage 
and family in Ireland were under attack from two women who married each 
other in Canada). Here, difference necessarily invokes a social hierarchy 
that is ‘justified’ by both constitutional and legislative precepts. I argue that 
the unequivocal demand for ending this egregious practice is rooted in the 
principle of equality, and the unacceptability of inequality of respect and 
recognition (see Baker et al 2004). This dimension to equality / inequality 
informs my opposition to the prevailing ban on same-sex marriage in 
Ireland, and my unequivocal support for marriage equality. This ‘who’ 
behind the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ underscores the manner in which theory 
and methodology coalesce in critical research.  
 
Another dimension to the ‘who’ behind the ‘what’ and the ‘why’ is my 
belief that our society is utterly diminished by such blatant discrimination, 
as that obtaining in the denial of marriage rights to lesbians and gay men. 
This ‘why’ is predicated on the idea that it is incumbent upon 
parliamentary and constitutional democracies, such as ours, to recognise, 
protect and vindicate the rights of minority cohorts of our population, such 
as gay men and lesbians. Irrespective of one’s position on the institution of 
marriage, this is a fundamental imperative, precisely because it is grounded 
in the principle of equality and the attendant dynamic of respect. 
 
Research Answers 
 
In the extract from the reported judgment that is reproduced at the 
beginning of this conclusion, heteronormativity implicitly dictates that 
privilege does not really raise the spectre of discrimination. Here, the 
‘logic’ of the ‘us / them’ distinction (see Brickell, 2001; Martín Rojo and 
van Dijk, 1997) salves the unconscionable, i.e. the deliberate placing of 
Irish citizens outside the realm of constitutional protection. This is key to 
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understanding the intransigence of lesbian and gay inequality in Ireland. 
The seemingly self-evident imperative of protecting both marriage and 
family from two women who are lesbians and spouses ‘justifies’ this 
discrimination. But what makes it so? What is the rationale behind it? It is 
difficult to make an unequivocal determination on this. My critical 
discourse analysis, particularly in Chapter Five, suggests that the primary 
trigger that drives this ‘logic’ is a normatively imposed ‘lacking’ that 
‘necessarily’ resides in the ‘suspect’ ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988). This 
is evidenced by the rootedness of gender complementarity, for example, 
which tends to be associated with the issue of child development. Indeed, 
this dynamic arose throughout my analysis, particularly in relation to the 
‘Letters to the Editor’ genre of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) that I 
discussed in Chapter Six. The ideological dominance of the nuclear family 
paradigm in Ireland, which ordains that marriage and family denote one 
social institution, helps to normalise this phenomenon. However, I am still 
at a loss as to why the physical, psychological, cognitive, and personal / 
social development of children is contingent upon gender complementarity, 
but only in the context of the nuclear family paradigm, and not in a family 
that is headed by an opposite-sex cohabiting couple, for example. 
 
While child development and child welfare are interlinked, I categorically 
reject their ‘logical’ conflation in the High Court. I reiterate that child 
welfare has a very specific connotation, which is quite different to the issue 
of child development. None of the evidence that was submitted to, or 
interpreted in, the High Court pertained to child welfare. Rather, it 
pertained to issues that are associated with child development, such as 
gender and sexual identity. This is clear from my analysis of both the 
primary research that denoted part of the submitted evidence in Zappone 
and Gilligan, and its interpretation by expert witnesses. In the above extract 
from the reported judgment (see [2008] 2 I.R. pp.417-513, at para. 248), a 
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seemingly self-evident link was made to child welfare at precisely the point 
at which it was not considered to be an issue. Why, therefore, is this link 
acceptable? Indeed, why is the issue of child welfare linked to the issue of 
same-sex marriage in the first instance? The current inextricable link 
between marriage and family in Ireland is a possible factor. Similarly, a 
preoccupation with the ‘suspect’ gay or lesbian ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 
1988), whose capacity to parent must be proven into perpetuity, could be a 
factor. However, both of these hypotheses could equally apply to the issue 
of child development. Therefore, there must be something else ‘out there’ 
‘in’ social cognition (see van Dijk, 1993; 2006) that explains the seemingly 
commonsensical linking of child welfare with same-sex marriage. It is an 
important point in the sense that over the course of my critical analysis of 
three genres of discourse (see Wodak, 1997b) in Chapter Six, I discerned 
only one reference to the issue of child welfare.
265
  
 
It is conceivable that difference as deficit / defect / deviance, which I 
theorised whilst drawing upon Baumrind (1995) and Cameron and 
Cameron (1996), could account for this. This dynamic to difference was 
really only made plain to me in 2012, as I engaged in public protests 
against the 2004 enactment of the legislative ban on same-sex marriage in 
Ireland. In that regard, I have encountered a few members of the public 
who are vehemently opposed to same-sex marriage. The vast majority of 
this opposition is implicitly informed by the seemingly self-evident 
deviance of the ‘necessarily suspect’ ‘Other’ (see de Beauvoir, 1988). For 
example, I have been told that the introduction of same-sex marriage in 
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 In this regard, see the extract from Minister Ahern’s interaction with the Select Committee on Justice, 
Equality, Defence, and Women’s Rights (2010a, Section 127). Please note that in 2012, on foot of 
correspondence from me to Fianna Fáil deputies and senators in relation to their party leader’s current 
position on marriage equality, which he supports, one deputy made reference to ‘protecting children’. 
Child protection does raise the spectre of child welfare. However, this issue never arose in any 
correspondence from him to me in 2010, on foot of asking him repeatedly to state his rationale for voting 
to support the enactment of the 2004 legislative ban on same-sex marriage. This deputy’s 2010 responses 
to me did not form part of my critical analysis in Chapter Six. (The current leader of Fianna Fáil has 
consistently ignored my repeated correspondence to him in relation to the 2004 ban on same-sex 
marriage). 
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Ireland will result in gay men wanting to marry their dogs. This raises the 
spectre of bestiality, which I discussed in Chapter Three. Difference as 
deficit / defect / deviance also implicitly informs the equally spurious claim 
(from one member of the public) that gay marriage equates with 
paedophilia because of what gay men do to each other sexually.
266
 It is 
important to stress that these do not denote social scientific findings. 
Neither are they generalisable to the cohort of the population in Ireland that 
is opposed to same-sex marriage. They simply point to an alarming 
prejudice that I discerned from (some) public opposition to marriage 
equality in Ireland, after I had conducted most of my discourse analysis. 
Because it was difficult to engage with persons who hold such views, I did 
not categorically determine the rationale behind their perspectives. 
Nonetheless, it is interesting that these claims centre on gay men. 
Moreover, they implicitly invoke the rationale that led to the 
criminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland, as evidenced by Sections 61 
and 62 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 and Section 11 of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885.
267
 This suggests that the act of 
decriminalisation in 1993 has not fully dispensed with the routine 
pathologisation of same-sex intimacy between men in Ireland. 
 
While such perspectives could inform the conducting of future research 
into heterosexist and homophobic opposition to marriage equality in 
Ireland, they do not answer my research questions. At this juncture, I find it 
difficult to answer them. 
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 Muintir na hÉireann stated in its written submission to the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution (2006, p. A193) that providing for homosexual marriage in Ireland would give homosexual 
couples the right to adopt minor children. The organisation then ‘commonsensically’ concluded the 
following: “It would also mean that a sixteen year old, who could be homeless, could be adopted by a 
homosexual couple for perverted reasons.” 
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 See Appendix II for details. 
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Appendix I 
 
Irish Constitution (1937) 
 
Preamble to Bunreacht na hÉireann: 
 
“In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to 
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be 
referred,  
 
We, the people of Éire,  
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus 
Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, 
 
Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the 
rightful independence of our Nation,  
 
And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of 
Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the 
individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our 
country restored, and concord established with other nations,  
 
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.” 
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Article 8.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Irish language as the national language is the first official language.” 
 
Article 8.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The English language is recognised as a second official language.”  
 
Article 9.1.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“On the coming into operation of this Constitution any person who was a 
citizen of Saorstát Éireann immediately before the coming into operation of 
this Constitution shall become and be a citizen of Ireland.” 
 
Article 9.1.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The future acquisition and loss of Irish nationality and citizenship shall be 
determined in accordance with law.” 
 
Article 9.1.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“No person may be excluded from Irish nationality and citizenship by 
reason of the sex of such person.” 
 
Article 9.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Fidelity to the nation and loyalty to the State are fundamental political 
duties of all citizens.” 
 
Article 12.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The President shall hold office for seven years from the date upon which 
he enters upon his office, unless before the expiration of that period he dies, 
or resigns, or is removed from office, or becomes permanently 
incapacitated, such incapacity being established to the satisfaction of the 
Supreme Court consisting of not less than five judges.” 
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Article 12.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“Every citizen who has reached his thirty-fifth year of age is eligible for 
election to the office of President.” 
 
Article 12.6.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“If a member of either House of the Oireachtas be elected President, he 
shall be deemed to have vacated his seat in that House.” 
 
Article 13.9 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The powers and functions conferred on the President by this Constitution 
shall be exercisable and performable by him only on the advice of the 
Government, save where it is provided by this Constitution that he shall act 
in his absolute discretion or after consultation with or in relation to the 
Council of State, or on the advice or nomination of, or on receipt of any 
other communication from, any other person or body.” 
 
Article 14.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The provisions of this Constitution which relate to the exercise and 
performance by the President of the powers and functions conferred on him 
by or under this Constitution shall subject to the subsequent provisions of 
this section apply to the exercise and performance of the said powers and 
functions under this Article.” 
 
Article 15.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Oireachtas shall not enact any law which is in any respect repugnant 
to this Constitution or any provision thereof.” 
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Article 15.4.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every law enacted by the Oireachtas which is in any respect repugnant to 
this Constitution or to any provision thereof, shall, but to the extent only of 
such repugnancy, be invalid.” 
 
Article 15.14 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“No person may be at the same time a member of both Houses of the 
Oireachtas, and, if any person who is already a member of either House 
becomes a member of the other House, he shall forthwith be deemed to 
have vacated his first seat.” 
 
Article 16.1.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every citizen without distinction of sex who has reached the age of 
twenty-one years, and who is not placed under disability or incapacity by 
this Constitution or by law, shall be eligible for membership of Dáil 
Éireann.” 
 
Article 16.1.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
i. “All citizens, and 
ii. such other persons in the State as may be determined by law, 
 
without distinction of sex who have reached the age of eighteen years who 
are not disqualified by law and comply with the provisions of the law 
relating to the election of members of Dáil Éireann, shall have the right to 
vote at an election for members of Dáil Éireann.” 
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Article 16.1.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“No law shall be enacted placing any citizen under disability or incapacity 
for membership of Dáil Éireann on the ground of sex or disqualifying any 
citizen or other person from voting at an election for members of Dáil 
Éireann on that ground.”  
 
Article 18.9 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every member of Seanad Éireann shall, unless he previously dies, resigns, 
or becomes disqualified, continue to hold office until the day before the 
polling day of the general election for Seanad Éireann next held after his 
election or nomination.” 
 
Article 22.2.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Chairman of Dáil Éireann shall certify any Bill which, in his opinion, 
is a Money Bill to be a Money Bill, and his certificate shall, subject to the 
subsequent provisions of this section, be final and conclusive.” 
 
Article 25.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“As soon as any Bill, other than a Bill expressed to be a Bill containing a 
proposal for the amendment of this Constitution, shall have been passed or 
deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, the 
Taoiseach shall present it to the President for his signature and for 
promulgation by him as a law in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article.” 
 
Article 25.4.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“In case of conflict between the texts of a law enrolled under this section in 
both the official languages, the text in the national language shall prevail.” 
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Article 25.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“It shall be lawful for the Taoiseach, from time to time as occasion appears 
to him to require, to cause to be prepared under his supervision a text (in 
both the official languages) of this Constitution as then in force embodying 
all amendments theretofore made therein.” 
 
Article 25.5.4 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“In case of conflict between the texts of any copy of this Constitution 
enrolled under this section, the text in the national language shall prevail.” 
 
Article 26 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“This Article applies to any Bill passed or deemed to have been passed by 
both Houses of the Oireachtas other than a Money Bill, or a Bill expressed 
to be a Bill containing a proposal to amend the Constitution, or a Bill the 
time for the consideration of which by Seanad Éireann shall have been 
abridged under Article 24 of this Constitution.”   
 
Article 26.1.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer any 
Bill to which this Article applies to the Supreme Court for a decision on the 
question as to whether such Bill or any specified provision or provisions of 
such Bill is or are repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision 
thereof.” 
 
Article 26.1.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every such reference shall be made not later than the seventh day after the 
date on which such Bill shall have been presented by the Taoiseach to the 
President for his signature.” 
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Article 26.1.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The President shall not sign any Bill the subject of a reference to the 
Supreme Court under this Article pending the pronouncement of the 
decision of the Court.” 
 
Article 26.2.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Supreme Court consisting of not less than five judges shall consider 
every question referred to it by the President under this Article for a 
decision, and, having heard arguments by or on behalf of the Attorney 
General and by counsel assigned by the Court, shall pronounce its decision 
on such question in open court as soon as may be, and in any case not later 
than sixty days after the date of such reference.” 
 
Article 26.2.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The decision of the majority of the judges of the Supreme Court shall, for 
the purposes of this Article, be the decision of the Court and shall be 
pronounced by such one of those judges as the Court shall direct, and no 
other opinion, whether assenting or dissenting, shall be pronounced nor 
shall the existence of any such other opinion be disclosed.” 
 
Article 26.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:   
“In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a 
Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is 
repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President 
shall decline to sign such Bill.” 
 
Article 26.3.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“If, in the case of a Bill to which Article 27 of this Constitution applies, a 
petition has been addressed to the President under that Article, that Article 
shall be complied with.” 
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Article 26.3.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after 
the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been 
pronounced.” 
 
Article 27.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Upon receipt of a petition addressed to him under this Article, the 
President shall forthwith consider such petition and shall, after consultation 
with the Council of State, pronounce his decision thereon not later than ten 
days after the date on which the Bill to which such petition relates shall 
have been deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas.” 
 
Article 28.9.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Taoiseach may resign from office at any time by placing his 
resignation in the hands of the President.” 
 
Article 28.9.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Any other member of the Government may resign from office by placing 
his resignation in the hands of the Taoiseach for submission to the 
President.” 
 
Article 29.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every international agreement to which the State becomes a party shall be 
laid before Dáil Éireann.” 
 
Article 29.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State 
save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.” 
 
 357 
Article 30.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“There shall be an Attorney General who shall be the adviser of the 
Government in matters of law and legal opinion, and shall exercise and 
perform all such powers, functions and duties as are conferred or imposed 
on him by this Constitution or by law.” 
 
Article 30.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Attorney General may at any time resign from office by placing his 
resignation in the hands of the Taoiseach for submission to the President.” 
 
Article 30.5.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Taoiseach may, for reasons which to him seem sufficient, request the 
resignation of the Attorney General.” 
 
Article 30.5.4 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Attorney General shall retire from office upon the resignation of the 
Taoiseach, but may continue to carry on his duties until the successor to the 
Taoiseach shall have been appointed.” 
 
Article 31.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Any member of the Council of State appointed by the President may 
resign from office by placing his resignation in the hands of the President.” 
 
Article 32 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The President shall not exercise or perform any of the powers or functions 
which are by this Constitution expressed to be exercisable or performable 
by him after consultation with the Council of State unless, and on every 
occasion before so doing, he shall have convened a meeting of the Council 
of State and the members present at such meeting shall have been heard by 
him.” 
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Article 33.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Comptroller and Auditor General shall not be removed from office 
except for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only upon 
resolutions passed by Dáil Éireann and by Seanad Éireann calling for his 
removal.” 
 
Article 33.5.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Taoiseach shall duly notify the President of any such resolutions as 
aforesaid passed by Dáil Éireann and by Seanad Éireann and shall send him 
a copy of each such resolution certified by the Chairman of the House of 
the Oireachtas by which it shall have been passed.” 
 
Article 34.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Courts of First Instance shall include a High Court invested with full 
original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions 
whether of law or fact, civil or criminal.” 
 
Article 34.3.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Save as otherwise provided by this Article, the jurisdiction of the High 
Court shall extend to the question of the validity of any law having regard 
to the provisions of this Constitution, and no such question shall be raised 
(whether by pleading, argument or otherwise) in any Court established 
under this or any other Article of this Constitution other than the High 
Court or the Supreme Court.” 
 
Article 34.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Court of Final Appeal shall be called the Supreme Court.” 
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Article 34.4.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and 
conclusive.” 
 
Article 34.5.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every person appointed a judge under this Constitution shall make and 
subscribe the following declaration: 
“In the presence of Almighty God I do solemnly and sincerely promise and 
declare that I will duly and faithfully and to the best of my knowledge and 
power execute the office of Chief Justice (or as the case may be) without 
fear or favour, affection or ill-will towards any man, and that I will uphold 
the Constitution and the laws. May God direct and sustain me.”” 
 
Article 34.5.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“This declaration shall be made and subscribed by the Chief Justice in the 
presence of the President, and by each of the other judges of the Supreme 
Court, the judges of the High Court and the judges of every other Court in 
the presence of the Chief Justice or the senior available judge of the 
Supreme Court in open court.” 
 
Article 34.5.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The declaration shall be made and subscribed by every judge before 
entering upon his duties as such judge, and in any case not later than ten 
days after the date of his appointment or such later date as may be 
determined by the President.” 
 
Article 35.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The judges of the Supreme Court, the High Court and all other Courts 
established in pursuance of Article 34 hereof shall be appointed by the 
President.” 
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Article 35.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions 
and subject only to this Constitution and the law.” 
 
Article 35.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“A judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court shall not be removed 
from office except for stated misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only 
upon resolutions passed by Dáil Éireann and by Seanad Éireann calling for 
his removal.” 
 
Article 35.5 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The remuneration of a judge shall not be reduced during his continuance 
in office.”   
 
Article 36 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Constitution relating to the 
Courts, the following matters shall be regulated in accordance with law, 
that is to say:– 
 
i. the number of judges of the Supreme Court, and of the High Court, 
the remuneration, age of retirement and pensions of such judges, 
ii. the number of the judges of all other Courts, and their terms of 
appointment, and 
iii. the constitution and organization of the said Courts, the distribution 
of jurisdiction and business among the said Courts and judges, and 
all matters of procedure.” 
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Article 40.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. 
This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have 
due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social 
function.” 
 
Article 40.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.” 
 
Article 40.3.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust 
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good 
name, and property rights of every citizen.” 
 
Article 40.3.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to 
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that 
right. 
 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and 
another state. 
 
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the 
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information 
relating to services lawfully available in another state.” 
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Article 41.1.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental 
unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.” 
 
Article 41.1.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State, therefore, guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution 
and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to 
the welfare of the Nation and the State.”  
 
Article 41.2.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, woman 
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be 
achieved.”  
 
Article 41.2.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their 
duties in the home.” 
 
Article 41.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates:  
“The State pledges itself to guard with special care the institution of 
Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack.” 
 
 363 
Article 41.3.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“A Court designated by law may grant a dissolution of marriage where, but 
only where, it is satisfied that – 
 
i. at the date of the institution of the proceedings, the spouses have 
lived apart from one another for a period of, or periods amounting to, 
at least four years during the previous five years, 
ii. there is no reasonable prospect of a reconciliation between the 
spouses, 
iii. such provision as the Court considers proper having regard to the 
circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses, any children of 
either or both of them and any other person prescribed by law, and 
iv. any further conditions prescribed by law are complied with.” 
 
Article 41.3.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“No person whose marriage has been dissolved under the civil law of any 
other State but is a subsisting valid marriage under the law for the time 
being in force within the jurisdiction of the Government and Parliament 
established by this Constitution shall be capable of contracting a valid 
marriage within that jurisdiction during the lifetime of the other party to the 
marriage so dissolved.” 
 
Article 42.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child 
is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of 
parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, 
intellectual, physical and social education of their children.” 
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Article 43.1.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State acknowledges that man, in virtue of his rational being, has the 
natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of 
external goods.” 
 
Article 43.1.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State accordingly guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish the 
right of private ownership or the general right to transfer, bequeath, and 
inherit property.” 
 
Article 45 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The principles of social policy set forth in this Article are intended for the 
general guidance of the Oireachtas. The application of those principles in 
the making of laws shall be the care of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall 
not be cognisable by any Court under any of the provisions of this 
Constitution.” 
 
Article 45.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the whole people by 
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which 
justice and charity shall inform all the institutions of the national life.” 
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Article 45.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:– 
i. That the citizens (all of whom, men and women equally, have the 
right to an adequate means of livelihood) may through their 
occupations find the means of making reasonable provision for their 
domestic needs. 
ii. That the ownership and control of the material resources of the 
community may be so distributed amongst private individuals and 
the various classes as best to subserve the common good. 
iii. That, especially, the operation of free competition shall not be 
allowed so to develop as to result in the concentration of the 
ownership or control of essential commodities in a few individuals to 
the common detriment. 
iv. That in what pertains to the control of credit the constant and 
predominant aim shall be the welfare of the people as a whole. 
v. That there may be established on the land in economic security as 
many families as in the circumstances shall be practicable.” 
 
Article 45.4.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State pledges itself to safeguard with especial care the economic 
interests of the weaker sections of the community, and, where necessary, to 
contribute to the support of the infirm, the widow, the orphan, and the 
aged.” 
 
Article 45.4.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The State shall endeavour to ensure that the strength and health of 
workers, men and women, and the tender age of children shall not be 
abused and that citizens shall not be forced by economic necessity to enter 
avocations unsuited to their sex, age or strength.” 
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Article 46.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of 
variation, addition, or repeal, in the manner provided by this Article.” 
 
Article 46.2 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every proposal for an amendment of this Constitution shall be initiated in 
Dáil Éireann as a Bill, and shall upon having been passed or deemed to 
have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, be submitted by 
Referendum to the decision of the people in accordance with the law for the 
time being in force relating to the Referendum.” 
 
Article 46.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every such Bill shall be expressed to be “An Act to amend the 
Constitution”.” 
 
Article 46.4 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“A Bill containing a proposal or proposals for the amendment of this 
Constitution shall not contain any other proposal.” 
 
Article 46.5 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“A Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this Constitution shall 
be signed by the President forthwith upon his being satisfied that the 
provisions of this Article have been complied with in respect thereof and 
that such proposal has been duly approved by the people in accordance 
with the provisions of section 1 of Article 47 of this Constitution and shall 
be duly promulgated by the President as a law.” 
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Article 47.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Every proposal for an amendment of this Constitution which is submitted 
by Referendum to the decision of the people shall, for the purpose of 
Article 46 of this Constitution, be held to have been approved by the 
people, if, upon having been so submitted, a majority of the votes cast at 
such Referendum shall have been cast in favour of its enactment into law.” 
 
Article 48 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“The Constitution of Saorstát Éireann in force immediately prior to the date 
of the coming into operation of this Constitution and the Constitution of the 
Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) Act, 1922, in so far as that Act or any 
provision thereof is then in force shall be and are hereby repealed as on and 
from that date.” 
 
Article 50.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) stipulates: 
“Subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not 
inconsistent therewith, the laws in force in Saorstát Éireann immediately 
prior to the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution shall 
continue to be of full force and effect until the same or any of them shall 
have been repealed or amended by enactment of the Oireachtas.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) 
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Appendix II 
 
Miscellaneous Legislation 
 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and 
Ireland relating to Offences against the Person. 
 
Section 57 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 stipulates: 
 
“Whosoever, being married, shall marry any other Person during the Life 
of the former Husband or Wife, whether the Second Marriage shall have 
taken place in England or Ireland or elsewhere, shall be guilty of Felony, 
and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, 
to be kept in Penal Servitude for any Term not exceeding Seven Years and 
not less than Three Years, - or to be imprisoned for any Term not 
exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour; and any such Offence 
may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in any 
County or place in England or Ireland where the Offender shall be 
apprehended or be in Custody, in the same Manner in all respects as if the 
Offence had been actually committed in that County or Place : Provided 
that nothing in this Section contained shall extend to any Second Marriage 
contracted elsewhere than in England and Ireland by any other than a 
Subject of Her Majesty, or to any Person marrying a Second Time whose 
Husband or Wife shall have been continually absent from such Person for 
the Space of Seven Years then last past, and shall not have been known by 
such Person to be living within that Time, or shall extend to any Person 
who, at the Time of such Second Marriage, shall have been divorced from 
the Bond of the First Marriage, or to any Person whose former Marriage 
shall have been declared void by the Sentence of any Court of competent 
Jurisdiction.” 
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Section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 stipulates: 
 
“Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable Crime of Buggery, 
committed either with Mankind or with any Animal, shall be liable, at the 
Discretion of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for any 
Term not less than Ten Years.” 
 
 
Section 62 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 stipulates: 
 
“Whosoever shall attempt to commit the said abominable Crime, or shall 
be guilty of any Assault with Intent to commit the same, or of any indecent 
Assault upon any Male Person, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor, and being 
convicted thereof shall be liable, at the Discretion of the Court, to be kept 
in Penal Servitude for any Term not exceeding Ten Years and not less than 
Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, 
with or without Hard Labour.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/legis/num_act/1861/ukpga_18610100_en.html 
(Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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An Act to make further provision for the Protection of Women and 
Girls, the suppression of brothels, and other purposes.  
 
Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 stipulates: 
 
“Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the 
commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any 
male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at 
the discretion of the court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two 
years, with or without hard labour.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from: http://www.bailii.org (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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An Act to Prohibit Incitement to Hatred on account of Race, Religion, 
Nationality or Sexual Orientation.  
 
Section 1.1 of the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act, 1989 
stipulates:  
 
“… “hatred” means hatred against a group of persons in the State or 
elsewhere on account of their race, colour, nationality, religion, ethnic or 
national origins, membership of the travelling community or sexual 
orientation; …” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from: http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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An Act to amend and extend the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 and 
1991, and to provide for related matters.  
 
Section 1.1 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993 stipulates:  
 
“In this Act “the Principal Act” means the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977.” 
 
 
Section 5 of the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act, 1993 stipulates: 
 
“Section 6 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by – 
(a) the substitution in subsection (2) of the following paragraphs for 
paragraph (e): 
“   (e) the race, colour or sexual orientation of the employee, 
   (ee) the age of the employee, 
 (eee) the employee’s membership of the travelling community,”…” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available from: http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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An Act to make further provision for the promotion of equality 
between employed persons; to make further provision with respect to 
discrimination in, and in connection with, employment, vocational 
training and membership of certain bodies; to make further provision 
in connection with Council Directive No. 75/117/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the 
application of the principle of equal pay for men and women and 
Council Directive No. 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions; to make further provision with respect to harassment in 
employment and in the workplace; to change the name and 
constitution of the Employment Equality Agency and provide for the 
administration by that body of various matters pertaining to this Act; 
to establish procedures for the investigation and remedying of various 
matters arising under this Act; to repeal the Anti-discrimination (Pay) 
Act, 1974, and the Employment Equality Act, 1977, and to provide for 
related matters. 
 
Section 6.1 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 stipulates: 
 
“For the purposes of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur where, 
on any of the grounds in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as “the 
discriminatory grounds”), one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated.” 
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Section 6.2 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 stipulates: 
 
“As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the 
descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are – 
(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as 
“the gender ground”),  
(b) that they are of different marital status (in this Act referred to as “the 
marital status ground”), 
(c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred 
to as “the family status ground”), 
(d) that they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as 
“the sexual orientation ground”), 
(e) that one has a different religious belief from the other, or that one 
has a religious belief and the other has not (in this Act referred to as 
“the religion ground”), 
(f) that they are of different ages, but subject to subsection (3) (in this 
Act referred to as “the age ground”), 
(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a 
person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the 
disability ground”),  
(h) that they are of different race, colour, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins (in this Act referred to as “the ground of race”), 
(i) that one is a member of the traveller community and the other is not 
(in this Act referred to as “the traveller community ground”).”   
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Section 37.1 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 stipulates: 
 
“A religious, educational or medical institution which is under the direction 
or control of a body established for religious purposes or whose objectives 
include the provision of services in an environment which promotes certain 
religious values shall not be taken to discriminate against a person for the 
purposes of this Part or Part II if – 
(a) it gives more favourable treatment, on the religion ground, to an 
employee or a prospective employee over that person where it is 
reasonable to do so in order to maintain the religious ethos of the 
institution, or 
(b) it takes action which is reasonably necessary to prevent an employee 
or a prospective employee from undermining the religious ethos of 
the institution.” 
 
 
Section 38.1 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 stipulates: 
 
“The Employment Equality Agency established by section 34 of the 
Employment Equality Act, 1977, shall continue as a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and power to sue and be sued in its corporate name 
and to acquire, hold and dispose of land and on and after the coming into 
operation of this section shall be known as An tÚdarás Comhionannais or, 
in the English language, the Equality Authority, and references in any 
enactment or other document to the Employment Equality Agency shall be 
construed accordingly.”  
 
 
 
Available from: http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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An Act to provide for the reorganisation, modernisation and naming of 
the system (to be known as the Civil Registration Service or, in the 
Irish language, an tSeirbhís um Chlárú Sibhialta) of registration of 
births, still-births, adoptions, marriages and deaths (including certain 
births and deaths occurring outside the state), to provide for the 
extension of the system to decrees of divorce and decrees of nullity of 
marriage and for those purposes to revise the law relating to the 
system, to amend the law relating to marriages and to provide for 
related matters. 
 
Section 2.2 of the Civil Registration Act, 2004 stipulates: 
 
“For the purposes of this Act there is an impediment to a marriage if –  
(a) the marriage would be void by virtue of the Marriage Act 1835 as 
amended by the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Acts 
1907 and 1921,  
(b) one of the parties to the marriage is, or both are, already married, 
(c) one or both, of the parties to the intended marriage will be under the 
age of 18 years on the date of solemnisation of the intended marriage 
and an exemption from the application of section 31(1)(a) of the 
Family Law Act 1995 in relation to the marriage was not granted 
under section 33 of that Act,  
(d) the marriage would be void by virtue of the Marriage of Lunatics Act 
1811, or 
(e) both parties are of the same sex.” 
 
 
 
 
Available from: http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
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Appendix III 
 
Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) 
 
Airteagal 40.3.1 
“Ráthaíonn an Stát gan cur isteach lena dhlíthe ar chearta pearsanta aon 
saoránaigh, agus ráthaíonn fós na cearta sin a chosaint is a shuíomh lena 
dhlíthe sa mhéid gur féidir é.” 
 
Airteagal 41.1.1 
“Admhaíonn an Stát gurb é an Teaghlach is buíon-aonad príomha bunaidh 
don chomh-dhaonnacht de réir nádúir, agus gur foras morálta é ag a bhfuil 
cearta doshannta dochloíte is ársa agus is airde ná aon reacht daonna.”  
 
Airteagal 41.3.1 
“Ós ar an bPósadh atá an Teaghlach bunaithe gabhann an Stát air féin 
coimirce faoi leith a dhéanamh ar ord an phósta agus é a chosaint ar 
ionsaí.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937) 
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Appendix IV 
 
Central Statistics Office: Census 2011 
 
Question 5: What is your current marital status? 
Answer if aged 15 years or over. 
Mark one box only. 
 
1. Single (never married) 
2. Married (first marriage) 
3. Re-married (following widowhood) 
4. Re-married (following divorce/annulment) 
5. Separated (including deserted) 
6. Divorced 
7. Widowed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office (2011) 
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Appendix V 
 
Defense of Marriage Act, 1996 
 
“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
“spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.” 
 
Pub. L. 104-199, sec. 1, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996), codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (1997). 
 
 
“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim 
arising from such relationship.” 
 
Pub. L. 104-199, sec. 2, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996), codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alliance Defense Fund (2008) 
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Appendix VI 
 
19
th
, 20
th
 and 21
st
 Century Marriage Laws 
 
Marriage Act. 31
st
 August 1835. 
 
Marriages (Ireland) Act. 1844.  
 
Marriages (Ireland) Act. 1846. 
 
Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act. 1863. 
 
Registration of Marriages (Ireland) Act. 1863.  
 
Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act. 1870. 
 
Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act. 1871. 
 
Marriage Law (Ireland) Amendment Act. 1873. 
 
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act. 1907. 
 
Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act. 1921. 
 
Registration of Marriages Act. No. 35. 24
th
 July 1936. 
 
Marriages Act. No. 47. 27
th
 November 1936. 
 
Vital Statistics and Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act. No. 8. 
10
th
 June 1952. 
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Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act. No. 25. 29
th
 November 
1972. 
 
Marriages Act. No. 30. 20
th
 December 1972. 
 
Domicile and Recognition of Foreign Divorces Act. No. 24. 2
nd
 July 1986. 
 
Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act. No. 6. 19
th
 April 1989. 
 
Family Law Act. No. 26. 2
nd
 October 1995. 
 
Family Law (Divorce) Act. No. 33. 27
th
 November 1996. 
 
Civil Registration Act. No. 3. 27
th
 February 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  
Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs (2004b)
274
  
Select Committee on Social and Family Affairs (2004c)
275
  
http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
http://www.bailii.org (Accessed 14
th
 May 2011) 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2003/3503/b35a03d.pdf  
(Accessed 28
th
 November 2012) 
                                           
274
 See Amendments 9 and 47. 
275
 See Amendments 74, 81, 135, 136, and 137. 
 382 
Appendix VII 
 
Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act, 
2010 
 
An Act to provide for the registration of civil partners and for the 
consequences of that registration, to provide for the rights and 
obligations of cohabitants and to provide for connected matters. 
 
Section 3 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of 
Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“For the purposes of this Act a civil partner is either of two persons of the 
same sex who are— 
(a) parties to a civil partnership registration that has not been 
dissolved or the subject of a decree of nullity, or 
(b) parties to a legal relationship of a class that is the subject of an 
order made under section 5 that has not been dissolved or the 
subject of a decree of nullity.” 
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Section 5.1 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“The Minister may, by order, declare that a class of legal relationship 
entered into by two parties of the same sex is entitled to be recognised as a 
civil partnership if under the law of the jurisdiction in which the legal 
relationship was entered into— 
(a) the relationship is exclusive in nature, 
(b) the relationship is permanent unless the parties dissolve it through the 
courts, 
(c) the relationship has been registered under the law of that jurisdiction, 
and 
(d) the rights and obligations attendant on the relationship are, in the 
opinion of the Minister, sufficient to indicate that the relationship would 
be treated comparably to a civil partnership.” 
 
 
Section 6 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of 
Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“In this Part, “Act of 2004” means the Civil Registration Act 2004.” 
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Section 7.1 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“Section 2(1) of the Act of 2004 is amended— 
(a) by inserting the following definitions: 
“ ‘Act of 2010’ means the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and 
Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010;  
‘civil partner’ has the meaning assigned to it by the Act of 2010; 
‘civil partnership registration’ means registration under section 59D; 
‘civil status’ means being single, married, separated, divorced, widowed, in 
a civil partnership or being a former civil partner in a civil partnership that 
has ended by death or been dissolved; 
‘dissolution’ means dissolution of a civil partnership under section 110 of 
the Act of 2010;”, …” 
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Section 7.3 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“Section 2 of the Act of 2004 is amended by inserting the following 
subsection after subsection (2): 
“(2A) For the purposes of this Act, there is an impediment to a civil 
partnership registration if— 
(a) the civil partnership would be void by virtue of the Third Schedule, 
(b) one of the parties to the intended civil partnership is, or both are, 
already party to a subsisting civil partnership, 
(c) one or both of the parties to the intended civil partnership will be under 
the age of 18 years on the date of the intended civil partnership 
registration, 
(d) one or both of the parties to the intended civil partnership does not give 
free and informed consent, 
(e) the parties are not of the same sex, or 
(f) one of the parties to the intended civil partnership is, or both are, 
married.”.” 
 
 
Section 27 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of 
Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“… “shared home” means— 
(a) subject to paragraph (b), a dwelling in which the civil partners 
ordinarily reside; and 
(b) in relation to a civil partner whose protection is in issue, the dwelling in 
which that civil partner ordinarily resides or, if he or she has left the 
other civil partner, in which he or she ordinarily resided before leaving.” 
 
 386 
Section 172 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Act, 2010 stipulates: 
 
“(1) For the purposes of this Part, a cohabitant is one of 2 adults (whether 
of the same or the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an 
intimate and committed relationship and who are not related to each 
other within the prohibited degrees of relationship or married to each 
other or civil partners of each other. 
(2) In determining whether or not 2 adults are cohabitants, the court shall 
take into account all the circumstances of the relationship and in 
particular shall have regard to the following: 
(a) the duration of the relationship; 
(b) the basis on which the couple live together; 
(c) the degree of financial dependence of either adult on the other and any 
agreements in respect of their finances; 
(d) the degree and nature of any financial arrangements between the adults 
including any joint purchase of an estate or interest in land or joint 
acquisition of personal property; 
(e) whether there are one or more dependent children; 
(f) whether one of the adults cares for and supports the children of the 
other; and 
(g) the degree to which the adults present themselves to others as a couple. 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt a relationship does not cease to be an 
intimate relationship for the purpose of this section merely because it is 
no longer sexual in nature. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, 2 adults are within a prohibited degree 
of relationship if— 
(a) they would be prohibited from marrying each other in the State, or 
(b) they are in a relationship referred to in the Third Schedule to the Civil 
Registration Act 2004 inserted by section 26 of this Act. 
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(5) For the purposes of this Part, a qualified cohabitant means an adult who 
was in a relationship of cohabitation with another adult and who, 
immediately before the time that that relationship ended, whether 
through death or otherwise, was living with the other adult as a couple 
for a period— 
(a) of 2 years or more, in the case where they are the parents of one or more 
dependent children, and 
(b) of 5 years or more, in any other case. 
(6) Notwithstanding subsection (5), an adult who would otherwise be a 
qualified cohabitant is not a qualified cohabitant if— 
(a) one or both of the adults is or was, at any time during the relationship 
concerned, an adult who was married to someone else, and 
(b) at the time the relationship concerned ends, each adult who is or was 
married has not lived apart from his or her spouse for a period or 
periods of at least 4 years during the previous 5 years.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://acts.oireachtas.ie (Accessed 20
th
 May 2011) 
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Appendix VIII 
 
Working Group on Domestic Partnership (2006) 
 
“The Working Group on Domestic Partnership was established by Mr 
Michael McDowell T.D., Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in 
late March 2006. In establishing the Working Group, the Minister set down 
the following challenging task: 
 
“The Group is charged with preparing an Options Paper on Domestic 
Partnership for presentation to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform by 20 October 2006, within the following terms of reference:  
(i) to consider the categories of partnerships and relationships 
outside of marriage to which legal effect and recognition might 
be accorded, consistent with Constitutional provisions, and  
(ii) to identify options as to how and to what extent legal recognition 
could be given to those alternative forms of partnership, 
including partnerships entered into outside the State. 
The Group is to take into account models in place in other countries.”” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Working Group on Domestic Partnership (2006, p.2) 
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Appendix IX 
 
European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
 
An Act to enable further effect to be given, subject to the Constitution, 
to certain provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms done at Rome on the 4
th
 day of 
November 1950 and certain protocols thereto, to amend the Human 
Rights Commission Act 2000 and to provide for related matters. 
 
Section 2.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates: 
 
“In interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court 
shall, in so far as is possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such 
interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the 
State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.” 
 
 
Section 2.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates: 
 
“This section applies to any statutory provision or rule of law in force 
immediately before the passing of this Act or any such provision coming 
into force thereafter.” 
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Section 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates: 
 
“Judicial notice shall be taken of the Convention provisions and of—  
(a) any declaration, decision, advisory opinion or judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights established under the Convention 
on any question in respect of which that Court has jurisdiction,  
(b) any decision or opinion of the European Commission of Human 
Rights so established on any question in respect of which it had 
jurisdiction,  
(c) any decision of the Committee of Ministers established under the 
Statute of the Council of Europe on any question in respect of which 
it has jurisdiction,  
and a court shall, when interpreting and applying the Convention 
provisions, take due account of the principles laid down by those 
declarations, decisions, advisory opinions, opinions and judgments.” 
 
 
Section 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates:  
 
“In any proceedings, the High Court, or the Supreme Court when 
exercising its appellate jurisdiction, may, having regard to the provisions of 
section 2, on application to it in that behalf by a party, or of its own motion, 
and where no other legal remedy is adequate and available, make a 
declaration (referred to in this Act as ‘‘a declaration of incompatibility’’) 
that a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the State’s 
obligations under the Convention provisions.” 
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Section 5.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates:  
 
“A declaration of incompatibility—  
(a) shall not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of 
the statutory provision or rule of law in respect of which it is made, 
and  
(b) shall not prevent a party to the proceedings concerned from making 
submissions or representations in relation to matters to which the 
declaration relates in any proceedings before the European Court of 
Human Rights.” 
 
 
Section 5.3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates:   
 
“The Taoiseach shall cause a copy of any order containing a declaration of 
incompatibility to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas within the 
next 21 days on which that House has sat after the making of the order.” 
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Section 5.4 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates:   
 
“Where— 
(a) a declaration of incompatibility is made,  
(b) a party to the proceedings concerned makes an application in writing 
to the Attorney General for compensation in respect of an injury or 
loss or damage suffered by him or her as a result of the 
incompatibility concerned, and 
(c) the Government, in their discretion, consider that it may be 
appropriate to make an ex gratia payment of compensation to that 
party (‘‘a payment’’), 
the Government may request an adviser appointed by them to advise them 
as to the amount of such compensation (if any) and may, in their discretion, 
make a payment of the amount aforesaid or of such other amount as they 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.” 
 
 
Section 5.5 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 
stipulates: 
  
“In advising the Government on the amount of compensation for the 
purposes of subsection (4), an adviser shall take appropriate account of the 
principles and practice applied by the European Court of Human Rights in 
relation to affording just satisfaction to an injured party under Article 41 of 
the Convention.” 
 
Available from: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2003/a2003.pdf  
(Accessed 30
th
 September 2011) 
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates: 
 
“Right to respect for private and family life  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety 
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates:  
 
“Right to marry  
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.” 
 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates:  
 
“Prohibition of discrimination  
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 
 
Source: Registry of the European Court of Human Rights (2010) 
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Appendix X 
 
American Academy of Pediatrics (2002) 
 
“A growing body of scientific literature demonstrates that children who 
grow up with 1 or 2 gay and/or lesbian parents fare as well in emotional, 
cognitive, social, and sexual functioning as do children whose parents are 
heterosexual. Children’s optimal development seems to be influenced more 
by the nature of the relationships and interactions within the family unit 
than by the particular structural form it takes.” 
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“The gender identity of preadolescent children raised by lesbian mothers 
has been found consistently to be in line with their biologic sex. None of 
the more than 300 children studied to date have shown evidence of gender 
identity confusion, wished to be the other sex, or consistently engaged in 
cross-gender behavior. […] No differences have been found in the gender 
identity, social roles, or sexual orientation of adults who had a divorced 
homosexual parent (or parents), compared with those who had divorced 
heterosexual parents. Similar proportions of young adults who had 
homosexual parents and those who had heterosexual parents have reported 
feelings of attraction toward someone of the same sex. Compared with 
young adults who had heterosexual mothers, men and women who had 
lesbian mothers were slightly more likely to consider the possibility of 
having a same-sex partner, and more of them had been involved in at least 
a brief relationship with someone of the same sex, but in each group similar 
proportions of adult men and women identified themselves as homosexual. 
[…] Several studies comparing children who have a lesbian mother with 
children who have a heterosexual mother have failed to document any 
differences between such groups on personality measures, measures of peer 
group relationships, self-esteem, behavioral difficulties, academic success, 
or warmth and quality of family relationships.”     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: American Academy of Pediatrics (2002, pp.341-342) 
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Appendix XI 
 
Green et al (1986) 
 
Excerpt I 
 
“This paper reports results of a study designed to assess aspects of the 
psychosexual and psychosocial development of prepubescent children 
living with their mothers, with the independent variable being the mother’s 
sexual orientation. Data from a group of 50 currently homosexual women 
and their 56 children, ages 3 to 11, were compared with data from a 
matched group of 40 heterosexual women and their 48 children. […] This 
research project assessed the effects on children’s sexual identity 
development of living in a father-absent household with either a 
heterosexual or a homosexual mother. Heterosexual mothers, also divorced, 
and without adult males living in the home, were selected as a control 
group for the homosexual mother households so that the effects on children 
of divorce and/or father absence could be balanced between the two family 
groups.” 
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Excerpt II 
 
“The samples were two matched groups of currently unmarried women 
living with at least one child between the ages of 3 and 11 years. The 
homosexual sample was recruited from volunteers who contacted the 
research team after learning about the study from national and local 
women’s groups or through friendship networks. Research efforts were 
concentrated in 10 states within reasonable traveling distance for the 
researchers (Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin). All volunteers within a 
geographic area were accepted if they met the study criteria. The criteria 
were (1) currently unmarried, (2) legal custodian of at least one child 
between 3 and 11 years, (3) currently self-identified as a lesbian, and (4) no 
adult male living in the household for at least 2 years. The heterosexual 
sample was collected from approximately 900 responses to requests for 
single-mother subjects. […] They had been living as single parents for at 
least 2 years with a mean of 4.0 years. While the majority (82% of 
homosexuals and 90% of heterosexuals) were separated or divorced, three 
homosexual women were widowed and 10% of both samples had never 
married. […] When asked to describe their present sexual orientation, all 
women in one group labeled themselves lesbian, while none in the other 
group were so identified.” 
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Excerpt III 
 
“Current relationships and living situations differed for the two groups. 
Thirty-nine lesbian mothers and four heterosexual mothers indicated that 
other adults were living in their household besides themselves and their 
children. For 28 of the lesbians, these were partners with whom they had a 
sexual relationship. For 11 other lesbians these were female roommates 
who were not sexual partners. One of the heterosexual mothers had a 
female roommate and three had a relative, usually a sister or mother.” 
 
 
Excerpt IV 
 
“Some of the lesbian mothers had divorced prior to acknowledging a 
homosexual preference. In eight of the lesbian mothers’ divorce 
proceedings sexual preference was an issue, and for seven of the lesbian 
mothers it was an issue in establishing child custody.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Green et al (1986, p.168, p.169, p.172, and p.173) 
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Appendix XII 
 
Justice Sosman: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
 
“Based on our own philosophy of child rearing, and on our observations of 
the children being raised by same-sex couples to whom we are personally 
close, we may be of the view that what matters to children is not the 
gender, or sexual orientation, or even the number of the adults who raise 
them, but rather whether those adults provide the children with a nurturing, 
stable, safe, consistent, and supportive environment in which to mature. 
Same-sex couples can provide their children with the requisite nurturing, 
stable, safe, consistent, and supportive environment in which to mature, 
just as opposite-sex couples do. It is therefore understandable that the court 
might view the traditional definition of marriage as an unnecessary 
anachronism, rooted in historical prejudices that modern society has in 
large measure rejected and biological limitations that modern science has 
overcome.  
 
It is not, however, our assessment that matters. Conspicuously absent from 
the court’s opinion today is any acknowledgment that the attempts at 
scientific study of the ramifications of raising children in same-sex couple 
households are themselves in their infancy and have so far produced 
inconclusive and conflicting results. Notwithstanding our belief that gender 
and sexual orientation of parents should not matter to the success of the 
child rearing venture, studies to date reveal that there are still some 
observable differences between children raised by opposite-sex couples and 
children raised by same-sex couples. … Interpretation of the data gathered 
by those studies then becomes clouded by the personal and political beliefs 
of the investigators, both as to whether the differences identified are 
positive or negative, and as to the untested explanations of what might 
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account for those differences. (This is hardly the first time in history that 
the ostensible steel of the scientific method has melted and buckled under 
the intense heat of political and religious passions.) Even in the absence of 
bias or political agenda behind the various studies of children raised by 
same-sex couples, the most neutral and strict application of scientific 
principles to this field would be constrained by the limited period of 
observation that has been available. Gay and lesbian couples living together 
openly, and official recognition of them as their children’s sole parents, 
comprise a very recent phenomenon, and the recency of that phenomenon 
has not yet permitted any study of how those children fare as adults and at 
best minimal study of how they fare during their adolescent years. The 
Legislature can rationally view the state of the scientific evidence as 
unsettled on the critical question it now faces: Are families headed by 
same-sex parents equally successful in rearing children from infancy to 
adulthood as families headed by parents of opposite sexes? Our belief that 
children raised by same-sex couples should fare the same as children raised 
in traditional families is just that: a passionately held but utterly untested 
belief. The Legislature is not required to share that belief but may, as the 
creator of the institution of civil marriage, wish to see the proof before 
making a fundamental alternation to that institution.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goodridge v. Department of Public Health  
(see [2003] Mass. 440, paras. 309-395 at paras. 358-359) 
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Appendix XIII 
 
Anderssen et al (2002) 
 
“Twenty-three empirical studies published between 1978 and 2000 on 
nonclinical children raised by lesbian mothers or gay fathers were reviewed 
(one Belgian/Dutch, one Danish, three British, and 18 North American). 
Twenty reported on offspring of lesbian mothers, and three on offspring of 
gay fathers. The studies encompassed a total of 615 offspring (age range 
1.5 – 44 years) of lesbian mothers or gay fathers and 387 controls, who 
were assessed by psychological tests, questionnaires or interviews. Seven 
types of outcomes were found to be typical: emotional functioning, sexual 
preference, stigmatization, gender role behavior, behavioral adjustment, 
gender identity, and cognitive functioning. Children raised by lesbian 
mothers or gay fathers did not systematically differ from other children on 
any of the outcomes. The studies indicate that children raised by lesbian 
women do not experience adverse outcomes compared with other children. 
The same holds for children raised by gay men, but more studies should be 
done.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Anderssen et al (2002, p.335) 
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Appendix XIV 
 
Miller (1979) 
 
“Fathers interviewed tended to show little anxiety about their children’s 
eventual orientation. One openly-gay respondent said: 
My straight parents failed to make me straight, so there’s no reason to 
believe I’d succeed in doing the reverse with [my son] even if I wanted to. 
He will be whatever he is. Gay or straight is okay as long as he’s happy. I’ll 
love him. Relatives will blame me if he’s gay and say it’s a miracle if he’s 
straight. Either way they’ll give me no credit, so I’ve stopped worrying 
about it.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Miller (1979, p.547) 
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Appendix XVI 
 
Nock (2001) 
 
“But the authors note that 78% of the lesbians, but only 10% of the 
heterosexual mothers had partners living in the household. Clearly, even if 
no other differences existed, this simple and enormous difference 
invalidates any comparison between the groups without appropriate 
statistical controls.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nock (2001, pp.60-61) 
